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EXPERT ADVICE AS 
TOOL OF FOREIGN AID 
Foreign aid has been subject to critique continuously for quite some time, not 
least by individuals who have been involved in formulating and executing 
policies and programmes. William Easterly, a former World Bank economist and 
now professor at New York University, published a book with the provocative 
title The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the 
Poor. Therein, he condemns aid agencies for maintaining the ‘technocratic 
illusion’ that expertise will solve the problems of the developing world; in his 
view, the advice of technocrats has helped to oppress people rather than to free 
them from poverty (Easterly 2013). While certainly taking one of the strongest 
positions, Easterly has not been the first critic of expert advice as a tool of 
development aid. Doubts about the impact of expert support were broached 
early on. Already in 1968, an economist at Washington State University 
published an article ‘Why Overseas Technical Assistance is Ineffective’ (Loomis 
1968). In 1989, Richard Jolly, at that time Assistant Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, stated that “the vast bulk of technical experts and expertise at 
present provided by the UN and donor system has outlived their usefulness” 
(Jolly 1989:  21). A few years later, Edward VK Jaycox, the World Bank’s 
former vice-president for Africa, described the use of expatriate advisors as “a 
systematic destructive force which is undermining the development of capacity 
in Africa” (Jaycox 1993). 
The aid community has reacted to the persistent critique of one of its main 
devices by routinely commissioning studies on the impact of technical assistance 
under which expert advice is commonly subsumed.1 Though varying in terms 
1 See, for instance, Forss et al. (1988); Berg (1993); Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway & 
Asplan Analyse (1994); Williams et al. (2003); World Bank (2005a); DFID (2006); ECDPM & ACE 
Europe (2006); Land (2007); JICA (2008); OECD (2008); World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group (2008); Morgan (2010).
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of focus, scope and methodology, many of these evaluations yielded similar 
findings; to give just a few examples: 
Looking at the 900 man years of assistance we must conclude that the 
institutional framework that should lead to a transfer of knowledge was 
non-existent or crippled. (Forss et al. 1988: ii) 
Technical cooperation has not produced the national capacity necessary for 
self-reliance. (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway & Asplan 
Analyse 1994: 9) 
A significant proportion of current technical assistance is ineffective (…). 
(Greenhill 2006: 24)
It is only in a minority of the cases reviewed that a capacity development 
impact can be identified. (DFID 2006: xiv)
Almost without exception the reports share the same circular structure: the 
identification of obstacles which impeded ‘capacity-building’ is followed by 
recommendations on how to improve the practice of technical assistance in 
order to increase its ‘effectiveness’ in future. 
We refrain from following this pattern considering the problems of aid to 
be merely flaws of implementation. Rather, we see them to be fundamental 
in nature, pertaining to the structural complexities of knowledge transfer to 
young democracies as such. They concern issues of legitimacy and sovereignty 
on the recipients’ side, interacting with vested interests and domestic political 
dependencies on the donors’ side. Despite all rhetoric of ‘partnership’, aid 
relations are subject to intrinsic constraints that thwart the claimed objective 
of foreign support, namely helping recipients to become self-reliant. Quite the 
contrary, the persistent interference by outside actors in our view undermines 
the development of young into strong democracies as it puts governments at 
risk of losing control over their own policy agendas.
Various scholars in political science, international relations and development 
studies have demonstrated that donors continue to exert significant influence 
on policy decisions in recipient states, even though aid ‘conditionality’ has 
formally been abandoned in the post-structural adjustment era.2 The new 
emphasis on national ‘leadership’ and ‘ownership’, many argue, makes 
things worse since it overplays the agency of beneficiaries, while masking 
2 See, for instance, Helleiner (2000); Gould & Ojanen (2003); Harrison (2004); Wangwe (2004); 
Dijkstra (2005); Holtom (2007); Pender (2007); Mkandawire (2010); Ear (2013).
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the pervasive involvement of external funders. Focusing particularly on 
the World Bank’s role in Africa, Harrison (2004: 88) has shown how the 
innovation of mechanisms such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)3 
and Sector-wide Approaches (SWAps)4 has legitimated “intense and routine 
donor involvement” in recipient countries’ policy space. Dijkstra (2005: 462), 
analysing the formulation processes of PRSPs in Bolivia, Honduras and 
Nicaragua, found that these were “written because donors want them to be 
written”, that the elected parliaments were barely involved, and that donor-
organised ‘dialogue’ with civil society served as a ‘cosmetic’ element rather 
than being a serious effort to enhance participation. Holtom (2007) and 
Pender (2007) came to a similar conclusion for the PRSP process in Tanzania. 
The latter inferred that the new ‘partnership’ with donors “involves more, 
not less, domination”  (Pender 2007: 117). In one of the most recent and 
comprehensive publications on contemporary aid and power relations, the 
authors examined to what extent aid-receiving governments in Africa have 
been able to retain control over their policy agendas, and why some have 
been more successful than others (Whitfield 2009b).5 The economic, political, 
ideological and institutional conditions of states were deemed decisive in this 
regard since they heavily influenced governments’ strategies for dealing with 
donors. While Whitfield and other authors investigated aid as a matter of 
negotiation, we look at it primarily as a problem of (imposed) expert advice 
which, as will be argued, invariably carries vested interests and perpetuates 
existing dependencies in donor-recipient relations. 
3 In 1999, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank made the formulation of Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers a requirement for multilateral debt relief under the Highly-Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and for access to concessional lending. In many aid-receiving 
countries, PRSPs have replaced earlier national development plans and have become governments’ 
overriding policy frameworks. 
4 In international aid circles, the concept of SWAps came up in the late 1990s when the traditional 
project approach was increasingly criticised for being donor driven and leading to duplication and 
fragmentation. This should be avoided by adopting a SWAp under which the recipient government 
takes the lead and owns a sector-wide programme which external partners jointly support. The 
Inter-Agency Group on Sector-wide Approaches and Development Cooperation, which elaborated 
the concept, defined a SWAp in the following way: “All significant funding for the sector supports a 
single sector policy and expenditure programme, under government leadership, adopting common 
approaches across the sector, and progressing towards relying on government procedures to 
disburse and account for all funds” (Foster et al. 2000: 1).
5 The research referred to above was carried out under the auspices of the Negotiating Aid project 
(2005–2007) based at the Global Economic Governance Programme, University of Oxford. The 
country studies included Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Zambia. Full findings have been published in Whitfield (2009b); central results are summarised in 
Whitfield and Fraser (2010). 
4
The Delusion of Knowledge Transfer
Aim and structure of the book
This book sets out to reveal the complexities of expert advice in the aid context 
and to assess its impact on policy-making in young democracies. To do so 
we carried out empirical research in South Africa and Tanzania, two African 
countries which over the past decades have received lavish donor support for 
system reforms in almost all fields of governance.6 The focus of this study is on 
the areas of education, health and environment on the grounds that (a) they 
are high on the development agendas of both countries; (b) they have been 
priority areas of external engagement; and (c) they rely on different types of 
expertise and ‘evidence’ for policy legitimation. By comparing different sectors 
in two different countries, both of which are comparatively young democracies 
but have very different economic strengths, we expected to find out (1) what 
are the complexities of knowledge transfer through foreign experts in general; 
and (2) what role structural conditions such as the political and administrative 
systems and economic wealth have in helping the recipients of outside aid in 
retaining control over their policy agendas. 
The book is structured as follows: Chapter  1 presents the theoretical 
framework. Unlike other studies we consolidate considerations from the theory 
of democracy and from the sociology of science, providing us with a unique 
perspective on the problems implied in knowledge transfer from Western to 
Southern countries. In Chapter 2 we give the reader an introduction to South 
Africa and Tanzania as sites of investigation; in Chapter 3 we briefly describe 
our research methodology and in Chapter 4 the actors and their interests in 
the aid business.
Chapter  5 dwells on the obstructive preconditions of expert advice in 
development assistance: the linkage between aid and politics, it will be argued, 
makes advice volatile, conditional and supply-oriented insofar as it becomes 
driven by shifting fads, legitimation and accountability pressures. Moreover, 
the chapter will show that structural flaws pertaining to the employment of 
external experts by donor agencies hamper knowledge transfer and ‘mutual’ 
learning. Beyond that, unequal relationships between actors in aid are 
reinforced through knowledge hierarchies that de-valuate experts in recipient 
countries, and increase the discursive power of agents working for international 
organisations.
The various constraints outlined in Chapter 5 explain why expert advice in 
the context of aid largely fails to achieve its main objective, namely to increase 
the capacity of recipients to an extent which would make them independent 
6 For a more detailed justification of South Africa and Tanzania as sites of empirical investigation, see 
Chapter 3. 
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from outside assistance. As a result, governments run the risk of ending up in 
a perpetual cycle of being advised by external experts who potentially (and 
illegitimately) gain significant influence in the policy space. Under which 
conditions recipients are able to defend their decision-making autonomy in 
such a setting will be analysed in Chapters 6 and 7.
Assessing South Africa’s and Tanzania’s relative strengths with respect to 
determining their own political agendas, we regard three factors decisive for 
dealing with external advice: financial resources, administrative capacity and 
the local knowledge base (i.e. scientific community). As outlined in Chapter 6, 
there are significant variations not only between the two countries, but also 
across the different sectors. Six case studies examine to what extent South 
Africa and Tanzania as recipients of aid have been able to retain their agenda-
setting control in the respective areas (Chapter 7). Starting with a brief outline 
of sectoral challenges, governance structures and donor presence, each case 
study provides detailed reconstructions of past and present policy processes, 
with a particular focus on how external experts were involved therein and 
to what degree they were able to shape decisions. Chapter 7 concludes with 
a synthesis of findings drawn from the comparative view on the empirical 
accounts.
Chapter 8 summarises the main results. Instead of concluding with 
suggestions as to how to make expert advice in development assistance more 
‘effective’, we offer some thoughts on what kind of support might better help 
young democracies to grow their own knowledge bases and, thus, to become 
truly independent from external expertise.
Normative assumptions and issues of terminology
Doing research and writing about aid means to enter a highly politicised terrain 
covered with ideological booby traps concerning terminology. Authors are 
easily pigeonholed not only on the basis of arguments, but also because of the 
wording they use.7 This is why a few remarks concerning the terminology and 
the scholarly perspective adopted in this book are in place. Our argumentation 
implies some normative assumptions drawn from political science. In line 
with Bickerton et al. (2007), we take it to be a core aspect of sovereignty that 
7 Easterly (2013: 12–13) pointed out the hazard of ‘code words’ for the perception of development 
writers by stating: “Mention markets and you are presumed to favor a world with zero government. 
Mention liberty too often and you are presumed to be in favor of some extreme right-wing ideology 
(…). If you mention colonialism, racism, or imperialism too often (…), you risk being seen as a leftist 
ideologue.”
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states govern themselves and define their own policies.8 A loss of control over 
the agenda amounts to a loss of democratic legitimacy.9 Therefore, we see the 
interference of external actors in the policy space of young democracies as 
highly problematic, irrespective of the intentions they may have.  
As to issues of terminology: we are aware that speaking about ‘local’ and 
‘foreign’ experts, or referring to ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’ implies a generalisation 
which in a way oversimplifies reality and disregards contextual differences. 
Post-structuralist scholars would further criticise, commenting that by using 
such notions we reproduce the hierarchical classifications and unequal power 
relations which are objects of our study, and would not be satisfied with the 
defence that this is far from our intention.10 In fact, we agree with Ziai (2011: 2) 
that “it makes a fundamental difference whether we describe reality in one 
way or another”. Being conscious about the significance of language, it is also 
true that language alone does not change political realities. If we deliberately 
draw on a rather conventional vocabulary in writing about aid, this is because 
the ‘reality’ we encountered was and still is characterised by asymmetries 
and boundaries. Replacing the conceptual pair of ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’ 
with alternative terms (as done, for instance, by Eriksson Baaz (2005) who 
substituted the latter with ‘partners’) would mask persisting dependencies 
instead of helping to reveal them. We also noted that although much wording 
in the written discourse on aid has changed, the actors affected on either side 
still resort to the ‘old’ terminology when giving account of their experiences. 
This is why we refrain from using alternative constructs which are seemingly 
more impartial but often remain vague and confusing. We hope to provide the 
reader with clear language, giving priority to precision over premature political 
correctness. 
8 In our view, Brown’s distinction between the sovereignty of a country and the control over its 
political agenda is splitting hairs. He argues that the loss of the latter, although not uncommon, 
does not entail loss of the former (Brown 2013). We disagree by regarding self-determination a 
fundamental device of sovereign states. 
9 Speaking about public control over the agenda as a fundamental requisite of democracy, Robert 
Dahl in an interview for the Annual Review of Political Science rhetorically asked: “If somebody else is 
controlling the agenda, what’s it all about?” (Dahl & Levi 2009: 5). 




TRANSFER TO YOUNG 
DEMOCRACIES:  
ISSUES OF LEGITIMACY, 
SOVEREIGNTY  
AND EFFICACY
The role of knowledge in democracy
Since the fathers of the American Constitution it has generally been accepted 
that knowledge, or rather education in general, is a safeguard for democracy. 
Education, and thus the acquisition of systematic knowledge, prevents (or is 
supposed to prevent) citizens from populist or ideological temptations and 
protects the political process from the irrationalities that come with them. 
The assumption underlying this model is that the citizens reach decisions and 
consensus through enlightened deliberation and, in the process, accommodate 
their respective interests with the factual possibilities (technical and material 
resources) to realise them. The counter model is the liberal pluralistic one. In 
this model decisions are reached among citizens whose interests are assumed to 
be fixed and which can only be accommodated by the search for compromise. 
These two different notions of democracy, if taken as the endpoints of a 
continuous spectrum, are to be found in a multitude of combinations. 
One dimension of the role of knowledge in democratic regimes concerns 
the degree of participation of the citizenry in decision-making. Here the 
spectrum reaches from the ‘mere’ choice of leadership, which is the rationale of 
‘representative’ parliamentary systems, to ‘direct’ participation. The federalists 
distrusted the wisdom of the electorate so much that they introduced an 
additional tier, the electoral college, that chooses the president and may, in 
the extreme case, contradict the popular vote. The Swiss democracy allows its 
citizens to decide ‘directly’ certain purportedly fundamental issues. At least in 
8
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the European democracies one may recently observe a somewhat strengthened 
movement towards more direct participation in reaction to an alienation of 
the citizenry from the ‘professionalised’ political class (Crouch 2005). But 
this movement is met with the well-known and justified warnings of populist 
decisions implied in direct participation which can only be avoided by having 
a layer of ‘representatives’. Central to these variants – although often implicit 
– is the role of knowledge, whether in terms of the general level of education 
and/or as the use of specialised technical advice by policy-makers. Given the 
quest for rational, informed decision-making, the latter has become a central 
tool of democratic rulers. The governance, administration and regulation of 
modern societies have become extremely complex; this has led to the discourse 
that policy-makers depend on academically trained specialists who provide 
expertise for the formulation and execution of policies. 
What is generally overlooked in such diagnoses is that this increased 
reliance on specialised (scientific) knowledge on the part of governments, 
at least insofar as they are democratic regimes, amounts to a shift toward 
technocracy. The more intense the alleged dependency of governments on 
scientific knowledge, the more pronounced the conflict between politicians 
and experts becomes. This conflict reaches deep into the fabric of democratic 
societies because it emanates from contradicting types of legitimacy: politicians 
are legitimated by popular vote and are supposed to represent the interests 
and preferences of their respective voters. Scientific experts are legitimated by 
their specialised knowledge, which is supposed to provide answers to factual 
problems. In other words, the logics of politics and science do not coincide; 
they may diverge and even be contradictory. 
All modern states have developed institutional arrangements to regulate 
the use of knowledge in the political process. These arrangements address, in 
various ways, the problem of the underlying conflict between governments’ 
dependency on knowledge, that is, its instrumental function, on the one hand, 
and the potential loss of control over decision-making to technocratic experts, 
on the other: 
Both variability and convergence can be seen as an expression of the 
potential threat that any advice poses to the legitimacy of governments 
and, likewise, that politicisation poses to the authority of scientists, i.e. the 
reciprocal interest to control the advisory process and outcome (…). All 
advisory bodies and their procedural rules are situated somewhere on a 
continuum whose endpoints are dominated by one or the other: dependence 
of the advisers and their politicisation on one hand, and independence or 
autonomy of the advisers and the technocratic shaping of politics on the 
other. (Lentsch & Weingart 2011: 10)
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The contradiction between expert knowledge and the political formation 
of opinion and decision-making has particular significance for ‘young 
democracies’ whose local science base is comparatively weak and in which, 
as a consequence, science-based policy advice is predominantly provided by 
foreign experts in the context of development aid. 11 
The role of knowledge in development aid 
Expert advice in the form of ‘technical assistance’ has been an instrument of 
foreign aid since its inception in the late 1940s/early 1950s when the attached 
system of international organisations came into being. In the aftermath of the 
Second World War, the United Nations was established with the aim “to promote 
social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”, and, therefore, 
“to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and 
social advancement of all peoples” (United Nations 1945). The then President 
of the United States, Harry Truman, in his 1949 inaugural address emphasised 
the need to participate in that machinery and provide assistance to countries 
in need as follows: 
[We] must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement 
and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the 
world are living in conditions approaching misery (…). For the first 
time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the 
suffering of these people.
The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of 
industrial and scientific techniques (...). I believe that we should make 
available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical 
knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. 
And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment 
in areas needing development. 
We invite other countries to pool their technological resources in this undertaking. 
Their contributions will be warmly welcomed. This should be a cooperative 
11 We use the term ‘young democracies’ for countries that experience a process of democratic 
transformation, irrespective of the year in which they have formally adopted ‘democracy’ as a 
form of government. This allows us to also include countries such as Tanzania, which turned from 
an authoritarian, socialist ‘one-party democracy’ into a multi-party democracy in 1995 and, since 
then, has undergone significant reform processes in all fields of governance.
10
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enterprise in which all nations work together through the United Nations 
and its specialized agencies whenever practicable. (Truman 1949)
The fourth point of Truman’s speech is cited in some length here since it points 
to essential elements of the discourse that was to shape the first decades of 
aid: on the one hand, a division of the world into ‘developed’ (i.e. prosperous, 
scientifically and technologically leading) and ‘underdeveloped’ (i.e. deficient, 
unprogressive) nations facing conditions of misery, whereby the latter were 
depicted as unable to end the suffering of their people without the ‘knowledge 
and skills’ of the former; on the other hand, the problem-solution, namely the 
transfer of capital, science and technology. On the grounds of this narrative, 
so-called ‘technical assistance’ became a major means of aid, complementing 
large investment and infrastructure projects designed and carried out by 
Western experts sent to the South to provide a ‘tech-fix’ to the ‘problems’ of 
supposedly impotent, needy societies. 
Although criticism of the technological and epistemic determinism 
underlying this practice was raised early on even by influential voices from 
within the system, the idea that donors would provide appropriate concepts and 
tools to trigger economic growth and development in recipient countries was 
upheld over decades (Cherlet 2014). During the 1980s, international financial 
institutions started to impose neoliberal policy reforms on borrowing states; the 
Washington Consensus of 1989 formally consolidated the hierarchical model 
of ‘donorship’ (Faul 2016: 188) enacted in the era of structural adjustment.
The 1990s paved the way for a discursive turn. In light of the detrimental 
effects of structural adjustment programmes on social and economic conditions 
in ‘beneficiary’ countries, the critique of the “top-down, authoritarian 
enterprise” (Ziai 2014: 9) of aid articulated in both development and academic 
circles could no longer be disregarded. The idea that the North could solve 
the problems of the South by exporting its expertise and technology seemed 
increasingly obsolete. The ‘knowledge for development’ agenda emerging in 
parallel to the upcoming partnership paradigm emphasised the need “to assess 
and adapt relevant policy and technical knowledge to local situations” (World 
Bank 1999c:  7), and to incorporate local knowledge into transformational 
processes. The new narrative highlighted “that local conditions matter for the 
success of programs, that people on the ground have the most knowledge 
of local conditions, and that the challenge of knowledge for development is 
to combine local knowledge with the wealth of experience from around the 
world” (World Bank 1999c: 14). 
The framing of aid relations and the role of knowledge therein has changed 
significantly over the past decades. The dichotomic rhetoric of the 20th 
century (developed versus underdeveloped, donors versus recipients) has 
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been replaced by a rhetoric of equality which pertains to decisional power 
and expertise alike. Hence, seminal documents such as the Busan Partnership 
Agreement endorsed in 2011 no longer speak of ‘technical assistance’ and 
knowledge transfer, but knowledge ‘exchange’ and ‘mutual learning’ (Fourth 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 2011). The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development adopted by world leaders in 2015 outlines a vision of ‘partners’ 
who aim to ‘share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources’ 
in a ‘spirit of strengthened global solidarity, focused in particular on the needs 
of the poorest and most vulnerable and with the participation of all countries, 
all stakeholders and all people’ (United Nations 2015).
The discursive shifts, however, have not (yet) substantially changed 
international cooperation – neither in terms of power relations nor with 
regard to the use of expertise. As Ziai (2014:  12) points out, aid agencies 
remain based on the assumption of “knowledge on social change which 
is universal in character and therefore applicable all over the world”. 
Consequently, ‘international’ experts continue to play a key part in the aid 
business, as administrators, policy advisors or ‘technical assistants’. While 
it is somehow assumed that they impart their knowledge and skills to local 
actors by their mere presence (see also Chapter 5), the reality of knowledge 
transfer, exchange, absorption and adaption is much more complicated than 
the World Bank’s optimistic (or cynical?) declaration that “knowledge is like 
light” and “can easily travel the world” suggests (World Bank 1999c: 1). In this 
book, we examine expert advice as an instrument of foreign aid. By doing so, 
the arrangements of advisory processes at the science–politics interface best 
serve as the model because only they reveal the complexities of the transfer 
of knowledge. Before we dwell on these complexities, we briefly discuss what 
kind of knowledge is at stake in the discourse on ‘development’. 
Differentiating ‘knowledges’
When in 1999 the World Bank issued its World Development Report and 
likewise UNESCO its ‘Declaration on science and the use of scientific knowledge’, 
both organisations addressed the inequality of knowledge between nations 
(UNESCO 1999; World Bank 1999c). The reference was primarily to scientific 
knowledge, even though the World Bank distinguished between scientific 
and technical knowledge, on the one hand, and knowledge about attributes, 
for example, the quality of goods, on the other. The assumption underlying 
these declarations is that scientific knowledge is a, if not the, crucial factor 
responsible for development identified with economic well-being (Weingart 
2006: 164). This assumption, whether true or not, is in line with the rhetoric of 
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the ‘knowledge society’ that has informed the science and innovation policies 
of Western countries, but has also been adopted by, for example, South Africa. 
One is tempted to conclude from the respective declarations that since the 
end of the last millennium the policies and programmes of donor countries 
toward ‘developing’ countries in general, and Africa in particular, would focus 
on (a) strengthening scientific knowledge production in these countries in 
order to attack the development problem at its roots instead of tampering with 
symptoms and (b) strengthening local knowledges and promoting constructive 
co-production of knowledge. Yet, the dominant approach used by aid agencies 
has been and continues to be to send advisors and consultants supposed to 
transfer and share their ‘expert knowledge’ with counterparts in recipient 
governments. 
Just as the framing of aid relations has changed over the last decades so has 
the understanding of knowledge as part of it. The ‘knowledge for development’ 
agenda brought the differentiation between Western scientific and local 
knowledge to the fore. This distinction among many other possible ones is 
most pertinent to the issues of ‘development’ and ‘knowledge transfer’.
The very term ‘knowledge’ is so vague as to allow many interpretations and 
associations of meanings and interests. If, as is here the case, the focus is on the 
relation between the North and the South, on development and aid, knowledge 
refers to Western scientific and technical knowledge, part of which – as alluded 
to in the World Bank statement – is economic and management knowledge. 
Given the global predominance of this type of knowledge, it is also associated 
with the supremacy of the West over the developing countries. At the same 
time, it is seen to be superior to the ‘local’ knowledge that is to be found in 
the ‘developing countries’, not least because by definition science is global 
and purportedly not specific to and dependent on particular cultural contexts 
(Agrawal 1995). But ‘local knowledge’ is an equally vague concept that has 
become associated with romantic idealisations and misguided expectations, 
although it has also given rise to concrete policies.12 This crude picture has 
been replaced and refined in the course of the shift to the rhetoric of ‘equality’. 
In particular, common assumptions about certain properties of scientific 
knowledge have been called into question, such as its epistemic superiority 
(power of prediction, certitude), its independence of (cultural) contexts and 
universal validity and, thus, its applicability. Parallel to this, ‘local’ knowledge 
has been invested with expectations regarding ‘development’ that most likely 
overstretch its actual potential (Agrawal 1995). Rather than following the 
various arguments invariably coloured by political and ideological convictions 
12 Antweiler (1998: Table 1) gives a list of terms and connotations for ‘local knowledge’, pointing to 
it being both instrumentalised and romanticised. 
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reflecting allegiances to the respective development paradigm, the discussion 
here has to be limited to answer just a few questions: 
• What kind of knowledge is at stake in aid relations? 
• What kind of knowledge (scientific/global and/or local) is available; 
what is lacking in the countries concerned? 
• What kind of knowledge can be/is being provided from ‘outside’ and 
under which circumstances?  
Not all fields of knowledge, let alone scientific knowledge, are relevant in 
‘development’. Hornidge (2012: 25), in a review, lists five related discourses 
that pertain to knowledge: (a) the construction of ‘information’ and ‘knowledge 
societies’; (b) the development agenda of international donor organisations, 
summarised under ‘knowledge for development’; (c) bridging of ‘the global 
digital divide’ summarised under ‘ICTs for development’; (d) current trends 
of ‘innovations’ and ‘innovation systems’; and (e) the adaptive capacities 
of ‘knowledge’ for the living with change processes, ranging from climatic 
and environmental changes to socio-economic and political transformation 
processes. The delineation of these discourses is fuzzy and does not lead one 
to concrete fields of knowledge. In fact, they also reflect fads in development, 
such as the shift from engineering knowledge to soft social science issues such 
as ‘good governance’ as a precondition of development. The more concrete 
reference of the World Bank to ‘knowledge about technology’ and ‘knowledge 
about attributes’ (i.e. quality of goods and services), points to types of 
knowledge which clearly reside in Western knowledge systems. The same can 
be said about the “narrowing down of the former ‘knowledge for development’ 
to ‘ICTs for development’, a process possibly also nurturing the interests of 
the ICT industries of mainly developed countries, and thus supporting an 
‘expert knowledge’-focused approach in development cooperation” (Hornidge 
2012: 33). The discourse on innovation and national innovation systems (NIS) 
represents another example of broadening the scope of the development 
agenda to institutional and social issues. The notion of NIS was taken up, for 
example, by South Africa which has formulated a national innovation systems 
policy, thereby following an international fad. However, the very term is 
controversial in academic discussions not least because it is trendy rather than 
providing political orientation. This is documented by the OECD’s assessment 
that the “relatively strong” system under the apartheid regime has been re-
shaped into “another strong” system since 1994, implying that SA had an NIS 
without it being called as such, thus documenting the vacuousness of the term 
itself (OECD 2007:10). Finally, the issue of processes of change, for example 
climate change mitigation and adaptation, points to the most concrete conflict 
14
The Delusion of Knowledge Transfer
between types of knowledge, since the climate models are developed by a 
high-tech instrument-intensive Western science, while in the ‘developing’ 
countries people rely mostly on local observations and long-term experience. 
Much if not most of the knowledge negotiated in these discourses, assuming 
that they represent the foci of ‘development strategies’ over the last two or 
three decades, is organisational, management and economics oriented, 
and it is mostly Western based. The ‘knowledge deficits’ on the part of the 
recipient countries accrue in part from the ‘development agendas’ of the donor 
countries and from the international development paradigms. Knowledge on 
governance, finance and management, as well as quality management as it is 
either implied in or explicit in the World Bank’s and other donor countries’ 
development agendas, is very much a domain of Western business schools and 
political science departments at universities. It is also the kind of knowledge 
that is typically communicated by ‘experts’ from the West. The asymmetry 
with respect to knowledge is, in part, also determined by the knowledge base 
that exists in both donor and recipient countries. Some donor countries have 
selected aid programmes for which they have particular expertise, such as the 
Scandinavian countries’ programme on forestry in Tanzania. For these they 
can draw on their own scientific resources. But their ‘experts’ meet with local 
people who have in-depth knowledge about and experience with their natural 
environment. In the case of South Africa, its science base with respect to bio-
diversity and the protection of the specific flora of that country is so strong that 
administrators can take the attitude of equal partnership or even conditional 
acceptance of outside expert advice, as they are able to rely on renowned 
academics at the country’s own universities.
In the examples given it is not clear which part of ‘local knowledge’ is also 
part of Western scientific knowledge, and which is ‘local’ in the sense of it being 
locally restricted and context-bound. The assumption that Western scientific 
knowledge and ‘local knowledge’ necessarily clash because they are epistemically 
incompatible is simplistic and mostly unjustified. There are many ways in which 
Western scientific and local knowledges can and factually do interact, ranging 
from dominance all the way to innovative adaptation and mixing (cf. Antweiler 
1998: 482, Table 6). The problem of any transfer of knowledge resides in the 
degree to which the ‘external’ knowledge is abstract with respect to the ‘local’ 
issue to be solved and the knowledge held by ‘local’ recipients of ‘external’ 
advice. Simple standardised technical solutions to problems such as installing 
water pumps are much more easily transferred to a community with little 
technical knowledge than complex designs of, for example, an effective and 
just taxation system. The underlying economic and social knowledge for the 
latter is abstract, fraught with uncertainties and requires substantial input of 
‘local’ knowledge about the socio-economic situation of the population, political 
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loyalties among the citizenry, and pertinent provisions of the legal system etc., 
to be applicable and useful. In view of this, the very term ‘knowledge transfer’ 
suggests the superiority of the ‘external’ Western type of knowledge and disdain 
for the ‘local’ knowledges in question; this has consequently drawn a lot of 
criticism, resulting in the development discourse becoming more sensitive and 
egalitarian. The ‘transfer’ of supposedly universal and value-free knowledge is 
a highly complex matter in its own right. The knowledge in question, such as 
about financial and project management, regulation of markets, rules of ‘good 
governance’ and the like is far from certain. It is subject to fads such as ‘new 
public management’ and it comes with cultural contextualities. Even seemingly 
‘objective knowledge’, for example the evidence of the HIV/Aids link, has 
been contested for political reasons. The attitude on the part of the donor 
organisations and of the experts they commission can make all the difference, 
and often enough corroborates the criticism, for example, if highly paid foreign 
experts are commissioned to advise local governments on a short-term basis 
with little or no time nor concern for the applicability of their knowledge to 
the local context. This is exacerbated by the fact that these experts appear to 
develop their own professional identity and pursue their own interests as an 
‘epistemic community’, most notably the diffusion of concepts deemed valid by 
themselves and the agencies on behalf of which they operate (cf. below). 
Thus, the paradigmatic shift towards an egalitarian approach in development, 
to equal partnership and to a recognition of local knowledge all point to a more 
sophisticated understanding of the communication of knowledge which would 
create conditions that allow for a process of co-creation of knowledge that is 
both scientifically sound and up to date, as well as adequately adapted to local 
circumstances. To what extent that ideal is realised is the object of this study.  
Risks of aid-related expert advice for young democracies
The major threat to young democracies is that they lose control over setting 
their own political agenda. Obviously, the ability of a citizenry to elect their 
representatives into political office where they can design policies that reflect 
the electorate’s wishes and interests and reach compromises with their 
opponents is the core element of any democratic system. It is the principle of 
self-determination. This principle is undermined if decision-making primarily 
follows the objectives of external agents instead of being responsive to those 
of the country’s population. Young democracies are particularly vulnerable to 
this threat posed by donors in the form of aid programmes and expert advice 
because of their internal instability: their governments’ legitimacy with their 
electorates is often tenuous, their institutions are still fragile, and their scientific 
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communities (i.e. their knowledge bases) are usually comparatively small, 
isolated and underfunded, which makes the respective countries dependent on 
knowledge from outside. There is an obvious asymmetry between donor and 
recipient countries insofar as the latter do not match the Western democracies, 
be it in terms of institutional stability, sophistication of administrative 
infrastructure and staff, juridical and governance systems, higher education 
and research systems in terms of volume, level of education, research output 
and absorptive capacity. This is regardless of the vast differences between 
countries within Africa (see Chapter 6). 
The consequence of such asymmetry is that governments of countries 
that are recipients or addressees of aid programmes respectively come under 
influence from outside to varying degrees. This may impede their ability 
to determine their own political agendas and thereby run the risk of losing 
legitimacy with their own citizenry. This risk has become an object of a broad 
debate especially between observers of international aid policy and analysts 
from the aid community itself. 
Therefore, it is worth taking a closer look first at the nature of legitimacy 
as being threatened, then at those conditions that appear to be crucial for 
recipient control over political agenda-setting: financial strength, the quality 
of public administration, especially with respect to its ability to critically absorb 
knowledge provided by external experts (absorptive capacity), and the strength 
of the ‘local’ knowledge base.
Legitimacy
The acceptance of a political system by its citizenry and, thus, its legitimacy, 
depends on both the institutional arrangements on the input side and the 
actual effectiveness of governmental institutions, most obvious in the provision 
of socio-economic benefits, but also in the rule of law, on the output side. 
The concept of ‘legitimacy’ in theories of democracy has several meanings. A 
common distinction is that between ‘input legitimacy’ and ‘output legitimacy’ 
(Scharpf 2005). This suggests that legitimacy is constituted not only by the 
institutions which allow for the participation of the electorate, such as political 
parties, interest groups, NGOs and the media in framing political decisions, 
but also the institutions that guarantee the quality of the decisions and 
their implementation. The combination of ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy is 
particularly pertinent for this study as it points to the various factors shaping 
the relationship between recipient and donor governments, and allows an 
assessment of the impact of knowledge transfer ‘from outside’. 
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In young democracies, the most immediate threat to legitimacy from external 
experts, it can be hypothesised, will most likely come from a displacement of 
accountability of governments. This amounts to the open or implicit denial of 
‘voice’ (i.e. participation) in shaping and making decisions, in particular about 
the political agenda. This is underscored by the exemplary and frequently 
quoted statement from President Paul Kagame of Rwanda: 
To realize our development vision, we in Africa must substitute external 
conditionality – that is, what the donors tell us to do – with internal policy 
clarity – that is, knowing ourselves what we need to do and articulating 
this clearly and consistently to our people and our development partners 
(…). This requires that, among other things, we need to learn to ‘say no’ 
to donors whenever their priorities do not align with domestic objectives 
and agenda. (Kagame 2007: 5)
In order to capture the potential threat to the legitimacy of recipient governments 
posed by donor engagement it has been suggested to look at the “aid negotiation 
process as including the full policy cycle: agenda-setting, policy formulation, 
implementation, evaluation, and revision” with special emphasis “on the 
agenda-setting and policy formulation stages because these stages involve the 
strongest forms of recipient government control over its national development 
strategy and policies” (Whitfield & Fraser 2009:  39–40). By assuming this 
analytical perspective, both partners in the negotiation process come into view 
and are taken seriously as having their own interests and strategies in this 
process. More than that, it points to the particular conditions under which each 
party enters the process, such as governments’ dependence on aid. 
When looking at young democracies and their particular sensitivity to 
knowledge transfer from outside the crucial point is that both donors and 
recipients are subject to legitimacy issues. Donors depend on public opinion 
‘back home’, on the criteria and conditions of giving aid that are formulated 
by their parliaments, on the paradigms of the aid policy that may change with 
each new government. Likewise the recipient governments depend on the 
public consent of their respective citizenry to the various aid projects which add 
up to their aid policy. This dual orientation to each one’s source of legitimacy 
makes the negotiation between the two parties very sensitive. Mkandawire 
also points to this dual accountability when he writes: 
The more accountable a donor is to its own voters, the more onerous and 
invasive will be its intervention in the receiving economy and the more likely 
it is to undermine the recipient democratic government’s accountability to 
its own voters. (Mkandawire 2010: 1168) 
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In particular, it makes aid programmes that in many, if not most cases require 
time to show the desired effects, subject to frequent and sudden changes, thus 
putting an additional burden on governments’ credibility with the public.
Financial strength
A fundamental condition of political sovereignty, it would appear, is financial 
independence. As Pender (2007: 112) writes, it is 
the idea of material capacity to act which blurs the lines between 
sovereignty and economics. Power always depends on material strength, 
and sovereignty has always implied some degree of autonomy from, and 
control over, economic processes.
Governments that have enough financial means to run their own affairs do 
not depend on financial aid from outside and consequently do not have to 
accept advice that potentially interferes with their own agenda-setting. This 
is so self-evident that it hardly needs to be discussed. The reverse argument 
is that governments in need of foreign funding have a weaker position in 
negotiating with donors over political objectives and priorities. In the extreme 
case the price they pay for securing aid is a loss of policy-making autonomy 
which threatens their legitimacy if decision-making becomes more responsive 
to external demands than to public preferences. 
Yet, there are some considerations that suggest a more differentiated view 
on the effect of finances. Findings from recent studies indicate that there is no 
direct correlation between aid dependency, as measured in terms of foreign 
funding as a share of national budgets or gross national income, and the 
extent of external influence. Whitfield (2009a), for instance, has shown that 
countries such as Ethiopia and Rwanda show high degrees of control over their 
policy agendas in spite of being highly dependent on aid, as they are able to 
derive negotiating capital from favourable political and ideological conditions, 
amongst others.13 This challenges the assumption that countries which suffer 
from lack of funds must accept donor interference. It also indicates that ‘lack 
of funds’ is a relative figure that has to be seen in reference to the economic 
13 According to Whitfield (2009a:  333–341), the favourable political and ideological conditions in 
Ethiopia and Rwanda include their geostrategic importance for the West, the existence of clear 
development visions and a strong confidence of the governments in their authority relative to 
donors which they derive from their respective country histories. Ethiopia, for instance, had never 
been colonised as most other sub-Saharan states, and thus shows a strong sense of its own equality 
with donor countries; Rwanda is able to use the legacy of the genocide to de-legitimise external 
interference in domestic affairs. 
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power of the recipient country, but also to its political ambitions and objective 
needs. The onslaught of the HIV/Aids epidemic, for example, has imposed 
financial burdens on various African countries that were unanticipated and 
have threatened their economic well-being to different degrees. 
It is more instructive therefore to look at the ratio outside funds constitute 
as a percentage of budgets available for certain policy fields. Then financial 
dependency becomes more concrete: political agenda-setting usually applies 
to sectors represented by line ministries. It is on that level that the range of 
political options is narrowed by advice from outside. Here interference with 
policy agendas is most direct and damaging to a government’s authority and 
legitimacy.  
Administrative capacity 
Modern democracies rely heavily on efficient administration for both 
the preparation and implementation of political decisions taken by their 
legislatures. The administration of health care or education systems and the 
regulation of the labour market, to take just these examples, depend on 
systematic and reliable knowledge. The quality of bureaucracies has a strong 
influence on the quality of governments, their policies and their decision-
making. With a constantly growing share of public administration being 
knowledge-based, bureaucracies have to have well-educated professional 
staffs which also connect them with their respective academic communities 
and allow them to gain some independence from the various lobby groups 
around them trying to gain influence over their actions. Control of the political 
agenda is thus an issue if bureaucracies are being confronted with expert 
advice they are not able to absorb properly, for lack of capable personnel or 
because – in the worst case – they are inefficient and corrupt. Then they are 
less likely to be competent parties in negotiations with donors than if they 
have a high level of professionalisation and well-trained staff. The perception 
that ‘their’ administrations are fit to deal with donors in a way that safeguards 
the local interests and guarantees performance that benefits their society will 
also gain a higher degree of trust from their constituency. Thus, the quality 
of bureaucracies in terms of their knowledge-related absorptive capacity is a 
crucial factor determining their ‘strength’ or ‘weakness’, respectively, and 
an important element of a government’s output legitimacy. The significance 
of absorptive capacity, thus, lies in its function to enable governments of 
developing countries to retain the control over their own political agendas, 
and as this control is closely related to legitimacy in (new) democracies it is a 
very important political resource.
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The precondition for strengthening the absorptive capacity and, thus, for 
gaining independence from and control over foreign experts lies obviously 
in an education system that provides the respective governments with well-
educated manpower. Although most African states now have elaborate 
education programmes and policies in place, their actual implementation ‘on 
the ground’ is a recurrent topic of complaint.14 Many lack the means and the 
competence to set up functioning education systems, although the quality 
varies greatly among them. Perhaps with the exception of South Africa, 
the education systems of many African states are not well developed and 
consequently the ‘absorptive capacity’ of these countries is comparatively low. 
As a result they are severely constrained in receiving the donors’ experts with 
their own critical assessment of the information they are being given, and 
in doing their part of translating the expertise into their respective political, 
cultural and social contexts.
Local knowledge base
To a considerable extent the absorptive capacity of a country is also determined 
by the relative strength of its own science system. Although scientific knowledge 
is supposedly international and the scientific community is a global network of 
communication, the differences between countries, the North and the South 
in particular, are considerable. Compared to the leading ‘scientific nations’ 
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and since 
recently China, many African countries do not have the means to support a 
science system that can sustain internationally competitive research. Strictly 
speaking it is not necessary for a country to compete at the frontiers of research 
– and practically none can afford to do this in every field. But in order to tap 
that knowledge which is freely available and to adapt it to local conditions, a 
country needs a scientific community (and the requisite institutions) that is 
able to ‘absorb’ this knowledge. It is only then that knowledge can be converted 
to ‘expertise’ (i.e. knowledge) that is to be applied to solve practical problems. 
Only then will a roster of local experts be created, recruited from the national 
scientific community. 
The difference between ‘local’ and ‘foreign’ expertise is an issue because the 
international community of experts has its own identity, its own culture, its 
own ideology and its own interests. The configurations of this community have 
been assigned different concepts over the last decades, from ‘strategic groups’ 
(Evers et al. 1988) to ‘(globalised) epistemic communities’ (Haas 1992; Evers 
14 See, for instance, Kisting (2012); Ayo (2013); Ndlovu (2013). 
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et al. 2009). These conceptualisations reflect to an extent the theoretical (and 
ideological) positions of their authors. But they also mirror the experience 
and the evidence gathered in numerous studies about the activities of foreign 
experts, their impact and their failures. The main point is that these groups 
or networks or communities of experts, even if they come from different 
disciplines and act on behalf of different governments or donor agencies, share 
a common set of qualities that Haas has characterised as being 
(1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-
based rationale for the social action of community members; (2)  shared 
causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or 
contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then 
serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible 
policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity – that 
is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating 
knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy 
enterprise – that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of 
problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably 
out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence. 
(Haas 1992: 3)
As vague as the delineation of these ‘communities’ is, the analytical significance 
of the concept is the thesis that they represent certain views which they 
successfully transfer into politics. The mechanism of influence, as Haas sees it, 
is such that members of these communities may identify interests for decision-
makers or illuminate dimensions of an issue
from which the decision makers may then deduce their interests. The 
decision makers in one state may, in turn, influence the interests and 
behaviour of other states, thereby increasing the likelihood of convergent 
state behaviour and international policy coordination, informed by the 
causal beliefs and policy preferences of the epistemic community. (Haas 
1992: 4) 
In other words, although on the surface one is made to believe that knowledge, 
scientific knowledge in particular, is universal and therefore neutral towards 
parochial interests and cultural contexts that assumption is naïve. The 
distinction between ‘local’ and ‘foreign’ expertise does make a difference.
Given the endemic weakness of the education and science systems of 
African countries, their governments are at the mercy of the international 
donor community – again with considerable differences between countries. 
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The realisation that this dependence is threatening their national and cultural 
identities, beyond posing a danger to their democratic institutions where they 
exist, has led to the appeal to ‘indigenous knowledge’. The United Nations 
declared the period 1995–2004 as the ‘International Decade of the World’s 
Indigenous People’ which was extended, as the second decade, to 2015. 
South Africa’s National Research Fund established the interface of indigenous 
knowledge (IK) and Western science as a research focus. This emphasis on 
IK is clearly motivated by a quest for cultural and national identity; it implies 
a paradigm shift insofar as it places knowledge at the centre of development 
strategies, and recognises the importance of ‘local’ knowledge and participation 
(see Weingart 2006: 184).15 Some authors have propagated IK as an alternative 
to Western science. That is the most concrete suggestion but it is also the least 
realistic option because it would isolate the countries that would follow this 
course from the global community, apart from the fact that the knowledge base 
would be far too small to allow full scale sustainable development. However, 
as Girvan (2007: 40) points out, the more realistic option to obtain a degree 
of independence is not to take the road into intellectual isolation but to set 
up local and regional knowledge centres in order to strengthen the respective 
science bases.
The real importance of ‘local expertise’ rests elsewhere. Experts who 
have been socialised and educated in the respective country at stake are 
representatives of the ‘local’ culture and the values that are being shared by 
its citizens, they speak the language. They have first-hand knowledge of the 
country’s problems and needs and how to meet them. Educated both in the 
respective country and often also abroad as many of the local academic elite 
are, they are able to absorb knowledge (i.e. function as critical interpreters 
who scrutinise expertise with regard to its relevance, as well as underlying 
paradigms and implicit interests). All these qualities allow them to be equal 
partners in the negotiation of projects with ‘foreign experts’. Finally, belonging 
to the recipient country’s expert community is a crucial condition for having 
credibility with local policy-makers and the public at large because it is assumed 
that primary allegiance is to the own country.
‘Capacity-building’ and foreign experts 
In response to the perceived weakness of the local knowledge bases in 
developing countries the concept of ‘capacity-building’ has been used to 
15 In Tanzania, the significance of indigenous knowledge was already highlighted by the country’s 
first post-colonial leader Julius K Nyerere in his ‘education for self-reliance’ policy (Nyerere 1967); 
for details, see Chapter 7. 
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circumscribe a prime objective of aid programmes. In fact, the notion of 
‘capacity-building’ goes back to the end of the 1960s when it had become 
apparent that the transfer of knowledge embodied in technology required, 
apart from an economic infrastructure, an education base. Already then it 
had become clear that the copying of knowledge alone was not sufficient but 
that an ‘absorptive capacity’ had to be built, meaning an indigenous base of 
knowledge production. The UN Economic and Social Council stated already in 
its 1969 ‘World Plan’: 
It is difficult for a developing country without a science and technology 
capacity of its own, and particularly without the trained people involved, 
to know what useful technology exists elsewhere, to understand it, to 
select it, to adapt, to absorb, to repair and maintain, to operate. (United 
Nations Economic and Social Council 1971: 102) 
It thus considered it “a fundamental necessity to build up indigenous scientific 
capability in the developing countries” (United Nations Economic and Social 
Council 1971: 102).
If the problem of absorption is addressed here with reference to the transfer 
of technology, it has become even more acute as aid programmes have since 
shifted to more abstract issues: governance in general, administration and 
accounting procedures in particular, therefore involving not only natural 
science knowledge but also economic, social and political science knowledge. 
‘Capacity-building’ as it is being used by the World Bank, for example, 
includes increasing the “effectiveness of the states in designing and managing 
public policies and programs; in implementing regulatory frameworks; in 
delivering public services; and in promoting accountability and transparency 
in economic, financial and administrative governance” (World Bank 2010a).16 
Thus, the term itself has become inflated and rather than addressing the issue 
of creating specifically a capacity for absorbing knowledge refers more generally 
to improving governance and financial management capabilities. 
This is related to the kinds of experts who are engaged from ‘outside’. Knack 
and Rahman (2007: 194) state that donors should be careful not to disturb 
the market for skilled labour by bringing in expensive expatriates (usually 
because they are well trained abroad) because not only may this “prevent 
valuable learning-by-doing on the part of local staff” but also “those same 
benefits could be obtained, without the negative consequences, from using 
the funds to increase salaries of underpaid civil servants, or through general 
16 This is taken from a World Bank project information document related to its African Capacity 
Building Foundation (ACBF) Regional Capacity Building Project (Project ID P122478) running 
from 2011 to 2017.
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budget support”. The provision of advice as the dominant form of knowledge 
transfer is a process whose success hinges on mutual trust between advisor 
and his/her counterpart and on the ability of the latter to receive the advice 
with the competence to assess its value in the context of his/her problems and 
to apply and develop it further. Where these conditions are not met advice is 
inevitably the imposition of the advisor’s interests and values on the recipient. 
The extensive use of experts from developed countries rests on the donors’ 
perception that the administrations in developing countries are not meeting 
their standards. Their interest in obtaining visible results as fast as possible 
thus pushes them to rely on ‘external’ experts rather than to improve the 
competence of local ones. The legitimacy pressures on the donors override the 
need for legitimacy on the recipients’ side.
The political intricacies of ‘knowledge transfer’
As will be shown later in detail (see Chapter 5), donor organisations rarely have 
precise concepts about how to communicate knowledge in advisory processes, 
about the nature of the knowledge to be communicated (i.e. whether it is 
based on evidence or more loosely on experience), about what it entails on 
the recipients’ side to actually absorb the knowledge offered and to build on it 
locally in a sustained fashion. Aid programmes are almost without exception 
targeted to operational problems such as the improvement of healthcare or the 
introduction of advanced accounting practices etc., but they do not reflect on 
the conditions of the transfer process itself. Providing aid is an activity that is 
ruled by criteria such as time constraints, efficiency and efficacy, it is oriented to 
achieving set objectives. In addition, the ‘experts’ that are being sent by the donor 
organisations or represent them act on their own and/or their organisation’s 
behalf (see Chapter 4). Reflecting on the conditions of knowledge transfer is 
not one of their concerns, and even if it were, the realities of organisations 
prove to be dominating. In his analysis of knowledge management among the 
experts within the German GTZ (now GIZ) Hüsken (2006: 246) states that the 
“collection, evaluation and the exchange of knowledge between headquarter, 
country bureaus and projects is unsystematic, and it is subject to conflicts of 
interests and power” (translated by authors). Note that this does not even 
refer to the advisory process executed by GTZ experts to their counterparts in 
developing countries. 
In addition, the aid programmes of the international donor community are 
subject to changing paradigms of aid: 
25
CHAPTER 1 Knowledge Transfer to Young Democracies: Issues of Legitimacy, Sovereignty and Efficacy
Over the past three decades, Western aid policies towards Africa have 
been dominated by, in roughly chronological and cumulative sequence, 
economic conditionalities around structural adjustment programmes; 
political conditionalities around respect for human rights and governance; 
and ‘partnership’ policies involving intensive and extensive redesigning of 
policy formation and budgetary processes in recipient countries. (Brown 
2013: 263)
Several authors have argued that these programmes amount to “intrusions 
by outside agencies” (Plank 1993:  408). But regardless of whether analysts 
and critics believe that the actual control of nations over agenda-setting and 
outcomes may be threatened or if they regard modern aid programmes as a 
continuation of colonialism there can be little doubt that development experts 
as representatives of aid organisations and government officials of recipient 
countries enter a relationship which is characterised by potentially conflicting 
interests and inequality of control and discretionary powers. Even if the rhetoric 
of ‘conditionality’ has been abandoned, donors can and factually do determine 
which conditions the recipient has to meet in order to obtain aid. The power 
differential and, thus, the vulnerability of the young democracies’ agenda-
setting control remains and – contrary to the World Bank’s assessment  – is 
even more difficult to escape when the chief currency of aid is knowledge. 
Their legitimacy may be threatened even if that is no one’s intention. 
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ACCESSING THE WORLD 
OF DEVELOPMENT AID: 
STUDY DESIGN AND 
FIELDWORK 
Questioning the ‘knowledge is like light’ assumption which prevails in 
international donor circles, this study set out to explain the intricacies of 
expert advice in the aid context by developing a generalised description of 
underlying mechanisms and conditions. Such an enterprise has to meet 
two requirements: first, the availability of “rich descriptions of empirical 
phenomena” that can be analysed, and second, a variance in data which 
“can be obtained by comparative case studies” (Gläser & Laudel 2013). The 
qualitative empirical study is based on 73 semi-structured expert interviews 
conducted in South Africa and Tanzania during four field trips in the years 
2011, 2012 and 2013. A standardised background questionnaire distributed to 
informants and a comprehensive body of documents produced by government 
authorities and aid agencies were used to complement and contextualise the 
interview material. 
As sociologists of knowledge have shown, results gained through academic 
research are always products of constructive processes rather than a detection 
of facts (Schütz 1953; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Knorr-Cetina 1984). In the following, 
we delineate the creative aspects of our empirical work and unfold experiences 
made ‘in the field’ which inevitably affected the interpretation of findings.
Tools of data generation: Expert interviews, questionnaires 
and document analysis 
Since this study aimed to explore the impact of expert advice on policy 
processes in developing democracies, the focus of research was not on the 
technical content of policies as such, but rather on the processes through which 
they were developed. In order to reconstruct the latter, we approached the 
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decisive actors involved therein, using expert interviews as the main method 
of investigation.17 
What constitutes an individual as an ‘expert’ in the expert interview as 
a method of qualitative research is his or her exclusive knowledge on the 
researcher’s object (Littig 2008).18 It is particularly his or her knowledge and 
interpretation of the social situation – the process and interpretative dimension 
of expert knowledge – that is relevant for reconstructing social objects the 
researcher is not able to observe directly.19 Applying this concept to this study, 
the ‘expert status’ has been ascribed to those who play a major role in policy-
making in South Africa and Tanzania, and, given their direct participation 
therein, possess exclusive knowledge on how and to what extent decisions are 
influenced by external advice. 
Suitable protagonists in this regard were found in government bodies, donor 
agencies, and partly in academia and civil society. The variety of their roles and 
functions required a flexible use of the interview guidelines that were designed 
to ensure comparability by focusing the interviews on specific major topics. We 
used the guidelines more as a memo than as a pre-fixed list of questions. A 
rather open interview approach was instructive insofar as it provided room 
for interviewees to “report cases of decision-making for reconstructing the 
supra-individual, field-specific patterns of expert knowledge” (Meuser & Nagel 
2009: 31). Such reports and narratives about specific episodes, conflicts and 
problem solutions in the experts’ professional activities are considered key 
points of reference for tapping “the tacit aspects of expert knowledge, which 
17 A policy analysis based on documents might have had the potential to trace external influences to 
some extent, for example, by scrutinising national policy documents for their references to global 
conventions or normative guidelines of the international community. This approach, however, 
would have fallen short of revealing how external influences come into play, by whom they 
are enforced, and how they are dealt with. One could argue that participant observation would 
have allowed a more direct insight into negotiation processes between the different actors in the 
realm of policy-making. However, here this method would neither have been feasible nor would 
it have been the most appropriate one. Apart from the difficulty in getting direct access to policy 
negotiations and advisory situations as a researcher, the long-term character of policy processes 
would have been a major obstacle, given the time-frame of the study. It would also not have been 
possible to directly observe processes in three sectors and two countries, which would have meant 
that we lacked the variance of data required for comparison. 
18 Littig (2008) provides an analysis of commonalities and differences regarding the discussion of 
expert and elite interviews in the German and English literature. The term ‘expert’ in this context 
is used as a relational concept decoupled from the professional roles or formal occupational status 
of interviewees (Meuser & Nagel 2009).
19 Bogner and Menz (2009) deconstruct expert knowledge into three dimensions: technical, process 
and interpretative knowledge. The first is closely related to the specialised knowledge the expert 
has accumulated in a particular technical area through formal qualification and training. Process 
knowledge, in contrast, is mainly gained through experience and relates to “sequences of actions, 
interaction routines, organizational constellations, and past or current events” (Bogner & Menz 
2009:  52) in which the expert was involved through his/her practical activity. Interpretative 
knowledge as a third dimension includes “the expert’s subjective orientations, rules, points of view 
and interpretations” (Bogner & Menz 2009: 52). 
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she or he is not fully aware of and which, on the contrary, become noticed only 
gradually in the course of the narration” (Meuser & Nagel 2009: 32). Narrative 
interview passages became particularly useful when interviewees seemed to 
provide more of an official answer rather than actual experience, hesitant 
to directly criticise prevailing practices or unwilling to disclose their expert 
knowledge for other reasons. Letting interviewees report about concrete cases 
often brought forward implicit patterns of social action and interpretations 
that were not explicitly formulated. It also helped to avoid socially desirable 
responses.20 The perception of the interviewers’ roles, competencies and 
assumed intentions may impact on the interviewee’s way of responding.21 
For example, our nationality as Germans led a few interviewees to emphasise 
their ‘good experiences’ with German development cooperation. Hence, we 
explicitly informed the interviewees about the academic background of our 
research interests. Providing preliminary assumptions and hypotheses was 
particularly instructive to obtain experts’ reactions and interpretations that 
pointed to underlying patterns and principles of acting in advisory situations. 
In assessing “the meaning and significance” of interview statements, it is 
crucial to take into account the “institutional-organizational context within 
which the expert’s position is embedded” (Meuser & Nagel 2009:  35). The 
standardised questionnaire was one tool which helped to define the different 
contexts of interviewees in the sample. It covered a maximum of 30 questions 
on the personal and professional background, the cooperation with partners, 
and the access to and management of knowledge. The questionnaire was 
distributed online prior to meeting the interviewees; however, the majority 
of them completed it after the interview was done, either online or using the 
paper version. Overall, we received a response rate of 82%.22 It is important 
to emphasise, however, that the questionnaire was not designed to gain data 
which claim statistical significance. Instead, it has been used to describe our 
sample and to illustrate patterns with regard to qualifications, experiences and 
routine practices of the participants’ professional activity. The data generated by 
the survey thus complement the qualitative findings taken from the interview 
material. 
In order to contextualise the latter, an extensive corpus of documents 
related to relevant advisory and policy processes was gathered. The collection 
included a variety of text types such as project and programme reports disclosed 
by international organisations, job descriptions, evaluation studies, sector 
reviews, policy documents and official government publications. Juxtaposing 
20 For a typology of interaction situations and interview strategies, see Bogner and Menz (2009). 
21 See Meuser & Nagel 2009: 57.
22 60 out of 73 interviewees approached fully completed the questionnaire. 
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the interview statements with ‘natural’ text generated in the field of the 
interviewees’ professional activity not only helped to embed narrations in a 
broader ‘story’, but also to compare, confirm or contrast representations of 
processes the interviewees were part of. Contradictions that emerge through 
this approach are not treated as irregularities or distortions of the findings; 
instead, they reveal different patterns of legitimation and thereby crucial 
aspects of the research objective. 
The sample: Development experts, government officials, 
academics and activists
As outlined above, the aim of the expert interview is to access the exclusive 
knowledge of experts in order to be able to reconstruct social situations and 
processes in which they participated (Gläser & Laudel 2010). Thus, the main 
criteria for selecting potential interviewees in our study was their engagement 
in one of three policy areas we were interested in, namely health, education 
and environment.
In order to identify relevant actors on the donor side, we contacted country 
offices, embassies and ‘development partner’ secretariats in South Africa 
and Tanzania, and screened documents such as minutes of policy meetings, 
joint sector reviews, progress and evaluation reports of major projects and 
programmes which usually list participants or responsible staff. While the names 
of the current health specialist or an education advisor in a particular donor 
agency were found relatively easily (in some cases by mere online search), 
it was far more complicated to identify their ‘counterparts’ in government 
authorities (i.e. the Tanzanian or South African officials they interact with). 
Gaining contact details of policy-makers and technical staff from abroad 
proved challenging for a number of reasons. Compared to donor websites, the 
online presence of ministries and departments is often rudimentary and not 
up to date regarding office holders, phone numbers or email addresses. This 
appeared to be connected with a high staff turn-over in these organisations. 
Calling operators did not always help either. Lastly, being less familiar with 
formal organisational structures and informal power relations, it was difficult 
for us in the beginning to figure out the pivotal people within the bureaucracies 
who do have a say in policy decisions. 
In this regard, recommendations of a few key actors with years of experience 
on government or donor side were extremely useful and often functioned as 
a door opener for arranging meetings with high-level role-players. To give just 
one example: a German health expert who had spent around eight years in 
Tanzania allowed us to refer to him when contacting his former partners. Doing 
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so evoked a surprising turn-around of reaction in many cases. After hearing 
his name, Tanzanian officials, who were first hesitant to meet, now warm-
heartedly invited us to visit them, sending best wishes to their ‘colleague’ and 
‘friend’ – one even responded: “People in Tanzania will never forget what he 
has done for our country. You are most welcome!” This anecdote points to 
the great importance of personal relationships in the realm of development 
cooperation which we not only experienced during the research, but which 
also came up as a major issue in the interviews. The fact that we arrived at a 
point where we were given congruent recommendations of whom to meet 
from different people (referring us to the ones who had suggested them) hints 
at a marked feature of governance particularly in Tanzania, namely that policy-
making power is held by a rather small group of protagonists. 
During the second rounds of interviews in South Africa and Tanzania, 
we came to a point where we felt to have reached ‘saturation’ in the sense 
that interviews did not reveal new aspects or perspectives on the topic, 
but reconfirmed prior statements and legitimation patterns. Altogether, 
we conducted 73 interviews which took place in Dar es Salaam, Pretoria, 
Johannesburg and Berlin. The sample consists of a fairly heterogeneous group 
of interviewees who can broadly be grouped into three categories: 
• Experts working for bi- and multilateral organisations. Experts working for 
bi- and multilateral organisations are deployed in the field in various 
different positions (see Chapter 4); hence the titles of our interviewees 
were manifold: amongst others, we spoke to senior (technical) advisors, 
programme managers, first secretaries, counsellors, team leaders, 
sector specialists, professional officers, attachés, and consultants. The 
variety of functions and relevance of positions result from the fact that 
donor and recipient countries organise the management of aid in very 
different ways.23 The majority of interviewees from this group ranked 
themselves as being a senior staff member or at medium level in the 
hierarchy of their organisation.24 One third of them had between 21 
and 30 years of experience in development cooperation; roughly 50% 
between 11 and 20 years; and a smaller number less than ten years.25 
23 For details on aid management structures in South Africa and Tanzania, see Chapter 3. For an 
overview of different organisational types on the donor side, see Chapter 4.
24 The allocation of questionnaire answers related to the level of seniority in detail: head of 
organisation/mission:  3.7%; high-ranking manager (e.g. vice-president, vice-chairperson, 
director): 3.7%; senior member of staff (e.g. head of department, team leader): 59.3%; medium 
level of seniority (e.g. attaché, advisor, project manager): 29.6%; other: 3.7% (= 100%). 
25 The allocation of questionnaire answers related to the work experience of external experts in 
detail: 1–5 years: 7.4%; 6–10 years: 7.4%; 11–20 years: 51.9%; 21–30 years: 33.3%; 31 and more 
years: 0% (= 100%). 
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While 18 interviewees in this group were foreigners coming from Europe 
or North America, nine were ‘local internationals’ (i.e. Tanzanians and 
South Africans working for an international organisation). As many 
of them had prior experience in working for their governments and 
thus were knowledgeable of the problems and pressures on both the 
recipient and donor side, they had particularly interesting perspectives 
on the topic. 
• Government officials in recipient authorities. The second critical group of 
interviewees in our sample is made up of those who constitute the main 
target group for external policy advice: the cadre of senior government 
officials who are the designated ‘counterparts’ of aid experts. Entering 
national ministries, departments and other government bodies, we 
spoke to permanent secretaries, deputy director-generals, heads of 
government agencies, and directors and programme officers who 
regularly interact with donor staff. Asked for the number of years of 
experience in development cooperation, answers ranged from two to 
30 years. Among those with decades of experience, some were already 
retired from government service. Their statements based on years of 
dealing with donors were particularly fruitful for gaining a long-term 
perspective on developments both in the respective sector and the aid 
community. Having a more distant view on day-to-day politics, the senior 
interviewees provided valuable reflections on changing relationships, 
paradigm shifts and the overall impact of external advice on sector 
policies over time. While retired interviewees were able to speak frankly 
about conflicts and failures, government officials still in service seemed 
more cautious in their assessments, although we guaranteed anonymity 
with regard to the use of the material. Yet, we felt that most of them 
were quite honest in speaking about current policy processes and the 
involvement of external actors therein, with some being outspoken in 
their criticism and others communicating their messages between the 
lines. 
• Academics and civil society activists. Academics and leading civil society 
activists make up the smallest group of interviewees in our study. 
Including them in the sample was instructive insofar as their experience 
of being or not being consulted by governments or donors was an 
important aspect of our research. Their assessment of who pulls the 
strings in policy-making complemented the picture painted by external 
experts and government officials with a third perspective. Moreover, they 
provided useful comments on preliminary hypotheses, argumentation 
lines and impressions that came up during the field trips.  
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On average, the interviews took around one hour. While some appointments 
were arranged in hotel lobbies or other venues suggested by interviewees, we 
usually met them at their workplace. It is worth making a side note on the 
experience these visits provided; in Tanzania, we got the impression that the 
status difference between donors and recipients is in the truest sense of the 
word cemented in the buildings of government authorities, country offices 
and embassies. 
A note on interview locations
Scheduling meetings with aid experts in Dar es Salaam turned out to be 
relatively easy in the sense that except for the compound of the United States 
Embassy, a high security fort in the northern district, most foreign embassies 
and country offices of international organisations are located within a radius 
of three square kilometres in the city centre. Due to sophisticated registration 
and security check procedures, entering these buildings often took longer 
than expected. Once inside, we found ourselves in shining, air-conditioned 
entrance halls or foyers. After a fluent English-speaking (usually Tanzanian) 
receptionist had informed the interview partner about our arrival, we were 
picked up and guided to an office properly equipped with modern furniture 
and ICT, as it is standard in Western countries. 
The contrast between the setting we found in donor edifices and the 
conditions in government buildings was striking. The facilities available for 
officials in ministries and departments are not comparable to the ones of 
foreigners working in the country in terms of both their outside appearance 
and the interior. Piles of paper stored on ledges and handwritten notes loosely 
stacked on desks were a common picture in Tanzanian offices, which often 
lacked not only technological equipment, but also basic office supplies such as 
shelves and files. The fact that it seemed easier to arrange appointments with 
government officials by phone (using private mobile numbers) than by email 
was not surprising, given the fragile power supply and network infrastructure 
at their workplace. 
In South Africa, the contrast between donor and government buildings was 
certainly less extreme, but still apparent. With this anecdotal description of 
the field we encountered, we want to point out that local and foreign actors 
in the aid context obviously operate in two quite different worlds. Meeting 
our interviewees in their respective professional environments reinforced the 
impression of a rather unequal setting for cooperation between ‘partners’. 
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Steps of analysis: Coding, interpretation and data 
consolidation 
The findings of this study were produced through an iterative process of 
data collection and analysis.26 After each phase of fieldwork, the respective 
interviews were transcribed and subjected to an inductive process of coding 
(i.e. indexing themes in the text in order to structure the material).27 Deriving 
the codes from the empirical data, the coding system was constantly refined 
until a set of categories was developed that represented a first step of empirical 
generalisation. The information base constructed through the process helped 
us to selectively retrieve the text in search for patterns and causal explanations 
which were finally integrated into “a systematic, theoretically embedded 
explanation” (Gläser & Laudel 2013). Compiling the findings, we supplemented 
them with additional material taken from the collection of documents and the 
results of the questionnaire where suitable. 
26 This is suggested by the grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss 1967).
27 For coding the interview material, we used the software Maxqda Version 11. 
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SOUTH AFRICA  
AND TANZANIA:  
TWO DIFFERENT TYPES 
OF ‘DONOR DARLINGS’
South Africa and Tanzania were selected as cases for a number of reasons. Both 
countries represent young African democracies which for the past 20 years 
have been undergoing profound transformation processes affecting basically 
all fields of governance.28 The policy reforms carried out in this context have 
to significant extents been supported by the international community which, 
aside from money, has supplied expertise in the form of policy advice and 
technical assistance. The comparison between South Africa and Tanzania is 
of particular interest because both countries vary considerably in terms of 
general conditions and have adopted very different ways of dealing with and 
positioning themselves towards donors. In order to understand current aid 
relationships, it is instructive to take a look at the setting in which these have 
emerged. In this chapter, we thus briefly glance at the significance of aid for 
South Africa and Tanzania, and sketch out their history as recipients of official 
development assistance. This will elucidate why, despite all differentials, both 
have at times been ‘donor darlings’ in a distinct sense. 
The significance of aid for South Africa and Tanzania
Comparing the significance of aid for national finances, the discrepancy 
between the two countries under investigation is striking: while in South 
Africa, aid amounts to less than 1% of the budget, it accounts for around 
28 We call South Africa and Tanzania ‘young democracies’ on the grounds that they formally 
introduced this form of governance only about 20 years ago. South Africa’s first non-racial 
election which marked the end of the apartheid regime took place in 1994 (see, for instance, 
Johnson & Schlemmer 1996); Tanzania held its first multi-party general elections which officially 
terminated the era of the single-party hegemony under the socialist leader Nyerere in 1995 (see 
Van Cranenburgh 1996). 
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40% in Tanzania (Economic and Social Research Foundation 2010; WYG 
International Limited 2011). To give an idea of the dimension of aid volumes, 
we provide some absolute numbers: in 2012, Tanzania received USD 2 832 
million net official development assistance (ODA) (equivalent to USD 59 per 
capita), of which USD 205 million were used for technical cooperation; South 
Africa’s volume of ODA comprised USD 1 066 million (equivalent to USD 20 
per capita), including 179 million for technical cooperation (World Bank 
2016b).29
As illustrated by Figure 1, aid flows to Tanzania in the period 1992–2012 
were not only constantly higher than in South Africa, but also more erratic. In 
a low-income country for which aid is a pivotal element of the budget, such 
fluctuations have a noticeable impact on the government’s scope of action. 
Figure 1: Aid flows to Tanzania and South Africa 1992–2012
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016b).
For South Africa as a relatively resource-rich middle-income country, in contrast, 
ODA is not essential in financial terms, although some line departments and 
provincial authorities consider it an important source of additional income.30 
Instead, as will be shown later, its value lies in its leveraging effect as a tool of 
foreign policy, and particularly in the knowledge capital which comes with aid. 
29 The data are taken from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank which 
provides the following definition: “Net official development assistance (ODA) consists of 
disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by 
official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral 
institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in countries 
and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. It includes loans with a grant element of at least 
25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent). Data are in current U.S. dollars” (World 
Bank 2016b).  
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Evolving aid relations in Tanzania 
Tanzania has been receiving aid since its independence in 1961. The country’s 
first post-colonial leader, Julius K Nyerere, successfully promoted his vision 
of African socialism based on the principles of self-reliance and familyhood 
(‘Ujamaa’), and established close relations particularly with the Scandinavian 
states, Canada, West Germany and even the World Bank whose ‘growth with 
equity’ policy was concordant with Tanzania’s economic strategy (Wangwe 
2004). From the outset, donors provided not only loans and grants for 
investment projects, but also supplied technical assistance in order to “fill 
vacant posts until Tanzanians had been trained to take over” (Economic and 
Social Research Foundation 2010: 51).31 
While the enormous amounts of aid flowing into the country during the 
1960s and 1970s helped the government to realise key elements of its policies 
especially in social sectors (e.g. free primary education), it became more and 
more dependent on this source of foreign finance. From 1964 to 1980, the 
share of aid in central government expenditures rose from about 22% to 
46% (Tanzania budget figures and World Development Indicators, as cited in 
Radetzki 1973: 172 and Bigsten & Danielson 2001: 25, respectively). The risk 
the reliance on aid implied became evident when the economic crisis emerging 
in the mid-1970s got many Northern countries to reduce their funding 
volumes and induced a change in the climate of giving. Hitherto, Tanzania’s 
supporters had pretty much refrained from interfering in policy decisions; 
now, donor countries led by conservative, market-oriented governments, 
most notably the US, the UK and West Germany, started to push for the 
adoption of extensive neo-liberal reforms as recommended by the Bretton 
Woods institutions (Wangwe 2004). After years of resistance by Nyerere, the 
Tanzanian government under the new President Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1986 
eventually bowed to pressure and accepted the Economic Recovery Programme 
prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
This step and the following structural adjustment of macroeconomic and social 
policies leveraged immense resource flows from the aid community. Tanzanian 
leaders, however, soon realised that they had lost their policy autonomy to 
external actors which now directed decision-making.
Relations deteriorated when donors in the early 1990s became increasingly 
upset about deficient counterpart commitment and irregularities regarding 
the use of funds (Wangwe 2004). The tense situation escalated when in 1994 
31 During the 1960s, the Tanzanian government interestingly carried out the procurement process 
of technical assistants itself via international advertisement and a recruitment office in the UK; 
with increasing aid volumes, donors started to bring in experts from abroad according to their own 
regulations (Economic and Social Research Foundation 2010). 
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a massive scandal of financial mismanagement involving the minister of 
finance became public and led to an aid freeze (Harrison & Mulley 2009). To 
overcome this crisis, Denmark commissioned an independent group of local 
and international experts to assess the crisis in aid relations and to propose 
strategies to restore mutual confidence. The review which became known as the 
‘Helleiner Report’ (named after the team’s chairman, the Canadian Professor 
Gerald Helleiner) faulted the weak guidance exercised by the government, but 
also sharply criticised the high degree of donor interference which had eroded 
local ‘ownership’ (Helleiner et al. 1995). 
Based on the report’s recommendations, the Tanzanian government and 
donors formulated a set of ‘agreed notes’ which sketched out fundamentals 
of future cooperation (Government of Tanzania 2002). Emphasising country 
leadership, transparency, mutual accountability and efficiency in aid delivery, 
it pre-empted the principles of the Paris Declaration endorsed at the High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 and taken up in the Joint Assistance 
Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) of 2006 (OECD 2005; United Republic of Tanzania 
2006b).32 The national policy framework for aid management embraced 
the upcoming rhetoric of ‘development partnership’, provided for the 
establishment of joint policy dialogue and promoted general budget support 
(GBS) as the government’s preferred channel of support. For the international 
donor community, Tanzania became a role model of its partnership paradigm, 
and “a forerunner in and major laboratory for experimentation with new 
modalities” (Gould & Ojanen 2003: 41). 
While the new forms of cooperation aimed at restoring the government’s 
leading role in the policy space, they at the same time institutionalised donor 
engagement therein. The terms for general budget support and basket funding 
agreed upon included regular interaction between high-level officials and 
aid experts through working groups and coordination forums at various 
levels. Donors were now expected to participate in policy discussions and 
advise the government on issues related to the implementation of Tanzania’s 
National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (popularly known 
as MKUKUTA), as well as on sectoral reforms. Instead of ‘micro-managing’ 
projects, they should provide their views in a coherent manner through the 
‘Development Partners Group’ which had been formed to increase collaboration 
32 The principles include: strengthening national ownership, aligning external support to government 
priorities and systems, harmonising government and donor processes, focusing on measurable 
results and ensuring mutual accountability of government and development partners (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2006a).
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and thereby “to improve effectiveness and quality of development assistance” 
(Development Partners Group Tanzania 2010b: 2).33 
Since the new arrangements have been put in place, the international 
community presents Tanzania as “as a prime example of ‘ownership’” 
(Harrison & Mulley 2009:  283). Critical scholars, however, early on raised 
doubts about the validity of this claim (see, for instance, Gould & Ojanen 2005; 
Pender 2007; Harrison & Mulley 2009). In 2010, an evaluation conducted by 
the Independent Monitoring Group, which since 1994 has regularly assessed 
aid relations in Tanzania, found “signs of slippage in ownership” (Joint 
Assistance Strategy for Tanzania Working Group & Independent Monitoring 
Group 2010:  8) and come to the conclusion that trust, confidence and the 
quality of dialogue between the government and ‘development partners’ has 
considerably decreased. After years in which Tanzania served as the “poster 
child of the new partnership model of aid” (Harrison & Mulley 2009: 271), it 
seems as if relations have changed again. 
Evolving aid relations in South Africa 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, South Africa – in contrast 
to Tanzania and many other African states – has never been dependent on 
external finances; given its relatively solid state budget and comparatively 
strong administration, it has always been a somewhat “paradoxical recipient” 
of official development assistance (WYG International Limited 2011:  6). 
Nonetheless, aid has played “a rather special role” (WYG International 
Limited 2011: 9) in the country’s recent history, especially during the years of 
democratic transition. 
Foreign aid already began to flow into South Africa in the 1980s when donors 
from all over the world backed the anti-apartheid movement in its fight against 
the ruling regime. While the National Party government was diplomatically 
isolated by the international community, civil society organisations received a 
considerable amount of assistance in the form of funding, but also in the form 
of scholarships and programmes set up to provide the oppressed population 
with opportunities of education and intellectual exchange. Major institutions 
which thereby served as conduits for channelling aid included the South 
33 The Development Partners Group was formally established in 2004; as of 2014, it comprised 17 
bilateral and 5 multilateral (UN counted as one) aid agencies engaged in Tanzania (Development 
Partners Group Tanzania 2014c). Members commit themselves to respect the agreed division of 
labour and “to represent a common DPG position once agreed (unless inability to be part of the 
consensus was made clear at the time of decision) (…)” (Development Partners Group Tanzania 
2010b: 2).
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African Council of Churches, the Kagiso Trust, and the United Democratic 
Front; the state, in contrast, was mostly bypassed (Bratton & Landsberg 2000). 
However, in the early 1990s when there were clear signs of commitment 
to political change, funding streams began to shift. Following the first post-
apartheid elections in 1994 (for which donors, amongst others, sponsored an 
independent commission and electoral observers), the new Government of 
National Unity led by the charismatic President Mandela became the major 
recipient of ODA. The international community rewarded South Africa 
generously for its peaceful transition, pledging more than USD 6 billion for 
the first five-year period of democracy (Bratton & Landsberg 2000). The 
willingness to give financial and technical assistance to a middle-income 
country which did not qualify for aid at all can be explained in terms of the 
strategic interests on the donor side. Not only were they eager to associate 
themselves with the new-born ‘rainbow nation’ and its unique success story 
of abolishing a system of racial oppression by means of negotiation, they also 
saw their chance to shape the fabric of the young democracy which promised 
to become the political and economic powerhouse on the African continent. 
The new South African leaders, however, encountered the aid community 
with a strong sense of preserving agenda-setting autonomy. From the outset, 
they made it plain that donors were expected to support the priorities of the 
national Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).34 Many of those 
who had newly moved into government departments were “well aware that 
elsewhere in Africa and the developing world, the policy conditionality of 
aid had proved extremely controversial”, and were thus “anxious to ensure 
that the policy development process remained firmly in South African hands” 
(King 1999: 262). Hence, while external assistance was principally welcomed, 
not all offers were accepted. Concessional loans were widely rejected since 
the government took “the view that it does not need to give up its freedom, 
and mortgage its future to embrace potentially debilitating debt dressed up as 
development aid” (Soni 2000: 133). 
South African actors were not only fairly clear about what type of aid they 
favoured, but also how it should be managed. Until 1996, all in-flows were 
centrally channelled through the RDP fund and the respective office was made 
the focal point for donors; later on, the responsibility for coordinating aid was 
shifted to the International Development Cooperation Unit (IDC) unit in the 
National Treasury. While all agreements needed to pass through this unit, the 
authority to negotiate aid remained with the respective implementing agencies, 
that is, national departments, and provincial and local authorities, which 
34 A former government member who worked for the RDP office at that time stated in this regard: 
“Everybody wanted to throw money at us. And the big issue was: Yes, you can throw money at us, 
but against our agenda, not your agenda” (Interview 24). 
40
The Delusion of Knowledge Transfer
were given a high degree of autonomy in soliciting support (see International 
Development Cooperation Unit 2003). 
Faced with a recipient who seemed reluctant to be imposed with external 
rules and preferences, donors largely responded to South Africa’s requests, 
directing assistance especially to the priority areas of education, democracy 
and governance, agriculture, business development, health and housing 
(Bratton & Landsberg 2000:  276). Initially, large parts of aid in these areas 
focused on the reformulation of policies and legislative frameworks, and the 
creation of new institutional arrangements and governance structures (Soni 
2000:  50); post 1999, the focus gradually shifted to strengthening systems 
for implementation and service delivery. While aid helped to accelerate the 
pace of reforms insofar as it leveraged funding, the money as such was not 
substantial for their realisation. The main surplus of ODA for South Africa was 
the access to knowledge resources it facilitated. Putting in place new policies 
and legislation in basically all fields of governance was a huge challenge for 
an administration which had not only been re-structured, but was also staffed 
with new, often inexperienced (though committed) personnel (Bird 2001). 
Many line departments thus extensively drew on advisors and consultants 
provided by the aid community to assist in elaborating the technicalities of 
reforms. 
For donors, South Africa appeared as a perfect case in which to present 
themselves as ‘knowledge partners’ rather than ‘money-givers’. In its 1999 
country assistance strategy for South Africa, the World Bank declared: 
Since the 1994 elections, South Africa has provided the Bank with a 
unique opportunity to pilot our evolving role as a ‘knowledge bank‘. For 
South Africa, gaining access to international expertise and knowledge is 
at least as important as providing financial capital, and the Bank has 
operated as a clearinghouse and sounding board for international experts 
and best practice (…). In the future, we will continue to emphasize the 
Bank Group’s role in contributing knowledge to development issues in 
South Africa. (World Bank 1999b)
The majority of donors have adopted a similar approach in their engagement 
with South Africa, focusing assistance on the provision of expertise, ‘up-
stream’ policy advice and the facilitation of knowledge exchange. 
In contrast to Tanzania, the modes of cooperation in South Africa have 
hardly changed over the years; although the volume of sector budget support 
has increased (see WYG International Limited 2011), projects still constitute 
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the predominant aid modality.35 While in recent years mechanisms such as 
an annual Development Partners’ Consultative Forum have been set up to 
improve coordination and coherence, South Africa has not established dialogue 
structures as found in Tanzania and other countries. Aside from the absence 
of general budget support which usually requires such arrangements, it seems 
that the government has also deliberately refrained from creating joint forums 
for more ‘harmonised’ assistance. The preference to interact with partners 
on a one-to-one basis partly results from the conviction that negotiating aid 
individually provides recipients with a greater leeway for manoeuvring than 
dealing with a “united donor front” (Harrison & Mulley 2009: 275). Broadly 
speaking, South Africa condones problems of aid fragmentation for the benefit 
of keeping control over development cooperation. 
In recent years, aid relations have undergone a major change as several 
donors (e.g. Norway, Sweden and Denmark) have started to scale down or 
have completely phased out official development assistance (see Tjønneland 
et al. 2008). In 2013, DFID, hitherto a key partner particularly in the fields 
of health and business development, announced it would terminate its aid 
programme by 2015 with the intention to base the relationship “on sharing 
skills and knowledge, not on development funding, in recognition of the 
progress South Africa has made over the last two decades” (DFID 2013).36, 37 
The fact that South Africa is currently in the process of establishing its own 
development agency (see Besharati 2013) is certainly seen as a sign that the 
country’s role in the international arena is shifting. Yet, this does not mean 
that donors are generally preparing themselves to close their Pretoria offices. 
Quite the contrary, several have begun to increasingly use them as a focal point 
for regional programmes and triangular cooperation agreements.38 Hence, 
while traditional aid is currently declining, new arrangements with a focus on 
35 A 2011 country evaluation of aid to South Africa found: “As of late 2009, there were at least 33 
different development agencies implementing or preparing around 100 projects – this has escalated 
quite significantly with, for example, about twenty-five of some eighty EU ‘Green Economy’ 
commitments beginning in 2010” (WYG International Limited 2011: 55). 
36 DFID’s decision to end its aid programme for South Africa evoked harsh criticism both by UK 
MPs who blamed DFID for political expediency and disregard of recommended review procedures 
(Tran 2014) and on the part of the South African government which declared that the “unilateral 
announcement no doubt will affect how our bilateral relations going forward will be conducted” 
(Smith 2013). 
37 A DFID advisor placed in the South African Department of Health commented on this decision as 
follows: “If things go as we hope they would go and the government is beginning to do the right 
things, our support is about catalysing change, it’s not about telling government to do the right 
thing – they know what to do, it’s making change happen quickly. Now once that started, they 
won’t need DFID to help do that, and so we have a clear line by our current government that in 
four to five years’ time, we will be starting to exit from this sort of work”. (Interview 1) 
38 Germany, for instance, together with the National Treasury and other government departments, 
has set up a Trilateral Cooperation Fund with the aim to carry out regional activities and foster 
South–South cooperation (GIZ 2007).
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institutional and economic cooperation are on the rise. For the international 
community, South Africa remains an attractive counterpart: it represents both 
a strategic gateway to the continent and a prime example of a knowledge 
partnership which has yielded best practice and innovation. 
Concluding remarks 
The two countries which serve as the empirical cases of this study had different 
points of departure as recipients of aid and thus have adopted different 
approaches in dealing with donors. For the purpose of our research, the 
dissimilarity between South Africa and Tanzania is a crucial asset, allowing 
us to identify general intricacies of expert advice which are intrinsic to the aid 
context and exist irrespective of the particular country setting (see Chapter 5). 
At the same time, the dissimilarities enable us to investigate how different 
conditions delimit the extent to which recipients are able to absorb and use 
external expertise to advance their own development visions (see Chapters 6 
and 7). Before we do so, however, we first present the actors involved in aid 






THE MAIN PLAYERS OF 
THE AID GAME
We, Heads of State, Ministers and representatives of developing and developed 
countries, heads of multilateral and bilateral institutions, representatives 
of different types of public, civil society, private, parliamentary, local 
and regional organisations meeting here in Busan, Republic of Korea, 
recognise that we are united by a new partnership that is broader and 
more inclusive than ever before, founded on shared principles, common 
goals and differential commitments for effective international development. 
(Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 2011: 1)
In December 2011, about 3 000 delegates from governments, aid agencies, 
civil society and private sector institutions met at the Fourth High Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness in South Korea to assess the current state of aid relations, 
and to define a future agenda. The event culminated in the signing of the 
Busan Partnership agreement whose introductory statement proclaims a “new 
partnership that is broader and more inclusive than ever before” based on 
“shared principles” and “common goals” (Fourth High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness 2011: 1, see quotation above). 
The partnership rhetoric prevailing in the contemporary aid discourse 
usually disguises the fact that aid is an arena of multiple, often competing 
interests. Figure 2 schematically displays major interests on the donor and 
recipient side at the level of governments, organisations and individual actors.
Figure 2 represents a simplifying abstraction of the respective interests 
of donor and recipient governments, their respective administrative 
authorities and individual actors.39 Although incomplete, it indicates that 
39 It does not claim to capture all particular interests existing at the different levels and excludes other 
players such as non-governmental organisations, foundations, lobby groups, academia and elites. 
For an attempt to illustrate the multiplicity of interests in German aid, see Nuscheler (2005).
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the web of interests comprises political and economic objectives of nation 
states, organisational concerns of donor and recipient bureaucracies, and 
individual incentives of government members and development experts. In 
the following section, a closer look first focuses on the recipient side, then 
shifts to the donors. Finally, the spotlight is put on a group of actors who are 
part of the donor system, but who pursue distinct goals as knowledge brokers, 
namely the epistemic community of development experts. Summarising the 
observations of this section will be an understanding of the linkage of aid and 
interests that forms the complex setting for the advisory processes at the core 
of aid practices. 
Recipient governments and bureaucracies
While attracting additional resources is a primary purpose of recipient 
governments under pressure to cope with underfinanced budgets, they do 
pursue other interests in receiving assistance. Development projects potentially 
increase the public popularity of government heads, and bring along material 
rewards for the officials in charge. Moreover, aid is a strategic tool used in 
foreign relations, even by countries dependent on external support.  
Figure 2: Actors and interests in aid
DONOR SIDE RECIPIENT SIDE
Donor governments:
Increasing political influence
Profiting from the aid market
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Source: Authors’ own illustration.
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Financial resources 
Financial shortages are the chief motive for entering aid negotiations on the side 
of recipient governments. In low-income countries, external funding makes up 
a substantial share of the budget, in some cases up to 50%. It is a crucial amount 
for development expenses used for expanding road infrastructure, improving 
water supply or building schools and hospitals, amongst others.40 Given that 
governments of developing nations often spend a large proportion of their 
budget on recurrent costs, many investment projects can only be realised with 
donor funding, even in relatively resource-rich countries such as South Africa 
(Bond 2001). Authorities in areas such as environment, which receive a lower 
share of domestic resources, especially depend on external financing to carry 
out programmes.41 In countries such as Tanzania where even priority sectors are 
underfinanced, donor money critically extends line ministries’ scope of action. 
Public popularity
Opening a new construction site, inaugurating a day care centre or taking 
a power plant into operation are opportune events for policy-makers to 
demonstrate their efforts and achievements to the public. Aside from 
expanding the financial scope of governments, aid contributes to increasing 
the popularity of political actors. In Tanzania, pulling off aid is framed as a 
commendable merit. Government websites proudly advertise new international 
aid agreements, with pictures showing ministerial leaders shaking hands with 
donor representatives. Development cooperation activities are omnipresent 
in the media. Rarely a day goes by without at least one newspaper article 
covering a donor-funded project implemented by the government. The tenor 
of reports is usually very positive; negative effects of aid are seldom addressed. 
Policy-makers in Tanzania thus have an incentive to keep the status quo in 
terms of using foreign funding, although the government officially seeks to 
reduce its budgetary dependence (Tanzania Ministry of Finance 2013). As a 
retired government official commented about politicians in his country: 
They don’t want to cut aid. We are all afraid of loosing the polls. And that 
is something which is going to hurt us in the long run. (Interview 64) 
40 In contrast to the development budget, the recurrent budget is absorbed by operational expenses 
including salaries and wages for civil servants, the purchases of goods and services, and payments 
on national debts (Ministry of Finance 2012: 7). 
41 The Cape Action for People and the Environment (CAPE) initiative in South Africa’s Cape Floristic 
Region, for instance, very much gained from GEF funding which at times amounted to half of the 
overall budget (Global Environment Facility Evaluation Office 2008). For details, see Chapter 7. 
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Individual rewards
Not only high-level politicians, but also staff in ministries and agencies benefit 
individually from aid. Particularly among senior government cadres, donor-
funded activities are considered as “potentially lucrative and status enhancing” 
(Chêne 2009: 6) since they make available tangible rewards to the functionaries 
in charge. As a Tanzanian civil society actor pointed out, monetary and non-
monetary benefits constitute primary incentives for government members to 
engage with donor representatives: 
I sit and talk with you because I think, maybe I’ll get a study tool for 
capacity-building and I’ll get my allowances or, you know, maybe through 
you I’ll get a scholarship for my daughter to go to university or there’s a 
tender to order something and I will get my commission. That’s what it 
becomes, it becomes an opportunity for rent seeking. (Interview 70) 
Extra payments for government officials involved in aid activities are common 
practice in most recipient countries. Donors have co-created “per diem and 
allowance regime[s]” (Chêne 2009: 5) which are well entrenched, particularly 
in countries where the public service is severely underpaid.42 In many African 
states, government wages have been declining as a result of fiscal adjustment 
policies, with the consequence that salaries not only at lower levels hardly suffice 
to make a living. Receiving extra pay in the form of per diems and allowances 
has become “one of the most popular coping strategies for compensating for 
low public sector wages in the developing world” (Chêne 2009: 4). According 
to a survey among public servants in Tanzania and Uganda, the large majority 
of them (77%) considered allowances as equally important as their basic 
salary, some (13%) assessed extra pay as even more important than the latter 
(Therkildsen & Tidemand 2007). While allowances were actually introduced 
to reimburse officials for real expenses (e.g. travel reimbursement), they have 
become a second pillar of their income. The fact that they are relatively high 
compared to basic wages makes them even more attractive. A study conducted 
by the Tanzanian Policy Forum made the following calculation with data from 
the year 2009: a middle-level officer could earn about a third of his monthly 
salary (TSh 384 850, government scale TGS D) within three days by attending 
a workshop outside Dar es Salaam for which he receives a per diem of 
TSh 35 000 (Policy Forum 2009). As rates for foreign travels are even higher, 
“a civil servant going on a 5-day trip abroad easily doubles his or her salary, 
42 In Tanzania, donors fund around ten different types of allowances, such as per diems, honoraria or 
extra-duty top-ups. For an overview and details on what these allowances cover, see Rubin (2012). 
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even if this is the highest paid civil servant around” (Policy Forum 2009: 6). 
Thus, participating in events outside their offices pays off for government 
staff. Donor-funded workshops, trainings or conferences have become coveted 
extraordinary duties. 
Competing for key public officials, aid agencies in some cases even offer 
“attractive international daily rates” (Chêne 2009: 5) to bring them to their 
events. For the agencies, the per diem system helps to meet their own targets 
insofar as the number of participants is commonly used as a performance 
indicator (Hepworth 2009, as cited in Policy Forum 2009; Søreide et al. 2012). 
While paying allowances ensures attendance, salary top-ups paid to ministry 
officials concerned with donor projects aims to secure commitment on the 
counterpart side. As anecdotal evidence shows, this can make up to 40% 
increase in salary for the civil servants in charge (Rubin 2012). 
In Tanzania, cash incentives have become a decisive element in the 
interaction between donors and government officials. A World Bank expert 
who at the time of the interview was relatively new in the country commented: 
In Tanzania, if you have a meeting, you’re expected to pay people to show 
up and if you don’t pay them to show up, if they don’t care about it – 
which usually they don’t, cause usually it’s something that’s cared about 
by someone else, imposed upon them – then they don’t show up. So (…) 
everybody lines up at the back of these meetings to get little brown envelopes 
and it’s shocking to me to see that happen – shocking. (Interview 46) 
The institutionalisation of this practice has profound consequences not only for 
development cooperation, but also for the organisational culture in developing 
countries’ bureaucracies. Several studies have pointed out how the allowance 
regime creates room for fraud and corruption (Smith 2003; Ridde 2010; Vian 
et al. 2013), encouraging “opportunistic behaviour ‘to get a piece of the cake’” 
(Søreide et al. 2012: xiv).43 The individual benefits affiliated with aid activities 
lead government members to accept unnecessary support, to attend trainings 
irrespective of their ‘capacity-building’ use and to prolong processes in order 
to get projects extended (Chêne 2009; Vian et al. 2013).44 A natural resources 
43 In 2013, donors in Tanzania withdrew their support to the Local Government Reform Programme 
after an audit revealed the misuse of funds, amongst others for “excessive and unjustified per diem 
allowances and fees” (Mosoba & Mugarula 2013). 
44 The misuse of allowances particularly in the context of capacity-building activities has been 
documented several times. A study on donor support for water resource management in East 
Africa found that “during a two year period of working alongside East African practitioners it 
became apparent that there were numerous discrete training and workshop based capacity building 
initiatives run by donors and external support agencies covering the same or similar material. An 
example is provided by an agency of an East African government who over a period of two years 
were engaged in three separate residential training courses which covered the same topics, were 
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expert working for a Nordic donor in Tanzania explained the delays in her 
programme on the counterpart side as follows: 
I think it’s deliberate that they were only able to use half of the money 
that we were giving them for two years – they used it in three and a half 
years. And you know, somehow in my mind is the idea that if it lasts for 
six, seven years, it’s easier to get more daily allowances, all these per diems, 
discussion workshops organised and so on. So it kind of dilutes the whole 
thing. (Interview 36) 
Although donors have repeatedly claimed to tackle the self-made incentive 
problem by setting an end to extraordinary payments, the latter are still 
common practice and sometimes just termed differently. A study on donor 
compensations in Tanzania, Malawi and Ethiopia cites a senior staff member 
of a UN organisation saying: 
UN organisations are now using all kinds of words to avoid the term 
‘sitting allowance’ while in reality, they continue the practice. Very often, 
a cash payment of around TZS 80,000 is offered on top of ‘the meeting 
package’ – which includes accommodation and meals. In addition, they 
get a transport allowance – and this is an arrangement that can easily be 
manipulated. If they don’t get paid well they just leave – even if they have 
arrived at a hotel and have shown interest in the topic. (Søreide et al. 
2012: 35)
The policies and practices related to allowances certainly vary among aid 
agencies and across countries. While in Tanzania, individual rewards constitute 
a strong incentive on the recipient side to engage with donors, the situation is 
different in South Africa where public sector wages are comparably high, and 
allowances are not an issue affecting donor–recipient cooperation. 
Foreign relations 
In countries in which the financial assets of aid play less of a role for both 
a government’s budget and for actors involved, its non-monetary value as 
a strategic element of politics comes to the fore. This has particularly been 
emphasised by South African government officials; a director in the Department 
of Health stated in this regard: 
attended largely by the same people, each workshop being organised and funded, with per diems 
and expenses, by a different source from within the donor community” (Hepworth 2009, as cited 
in Policy Forum 2009: 7).
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ODA [official development cooperation] is all about what? It is all about 
foreign policy issues. It is all about strengthening our international 
relations. (Interview 18) 
South Africa has never been financially dependent on foreign aid (see Chapters 3 
and 6). A strong motivation of the government for becoming a recipient of 
official development assistance in 1994 was to re-build relationships after 
years of isolation by the international community. Obtaining financial and 
technical assistance was seen as a tool which would not only help economic 
development, but also foster political bonds and international trade.45 Even 
today, development cooperation is considered a central element of bi- and 
multilateral relations. Strengthening relationships with strategic partners is 
a main interest underlying aid which manifests in the fact that decisions on 
entering agreements for support are guided by directives from the Department 
of Foreign Affairs, as a senior official in the health department explained: 
They prioritize those governments and their relationships. So for example, 
if an interest is around, just an example, China, (…) whatever that they 
will provide or that they will give, whether we have resources on it or 
not, we have to make sure that we negotiate as to how we want to work 
together in the health sector. (Interview 18)       
The acceptance of aid is thus not solely dependent on actual needs; strategic 
considerations related to foreign policy priorities, trade or other interests play a 
role. This is not only the case in a resource-rich country such as South Africa, 
although it may have a more comfortable bargaining position than others. 
Even poorer African states, for example Benin, Kenya and Zimbabwe consider 
foreign policy interests when deciding whom to approach for assistance and 
whose offers to accept (Wright 1999). A recent study reports that Ethiopia 
“treats different donors in different ways and adapts its language and strategy 
accordingly” (Greenhill et al. 2013: 28). The fact that the Ethiopian government 
utilises aid relations in a very deliberate way is also corroborated by foreign 
policy documents and statements which emphasise the close linkage between 
development cooperation and diplomacy (Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). The case of Ethiopia 
illustrates that even highly aid-dependent countries adopt a strategic approach 
in securing assistance, taking its significance for foreign relations into account. 
45 This is outlined in an influential article published in 1993 under Nelson Mandela’s name which set 
out the direction of South Africa’s foreign policy under an ANC-led government (Mandela 1993). 
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Donor countries and aid organisations
Donor governments provide aid not out of altruism or generosity. They engage 
in development cooperation not (only) for the sake of development, but 
because it serves themselves for multiple purposes (Easterly 2002; Browne 
2006; Shikwati 2006; Lancaster 2007). While the extent to which aid is tied 
to such purposes varies, the general pattern is that political, economic and 
organisational interests are shaping donors’ aid policies. 
Political and economic interests of donor governments 
If aid was given with the aim to help those in greatest need, the poorest 
countries would receive the bulk of assistance. As statistics show, this is not 
the case. Among the top ten recipients of aid between 1980 and 2011 were 
states such as India, Iraq and China, as ranked in Table 1: 
Table 1: Top ten recipients of aid worldwide based on net ODA received 1980–2014
Rank Recipient country Net ODA received 1960–2014 in USD million
1 India 86 974
2 Egypt 86 000
3 Iraq 71 545
4 Pakistan 62 013
5 Afghanistan 61 301
6 Bangladesh 57 613
7 Vietnam 56 487
8 Ethiopia 53 166
9 Tanzania 52 870
10 China 49 433
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016b).46
Despite the international community’s claim to focus on poverty reduction, 
an OECD survey of 2012 found a significant shift in aid allocations from least 
developed countries towards middle-income countries in the Far East and 
South and Central Asia (OECD 2013b). Various scholars, notably in the field 
of development economics, have shown that historical, economic and political 
ties decisively shape the direction of aid flows: former colonial powers such as 
the United Kingdom or France still provide substantial amounts of aid to their 
46 The indicator “Net official development assistance received (current USD)” includes loans and 
grants disbursed by DAC and non-DAC countries and multilateral institutions. Data were retrieved 
on 4 August 2016. 
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ex-colonies, irrespective of the ruling regime or economic systems (Alesina 
& Dollar 2000; Berthélemy & Tichit 2004; Nunnenkamp & Thiele 2006).47, 48 
Trade linkages have a significant impact on aid allocation, with donors targeting 
assistance preferably to their most important trading partners in the developing 
world (Berthélemy & Tichit 2004; Berthélemy 2006; Nunnenkamp & Thiele 
2006; Younas 2008; Hoeffler & Outram 2011). The significance of political 
allegiance for aid is reflected by UN voting patterns: donor countries tend to 
give more aid to countries who vote in line with them (Alesina & Dollar 2000; 
Neumayer 2003; Dreher et al. 2009; Hoeffler & Outram 2011; Pincin 2012). All 
these findings indicate that donor governments select recipients not primarily 
on the basis of poverty rankings, but out of strategic considerations.49 
When official development assistance emerged after the Second World 
War, it was primarily legitimated with political interests. In the United States, 
President Truman in 1947 justified his request for economic and military aid to 
Greece and Turkey with the motivation that without assistance, both countries 
would fall under the influence of the Soviet Union. He introduced his speech 
to the Congress stating that “the foreign policy and the national security of this 
country [the United States] are involved” (Truman 1947). During the Cold 
War era, aid was widely used as a diplomatic instrument in order to win and 
keep allies, and thereby influence the geopolitical balance of power (Adamson 
2006). Other countries such as Japan and Germany began to provide aid as 
a means of export promotion (Lancaster 2007). Development as a declared 
priority of aid came of age only during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, 
shifting the focus on economic growth and (at a later stage) poverty reduction 
in the developing world (Lancaster 2007). 
Comparing legitimation patterns prevailing today, governments can broadly 
be divided into two groups: the first frames development cooperation as an 
instrument for safeguarding foreign policy and economic interests; the second 
acknowledges general interests, but emphasises the obligation of giving aid as 
47 In the period 1980–2004, 71% of UK aid and 51% of aid provided by France went to their respective 
former colonies (Hoeffler & Outram 2008: 23). Alesina and Dollar (2000: 55) found that “a non-
democratic former colony gets about twice as much aid as a democratic non-colony”.
48 In our study, interviewees in both South Africa and Tanzania highlighted the fact that donors 
preferably channel aid to regions in which they have historic ties. A South African official engaged 
in the education sector told us that when donors entered the country at the dawn of democracy, 
“they knew exactly where and who they want to support, where their missionaries were before, 
and now they were closely related to those geographic areas” (Interview 21). 
49 While development economists’ calculations generate evidence in the form of measurable results 
often presented as ‘hard facts’, we are cautious of some interpretations drawn from these findings 
insofar as they tend to include causal explanations which cannot be derived from the statistics 
produced. From our view, for instance, using only the correlation of UN voting patterns and aid 
flows as evidence for political interests in aid allocation is deficient insofar as it does not distinguish 
cause and effect. 
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an act of solidarity and shared responsibility. Exemplary justifications of aid 
in policy documents and statements of major donors are compiled in Table 2: 
Table 2: Rationales legitimating aid in donor policies
Political and economic interests Solidarity/responsibility
United States, Presidential Policy Directive on 
Global Development (22 September 2010): 
“The directive recognizes that development is 
vital to U.S. national security and is a strategic, 
economic, and moral imperative for the United 
States.  It calls for the elevation of development 
as a core pillar of American power and charts a 
course for development, diplomacy and defense 
to mutually reinforce and complement one anoth-
er in an integrated comprehensive approach to 
national security.”
The Netherlands, Letter to the House of Repre-
sentatives outlining development cooperation 
policy (2010): 
“The Netherlands has a direct interest in interna-
tional stability and security, energy and resource 
security, a well-functioning international legal 
order and a level playing field, with all the neces-
sary rules. Development cooperation is therefore 
an integral part of a broad foreign policy.”
Germany, Coalition Agreement (2009): 
“In pursuing our objectives in development policy 
our values and interests are on par (…) Foreign 
trade and development co-operation must build 
upon each other and be integrated in a seamless 
fashion. Development policy decisions must take 
sufficient account of the interests of German 
economy, particularly the needs of small and 
medium-sized companies.”
Norway, White Paper on Development Policy 
(Report No. 13, 2008–2009, to the Storting):
“The central aim of our foreign policy is to safe-
guard Norwegian interests. In development policy, 
the focus is on poor countries’ interests (...). An 
approach that includes an emphasis on common 
interests can further enhance understanding of 
and support for an active foreign and development 
policy, and can open up opportunities for new 
forms of cooperation. (…) However, the focus on 
safeguarding common interests and seeking to 
strengthen global public goods does not mean 
that the Government wishes to use development 
policy to further Norwegian economic interests 
or any other form of Norwegian self-interest. The 
objective of Norway’s development policy is to 
reduce poverty and to promote human rights.”
Sweden, Global Challenges – Our Responsibility: 
Communication on Sweden’s policy for global 
development (2008): 
“The fight against poverty in its various forms not 
only remains the overriding goal of Swedish de-
velopment cooperation but is also a central point 
of departure for the Government’s overall develop-
ment policy. Although the primary responsibility 
for poverty reduction and development lies with 
the governments of the developing countries, 
Sweden can and will contribute to equitable and 
sustainable global development. We must do 
so out of a sense of solidarity and because we 
share a responsibility for the future of the world. 
Assuming that responsibility, moreover, is in our 
own interests.”
Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2008a: 6–7); CDU et al. (2009: 64); Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009: 10); 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010: 1); The White House (2010).
Table 2 displays contrasting rationales used by donors to legitimate aid, with 
one side referring primarily to self-interests and the other to humanitarian 
motives. This division is in a way stylised since, as will be shown later, even 
in countries which emphasise the primacy of development in giving aid, other 
interests come into play. Yet, as Van der Veen (2011: 5) points out, the “frames” 
governments use to justify aid “shape the overall organization and quality of 
aid programmes” and “affect specific features, such as the total size of the aid 
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budget, or the geographical allocation of aid”.50 Donors who foreground self-
interests are likely to select recipients for their strategic importance and to 
design programmes from which they potentially profit.
The crucial role of political and economic interests in giving aid is manifest 
in the case of South Africa. When the country turned into a democracy in 
1994, a plethora of donors stood in a queue offering assistance although “by 
the usual criteria South Africa was too wealthy to qualify for much support” 
(Barber 2004: 149). Nevertheless, with USD 5 billion pledged from 1994 to 
1999, donors offered “an enormous sum compared to other (more desperate) 
African countries” (Bond 2001: 25). The main rationale of the funders, with 
the European Union, the United States and Japan at the fore, was to re-build 
relations with the most powerful country and economic hub of the African 
continent. The new ‘rainbow nation’ became an attractive recipient, and 
“everybody wanted to be seen as ‘we are assisting South Africa to rebuild 
itself’” (Interview 22). The fact that the supporters presumed political rewards 
from their new partner became obvious in situations in which South Africa 
acted against their expectations. The Taiwanese government, for instance, 
faced such a conflict. Aiming at retaining South African official recognition 
of Taiwan instead of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it presented itself 
as a generous friend to the ANC already prior to the first elections (Bond 
2001). When in 1996, South Africa reversed its position by recognising the 
PRC, “the furious Taiwanese foreign minister John Chang suspended grants to 
South Africa worth [US]$ 80 million and loans worth [US]$ 50 million” (Bond 
2001: 28). 
While Taiwan failed to ‘buy’ South Africa’s solidarity with aid, the United 
States secured itself more influence. In 1997, President Clinton’s warning to 
withdraw all aid to South Africa as a reaction to the South African Cabinet’s 
approval of arms sales to Syria – viewed as a ‘terrorist state’ by the US – showed 
the desirable effect (Barber 2004: 104): 
Although Mandela replied in March 1997 that it was immoral to abandon 
countries that had supported the ANC in the anti-apartheid fight ‘on the 
advice of countries that were friends of the apartheid regime’ (i.e. the US), 
Defence Minister Joe Modise confirmed that a marketing permit was issued 
for the arms but that, in the wake of the US warning, ‘We did not tender, 
as no documentation was received from Syria’. (Bond 2001: 29)
50 Van der Veen (2011) uses the concept of ‘frames’ to classify ideas about goals and purposes of aid. 
Drawing on legislative debates from 1950 to 2000, he provides an in-depth analysis of frames 
and their impact on aid programmes in four European countries, namely Belgium, Norway, the 
Netherlands and Italy. His findings show how prevailing ideas shape aid policy and practices of 
donor countries.  
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There are plenty of similar incidents across the developing world where aid 
(or the suspension of aid) has been used to influence decisions related to both 
foreign and domestic politics in recipient countries. In recent years, donors 
threatened to cut aid to Uganda and Malawi as a reaction to the governments’ 
homophobic positions; subsequently, Malawi repealed its anti-gay law (BBC 
News 2012), and Uganda put its harsh Anti-Homosexuality Bill temporarily 
on hold (Ndinda 2010). In Rwanda, major development partners suspended 
aid in 2012 following accusations from a UN report that the country supported 
rebels fighting in the Eastern Congo (Rwamucyo 2012). At first glance, these 
examples prompt that by withdrawing aid, the international community 
sanctions human rights violations and external intervention. A second look, 
however, reveals that criteria seem different for different countries, dependent 
on their strategic importance for the donors. Despite evidence of severe human 
rights abuses and political oppression, the Ethiopian government receives 
around USD 3 billion in aid every year (Stickler & Barr 2011). The generous 
donations of its major funders, namely the US, the EU and the UK, can be 
explained by the fact that they see President Meles Zenawi as a stable partner 
at the Horn of Africa who supports their fight against terrorism (Hagmann 
2012). 
The significance of security interests in connection with aid has strongly 
increased with the ‘war on terror’ proclaimed by the Western world after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. While security issues have 
always been part of aid considerations, scholars argue that post 2001 they have 
taken precedence over poverty or human rights concerns (Woods 2005; Aning 
2010). The “securitisation of development policy and practice (…) is manifest 
in aid rhetoric, policy discourse, institutional convergence and programming” 
(Howell & Lind 2009a: 1279; see also Howell & Lind 2009b). Articulating a causal 
linkage of poverty and terrorism, major donor governments have reframed the 
purposes and determinants of aid as an instrument serving security interests 
(Howell & Lind 2009a; Thede 2013).51 The Director-General of AusAid, Bruce 
Davis, expressed the paradigm shift in Australian aid as follows:
51 Thede (2013:  795–796) provides an impressive list of major donors who reformulated their 
missions and priorities: “In 2002 the Canadian International Development Agency’s mandate was 
revised to include supporting ‘efforts to reduce threats to Canadian security’. In 2003 the Australian 
government cited poverty reduction as secondary to security considerations in its aid programme. 
In 2003 as well Japan modified its ODA charter, adding national security as a purpose of aid and 
including the prevention of terrorism as one of its principles. In 2004 Denmark added the fight 
against terrorism to the priorities of its aid programme, and has made aid allocations dependent 
on recipient country involvement in the ‘war’ on terror. In the USA the 2004 White Paper by 
USAID presents aid as an element of security strategies in the global war on terror. In addition, the 
EU has included cooperation in counter-terrorism by recipient countries as a prerequisite for EU 
development aid.”
55
CHAPTER 4 Multiple Actors, Colliding Interests: The Main Players of the Aid Game
It was not too long ago that aid and development lay firmly on the periphery 
of serious considerations of Australia’s security and strategic interests. Aid 
was often regarded as a somewhat ill-defined process of ‘doing-good’, a 
process which had little tangible impact on the strategic environment faced 
by Australia and its policy makers. These times are now over. (Davis in a 
speech on 27 October 2005, cited in Howell & Lind 2009a: 1283) 
The new “security-first paradigm” (Aning 2010: 8) has not only brought about 
intensified collaboration and institutional tying of development and defence 
units, but has also affected the direction of funding flows, with ‘fragile states’ 
becoming prominent recipients (Howell & Lind 2009a). Various scholars have 
traced significant changes in aid allocations of Western donors, particularly the 
United States (Aning 2010; Fleck & Kilby 2010). Comparing USAID bilateral 
aid flows in the periods 1998–2001 and 2002–2005, Moss et al. (2005:  8) 
found that “Iraq and Afghanistan went from receiving virtually zero aid before 
the GWOT [Global War on Terror] to receiving two of the largest per capita 
allocations following 9/11. Jordan, already a major recipient, more than 
doubled its aid per capita from USAID”. While shifts in allocation patterns may 
be most obvious (and most frequently researched) in the case of the US, they 
are also found in a range of other donor countries (Howell & Lind 2009a). 
This suggests that the status of a country in the ‘war on terror’ has become a 
decisive variable for Western donors’ assistance decisions (Aning 2010).  
Political influence and security, however, are not the only non-
developmental objectives of aid. Economic interests are bluntly articulated 
by some donor governments and reflected in their aid agendas. In 2013, The 
Netherlands adopted a new policy titled ‘What the world deserves: A new 
agenda for aid, trade and investment’ which directly links aid and foreign trade 
(Government of the Netherlands 2013). In its coalition agreement of 2009, 
the liberal-conservative German government emphasised that “development 
policy decisions must take sufficient account of the interests of the German 
economy, particularly the needs of small and medium-sized companies” (CDU 
et al. 2009: 64). 
Development cooperation is a conduit for business. Aid projects entail 
tenders for all kinds of goods and services, ranging from vehicles, medical drugs 
and equipment to construction and advisory services in various fields. Until 
a decade ago, it was common practice that such contracts were exclusively 
awarded to companies or service providers from the respective donor country. 
For recipients, such kind of conditionality not only took away any choice, 
but raised the price of aid products by 15% to 30% and had distorting effects 
on local markets (Jepma 1991; Browne 2006; Petermann 2013). In order to 
“reduce the high transaction costs” and “improve country ownership and 
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alignment”, DAC member states committed themselves in the Paris Declaration 
to “make progress” on untying aid (OECD 2005: 5). Subsequently, the share of 
tied bilateral aid decreased from 54% in 1999–2001 to 24% in 2007 (Clay et 
al. 2009: viii). These data, however, are to be taken with caution. First, since 
donors voluntarily report the tying status of their aid to the OECD system, data 
are incomplete and inconsistent; second, they are skewed since two strongly 
tied types of aid are not covered, namely food aid and technical cooperation. 
In a country such as South Africa, which receives aid mainly in the form of 
technical assistance, the proportion of tied aid is hardly measurable due to 
a lack of donor information. Qualitative data, however, provide “evidence 
of de facto tying, with source country consultants or companies brought in to 
do work that could potentially be done domestically” (Ramkolowan & Stern 
2011: x, italics in original; see also Fölscher et al. 2010). 
The fact that donors continue to use aid to feed their own industries with 
contracts is corroborated by plain numbers: in 2012, USAID awarded only 4% 
of contracts to firms outside the United States (Piccio 2013); 18 of the top 20 
private consultancy partners used from October 2010 to March 2011 were 
based in the US (Villarino 2011). Numbers for DFID are similar: The Guardian 
revealed that only 9 out of 117 major contracts and procurement agreements 
awarded in 2011/2012 were given to non-UK firms, with the large majority 
going to well-established British consultancy companies such as Adam 
Smith International or the Mott McDonald Group (Provost & Hughes 2012). 
Considering that UK aid has officially been untied since 2001, the on-going 
dominance of domestic firms is striking. The list could be continued with data 
from various other agencies which show that large amounts of aid flow back to 
the respective donor countries’ industries (for AusAid, see Parmanand 2013; 
for GIZ, see Buss et al. 2012). Various interviewees in our study broached 
the obvious relevance of business interests in development cooperation, with 
one stating:
If you’re running a project and you want a project to get an extension, 
extended financial support, you have to ensure that there is provision 
for positions for foreign experts. Then you’re guaranteed of getting a 
continuation of that support. But I think it’s one way of job creation. 
Nothing else. (Interview 69) 
Apart from the direct gains derived from aid-related export of goods and 
services, aid brings along indirect benefits as it tends to trigger trade between 
donor and recipient countries also outside the field of development cooperation 
(Johansson & Pettersson 2005). The return of aid is thus potentially higher 
than the contract volume for donor companies arising out of aid activities. 
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A study which tried to measure both the direct and indirect effects of aid on 
export levels estimates that “aid is associated with an increase in exports of 
goods amounting to 133% of the aid” (Wagner 2003: 153), with exports of 
services not included.52 Economic gains have always been used to legitimate 
development assistance in the domestic political debate of donor countries. 
When in 1995, the Republican Party in the United States threatened to cut 
aid, Andrew Young as former US representative to the United Nations argued: 
We get a five to one return on investment in Africa, through our trade, 
investment, finance and aid. Don’t you see? We’re not aiding Africa by 
sending them aid, Africa’s aiding us. (Andrew Young as cited in Bond 
2001: 28)
Despite the significance of aid as foreign policy tool and door-opener for 
business, it would be superficial to lump donors all together and to deny that 
some give primacy to other, less selfish objectives. There are indeed countries 
which seem more guided by recipient needs than by political or economic 
interests, notably some Nordic states (Alesina & Dollar 2000). Sweden, for 
instance, has repeatedly been commended as a role model of the donor 
community with “development at the heart of its foreign policy” (OECD 
2013a: 16), as an OECD report put it. In 2012, Sweden’s official development 
assistance amounted to almost 1% of its gross national income which exceeds 
the international target of 0.7% set by the UN. Allocating the major share of its 
aid flows to least developing countries, mostly in sub-Sahara Africa, the country 
adheres to its policy which emphasises poverty reduction as the primary goal 
of Swedish development cooperation (OECD 2013a). Yet, although Sweden 
underlines “solidarity with poor and vulnerable people in other countries” 
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2003: 18) as main rationale for support, it does 
factor in other interests.53 In its 2008 policy for Africa, the government outlines 
a comprehensive approach to development which integrates security, aid and 
trade issues, stating: 
52 Wagner (2003: 171) estimates “that 35 cents out of every dollar of aid comes directly back to the 
donor for exports of goods related to the aid-financed project and that another 98 cents finds its 
way back to the donor for exports of goods not directly linked to aid projects. These measurements 
exclude exports of services, which surely comprise a significant part of donors’ exports to recipients.”
53 The Swedish government is also increasingly pushed to consider non-developmental interests by 
domestic players which potentially gain from aid. In 2006, a consortium of Swedish exporters 
(including Volvo, Ericsson and Tetra Pak, amongst others) sent a letter to the minister for trade 
and industry in which they called for a closer involvement of the Swedish private sector in foreign 
aid, arguing that industry’s engagement would create “many qualified job prospects in Sweden” 
(Greenhill 2006: 34).
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Economic ties in the form of trade and investment benefit African as well 
as Swedish commercial interests, a potential that should be exploited more 
extensively. The Government intends to collaborate with the private sector 
so as to protect and promote Swedish business relations with Africa. Closer 
political contacts, cooperation in the international arena and cultural 
exchange can be stimulated by and contribute to stronger and deeper 
economic relations. (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2008b: 21)
Clearly, aid must be seen as a policy instrument which serves multiple interests 
at the same time, ranging from global development, poverty reduction and 
wealth creation to political influence, security and trade. While in every 
donor county, all of these interests to some extent play a role in giving aid, 
governments prioritise them in different orders. The ranking of priorities 
sets the agenda for those who deliver development assistance, namely the 
respective aid bureaucracies and organisations. In order to understand how 
these bodies operate, it is instructive to take a closer look at the organisational 
structures of bi- and multilateral aid providers. 
Organisational structures of bi- and multilateral aid providers 
Donor countries have established a range of different set-ups for development 
cooperation. Bilateral aid organisations vary particularly with regard to their 
affiliation with foreign affairs and their presence ‘in the field’ (OECD 2009a). 
Considering these features, we can broadly differentiate three organisational 
models. 
In the first one, development cooperation units are directly affiliated with 
the ministry of foreign affairs or are even an integral part of it. Denmark, 
for instance, has fully shifted the responsibility for planning, implementing 
and monitoring official development assistance to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Its representations abroad, namely the Danish embassies and missions, 
manage aid in the respective recipient countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Denmark 2014). 
While similar structures are also found in Norway, Finland and the 
Netherlands, other countries have institutionally separated development 
cooperation and foreign affairs. The United Kingdom, for instance, has 
established the Department for International Development (DFID) as a 
standalone authority independent from the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office. Led by a secretary of state who is member of the cabinet, DFID has 
a very strong standing of its own and “enjoys an unambiguous relationship 
with other ministries, which allows it to influence cross government thinking 
on development policy” (OECD 2009a: 16). While DFID offices in recipient 
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countries are often housed in British embassies’ venues, they are not 
subordinate to them. Similarly autonomous are the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) and, until 2013, the Australian Agency for 
International Development.54 
Finally, there is a third model of managing aid adopted by a range of donor 
countries in which a superior authority is responsible for policy and decision-
making, but a separate agency exists for the delivery of aid.55 In Germany, 
for instance, the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) commissions the German development agency GIZ to implement aid 
activities. As a federal enterprise, GIZ has its own offices in recipient countries 
and operates as the executing arm of the BMZ in the field. Likewise, USAID, 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) function as implementing agencies 
for the governments of the United States, Sweden and Japan, respectively 
(OECD 2009a: 33). 
In addition to bilateral channels, donors use multilateral organisations and 
global funding mechanisms for allocating aid which usually have a three-tier 
system comprising headquarters, regional and country offices. In the period 
2001–2011, “multilateral ODA has risen from [USD] 27 billion to [USD] 38 
billion, accounting for close to one-third of gross ODA” (OECD 2012a: 11). For 
donor governments, multilateral agencies offer economies of scale and scope, 
a global outreach, and the potential to influence the international agenda in 
the respective field of specialisation, amongst others (see Martens 2008). Also, 
intergovernmental bodies are usually regarded as “more objective aid-givers 
who tend to allocate aid according to need and the potential effectiveness of 
aid allocations” (Schneider & Tobin 2010: 2) rather than to individual donor 
priorities. In fact, by pooling their funds, governments to some extent lose 
control over their money as “key decisions on what, where and how it is actually 
delivered are taken at supranational level” (OECD 2011a: 9). The perceived 
neutrality of multilateral aid, however, is misleading. The fact that governments 
try to influence aid policies of the multilateral agency according to their own 
priorities is reflected in strategic documents. The US administration under 
President Obama, for instance, emphasised the importance of multilateral aid 
in two seminal documents in 2010, namely the Presidential Policy Directive 
on Global Development and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 
Review. While the former states that the US will “redouble our efforts to 
54 On 1 November 2013, AusAid ceased to exist as an independent agency when it was merged into 
the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; at the time of writing, the re-structuring 
process was still on-going (Australian Government 2013). 
55 The superior authority can either be related to foreign affairs or be an independent development 
cooperation entity. 
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support, reform, and modernize multilateral development organizations most 
critical to our interests” (White House 2010), the latter outlines how such 
organisations should be used to foster the US agenda: 
Multilateral diplomacy is a specialized skill set that allows us to advance 
American interests across a wide range of multilateral organizations. 
We must expand the ranks of diplomats skilled in multilateral 
diplomacy and improve the links between our multilateral and bilateral 
diplomacy, especially with respect to our engagement with the United 
Nations. Multilateral diplomats must both maintain relationships with 
international organizations themselves and mobilize member-states to 
support our priorities in those organizations. (Department of State & 
USAID 2010: 55) 
The extent to which individual governments are able to foster strategic 
interests through multilateral organisations strongly depends on the allocation 
of power within the respective institutions. In United Nations agencies, the 
presence of countries in decision-making bodies is usually based on inclusion 
and rotation mechanisms established to ensure that the interests and needs of 
all member states are equally taken into account, irrespective of their political 
or financial strength.56 The World Bank as a multilateral financing institution, 
in contrast, has established a system in which countries’ economic performance 
and financial contribution to the Bank are determinants of decision-making 
authority (Stumm 2011).57 The majority of voting power lies in the hands of 
high-income countries, with the five main contributors alone holding 37% 
of all votes (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2013). 
The US as the largest shareholder with over 15% effectively has a veto on 
fundamental changes in the Bank. Consequently, the World Bank’s overall 
56 The World Health Organization, for instance, is governed by the World Health Assembly, the 
Executive Board and the Secretariat (World Health Organization 1946:  4). The Assembly as 
the supreme decision-making body is formed by delegates from all 194 member states. Taking 
into account an equitable geographical distribution, the Assembly elects 34 members entitled to 
designate a technically qualified person to serve on the Executive Board over a period of three 
years (World Health Organization 1946). In 2013, the Board was composed of seven delegates from 
the African continent, six from the Americas, three from South-East Asia, eight from Europe, five 
from the Eastern Mediterranean countries, and five from the Western Pacific region (World Health 
Organization 2013). 
57 This applies to the allocation of the influential Executive Director positions and voting power: Five 
of the 25 Executive Director positions are given to the largest shareholders of the Bank – currently 
France, the United States, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development et al. 2013). All member states receive votes consisting of basic 
votes plus additional votes according to their share of the Bank’s capital stock held (World Bank 
2012c), which leads to appalling power imbalances between developing and developed countries 
(Vestergaard 2011).
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agenda is strongly driven by the strategic interests of the most powerful 
Western countries, while member states from the developing world have little 
say.  
To what extent headquarters of bi- and multilateral organisations shape 
aid on the ground strongly depends on the decision-making autonomy 
of the respective agents in the field.58 The degree of authority delegated to 
staff in country offices varies considerably, both with regard to funding and 
programmatic issues. While some enjoy full financial authority over their 
country budget, others are not allowed to take any decisions on disbursements 
(OECD 2009b:  5–6).59 Similar differences exist when it comes to decision-
making on priorities and modalities of support. DFID’s country offices, as well 
as the embassies of Norway and Denmark, for instance, enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy in terms of formulating country strategies, designing programmes 
and implementing activities. While the superior authority at the central level 
has the final say in approvals, country-based staff has a broad leeway to tailor 
cooperation to the demands of local counterparts. In Tanzania, the Dutch are 
well known for their responsiveness in this regard, as stated in an assessment 
of the Netherlands’ programme: 
In the health sector, the Tanzanian government appreciated Dutch flexibility 
to re-direct support to fill crucial gaps based on what was needed in Tanzania, 
rather than what was in vogue at home. (OECD 2011d: 20–21)
The WHO adopts a similarly flexible approach. Although country strategies 
based on the global agenda and regional directions provide the broad 
framework for technical support, concrete activities are negotiated at the 
country-level between WHO staff and the local actors within the ministries 
and departments.60 
58 Donors differ widely with regard to the allocation of staff between headquarters and ‘the field’. The 
assumption that a higher share of staff in the field goes along with a higher degree of flexibility 
and responsiveness, however, does not hold true. The decisive factor in this regard is the degree of 
decision-making authority in the field, as elucidated above. 
59 According to a study conducted by the OECD in 2009, nine of 19 DAC donors do not allow their 
field staff to make any financial commitments. In contrast, “DFID field offices can commit up to 
USD 15 million, and the Netherlands and Norway can delegate full commitment authority to the 
field within budget limits” (OECD 2009b: 5).
60 Globally, the WHO is guided by its “Eleventh General Programme of Work 2006–2015” (World 
Health Organization 2006) and the “Medium-Term Strategic Plan 2008–2013” (World Health 
Organization 2008). Further, there are regional policy documents, as, for example, the “Strategic 
directions for WHO 2010–2015” in the African region (World Health Organization 2010). Yet, 
WHO country strategies emphasise that technical assistance is solely provided upon the request 
of governments and fully guided by their respective priorities (World Health Organization 2009b; 
World Health Organization 2009c).
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Contrary to these examples, there are organisations which maintain highly 
centralised decision-making structures. World Bank headquarters exert 
significant influence on the country assistance strategies that determine the 
Bank’s scope of support. Each single project has to be submitted to the Bank’s 
board of executive directors for consideration and approval (World Bank 
2012b). Some bilateral donors, particularly those that use executing agencies, 
have similar centralised set-ups. USAID, for instance, is to a large extent driven 
by directives from Washington where the global agenda is set.61 Changes of 
priorities at the central level immediately affect activities on the ground. When 
the agency released its new education strategy ‘Opportunity through learning’ 
in 2011, country offices world-wide had to align the fit of their on-going activities 
with the new directive. With goal one being “improved reading skills for 100 
million children in primary grades by 2015” (USAID 2011), “every USAID 
office around the globe has to show outcomes in readings” (Interview 42), 
an education specialist at USAID in Tanzania reported. Consequently, he had 
to justify before his superiors in Washington programmatic elements dealing 
with math and science which in light of the new strategy were perceived as 
“out of alignment” (Interview 42). 
Categorising aid organisations by the extent of their decision-making 
autonomy at the country-level, we can differentiate two types: the first 
one with little autonomy functions as a service-provider implementing the 
directives of its superior authority. There is a clear-cut institutional separation 
between decision-making and the delivery of aid. The second type is more 
than just an executing arm of respective headquarters. It is the sub-agent 
of the donor country on the ground, responsible not only for implementing 
activities, but also authorised to take financial and programmatic decisions. 
Although the superior authority gives overall guidance, representatives in the 
field have a relatively broad room for manoeuvre in prioritising their support. 
Legitimating and organising aid: Donor typology
We can draw the following conclusions from the above: first, bi- and multilateral 
aid is to a varying extent driven by strategic interests of donor governments 
which use different rationales for providing assistance. While some frame aid 
as an instrument to foster their own political and economic interests, others 
justify it as a humanitarian act and a matter of responsibility. Second, the 
extent to which the donor’s domestic agenda determines aid activities very 
61 As an example, the global strategy “PEPFAR Blueprint: Creating an AIDS-free generation” (United 
States of America, Department of State 2012) released by the US State Department on World 
AIDS Day 2012 became the guiding document for the US AIDS response world-wide and heavily 
influenced second-generation PEPFAR programmes at country-level. 
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much depends on the degree of authority delegated to the agents in the field 
(i.e. staff in country offices or embassies). 
Both features, legitimation patterns and organisational structures, determine 
the extent to which aid is tied to a certain donor agenda or responsive to 
recipients’ priorities. Combining the two variables, four different types of 
donors emerge as displayed in Figure 3: Type I represents donors that subject 
aid to strategic self-interests and strongly direct the delivery of aid from a central 
level, making sure it adheres to the headquarters’ agenda. Type II donors set an 
agenda led by vested interests, but concede a high degree of decision-making 
autonomy to staff in the field which allows for greater responsiveness to 
counterpart demands. Type III donors delegate less authority to country offices 
and representations, but are led by the principle of placing recipient needs over 
self-interests. Type IV is the antipode to the first one: guided by solidarity as 
political rationale for aid, donors of this type refrain from (strongly) tying aid 
to self-interests and delegate the responsibility for aid mainly to the field.
Figure 3: Donor typology based on aid rationales and decision-making structures
Source: Authors’ own illustration.
Organisational interests of aid agencies
Donor governments use different conduits for channelling aid, ranging from 
different types of bilateral agencies to multilateral organisations. While these 
bodies vary in terms of mandates, missions and structures, they share one 
decisive feature: their primary organisational goal is ‘moving money’ (Easterly 
2002:  22; Gould 2005a:  150). The legitimacy of aid organisations is based 
on aid delivery. Given the difficulty in assessing the quality of delivered aid 
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in terms of actual change achieved in recipient countries, performance is 
measured against the volume of money disbursed. Although in recent years 
more emphasis has been put on observable outcomes of support (e.g. more 
children in schools), aid organisations still justify their work in terms of input, 
that is, money spent (Easterly 2002:  21): The World Bank on its country 
website for Tanzania mainly displays lending commitments and informs that 
“since 1995 the Bank has provided more than USD 6 billion to Tanzania in 
credits and grants” (World Bank 2013b). In the GIZ 2012 Annual Report, the 
state secretary of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development in his function as chairman of the GIZ supervisory board declared 
that “GIZ made excellent progress by doing business worth over EUR 2 billion, 
and gaining an even firmer foothold on the international cooperation market 
for sustainable development” (GIZ 2013a: 5). The Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, presenting its performance against the strategic goal of tackling 
poverty and global inequality, noted that in 2012, “development assistance 
was increased by DKK 234 million and this amount will increase by a further 
DKK 366 million in 2013” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2013: 16). 
The fact that aid providers “redefine inputs to development as outputs” 
(Easterly 2002: 21) yields the logic that the more they spend the better. This 
equally holds true for creditor institutions that work towards higher lending 
volumes, for aid agencies that aim at increasing business volumes and for 
bureaucracies that seek to expand their budgets.62, 63 In the case of the latter, 
the disbursement imperative is exacerbated by the risk that “parliaments will 
react forcefully if approved allocations are not disbursed” (Gould & Ojanen 
2005: 22), that is, cut the ministry’s budget. 
The spending pressure pervading aid organisations has significant effects on 
the ground. First, it leads to donor-financed activities which lack any need on 
the recipient’s side, being solely organised for the sake of shifting money. A 
former GIZ programme manager told us: 
We had situations where (…) we received the directive to disburse around 
twelve thousand Euro within the next six weeks. Twelve thousand Euros 
are a hell of a lot of money to spend in a Tanzanian district. So what 
to do? I conduct a workshop as this is the fastest way to ditch money. 
(Interview 73, translated by authors)
62 The conception of the German aid agency GIZ as a company pursuing entrepreneurial goals has 
been underlined by GIZ staff interviewed, with one stating: “We are an enterprise and this has 
been pushed a lot in recent years, with our current chairman of the supervisory board being one 
of the drivers of this development. (…) GIZ is clearly drilled on business, we deliver by order.” 
(Interview 4, translated by authors)
63 For the budget-maximising goals of bureaucracies, see Niskanen (1971, repr. 2007). 
65
CHAPTER 4 Multiple Actors, Colliding Interests: The Main Players of the Aid Game
Second, donor staff tend to refrain from withholding funds even if interventions 
fail to materialise or irregularities emerge. The organisational target to deliver 
what has been agreed tends to precede concerns about the usage of aid. An 
interviewee working at GIZ commented in this regard: 
There were and there are cases of corruption in Tanzania where one 
wonders why certain donors did not suspend payments and instead just 
said, ‘we continue to transfer money.’ There you think there should be 
other interests on donor side. (Interview 72, translated by authors)
The “disbursement anxiety” dominating the donor community is not only 
related to “concerns of institutional survival” (Gould & Ojanen 2005: 22). It 
also drives donor staff at an individual level since professional careers depend 
on the volume of project or programme budgets and the timeliness of delivery 
(Gould 2005a: 139–140; Mummert 2013: 59). Thus, neither aid organisations 
nor their functionaries have an incentive to make themselves redundant by 
reducing aid flows and the need for assistance. If they succeeded in solving the 
problems of developing countries, their very existence would be at stake. The 
Kenyan economist James Shikwati, an outspoken opponent of foreign aid, 
thus states that “it is not in the interest of the aid industry to promote African 
homegrown solutions, because it feeds on the African problem” (Shikwati 
2006: 4). 
The epistemic community of development experts 
The aid industry provides employment opportunities for a broad range of 
professionals, ranging from bureaucrats to drivers. Its core cadre, however, 
is formed by experts who sell their knowledge and act as brokers in the 
field of development cooperation.64 Operating on the ground, they serve as 
intermediaries between donor and recipient governments. Experts’ brokerage 
facilitates the transfer of monetary and non-monetary resources from one side 
to the other, putting them in a crucial middle position in the aid arena where 
they constitute a ‘strategic group’ with distinct interests (Bierschenk 1988; 
Evers 2005). In the triad of aid relations, this group takes on the role of the 
‘tertius gaudens’ (Simmel 1950: 154 et seq.) that benefits from the opportunity 
to make profits and increase its own status, to accumulate power and expand 
64 We draw here on brokerage as a mechanism enabling disconnected groups to politically, 
economically or socially interact via a third party which helps resources (e.g. goods, money, 
information, opportunities) to flow across the gap. For details on the concept, see Stovel and Shaw 
(2012). 
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its scope of influence. In the following chapter, development experts are 
described as a transnational epistemic community with a particular stock of 
shared knowledge whose roles and activities help to explain their impact in 
recipient countries. 
Development experts: An epistemic community with knowledge as strategic resource
The rise of the ‘knowledge for development paradigm’ brought about the 
emergence of a global network of professionals who have become increasingly 
powerful: development experts in various roles and positions whose 
dominance is based on their ascribed expert knowledge on ‘development’ 
and all fields supposedly related to it. Haas (1992) defines such a “network 
of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area” an “epistemic community”. Although members may 
come from different disciplines and backgrounds, they share a set of normative 
and causal beliefs, notions of validity and a common policy enterprise, “that 
is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their 
professional competence is directed” (Haas 1992: 3). Their authority to diffuse 
their specific truth is based on the superior status of their knowledge which is 
both claimed by themselves and acknowledged by a given society and its elite 
(Haas 1992: 17). 
In the realm of aid, these features apply to the epistemic community of 
development experts. Consisting of professionals from a great variety of 
disciplines, its members share basic concepts and ideas that construct a 
reality in which goals and strategies increasingly converge (Evers 2005: 11).65 
Their power to define ‘development’ and development problems, and their 
legitimacy in providing suitable solutions rests on the expert knowledge they 
claim to possess and the accepted authority of their expertise. This knowledge 
has five distinct characteristics: (1) a claim to authority borrowed from science; 
(2) a high degree of self-referentiality; (3) being permeated with economic 
and managerial knowledge; (4) a claim to universal applicability; and (5) the 
potential to transnationally diffuse a distinct set of norms and values. 
What makes an expert an expert: Qualification criteria and professional backgrounds
In order to identify epistemic characteristics of development experts’ knowledge 
and the sources of their expertise, it is a useful starting point to look at formal 
65 The Millenium Development Goals proclaimed at the Millenium Summit in the year 2000 and agreed 
by 23 international organisations and 192 countries impressively illustrate the homogenisation 
tendency in the global development discourse. 
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qualification criteria and career backgrounds. They may indicate ‘what makes 
an expert an expert’.
Comparing eligibility criteria for advisory-related positions, the most 
obvious pattern is the requirement for an advanced university degree even 
at the lowest levels. To enter the so-called “Professional and Technical career 
path” at the World Bank, for instance, “advanced academic achievements and/
or technical professional credentials such as Masters or PhD” (World Bank 
2012d) are obligatory. In fact, a PhD is seen as essential for high-level advisory 
positions and promotion within the organisation (Dietrich 2006). In our 
sample, all interviewees working for an international organisation at least had 
a masters degree, one out of three a PhD. 
A noticeable aspect related to the experts’ academic background is where 
they have received their professional training. Among the foreign experts (i.e. 
experts who are not South African or Tanzanian nationals), 89% have acquired 
their highest level of education either in North America (US or Canada) or in 
Europe, the remaining 11% in both a developing and a developed country. 
Among the South African or Tanzanian nationals working for a donor 
organisation, two out of three have earned a degree in the West; only one 
out of three received their education solely in South Africa or Tanzania. This 
supports the observation that the expert community in the development 
arena is dominated by graduates whose expertise is certified with academic 
credentials achieved at Anglo-American or European universities.66 In the case 
of the World Bank, many of them pass through the same schools, especially 
those of the US Ivy league and British elite universities such as the London 
School of Economics (Dietrich 2006: 33).67 
The range of subjects studied by staff in international organisations is broad. 
In the sample interviewed, the majority is related to health sciences, educational 
sciences and natural/environmental sciences which corresponds to the policy 
fields of the study; the remainder can be categorised into economics and 
financial management, international relations/development studies and other 
social sciences. Many respondents specified more than one discipline. In many 
educational profiles, sector-specific studies were combined with additional 
training in public administration or development, for instance, “Sustainable 
Development and Environmental Studies, Public Financial Management, 
66 Given that our study focused on traditional donors and did not include agencies from emerging 
donors such as Brazil or India, one may criticise that the results presented are geographically 
biased. However, as European, North American and multilateral agencies still are the dominant 
organisations in aid, we argue that our sample, which includes experts working for 13 different 
agencies, provides a valid basis for our conclusion.
67 In her study on World Bank careers, Dietrich (2006: 33) cites a staff member saying: “A colleague 
of mine told me that there are more than 70 different nationalities working for the Bank, but they 
all come from ten different graduate schools.”
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International Studies”, “Public Health and International Development” or 
“Environment and Society and MBA”. The variety and the cross-disciplinary 
nature of educational backgrounds is a common pattern identified in the aid 
community which is the result of a shift towards multi-sectoral approaches and 
‘cross-cutting’ issues (e.g. ‘good governance’) requiring “good team players 
who can work across sector boundaries”, as a World Bank report put it (World 
Bank 2005a: 34). 
In all fields of development aid, management and administrative skills have 
increasingly gained importance. Several interviewees on both the recipient 
and donor side noticed a remarkable shift in employment practices in the sense 
that sector specialists in country offices have been replaced by administrators, 
accountants and economists. A South African government official responsible 
for international relations delineated this development as follows: 
Now what you then have in the period 1995 to let’s just say 2000 if I had 
to mark it (…) is that foreign governments would place in development 
cooperation offices experts and people who had great interest in the 
transformation agenda in South Africa. And these were experts in their 
fields. Now what happens after that period is that you find administrators 
coming in, who have a very different interest and approach to development 
issues. So that’s I think a very critical issue. (Interview 21) 
The changing composition of advisory cadres is closely related to the changing 
nature of advisory positions and responsibilities. A study on DFID’s use of 
advisors confirms this shift: 
There has been a move towards promoting interdisciplinarity, cross-sector 
working, and therefore multi-sector posts. This trend can be seen in the 
emergence of ‘results advisers’, ‘poverty advisers’, MDG advisers etc. (…). 
As DFID has placed more emphasis on defining core competencies and 
on ensuring they align with corporate strategy this has led to a stronger 
emphasis on management skills and experience. (Mendizabal et al. 
2012: x)
Aside from the shift related to educational backgrounds and the respective 
expertise of advisors, a second aspect of qualification is in flux, namely the 
scope and nature of development experts’ work experience. In this regard, the 
DFID study states that 
whereas a decade ago DFID advisers had substantial professional 
background and experience, recruited mid-career and of an older age, 
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advisers are being recruited earlier in their careers with less experience, 
and are unable to offer advice with the same depth. (Mendizabal et al. 
2012: 11)
Similarly, a World Bank report finds that in some regions, 
the number of team leaders with less than three years experience in the 
Bank is relatively significant. For example, in the Africa Region the 
staff profile is becoming less experienced at a time when the operational 
challenges call for more experience, knowledge of what works and how 
to do it, and capability to help enhance country capacity. (World Bank 
2005a: 37)
Many experts enter international organisations relatively soon after finishing 
their studies with little work experience in their profession outside the 
development domain. This tendency is supported by an increasing number of 
programmes for young professionals designed to bridge the time span between 
graduation and advisory positions, and provide a stepping stone for a straight-
forward career in the aid community.68 
International experience, preferably in the development world, is a crucial 
asset for this career. Once in the business, advisors accumulate assignments 
in a remarkable list of developing countries, staying at one place on average 
for two to four years.69 The professional profiles indicate a high degree of 
international mobility, with experts shifting from one developing country to 
the next or commuting between headquarters and the ‘field’.70 Interestingly, 
language skills and cultural knowledge seem to be of minor importance for 
the secondment to a host country. In our sample, 83% of the foreign experts 
68 Examples are the Junior Professional Officer Programme of the United Nations agencies (UNDP 
2013a), the World Bank’s Young Professional Programme (World Bank 2012f) or the Development 
Cooperation Trainee Programme offered by GIZ (GIZ 2013b). All of these programmes require a 
university degree at the masters level, around two years of practical experience (preferably in a 
developing country), and set the age limit for applicants between 30 and 32 years. 
69 In our sample, 72% of the foreign experts indicated they would stay in South Africa and Tanzania, 
respectively, for 2 to 4 years (11% between 5 and 7 years, 16.6% permanently). Nationals working 
for development organisations, in contrast, show a different pattern in this regard: many have a 
permanent contract for working in the respective country office. In our sample, six out of seven 
‘national’ experts who gave details about the duration of their stay are deployed on a permanent 
basis (answer “unlimited”).
70 The internal regulations with regard to rotation differ. While some organisations do not set strict 
rules, others apply specific rotation principles and limit the duration of stay in overseas offices to a 
certain time span after which staff has to go back to headquarters for a while. The justification for 
this practice mentioned in interviews is to ensure that experts keep up with headquarters’ policies 
and professional knowledge, and avoid ‘going native’ in the field. 
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did not have basic knowledge of Kiswahili or Afrikaans, respectively.71 Both in 
South Africa and Tanzania, the working language between advisors and their 
counterparts is English, the primary global language used within the expert 
community. 
The brief glance at professional backgrounds and careers allows a first 
characterisation of the epistemic group of development experts: they share 
a common belief in ‘development’ and interest in providing knowledge-
based concepts for the same. The formal criteria qualifying members for 
their professional activity is first of all technical knowledge acquired through 
high-level academic training. This specialised knowledge is combined with 
managerial skills and merged with practical experience gained primarily within 
the professional field of development cooperation. 
Implications for the nature of development knowledge
Based on these patterns, the knowledge shared by the epistemic community 
of development experts shows five distinct characteristics. First, development 
experts’ expertise derives its credibility from the reference to scientific knowledge 
and the adoption of scientific styles of presentation. Expert knowledge is 
certified by academic degrees usually acquired in developed countries of the 
North. Although aid experts are not part of the science community, nor do 
they (regularly) participate in the scientific discourse, the authority of their 
advice is to a significant extent based on the claimed scientific grounding; it is 
an authority borrowed from the truth claim of science.72 
Secondly, the expertise aid experts provide is neither based solely on scientific 
nor on professional knowledge outside the development domain. The working 
experience of advisors remains restricted, given the direct entry into the aid 
business. The generation of practical knowledge is thus primarily taking place 
within the realm of development cooperation. Consequently, a specific type of 
‘development knowledge’ emerges that is highly self-referential.73 
71 Among the foreign experts interviewed, only three had attended a language course before coming 
into the country. In general, preparatory training before going into the field does not seem to 
be standard: two out of three experts in the sample had not received any technical, cultural or 
language training courses prior to their arrival in the country. The fact that only a small number of 
organisations – in our sample Norway, Sweden, GIZ and USAID – provide preparatory courses is 
remarkable as one third of the interviewees in the study perceive cultural differences as problematic 
or even extremely problematic. More than half of the sample (54%) assesses different styles of 
communication as a major obstacle for cooperation.
72 Text (studies, evaluations, reports etc.) produced in the context of development cooperation 
resembles scientific publications in terms of formal characteristics such as the style of writing and 
referencing.
73 The self-referential nature of development knowledge is displayed in texts produced in the context 
of development projects, which primarily refer to publications produced within the aid community. 
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Thirdly, while the stock of knowledge on development comprises a variety 
of specialist knowledge, it is increasingly permeated with economics and 
managerial thinking. This is evidenced by a rising demand for specialised 
economists (such as health or environmental economists) and an increasing 
number of generalists and administrators filling expert positions. The changing 
composition of expertise impacts on advisory processes insofar as it leads to a 
primacy of procedural and finance-related aspects within cooperation (see also 
Chapter 5). 
Fourthly, the mobility of experts and the establishment of global knowledge 
networks suggest that the epistemic community regards its specific development 
knowledge as locally unbound and transferable. The practice of adopting and 
testing ideas and concepts in different countries around the globe implies a 
validity claim of universal application (Evers et al. 2009).
Such a claim ignores the contextual nature of knowledge (i.e. that knowledge 
is infused with norms and values).74 As Haas (1992: 4) points out, an epistemic 
community’s advice “is informed by its own broader worldview”. In the aid 
context, expert knowledge transmits a distinct perspective on development 
and democratic governance as constructed by the donor community. The 
potential to transnationally diffuse norms and values affiliated with these 
concepts is the fifth significant characteristic of the knowledge promulgated 
by the epistemic community of development experts. As will be shown in 
the pursuant case studies, the specific nature of development knowledge has 
distinct implications for advisory processes and the impact of expertise. 
Representatives, advisors, and consultants: Typology of experts in the field 
While sharing a transnational epistemic culture and using knowledge as a 
‘strategic resource’ (Evers et al. 1988; Evers 2005), development experts take on 
different roles and operate at various levels in recipient countries. The positions 
they hold differ in terms of employment conditions, authority and functions, 
particularly with regard to the linkage of administrative, programmatic and 
advisory responsibilities. Taking these aspects into account, one can broadly 
differentiate three types of experts in the field: representatives, advisors and 
(short-term) consultants. 
With job titles ranging from senior policy advisor, programme director or 
counsellor to first secretary for a specific sector, experts which we categorise 
as representatives are assigned to fulfil a combination of administrative, 
programmatic and advisory functions, and are usually deployed for a period 
74 For the context specificity and constructiveness of knowledge, see Berger and Luckmann (1966); 
Knorr-Cetina (1981); Knorr-Cetina (1984). 
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of three to four years. Placed in the country office of an organisation or in 
the embassy of a donor country, they administrate a sector portfolio or 
programme, being responsible for both overseeing funding flows and progress. 
Acting as official representatives of their organisation, they also participate in 
high-level meetings in which priorities and scope of support are negotiated. 
At the same time, they are regularly engaged in policy discussions and closely 
interact with senior government officials and policy-makers. An exemplary 
job description of UNDP for the position of a “Programme Specialist Energy 
and Climate Change” in Tanzania illustrates the broad range of responsibilities, 
listing 36 points of duties which comprise “substantive support to national 
counterparts in policy planning and advocacy”, “participation and leadership 
in the joint identification of programmatic and policy issues to be addressed 
and formulation of joint programme strategies” and “oversight of planning, 
budgeting, implementing and monitoring of designated UNDP projects, and 
monitoring the use of financial resources in accordance with UNDP rules and 
regulations” (UNDP 2012). 
Experts in such a multifunctional position are not necessarily sector 
specialists in the sense that they have a training background in the field they 
are concerned with. For the UNDP job above, the educational requirement 
was a masters degree or higher in the field of science, engineering, economics, 
development or a related field. A DFID education advisor in our sample was 
trained in geographic information science. A CIDA education team leader with 
a background in international affairs and development studies explained: 
I’m a generalist, basically, and that’s fairly typical for who CIDA puts 
in positions like mine. (…) Our expertise is more in how to work with 
governments, and how to work with our headquarters, and how to get 
projects approved, and through the process and so on, and then how to 
manage resources as needed. (Interview 30)
The tendency to employ generalists instead of specialists is supported by the 
increasing number of hybrid posts covering more than one sector. DFID in 
Tanzania, for example, in 2004 had established an advisory position responsible 
for education, water and health (Mendizabal et al. 2012).75 As will be discussed 
later (see Chapter  5), the move away from sector specialists has significant 
implications for advisory processes as it changes the expertise provided in 
policy discussions. 
75 While the establishment of a hybrid advisor reduced staff costs in the Tanzanian country office, 
it also led to a decreased influence of DFID, particularly in health. An evaluation concluded that 
hybrid advisors are not suited to influence policies in multiple sectors simultaneously, with advisors 
struggling to provide substantial input at a technical level (Mendizabal et al. 2012). 
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Compared to representatives, the work of the second type of experts 
categorised here as advisors is less concerned with representational and 
administrative tasks and more focused on providing technical expertise. Advisors 
are usually trained as specialists in the area they are involved in and deployed 
to assist in a specific process over a period of on average one to four years. They 
are often physically placed in the government ministry or department in order 
to closely interact with their counterparts who are usually senior government 
officials in the highest ranks of the technical cadre. A typical example is the 
Health Policy, Planning and Management Advisor of Danida’s health sector 
support (2009–2014) who was embedded in the Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare in Tanzania and supposed to closely liaise with the director of policy and 
planning and the chief medical officer (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 
& Government of Tanzania 2009). Similarly, DFID seconded a senior health 
advisor to the South African Department of Health who in the context of a 
comprehensive programme directly advised the director-general on on-going 
reform processes (DFID South Africa 2013). Advisors thus operate within the 
inner circle of governments. Their deployment is justified in terms of ‘capacity 
gaps’ in recipient authorities which they are expected to fill and at the same 
time to transfer knowledge and skills to their counterparts.76 
The third type of expert is the consultant hired by development organisations 
and/or recipient institutions for the delivery of expertise in the form of specific 
products, such as appraisal and feasibility studies, mid-term and final evaluations, 
expenditure tracking surveys, guidelines, etc. The time frame for short-term 
consultancies is usually far less than a year, on average ranging from a few weeks 
to six months. In many cases consultancies are solely based on the analysis of 
records and written documents. The interaction with ministerial staff is mostly 
limited to gaining information and access to data sources from the local institution. 
To what extent recipients take up reports and recommendations is out of the 
consultant’s responsibility and control, as a Finnish specialist acknowledged: 
Doing consultancy is much like you do short term things and then you 
write a report and even if you manage to communicate very well about it 
to the people with whom you’ve worked, then you don’t know if something 
is done, if your recommendations are really being implemented or what 
happens after that. (Interview 36)
In aid-receiving countries donor experts of all three types “work in a routinised 
fashion at the centre of policy making” (Harrison 2004: 90). Comparing their 
potential influence, the short-term consultant is at the lower end. Several 
76 The intricacies of this task will be discussed in Chapter 5.
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interviewees assessed the impact of consultancies as marginal. As a GIZ advisor 
in South Africa put it: 
Arriving as a short-term consultant, you hand in your analysis, here is the 
report, these are the recommendations. They say, ‘Yes, thank you’ – and 
put it in the shelf. (Interview 4, translated by authors) 
The other two types of experts, in contrast, have a broader scope of impact. 
Advisors seconded to counterpart ministries interact with senior officials 
on a daily basis, operating at the highest technical level of government. 
Representatives may less directly take a hand in particular issues, but instead 
shape the strategic direction of sector discussions. Investigating the impact of 
external experts in South Africa and Tanzania, it is thus crucial to consider 
their different roles and levels of influence in the realm of policy-making. 
Advisory activities of development experts
The omnipresence of development experts in the respective government 
agencies of aid-receiving countries provokes a simple question: what do these 
experts actually do, that is, what kind of support do they provide? The common 
answer given to this question, namely providing technical assistance or advice, 
is rather vague. In the donor community, the term is used as a placeholder for a 
variety of advisory activities which address different elements of policy-making 
and governance. Table 3 displays a categorisation of advice provided in the South 
African and Tanzanian ministries and departments included in this study: 
Table 3: Advisory activities, types of support and impact levels
Advisory activity Type of support Impact level
Technical advice Provision of technical expertise Content of policies
Provision of international 
experience 
Bringing in experience and 
evidence from other countries  
Content of policies 
Process facilitation Facilitating dialogue and 
supporting the policy process
Policy processes
Managerial advice Introduction and transfer of 
managerial methodologies 
Governance practice
Organisational development Assistance in setting up or re-
structuring government bodies
Governance systems 
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on empirical material.77
77 Table 3 only includes expert activities related to advice; it does not comprise administrative tasks or 
programmatic responsibilities. 
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In Table 3 technical advice is defined in a narrow sense as the provision of 
expertise for problems which require specialist knowledge. Experts in our 
sample, for instance, prepared guidelines for the initiation of antiretroviral 
treatment on HIV patients, analysed data for environmental resource 
assessments or provided input in the process of revising policies, in some cases 
even drafted the final policy document. 
Less directly, experts shape policy content by providing international 
experience, namely, presenting approaches adopted in other countries for 
similar problems. A South African government official described the advisory 
service of an expert seconded to his department in the following way: 
He [the advisor] will go out and research what is it that we are trying to 
do and find out very good learning experiences from other places (…). So 
he would be able to say, ‘Look, I know this what you are trying but in 
this other places, this is how they approach this issue and it seems as if 
you have got these options, these are consequences.’ And where he could 
not come up with a clear recommendation, he will phone other people that 
he was working with to search for the solutions that were used in their 
countries and what were some of the problems. (Interview 22) 
Here, the strategic resource experts draw on is less specialised knowledge, but 
rather their access to a global network in which experiences are stored and 
shared. This network also enables them to source internal and external expertise 
which governments are struggling to obtain. The mobilisation of knowledge is 
a typical activity classified under the broader rubric of ‘facilitation’ or ‘catalytic 
work’. While in Tanzania, a large proportion of advice is still focused on the 
provision of technical expertise, many experts in South Africa saw themselves 
as facilitators rather than as knowledge providers. A typical response in this 
regard was given by an advisor placed in the South African Department of 
Health who stated: 
A lot of the work that we’re doing is like facilitating groups, getting 
together, making sure due process is adhered to so if you’re going to do 
a consultation, make sure all the right groups are there, it’s that sort of 
thing. More facilitation and doing catalytic work, not so much the technical 
content of policies because that on the whole is here, that’s not where the 
gap is. (Interview 1) 
In practice, this means that advisors support the policy process by setting 
up meetings, preparing agendas, distributing information, drafting the 
minutes and monitoring follow-up actions. While this may seem as standard 
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bureaucratic work, it does affect policy processes in a significant way. By 
providing administrative assistance, experts impact the pace, procedures and 
priorities of policy negotiations. As brokers between stakeholder groups, they 
also to some extent influence who is given a voice in the dialogue. Finding civil 
society members or representatives of the private sector in policy discussions 
is often the result of donor persuasion. As a World Bank expert in Tanzania 
put it: 
A significant portion on the Bank’s value added is that you force all these 
people in a room together to talk about things, you know. They would say 
we’re a ‘convening power’. (Interview 46) 
This ‘convening power’ becomes manifest in meetings and events which are 
not likely to take place without external facilitation. A study tour on climate 
change financed and organised by the World Bank in the year 2012 serves 
as a case in point in this regard. In cooperation with DFID and the UNDP, 
the Bank brought a range of high-ranking Tanzanian government officials 
and civil society actors to Namibia for a week of workshops and discussions 
with ‘knowledge providers’ from Mexico, South Africa, Zambia and the host 
country. The aim of this ‘Learning Week’, as the World Bank termed it, “was for 
Tanzanian decision makers and advocates to learn from successful approaches 
to climate change planning in different economic and regional contexts and 
apply these lessons to their own context” (World Bank 2012g). The impact of 
this sort of facilitating work is hard to measure directly. Yet, through organising 
discourse behind the scenes, experts are able to push certain topics (such as 
climate change in the example above), to channel who is doing the talk and to 
accelerate the pace of policy-making concerning the respective matter. 
A direct impact of expert engagement which is more easily observable 
concerns the practice of governance: managerial advice to recipient 
bureaucracies has fundamentally changed their ways of working. Since the 
rise of new public management, experts have introduced “new methodologies 
of governance based on corporate plans, surveys and closer budgeting/
monitoring techniques” (Harrison 2004:  90). Asked what kind of expertise 
World Bank and UNDP experts provided to his organisation in the context of a 
joint environmental project, a South African official explained: 
I think they did bring with them a lot of project management skills which 
was useful, also evaluation mechanisms, you know, to evaluate your 
effectivity on the ground, your project effectivity, your cost effectivity, and 
so on. I think what also came out of this process very nicely was [that] 
it gives you the opportunity to stand back and evaluate objectively what 
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you’re doing and why you are doing it, to question on a regular basis 
that what you do is in fact aimed at a proper goal and a proper objective. 
(Interview 13)
The adoption of project management tools and evaluation mechanisms has 
far-reaching implications for government ministries and departments. It not 
only changes the language and format of their policies and plans which now 
commonly entail ‘strategic objectives’ and ‘logframe tables’, but also basic 
principles (‘efficiency and effectiveness’) and practices of governance. 
The last type of support in this categorisation of advisory activities is 
organisational development. Our study provides various examples in which 
external experts assisted in restructuring government bodies (e.g. the South 
African National AIDS Council) or establishing new units or offices (e.g. the 
South African Office of Health Standards Compliance), and thus engaged in 
shaping governance systems of aid-receiving countries. 
Addressing policy content and processes, as well as governance systems and 
practice, development experts deal with core issues of democratic governance. 
As Gould (2005b: 9) observes, they interact with a “growing assertiveness” in 
the political arena of recipient countries. Given their intimate involvement 
therein, it is striking that experts tend to dissociate themselves from the 
political processes in their host countries (Gould & Ojanen 2003).78 Reflecting 
on their professional role, several experts in our sample rejected any political 
influence.79 Similar to others, a GIZ advisor said: 
Whether I adopt a health financing system based on a social insurance 
model as we have in Germany, or a private one as in the US, or the NHS 
[National Health Service] in the UK, is a political decision. These decisions 
are made and must then be implemented by technical experts. We do not 
take part in political decision-making, we advise and recommend, but the 
decisions have to be taken at a different level. (Interview 4, translated 
by authors)
Only two senior experts, one of them retired, explicitly acknowledged having 
shaped political decisions in their host countries to a significant extent. The 
majority of donor representatives interviewed rather downplayed their role in 
78 Gould and Ojanen (2003: 15) observed the “dissociation from political processes” as a “defining 
characteristic” of the transnational expert elite, with donors “commonly avoid[ing] the appearance 
of engaging in ‘politics’”. 
79 Interestingly, when asked for an assessment of their organisation’s impact on policy processes in 
South Africa and Tanzania, almost two out of three donor interviewees (65.4%) in our sample 
ranked their organisation as being “amongst the most influential key players” (7.7% “most 
influential key player”; 23.1% “middle-range impact”; 3.8% “low impact”). 
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policy-making. Framing advice as a technocratic exercise, however, not only 
disguises the impact of external experts on policy-making and governance in 
young democracies; it also makes it impossible to hold them to account for 
consequences of their advice, despite their considerable discursive power in 
the political realm.
Summing up this chapter on actors and interests in aid, it has become clear 
that development assistance is used as a strategic tool by all players involved. 
While donor governments aim at maintaining geopolitical influence, as well 
as fostering export and trade, recipient governments seek to increase their 
budgets and thus their capacity to act, but also to strengthen relations with 
partners on their diplomatic priority list. Hence, aid is an instrument of foreign 
and domestic politics on both sides, albeit used from different angles. 
Looking at the level of organisations, the logic ‘the more aid, the better’ 
equally applies to bureaucracies that receive and to those which deliver it. 
Underfinanced ministries and departments in developing countries are usually 
keen to access as much additional funding as possible which often results in 
struggles between treasuries, line ministries and authorities at lower levels 
competing for donor money. As ‘moving money’ is the primary objective and 
source of legitimacy of aid bureaucracies, they share their partners’ interest 
in high spending volumes and on-going disbursements. Continued need for 
external support legitimates their existence. 
This also holds true for the individual employees of aid organisations who 
have tangible incentives to ‘keep aid rolling’ since their careers depend on 
it. Development cooperation has created a profitable market for professionals 
from various branches who are attracted by material and non-material rewards: 
with salaries matching donor countries’ pay scales, aid experts commonly 
enjoy a relatively high living standard in their host countries. Their (ascribed) 
expert knowledge grants them access to the highest government levels. 
Naturally, individuals work towards keeping that status. New aid projects and 
programmes, however, not only advance the careers of donor staff. They also 
promise benefits for officials in recipient institutions who can personally profit 
from extra payments commonly connected with donor-funded activities. 
In this summary, we paint a very ‘selfish’ picture of the agents involved in 
development cooperation. That calls for a qualification: it is not to be doubted 
that there are good intentions in aid, that is, that donor governments provide 
assistance out of a political culture which emphasises solidarity; that recipient 
institutions secure aid in order to fix health systems or improve education etc.; 
or that experts and government officials cooperate in aid projects with the goal 
of making a change for the people. The purpose of this chapter, however, was 
to shed light on the web of interrelated interests playing a role in development 
cooperation. The fact that aid is driven by actors with multiple motives and 
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agendas which sometimes correlate, but often collide, provides a complicated 
setting for advisory processes. The intricacies of expert advice that result from 
the linkage of aid and politics and other structural flaws in the context of aid 
are spelled out in more detail in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5
INTRICACIES OF  
EXPERT ADVICE IN  
THE AID CONTEXT
Expert advice provided in the context of aid takes place in a setting characterised 
by colliding interests, political pressures and asymmetric power relations. Such 
preconditions are obstructive to advisory processes in several regards. First, the 
linkage of aid and politics makes advice volatile, conditional and supply-oriented 
in that it is driven by shifting fads and legitimation pressures. Second, advisory 
processes are hampered by structural flaws related to conceptual deficiencies 
and employment practices on the part of donor organisations which impede 
knowledge transfer and learning. Third, advisory relations in the context of aid 
are structured along a knowledge hierarchy that reinforces power imbalances 
and marginalises rather than strengthens local expert communities. The 
various constraints which will be outlined in this chapter explain the failure of 
expert advice as a means of development assistance. This manifests itself in the 
persistent dependency on external expertise after decades of ‘capacity-building’ 
interventions.
The linkage between aid and politics
Aid provided by states to states is inherently political insofar as it is an outcome 
of political negotiation, and carried out in the realm of politics. The current 
knowledge paradigm which legitimates external assistance as primarily capacity 
building tends to mask the intrinsically political nature of aid. The prevailing 
“economic-centric, technocratic approach to development” (Carothers & De 
Gramont 2013: 3) is preferred by the international donor community for good 
reasons:  
While economics appears as a rational, scientific domain, politics seem to 
imply inevitable entanglement with the irrational side of human affairs – 
with ideological fervor, nationalistic impulses, and other volatile passions. 
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Economics emphasizes consensual ideas, like the universal appeal of 
prosperity and the tragedy of poverty. In contrast, politics is all about 
conflicting visions and objectives. Economics deals in definite goals, with 
easily measurable signs of improvement. Politics is about subjective values, 
with signs of progress hard to agree on, let alone measure. (Carothers & 
De Gramont 2013: 3–4)
This chapter aims to highlight the linkage between aid and politics and its 
implications for expert advice provided in the context of development 
cooperation: first by showing how advisory processes are affected by shifting 
fads regarding aid priorities and modes of operation which are driven by 
global and domestic politics on the donor side. Attention will then be turned 
to the legitimation and accountability pressure in aid which, translated into 
extensive reporting practices, substantially impacts on advisory relations and 
bureaucracies in recipient countries. Finally, it is elucidated how the linkage 
between aid and politics causes a twofold mismatch of supply and demand for 
expertise: the first pertains to advisory subjects and derives from conflicting 
agendas on both the donor and recipient side; the second concerns a general 
discrepancy between advice provided and requested which emanates from the 
fact that it serves donors as a means of influence and control. 
Shifting themes and modes of operation 
Due to its dependency on politics, the aid community is “very fickle” 
(Interview  27), as a South African civil society leader stated. This equally 
holds true for priority areas of support and favourite modes of operation. They 
shift with global trends and domestic developments in donor states. A retired 
government official in Tanzania commented in this regard: 
Sometimes priorities change. Sometimes an initiative begins well – and 
then there are things called elections [laughing]. They just happened in 
France the other day, and you have a change of government – this change 
of government comes with different policies saying now we are getting out 
of environment, now I think we are looking at gender, you know. Those 
kinds of things can actually happen. (Interview 66) 
Fluctuating trends in aid topics and modalities 
The fluctuation of topics in aid can be traced both across and within sectors. 
Figure 4 displays aid flows to selected areas in the period 1990–2012, drawing 
on aggregate ODA data from all donors captured in the OECD/DAC reporting 
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system. The sharp increase of aid to ‘Government & Civil Society’, a cluster 
summarising assistance for issues such as public management, institution-
building, and fiscal policy and planning, is eye-catching. Aid spent on these 
areas more than doubled from USD 3 373 million in 1999 to USD 7 236 million 
in 2000 and went up to USD 21 325 million in 2011 which reflects the career of 
‘good governance’ as an aid topic over the last decade. In the same period, HIV/
Aids began to receive significant attention from the international community. 
The steep rise in allocations for health can mainly be ascribed to HIV/Aids-
related funding which was pushed through the establishment of the Global 
Fund and PEPFAR around 2002/2003. With the advent of governance and HIV 
as donor priorities, the previously strong emphasis on education diminished. 
While in the early 1990s, education was among the sectors absorbing the bulk 
of aid resources, it was gradually superseded by other topics in the first years 
of the new millennium. Despite global campaigns such as the ‘Education for 
All’ initiative, spending relatively stagnated: whereas the total sum of ODA 
from 1990 to 2012 increased by 62%,80 the volume of aid to education only 
increased by 14%. Similarly, aid allocated for water supply and sanitation did 
not keep up with other sectors that came onto the agenda, as, for instance, 
environment which has emerged as an issue in recent years. The volume of 
aid spent on general environmental protection quintupled from 1995 (the first 
year in which it was captured as a separate category in the OECD database) to 
2012. Since as a cross-cutting theme, environment is also targeted by activities 
in other sectors (e.g. a forest management programme in the forestry sector), 
the total amount of environment-related aid can be assumed to be much 
higher than the graph in Figure 4 indicates (OECD 2012b).81 
The composition of aid not only shifted across but also within sectors. In 
education, the once prominent field of vocational education and training faded 
from the spotlight when at the 1990 World Conference on Education for All in 
Jomtien basic education came to the fore. Although the concept was originally 
“associated with the fulfilment of basic learning needs related to learning 
and life skills for every person – child, youth, and adult” (Buchert 1995: 19), 
many donors narrowed their focus on (early) childhood development, shifting 
resources to primary education at the expense of other areas. This new 
emphasis was reaffirmed by the Millennium Development Goals which set 
universal primary education by 2015 as a global target. Yet, even prior to 2015, 
spending figures indicated a sharp downturn in support to basic education 
80 According to OECD data extracted on 16 January 2013 from OECD.Stat, total ODA amounted to 
USD 203 221 million in 1990 and to USD 328 339 million in 2012.
81 In 2009–2010, the sum of only bilateral aid which scored environmental sustainability as ‘principal’ 
or ‘significant objective’ exceeded USD 25 billion, “representing a quarter of bilateral sector 
allocable ODA” (OECD 2012b: 57).
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particularly in low-income countries, with some donors completely pulling 
out of the area (Global Campaign For Education 2013). Instead, ‘old’ priorities 
come back into the picture, as an expert working in the Swedish Embassy in 
Dar es Salaam observed: 
We’ve been (…) focusing on basic education for the last [years], but before 
that during the 1990s we were very much into vocational training and 
before that we were also into folk education quite a lot. The Swedish 
government and Sida Stockholm decided to phase out the vocational 
training – but now we are moving back as many others. (Interview 40) 
In health, the most significant change was caused by the rise of HIV/Aids as 
an aid priority. The share of HIV-related funding grew rapidly from around 
3%–5% of total health assistance during the 1990s to 24% in 2010, which 
constituted the largest portion allocated to one specific health area. Moreover, 
in line with the increasing attention to governance in the first decade of the 
millennium, ‘health systems strengthening’ came onto the agenda. While still 
a minor area, its share sharply rose from only 0.2% in 1990 to 4.2% in 2010. 
A topic which lost its previous significance is maternal, new-born and child 
health. Although spending in absolute numbers grew at a stable pace between 
82 Data were extracted on 16 January 2013 from OECD.Stat for the following codes: Government & 
Civil Society (150), Education (110), Health (120) which was added up with Population Policies/
Programmes and Reproductive Health (including HIV-related funding) (130), Water and Sanitation 
(140) and General Environmental Protection (410). For a detailed itemisation of topics in the DAC 
Creditor Reporting System system, see OECD (2012c).
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1990 and 2010, its portion of total health-related aid diminished slightly over 
time. The variation of spending patterns is illustrated by Figure 5 which covers 
development assistance for health by focus areas from 1990 to 2010 (Institute 
for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2012b: 70–71): 
Figure 5: Spending patterns in health-related aid 1990–2010
 
Source: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (2012b: 70–71).83
For a certain time span, HIV/Aids was the most dominant theme of the 
international community but by 2013, it seems that it had lost this prominence 
as an aid priority. Various interviewees pointed out that donors have now 
shifted their attention to climate change as a new topic of global concern. 
The following statements were made by an HIV/Aids activist in South Africa, 
83 The table draws on data published by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) in its 
2012 report on global health financing. Tracking development assistance for health at a global level, 
the IHME extracts data from the OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System, but additionally uses 
other channels such as audited financial statements and annual reports from public and private 
organisations. Given the divergent approaches used for capturing aid flows, the total spending 
figure for health in Figure 5 slightly deviates from Figure 4 which is based on the OECD dataset. 
Due to donor reporting, a significant proportion of aid to health could not be disaggregated by 
focus areas and was thus classified as ‘unallocable’. Expenditures which were tied to distinct health 
targets, but did not fit into one of the six defined focus areas, were summarised in ‘Other’. For 
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by the leader of an education NGO and by a senior officer at the National 
Environmental Management Council in Tanzania, respectively: 
There’s the fact that other issues have arisen, so you know, they’re putting 
money into climate change rather than into health, and we have to persuade 
them or try to persuade them that HIV is not gone away. (Interview 27) 
The discourse of climate in development, you do it because that’s the 
new HIV/Aids, that’s the new agenda, you have to check that box. 
(Interview 70) 
Every donor now is running with climate change. Even now here in 
Tanzania there are other things – we have a lot of problems here. Like the 
desertification, we have land degradation, we have a lot of erosion, but [those 
issues] are not receiving attention. You’ve got these conventions, we have 
the CBD, we have the UNFCCC, we have the other one on desertification, 
but when you relatively compare these three sister conventions, it’s climate 
change now on top of the agenda. (Interview 59) 
The observation that climate change is the current ‘order of the day’, as a 
Tanzanian environmental expert put it, is confirmed by spending figures. 
Since 1998, the OECD/DAC has tracked aid related to global environmental 
objectives by using the so-called ‘Rio markers’ which help to identify assistance 
in implementing the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD), the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the UN Convention 
to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) (OECD 2012b: 60). Figure 6, which covers 
activiti cipal objective’, indicates the rapid growth of climate change-related 
aid. Despite a drop following its peak in 2010, spending on climate change 
mitigation is still on the rise, while funding for combating desertification has 
stagnated and aid for biodiversity has declined. 
Aid changes its composition not only with regard to sectors and priority 
areas. We also find shifting fads with respect to modes of operation. Here one 
can witness almost a cyclical movement: while during the first decade of the 
millennium the use of harmonised approaches such as sector and general budget 
support increased, there is now a reverse trend back from joint arrangements to 
individual assistance in the form of projects.84 In Tanzania, various donors pull 
out from budgetary support although it is still the government’s preferred aid 
modality (Economic and Social Research Foundation 2010: 9–10). DFID, for 
84 For details on the emergence of budget support and sector-wide approaches, see Foster (2000) and 
Haan and Everest-Phillips (2010). 
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instance, in its operational plan for Tanzania 2011–2015 announced a reduction 
in general budget support, arguing that according to an evaluation it “was not 
the most effective way to deliver results in the current circumstances” (DFID 
Tanzania 2011: 3). At the time of the interviews, Sweden critically discussed 
whether to continue with general budget support; Canada reconsidered its 
sector budget support for education. Germany, once a driving force in the 
establishment of a sector-wide approach in health and one of the largest 
contributors to the health basket fund, indicated its intention to pull out of the 
basket and to redirect the focus of assistance towards a system-strengthening 
approach with emphasis on results-based financing and targeted interventions  
(GIZ Tanzanian German Programme to Support Health 2011: 6).86 
Global and domestic politics as causes of aid volatility
The volatility of aid priorities and modes of operation derives from both 
changing global ideological fads and domestic political developments in 
donor countries. International agreements reflect the shifting paradigms and 
principles: the Paris Declaration (2005) placed ‘ownership’ in the centre of 
aid relations, fostering harmonised approaches, the use of country systems 
and mutual accountability (OECD 2005). The Busan Partnership Document 
85 Data were extracted from OECD Stat on 21 January 2014 using the Rio markers ‘Biodiversity’, 
‘Desertification’ and ‘Climate Change Mitigation’ and counting only activities scoring one of the 
global environmental objectives as ‘principal objectives’. Data were available since 2002. As the 
marker ‘Climate Change Adaption’ was only created in 2010, it was not included. 
86 A retired expert who had worked for GIZ for decades annotated the shifts in German assistance as 
follows: “This is what happens in development cooperation, it goes back and forth and back again” 
(Interview 73).
Figure 6: Aid targeting global environmental objectives 2002–2012
Source: OECD.Stat (2014b).86
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(2011), in contrast, features a focus on results and “the participation of the 
private sector in the design and implementation of development policies 
and strategies to foster sustainable growth and poverty reduction” (OECD 
2011b: 10). Although the agreement reiterates the principles of Paris, it implies 
a different message, prioritising issues such as ‘value for money’ and ‘aid for 
trade’. As a Swedish expert in Tanzania put it: 
The message nowadays after Busan – we have forgotten everything about 
ownership, alignment, harmonisation, and what we are talking about in 
the government is ‘get in the private sector and everything will be solved 
more or less’ and ‘find new modalities’. Now of course [I’m] exaggerating, 
but it’s going into that direction. (Interview 40) 
The reorientation towards the private sector and trade has been pushed by 
two parallel developments, namely the recession of the global economy in 
2008–2009 and a liberal conservative shift of politics in aid-giving countries. 
As a result of the global financial crisis, many donor governments were under 
pressure to tighten their budgets and thus cut aid; in 2011, ODA from OECD 
countries decreased for the first time since 1997 (OECD 2012b). Selling a 
reduction of ODA to recipients, however, is easier if framed as a deliberate 
decision derived from the discovery that “with trade and specifically with 
my country, we will solve many more problems now” (Interview 38), as one 
interviewee commented. The argument is indeed brought forward in this 
tone: in its Annual Report 2012, the OECD emphasises the “need to engage 
the private sector much more”, arguing that “the rewards will be substantial: 
new markets, new productive partnerships, new innovative technologies for 
developing countries, and more income and jobs” (OECD 2012b: 28). DFID 
even announced that its new focus on the private sector would “help private 
enterprise work its miracles as the engine of development” (DFID 2011: 4).87
This legitimation fits well with the market-oriented thinking spreading 
across Western governments where liberal-conservative parties have come 
to power which justify aid with economic interests and revamp development 
assistance accordingly.88 When in 2009 a member of the Liberal Party became 
minister for economic cooperation and development in Germany, he not only 
advanced an institutional reform process, but also promoted the involvement 
87 The sudden turn to the private sector as new addressee and theme of aid programmes has provoked 
stark criticism even within donor countries. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact, a 
watchdog institution of UK aid reporting to the British parliament, stated in a recent report that 
“DFID needs to recognise that the private sector is not a developmental panacea”, finding that 
objectives of private sector work are “excessively ambitious and fail to reflect what is possible, given 
the complexity of the challenge” (ICAI 2014: 9/33).
88 For the prevailing rationales used by governments to legitimate aid, see Chapter 4. 
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of the private sector through public-private partnerships and business-
oriented alliances (CDU et al. 2009; Riedel 2010; BMZ 2011). The Netherlands 
followed this trend shortly after: in 2010, the newly elected government led 
by the liberal Prime Minister Mark Rutte presented a major overhaul of Dutch 
development policy. He moved away from social to economic sectors, aligned 
aid with trade and placed Dutch self-interests in front (Netherlands Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2010, 2011). In Sweden, general budget support came under 
scrutiny when a liberal politician – herself originally trained as an auditor – took 
over the post of the development minister and started an intense debate on 
accountability and control mechanisms, arguing for results-based approaches 
(Carlsson 2012).89
These examples indicate that domestic politics have a significant impact 
on policies of giving aid (Lancaster 2007). As political actors within donor 
governments change, this often results in a redirection of priorities and modes 
of operation. ‘Cash on delivery’ and other forms of results-based aid are the 
prevailing mode of thinking among politicians concerned about the traceability 
of aid. Promising transparency and performance, the new modalities are based 
on a governance logic which is currently in vogue: 
It is basically an iteration of the recent fashion in rich countries to place 
targets on everything from hospital waiting lists to grades in secondary 
school. Achieve the target, and you get paid a bonus; fail to achieve it, and 
you don’t. (Glennie 2011)90
Developed by think tanks and innovation units in aid bureaucracies, the new 
approaches have been embraced by researchers, practitioners and politicians 
who are optimistic about making aid more ‘effective’. This is not surprising, 
given that introducing new modalities as soon as (or even before) the current 
ones show signs of failure, is an intrinsic reflex of the aid community. With 
reference to alleged innovations donors promise that aid will have more 
impact in the future than in the past (Lancaster 2007). For recipient countries, 
however, the frequent changes of political philosophies underpinning 
development strategies and ways of working attached to them are detrimental. 
A Tanzanian education specialist engaged in the education sector for more 
than forty years on both government and donor side described her experience 
as follows: 
89 Gunilla Carlsson, a member of the liberal conservative Moderate Party, served as Minister for 
International Development Cooperation in Sweden from 2006–2013. 
90 For details on ‘cash on delivery’ and other forms of results-based financing, see Birdsall et al. 
(2011) and Pearson (2011). 
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Sometimes these new internationally processed concepts and styles and 
approaches have a much bigger impact than we think of. Of course for us 
scholars, it is a way of experimenting and innovation. An idea worked in 
Ethiopia, maybe it will work in Tanzania. So, perpetually, these countries 
are experimental. That sustainability and maintaining the system is not 
really going to happen unless we reach a point of saying, ‘Enough is 
enough!’ We cannot move with what is workable. Let’s not just introduce 
new ideas, let’s move on.      
Because what I’m hearing constantly now that people of my age, a bit 
older, say, ‘But we did it in the old days. We had good teachers, children 
were learning in class, what was happening then that’s not happening 
today?’ It’s the changes, the approaches. So every time the government is in 
a learning curve. Sometimes I pity them, because the changes are coming so 
quickly – before you learn this other one, (…) you are already changing. 
(Interview 31) 
The volatility of aid emanating from its dependency on global and domestic 
politics has adverse effects on government systems and programmes in 
recipient countries. It impairs understaffed bureaucracies with ever-changing 
procedures and requirements, and makes support unpredictable. Government 
officials interviewed for this study reported various examples of projects and 
initiatives which had reached deadlock when donor interests changed. A 
retired doctor in Tanzania who had worked for the government in the field of 
public health remembered: 
There was a school health program in the 1980s and the donor decided 
‘that’s the end’, without consultation, all of a sudden it was stopped (…). 
Locked the doors, no money, no facilities, nothing. Then they come back 
after some time to continue with that project, they continued, finished, off 
they go. That was a bad one. (Interview 65) 
Similarly, a senior environment management officer working for the National 
Environmental Management Council in Tanzania reported: 
We had another project from the Swedish – way back in the 1990s. And I 
don’t know what happened, but they withdrew their support. So everything 
what we had planned within the council also ceased to be implemented. 
(…) So once [donors] shift their priorities, you have a problem. You find 
that whatever you planned, you fail to implement. (Interview 59)
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In South Africa, a high-ranking official engaged in the education sector reported 
on a donor government which, when joining the war in Iraq, unilaterally cut 
aid to schooling initiatives in Limpopo and the Eastern Cape, two provinces 
in dire need of educational support – “that was a dear lesson for us about 
commitments” (Interview 21), he commented. 
Currently, governments in developing countries are concerned about the 
drastic decline of international HIV/Aids funding, primarily due to cutbacks in 
PEPFAR and the Global Fund (see, for instance, IRIN News 2012, 2013a; Collins 
2013; IRIN News 2013b).91 Given that many government-run programmes are 
highly dependent on external financing, the reductions put national treatment, 
care and prevention programmes at risk. In South Africa, PEPFAR funding cuts 
particularly threaten NGO-run HIV services and specialised clinics which the 
government struggles to take over (Kahn 2012).92 Tanzania currently tries to 
lessen the effects of diminished external support by setting up an AIDS Trust 
Fund (Lamtey 2012), in order “to prepare ourselves to continue keeping it as a 
priority regardless of who else keeps it as a priority” (Interview 63), as a high-
ranking member of TACAIDS put it. 
The detrimental effects of shifting fads on advisory processes 
The “fickleness of aid” (Browne 2006: 7) not only has detrimental effects on 
budgets and programmes, but also on advice which is above all impeded by 
discontinuity. Several interviewees in both South Africa and Tanzania under-
lined that advisory processes require a long-term focus and duration, particularly 
when they aim at bringing about systemic changes and strengthening capacity. 
Similar to other respondents, a South African academic stated: 
I think that it’s about being willing to focus on a few things and do it well 
over long periods of time. I think stability and continuity are absolutely 
key (…) – iterative processes of learning, focusing on systems and some 
stability in the policy thinking and ideas. (Interview 28) 
Advisory support which met these conditions often had a substantial impact. 
A South African interviewee, for instance, highlighted the contribution of GIZ 
experts in the field of local governance, a permanent focus area of German 
development assistance since 1994: 
91 In November 2011, the Global Fund which accounts for around a quarter of international financing 
to fight HIV and AIDS announced it would provide no new grants until 2014 due to substantial 
budget reductions in some donor countries (Boseley 2011; Kelland 2011). In 2013, the US 
administration under Obama resolved on a continued drop in PEPFAR funding in its budget for the 
fiscal year 2014 (Aziz 2013). 
92 In March 2013, around one thousand South Africans protested against US funding cuts which had 
led to the closure of a specialised AIDS clinic in Durban (AIDS Healthcare Foundation 2013). 
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These guys had a massive impact in the way in which local government 
takes place in South Africa. Until today, the whole idea of having integrated 
development plans was done with the help of GTZ (…). They were there 
through thick and thin. Refined the thing, made it work, and it’s working 
until today. (Interview 8) 
Similarly, South African government officials emphasised the value of German 
assistance in the area of skills development which profited from the long-term 
relationship of key actors involved and the fact that it was continued for over 
a decade (for details, see Chapter 7). One explanation for the relatively stable 
phase of German development cooperation is that it was headed by the same 
minister from 1998 to 2009. Eleven years of ministerial leadership, however, 
is rather an exception to the rule, given the four- to five-year election cycles in 
many Western countries. Cabinet reshuffles on both the donor and recipient 
side often come with far-reaching changes in agreements and relationships 
which directly bear on aid activities in recipient countries.93 Advice is affected 
by such changes with respect to its form and substance: the ways of how 
advice is delivered shift along with preferred modalities of newly constituted 
donor governments; previously promoted policy approaches are replaced by 
new concepts, resulting in a “mad pace of new ideas” (Interview 28) recipients 
are confronted with. The ‘fickleness’ of politics thus collides with the necessity 
for advisory persistence, which is particularly essential in developing countries 
where governance is usually more fragile than in established democracies.
Legitimation and accountability pressures
Foreign aid is financed by taxpayers’ money. Decision-makers in donor 
countries thus have to justify aid before citizens, and they need to ensure it 
is responsibly used for the intended purposes. Accountability is required at all 
levels of administration involved in aid, from ministries in donor capitals to 
implementing units in recipient countries. Donor governments are put under 
pressure to legitimate the expenditure of public funds and account for their 
use. This strongly affects their advisory activities and has profound implications 
for administrations in developing democracies. 
93 A high-ranking government official in South Africa mentioned that from his experience, political 
changes have most significant consequences in the case of the United States: “If a particular party 
loses, the whole top management must go. So even the agreements that were signed, some of 
them, people don’t know about them. So it becomes very difficult to pursue those agreements. 
So that is why some of those agreements were very short-term, I mean, if you look at the Bush 
administration – when the political party did not win subsequent elections, it was very difficult” 
(Interview 22).
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Results as means of legitimation 
While impact and accountability have always been issues in the public debate 
around aid, they have gained centre stage in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis arising in 2008. In times of shrinking budgets, expenditures 
for development assistance need to be justified even more than before and be 
completely traceable – “we need to be careful with every nickel” (Interview 30), 
a Canadian Embassy official remarked. Bilateral donor organisations are 
particularly obliged to explain what they are doing and with which results. In 
the UK, for instance, DFID activities are under close scrutiny; a staff member 
in the Tanzanian country office reported: 
Regularly, we have to give responses to parliamentary questions from MPs, 
and they would relate to programmes of DFID. [For] Tanzania, specifically 
with regard to education, I usually have to give some sort of direct response 
to MPs from constituencies. There’s a parliamentary account committee 
which has done reports on how DFID spends money and their value for 
money, the effectiveness of the support. And under the current government, 
the liberal democrat conservative coalition which came into power in 
2010, they established a new agency called ICAI which is an Independent 
Commission for Aid Impact, and they are also now doing country or sector 
thematic studies. They did one on three East African Countries, Tanzania, 
Rwanda and Ethiopia a year ago, and they also came to these conclusions, 
you know. Typically you’re putting too much on budget support, we need 
to focus more on results and accountability. (Interview 35) 
ICAI evaluations and DFID management responses are disclosed online; the 
findings are critically discussed by the British parliament and widely reported 
in the media (see, for instance, Chorley 2013; Express 2013; Provost 2013). 
Voices slashing development assistance and questioning if it helps at all have 
become louder, not only in the UK. For aid organisations, this has increased the 
pressure to give evidence of their impact. They do so primarily by presenting 
numbers, as the following statements extracted from donor websites illustrate 
in exemplary fashion: 
USAID in Tanzania, HIV/Aids: 
By March 2013, 90 918 individuals were receiving antiretroviral treatment 
through USAID-supported facilities while 129 206 were benefiting from 
clinical care and 99 498 from community care. During the same period, 
USAID provided support to 181 092 vulnerable children, and 1  303 
individuals with TB received integrated TB/HIV care and treatment. 
(USAID 2013)
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World Bank in South Africa, Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable 
Development Project:
The total number of hectares under formal conservation agreements (…) 
almost doubled from 1,054,033 ha to 1,953,246 ha by 2011, exceeding the 
target of 1,454,033 hectares. (World Bank 2013a)
Sida in Tanzania, education and learning: 
The Swedish budget support has contributed to sharply increasing public 
investment in education. One concrete result from the support in 2012 is 
the construction of 130 new classrooms for around 4 000 students on the 
island of Zanzibar. (Sida 2013a)
The need to produce ‘visible’ results strongly affects the form and substance of 
assistance. Various interviewees emphasised that donors tend to prefer project 
interventions whose impact is directly measurable, at best in geographical areas 
easy to reach for delegations.94 Donors refrain from joint support modalities, 
arguing they are not able to trace their individual contribution. In the field of 
HIV/Aids, the treatment focus of external support can partially be explained by 
the fact that it is simple to count patients provided with antiretroviral drugs, but 
not the number of lives saved through awareness campaigns – “from care you 
get results today, you don’t get results today from prevention” (Interview 62), 
a Tanzanian interviewee remarked. 
The accounting imperative in aid 
Demonstrating results has become the survival strategy of aid agencies. 
Monitoring and evaluation practices – often abbreviated as M&E – are their 
means of legitimation. Performance and audit reports serve as proof of 
accountability, a notion which in the context of aid tends to be reduced to its 
technocratic dimension (Mkandawire 2010). Accountability is translated into 
auditable accounting, as Rottenburg (2000) points out. In practice, this means 
that all kinds of aid activities, irrespective of their form and substance, are 
somehow made measurable, compressed into log-frames displaying baseline 
indicators, inputs, milestones and targets against which they are regularly 
assessed. 
The current practice of generating factuality in the form of quantitative 
parameters through which the impact of aid is traced is problematic in several 
94 A retired Tanzanian government official commented in this regard: “If you leave them [donors] on 
their own, they would always start projects in places close to Dar es Salaam or close to Arusha, or 
where they can be reached quickly, like Mwanza, like Iringa. They won’t go to places like Goma, 
where you can have sometimes no flights the whole week. So when their bosses come around, 
they can’t take them there that easily. So they want to do it around Dar es Salaam, so that when 
their bosses come, they can show the results” (Interview 64).
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aspects. First of all, presenting the social world as “an assembly of facts which 
can be counted, aggregated and audited uses a rhetoric of de-politicization and 
absolute objectivity” (Rottenburg 2000:  148) which disguises the creational 
element of accounting. Figures used in appraisal reports, programme 
documents and evaluations inevitably are a result of method and choice since, 
put simply, “there are always several means of counting things” (Rottenburg 
2000: 147). Hence, numbers are always a product of deliberate decisions for 
certain ways of calculation and representation. The HIV/Aids situation of 
countries or regions, for instance, looks different if one draws on prevalence 
rates as a measure for the extent of the epidemic or incidence rates which 
indicate the dynamic of HIV transmission.95 Likewise, assessments on the status 
of education vary depending on the indicators used; the perennial debate 
around how to measure the quality of education hints at the constructed 
character of figures.96 Nonetheless, they have become the primary reference 
for proving impact and legitimating decisions in development cooperation. The 
continuation of general budget support, for instance, depends on the recipient 
government’s progress against criteria outlined in ‘Performance Assessment 
Frameworks’ (PAF) (Driscoll et al. 2005). In Tanzania, the 2013 PAF matrix 
entailed 38 outcome indicators covering issues such as Standard IV exam pass 
rates, the number of village land forest reserves or the proportion of births 
at health facilities (Development Partners Group Tanzania 2012). Given that 
despite some positive achievements, targets in key areas were not achieved, the 
Swedish ambassador, speaking on behalf of development partners, announced 
at the annual review meeting that “the 2014 commitments and disbursements 
from DPs will be affected, as the performance tranches cannot be released in 
full” (Hjelmåker 2013). 
Similar mechanisms have been established at the sector level where progress 
is assessed in the course of joint annual reviews. Findings generated through 
that process strongly affect future support – “you cannot go back to Canada, 
seek more money when Form Four results are getting worse” (Interview 31), 
an education advisor working for CIDA in Tanzania commented. Failures 
in meeting the agreed targets thus put all players involved under pressure. 
Government representatives need to explain why they were unable to bring 
95 This argument was brought forward by a high-level officer of TACAIDS who strongly argued 
for using incidence as an indicator for the epidemic (Interview  62). Prevalence rates describe 
the percentage of a certain population or group infected at a particular point in time, whereas 
incidence rates display the percentage of newly infected people over a certain time span. High 
prevalence can occur with low incidence and vice versa. Due to data availability, AIDS authorities, 
international organisations and media mostly use prevalence as an indicator for the epidemic. 
Incidence, however, is a better measure for reflecting dynamics in the spread of HIV. For details on 
prevalence and incidence rates, see Mattheyse (2007) and Puren (2011). 
96 For details on the debate around quality indicators in education, see, for instance, Barrett et al. 
(2006) and Alexander (2008). 
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about the expected changes despite external assistance; donor staff in country 
offices struggle to justify the quest for further support to their headquarters. 
The significance of figures in legitimating aid explains the frictions around 
defining indicators and interpreting results reported by various interviewees 
in both South Africa and Tanzania. In 2013, the performance review in the 
Tanzanian education sector caused a serious dispute between the actors 
involved. From the donor’s perspective, the government tried to finagle 
continued financial support by meeting the minimum percentage of outcomes 
required with minimum effort, whilst neglecting central issues. An education 
specialist at the World Bank in Dar es Salaam vigorously complained about the 
strategy he assumed to be behind the government’s behaviour: 
The government develops milestones which fit in the routine nature of 
activities. Then at the end of the day it will report: this done, this done, 
this done (…). When you sum up you find they have made 70%. But 
sometimes you find that those items which they didn’t do, they are the 
most important ones to make the effect, the really intended results in that 
particular milestone or activity. (Interview 45) 
Similarly, a DFID education advisor reported: 
Even jointly agreed indicators [have] come up with some friction, because 
I think there’s quite a complicated matrix that has got all the process-like 
indicators. Just saying that you have a process review and the like, whilst 
increasing the indicators about examining past results, the distribution 
of teachers in the country, are the pupil-to-teacher ratios equivalent to 
the remoter parts as to the urban parts of the country, and that’s proved 
difficult to get in place. In this year, from the exam results of the last year, 
end of primary and end of secondary, we’ve seen very major drops. But 
those indicators are things that in theory will trigger performance tranche 
payments to the government. Those aren’t likely to be met. (Interview 35) 
The government explained its failure with major constraints in implementation, 
namely “inadequate budget allocations and late receipt of funds; large number 
of specific actions, which lead into partial implementation of milestones; 
agreed milestones are not necessarily the same as the Government’s priorities; 
and, some milestones or specific actions are not clearly worded or well 
understood by all parties” (United Republic of Tanzania 2012b: 3). Although 
some of the crucial targets were not achieved, the government’s final ‘score’ 
in the 2012 education sector assessment was 62%, which according to the 
underlying scale implies a ‘satisfactory performance’ – an assessment which 
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sounds very moderate in light of the education crisis exclaimed by civil society 
activists, media and parents who blisteringly criticised the government for the 
deteriorating situation (Nkosi 2012; Tambwe 2013; Twaweza 2013). For donors, 
however, the public articulation of social change is not pivotal in decision-
making. Instead, they legitimate actions on the grounds of the ‘reality’ as 
constructed in written documentation based on parameters generated through 
techniques of standardisation and calculation (Rottenburg 2009).
Complexities of data generation in developing countries 
Drawing on reports and accounts in countries which struggle to produce 
the data required for numerical representations of the social world poses a 
problem. A high-ranking government official engaged in the education sector 
described the situation in Tanzania as follows: 
This country is very big. You cannot compare [it] with Germany (…). 
Infrastructure development is not the same. If you have to go from Berlin 
to Bonn, in a few hours you are already there. You can use email, because 
power, electricity supply is everywhere. People have got computers, and I’m 
told nowadays, normally people don’t even write much. They use laptops, 
desktops and the like, now iPads. 
In our context, that information someone has to scribble and then from the 
school that report is taken to the district. The district has several schools, 
they have to be typed, some people have to analyse what is contained in the 
reports and then that report is taken to region, that region is processed and 
then it’s taken to the centre. It can take more than the time allocated in the 
MoU [Memorandum of Understanding] because the MoU is saying you 
must be reporting every quarter. In some areas that information reaches 
the school when the quarter has elapsed (…). Now because you didn’t get 
the report timely, you are disbursed less. (Interview 60)
In addition to the difficulty of delivering data on time in a country made up 
of 169 districts which lack a proper road network and basic technological 
infrastructure, the interviewee pointed to another problem related to reporting, 
namely the low level of training among actors involved in the compilation of 
educational figures: 
What is basic education in UK, for example? I’m told generally there are 
very few – unless immigrants – who don’t go for secondary education. The 
majority goes up to college. But here, the majority remains at grade seven. 
This is purely primary. So don’t expect the quality of a thing prepared by 
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someone with grade seven can be as good as from a graduate of university. 
So we say sometimes, ‘Please, you need to understand and bear with us.’
So there’s that departure – expectations vis-à-vis the reality on the ground. 
We over-expect. Based on the current reality, you shouldn’t over-expect that 
much the competence and the capacity of those providing those reports (…). 
The teachers have never been taught records management. Why should we 
blame them? (Interview 60) 
From the view of the government official interviewed, donors blend out 
the environment in which recipient governments operate and lose sight of 
what is happening on the ground. Given the focus on written evidence in aid 
activities, newly acquired chairs in classrooms do not ‘count’ without formal 
documentation – “but the reality is that the chairs are there, being used by 
the kids” (Interview  60). The accounting imperative of the aid community 
encumbers recipients with reporting requirements which – even in a country 
such as South Africa which has a comparatively strong administration – 
overstretches their capacities. 
Overstrained recipient bureaucracies
The detrimental impact of aid on recipient institutions has been thematised 
by various scholars who point to the weakening of already overstrained 
bureaucracies through project proliferation and donor fragmentation (see, for 
instance, Morss 1984; Bräutigam & Botchwey 1999; Knack 2001; Bräutigam 
& Knack 2004; Knack & Rahman 2007; Moss et al. 2008). In response to this 
criticism, donors proclaimed the principles of ‘harmonisation’ and ‘alignment’ 
in the Paris Declaration. But their rhetorical commitment has been little 
translated into practice (Wood et al. 2011). Instead of coordinating procedures 
and using country systems, agencies continue to impose their own standards 
of managing and monitoring aid. Several interviewees of this study reported 
on the pressure related to meeting donors’ demands. An official in the South 
African department commented in this regard: 
The German government might say, ‘I am giving you money to deal with 
STIs [sexually transmitted infections] but I would like you to report on one, 
two, three, four, five indicators just to tell me, show me what you are doing 
with my money.’ And when you look at the existing systems, it doesn’t 
really accommodate what the Germans want. What do we do? We need to 
go back to our systems and change them to accommodate those or we create 
another system just for them to show our accountability. (Interview 17) 
98
The Delusion of Knowledge Transfer
The complexity of dealing with donor requirements increases further 
when multiple players are involved. Even organisations agreeing on ‘joint’ 
interventions insist on adherence to their respective rules and procedures. 
A case in point is the ‘CAPE Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable 
Development Project’ carried out from 2004 to 2010 in the South African 
Cape Floristic Region.97 While it was praised as the first GEF-funded project 
jointly implemented by UNDP and the World Bank, the persons in charge 
of coordinating the cooperation at the South African National Biodiversity 
Institute faced serious administrative challenges. A key actor involved told us: 
Interviewee: There are lots and lots of different forms that you have to 
fill in. You’re doing quarterly reports, we had to do financial reports 
and financial management reports, one for the World Bank, one for the 
UNDP, and the formats were completely different … It was very interesting 
working with both of them because they loved it and it seems to have been 
one of the very first projects where those agencies have worked together on 
the ground. And we can see how valuable it was for them and because of 
that we’re happy to have done it. But for us, it caused a huge amount of 
extra work behind the scenes, because even though they promised to align 
reports and would sort of align supervision missions, so they would come 
at the same time. But out of those supervision missions would still come one 
thing for the UNDP, one thing for the World Bank (…). 
Interviewer: And did you find over time that those processes were more 
closely aligned or did they stay kind of divergent?
Interviewee: No, I don’t think that they became aligned. I think that they 
got their own sort of monsters to feed back on. (Interview 25)
The compulsion of complying with standards designed to ensure accountability 
in many cases causes severe tensions, delays and deadlocks in cooperation. A 
high-ranking official involved in the initial stages of the primary education 
sector reform programme in Tanzania remembered the tedious negotiations 
between the government and donors on a common reporting format: 
We have the government system of reporting. Donors wanted different 
systems and it was very unfortunate that different donors had different 
formats. Now which one would you take? The one of GIZ, would you take 
97 Details on the project are outlined in the case study on the South African environment sector (see 
Chapter 7). 
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the DFID, would you take that of Sida Sweden? So it was very difficult. 
It took us more than six months to agree on the format. And during that 
discussion nothing was going on because we haven’t agreed on a format. 
And someone was saying now, ‘Which kind of format do you people 
need?’ And eventually they employed [name], he was in Rwanda, was just 
completing his Masters and he joined for a year, then he provided a good 
format over there. They said, ‘Wow, this is it.’ And we handled that format 
for just a year – then they said, ‘Oh no, the format is very complicated, we 
must go back’. (Interview 60) 
The struggle described above took place in the early years of the new millennium 
when the first Primary Education Development Plan was prepared. At the time 
of our interviews, more than ten years later, it was still a contentious issue in 
donor-government cooperation. The subject of deficient quality and timeliness 
of reports has become particularly sensitive due to the deteriorating situation 
in the education sector, with donor representatives struggling to justify the 
quest for further support to their headquarters. The fact that annual reports 
are not delivered as agreed poses a serious problem for field staff. A Tanzanian 
education specialist working for CIDA expressed her distress as follows:  
The reports don’t show results. I mean they are writing the way they write 
(…). We have sat together, we have developed the template. And that 
template, we are saying ideally this is what we should see in your report, 
(…) this is how it should look like so we see the results and blah, blah, 
blah. But then, there are times when we are questioning – this chapter on 
financing is not actually telling us anything. (Interview 31) 
The original idea behind designing a common reporting format for the education 
sector programme was that it would be used both by the government and 
donors in order to avoid a duplication of bureaucratic efforts. Yet, there are still 
parallel reporting procedures in place: 
In order to get funding from treasury, they have their own quarterly reports 
in which case the accounting officer in that ministry being the parliament 
secretary, sits down and says, ‘This is what was done’ and the accounting 
officer, ‘You gave me this much, this is what we did, these are the shortfalls 
or whatever’, however they are writing it. So quarterly he writes that, he 
gets money, he continues to implement his activities – and we are sitting 
here, waiting for an annual report. (Interview 31) 
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The significance of those annual reports as a means of legitimation and decision-
making on the donor side leads to the paradoxical situation that experts in the 
field themselves take over drawing up ‘government’ reports: 
We were caught up for some years in actually helping to shape those reports. 
Why? Because you sit down, you write your project document, in the end 
of it you say you are going to get this annual report … Now you also have 
a duty to fulfil this side, you know. So that report has to come through in 
a way, you are pushing. But there are times when you are actually – even 
though we say, we read and we provide input, it is not quite just an issue 
of reading and providing input – sometimes you are actually writing the 
sentences. (Interview 31)      
This behaviour and the various frictions on reporting issues sketched above 
indicate the extent to which the reality of development aid is based on 
presentational practices of documentation (Rottenburg 2009). The reference 
frame for actors in the aid arena derives from reports and accounts, against 
which they are assessed. 
The fabrication of facts to legitimate advice 
The accounting imperative not only puts pressure on recipients to demonstrate 
‘development’ in the form of figures. It also coerces donor experts to substantiate 
the impact of their activities in numbers, which is particularly difficult when it 
comes to advice. First, its impact on policy processes and governance is neither 
quantifiable nor directly traceable. Second, it usually does not bring about 
visible change within the narrow time frames of aid interventions. Experts 
help themselves by generating ‘far-fetched facts’ (Rottenburg 2009) which 
link advisory support and sector developments in spite of knowing that such 
causalities are fictitious. The dilemma is evident: either the virtual impossibility 
to account for demonstrable effects of advice is acknowledged at the cost 
of negative effects on their missions or the ‘effects’ have to be somehow 
constructed in order to please their clients. 
A health specialist illustrated this dilemma using the example of the so-called 
‘Multi-sector HIV and AIDS Prevention Programme’ implemented by GIZ in 
South Africa on behalf of the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ). A substantial element of the programme was the delivery 
of long-term as well as short-term advice which aimed at strengthening 
national, provincial and local AIDS councils and improving their coordination 
and dialogue. Given that these councils were to a great extent dysfunctional 
at the time the programme was conceptualised, capacity and organisational 
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development were indicated as main components of support by GIZ.98 Such a 
programme proposal, however, is difficult to sell to the ministry in Germany: 
The difficulty with this proposal was that we are convinced that it is 
necessary to strengthen intermediary structures. With three million Euros 
over three years, it would be crazy to expect making a difference at target 
group level, so we decided to focus on intermediary structures. But then 
BMZ [the ministry] says, ‘No, we want to see the change at target group 
level.’ Then you say, ‘Well, it will eventually occur somewhere.’ ‘No, but 
we insist on that.’ Basically, the ministry would preferably see us using 
the three million and proving that as a result of our intervention, the 
HIV testing rate among adolescents has increased about 50% in this or 
that district. This is just not possible. But they do not want to hear that. 
(Interview 5) 
Nonetheless, the proposal in the version on hand did include target indicators 
such as “the knowledge of the population in supported provinces about the 
prevention of HIV transmission has increased to at least 80%”, with ‘baseline’ 
data ranging from 14% to 41% in different provinces.99 
The pressure to demonstrate measurable impact at target-group level – which 
in donor rhetoric is ultimately the population in recipient countries – was also 
articulated by interviewees in other sectors. A senior manager working on skills 
development for GIZ in South Africa confirmed being obliged to indicate direct 
effects in programme concepts, preferably in the form of quantitative data: 
BMZ doesn’t like qualitative indicators. BMZ prefers concrete indicators 
and we rack our brains how to get them through quantifiable assessment 
methods. That is a balancing act. (Interview 3) 
In the ‘Skills Development for Green Jobs’ programme the interviewee was 
concerned with, one articulated goal was that “70 per cent of graduates from the 
various green occupations requiring initial or continuing vocational education 
and training should find suitable employment in the green economy” (GIZ 
2013c). As in the HIV awareness example above, it is questionable to what 
extent the achievements of such targets are attributable to one specific donor 
intervention, given the multiplicity of efforts and players in the field. The fact 
that aid agencies nonetheless claim credit for positive changes exclusively 
98 This information, as well as the following details, was obtained from an internal GIZ programme 
document which was given to the authors of the study. 
99 The programme document extracted the baseline data from a 2008 survey conducted by the Human 
Sciences Research Council on HIV knowledge and prejudices in the South African population. 
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for themselves causes annoyance on the recipient’s side. A retired high-
level official at TACAIDS remembered an incident when the wife of the then 
US President George W Bush came to Tanzania, praising the success of US 
assistance in tackling HIV: 
Laura Bush came to the country some time and she was speaking in one 
of the different centres and she was saying, ‘Through PEPFAR, so many 
hundreds of patients were on treatment.’ And we were saying, ‘That’s lies, 
those are lies!’ These were the national figures and there’s the Global Fund 
and other people who have actually contributed that. That has brought 
problems. (Interview 65) 
Hypothetic causalities are a prevalent feature of donor legitimation, although 
experts are fully aware of their fabricated nature. As a Swedish education 
specialist in Dar es Salaam stated: 
I don’t really believe that it’s that easy to say that there are either 
a lot of results or no results, it’s not causal – we cannot find these 
relationships between our interventions or our support. It’s more complex. 
(Interview 40)
In addition to the difficulty of constructing causality, experts face the problem 
of conflicting temporalities of aid interventions in developing countries. 
The time frames set by their organisations do not allow to “wait for results” 
(Interview 53). Several interviewees working for different donors pointed to 
the impossibility in delivering the results expected by their headquarters at 
the end of a three- or four-year programme. A counsellor in the Norwegian 
Embassy in Dar es Salaam, for instance, commented: 
For 12 years we have been supporting re-forestation and sustainable forest 
management in Shinyanga area. And it took ten years before we actually 
had a forest there, before we had the success story and we are saying, yes, it 
is re-forested. The local communities are harvesting, improved livelihoods 
there. They have funds now to send their children to schools, they have 
milk that they can sell at the market, and all these things. So I think 
that is also a challenge for us working here, that we have to sell these 
stories. You can’t have, you won’t have results in three years or four years. 
You have to have ten, 12 years at least before you can really have results. 
(Interview 39)
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Advice targeting policy and governance issues does not bring about change 
– howsoever measured – within the short lifespan of donor projects and 
programmes. Nonetheless, donor staff need to outline targets in spite of 
knowing they are not achievable. A Tanzanian environment specialist working 
for UNDP in Dar es Salaam admitted:  
Sometimes I feel embarrassed when you say ‘I will develop a strategy 
within two years.’ And two years come, you still have stakeholders who 
are not buying into the strategy you are going to develop. It takes a lot of 
time. (Interview 41) 
The fact that superior authorities on the donor side nonetheless insist on 
the formulation of concrete advisory outcomes reflects the accountability 
pressure which dominates the aid community, and which is transmitted from 
development ministries to their implementing agencies, from headquarters to 
country offices, and finally from field staff to their recipient counterparts. This 
becomes manifest in the exemplary experience reported by a professor at the 
University of Dar es Salaam who was decisively involved in the Norwegian–
Tanzanian cooperation on REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation). When we visited him for the interview in his office, he had 
just returned from a meeting with his Norwegian partners which had brought 
about a serious discussion:  
The reason why I was at the Norwegian Embassy: I think a minister for 
foreign affairs will be coming down to Tanzania from Norway. Then, of 
course, the Embassy wants some of the activities to be accomplished by the 
time the minister is here. So that at least they can impress upon him or her 
and say, ‘These are things we have done’. But some of these achievements 
depend on – they have to go through the government system. And each and 
every government has a bureaucracy, has the procedures to adopt things, 
to approve things. So you cannot just say, ‘I am the donor, I want xyz to 
be accomplished tomorrow.’ It doesn’t work that way. So you find more of 
a mismatch on the understanding. And for me who is actually responsible 
for the REDD initiative in this country, I am caught in between because the 
Embassy wants some things to be concluded at a given time frame. But the 
government has stipulated bureaucratic procedures in approving things. 
And there is no way you can bypass that procedure. (Interview 69) 
External pressure to fast-track aid-related issues and push processes is also 
experienced in South Africa. A government official working for the Department 
of Environmental Affairs commented on the impatience of donors: 
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They use the rationale that they’re investing in South Africa and we need 
to react immediately. And with our processes within the government, we 
can’t react immediately. So, sometimes there is that pressure, especially 
with the GEF funded projects. (Interview 15) 
The implication of donors referring to their financial investments to legitimate 
their demand for prompt government response is evident: their need of 
accountability potentially undermines state–citizen accountability in aid 
receiving countries.
The erosion of internal accountability as a result of aid 
The deteriorating effect of foreign aid on internal accountability in developing 
democracies has been thematised by several scholars sharing one argument: 
when policy-makers are obliged to defend their actions and decisions first and 
foremost towards external financiers before turning to domestic constituencies, 
a key democratic mechanism, namely the fiscal–social contract based on 
taxation, is annulled (Bräutigam 1992, 2000; Therkildsen 2002; Gould 2005a; 
Glennie 2008; Moss et al. 2008; Mkandawire 2010).  
If donors are providing the majority of public finance and governments are 
primarily accountable to those external agencies, then it may simply not 
be possible to expect a credible social contract to develop between the state 
and its citizens. Using the current terminology, aid may undercut the very 
principles the aid industry intends to promote: ownership, accountability, 
and participation. (Moss et al. 2008: 269)
The observation that aid erodes public consultation and oversight has been 
made particularly in countries which receive large parts of their budget from 
outside (see, for instance, Mwenda (2006) on Uganda). But even in South 
Africa where aid accounts for less than 1% of government resources, concerns 
about the political accountability and control of official development assistance 
are raised. In the National Treasury’s Development Cooperation Review 2010, 
the authors point out: 
Currently the main central mechanism is the annual report on the RDP 
[Reconstruction and Development Programme] Fund, which only covers 
RDP fund ODA programmes and concerns the management of the fund 
(deposits, disbursements and balance) but not the onward management 
of resources. There is therefore no mechanism that provides Cabinet, 
parliament and the public with an overview of ODA of all kinds into 
South Africa on an annual basis. (Fölscher et al. 2010: 16)
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Comprehensive and disaggregated data on aid flows and their use are not 
even accessible to the receiving executive, given donors’ restrictive disclosure 
policies. Government officials from both South Africa and Tanzania reported 
on their struggles to obtain accurate information on donor activities in 
their respective sectors. Not only are there specific expenses, such as the 
amount spent on expert advice, which is usually not reported to recipient 
institutions. Moreover, donors bypass government systems which exacerbates 
the deterioration of democratic control. In Tanzania, only 28% of external 
contributions for HIV/Aids interventions are captured in budget books 
(TACAIDS 2011). PEPFAR funding provided by the US, which makes up 72% 
of the HIV/Aids aid budget, is channelled directly to NGOs without going 
through government structures. A financing officer at TACAIDS criticised this 
practice in that it divests democratic institutions of their oversight function: 
If the money does not pass through the government machinery, it means it 
is not being reflected in the books of parliament. And parliament passes the 
budget though the money is outside, and therefore they cannot follow how 
it was worked on and how it is accounted. (Interview 61) 
Given that various donors sideline authorities in recipient countries, which 
deprives their governments of fiduciary control, their commitment to ‘mutual 
accountability’ emphasised in the Paris Declaration appears hypocritical. 
Various interviewees in our study from both government ministries and aid 
agencies stated that accountability in aid relations is still unidirectional and 
asymmetric: while recipients are constantly pressured to be accountable to 
their financiers, namely taxpayers in the donor countries, they have no means 
to hold aid agents liable for their interventions and unintended consequences 
(Rottenburg 2000). 
In sum, aid being given by democratic donor countries to democratic 
recipient countries results in a paradoxical outcome: 
As things stand, the more accountable a donor is to its own voters, the more 
onerous and invasive will be its intervention in the receiving economy and 
the more likely it is to undermine the recipient democratic government’s 
accountability to its own voters. (Mkandawire 2010: 1168)
This logic holds for advice as one distinct form of aid as well: the more 
accountable a donor is to its own voters, the more its advisory activities are 
directed by its own agenda and interests rather than those of the recipient. 
That this is indeed the case will be shown in the following section. 
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Mismatch of supply and demand for expertise
For more than 20 years, a plethora of studies have criticised advice in the 
form of technical assistance as being “driven by donors rather than provided 
in response to aid-recipient priorities” (Forss et al. 1988; Jolly 1989; Berg 
1993; Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway &  Asplan Analyse 1994; 
Williams et al. 2003: iii; Land 2007; European Commission 2008; World Bank 
Independent Evaluation Group 2008). Authors consistently find that “this 
basic and pervasive factor – the donor-driven character of so much technical 
cooperation – is a root cause of the ineffectiveness of this form of aid” (Berg 
1993: 95). In response to the critique, donors acknowledged the importance 
of ‘local ownership’ and announced that recipients would be allowed more 
participation in the procurement and management of experts. Shifting 
administrative responsibilities, however, does not tackle the actual problem 
which is grounded in the linkage of aid and politics: donors leverage aid to 
foster issues of their own agenda and use advice as a means of influence and 
control. The political interests related to aid and the accountability pressures 
in donor countries explain the frequently diagnosed mismatch of supply and 
demand of technical assistance. 
This is corroborated by our own findings. Ministry officials from both 
Tanzania and South Africa perceived the donor community as little responsive 
to their own respective priorities. A member of the South African National 
Treasury summarised his experience as follows:  
Interviewee: If you look at the general development partner relationships, 
there are only a handful of partners who would come in and say, ‘We are 
prepared to support what you would want from us.’ 
Interviewer: Who would that be? 
Interviewee: That would be, well, it used to be Sweden. I’m not very 
attached to the Swedish approach anymore. The Swiss are very much 
doing the same thing now. The Dutch used to do that, they don’t do that 
anymore. In fact they have got their own attitude about it. The Norwegians 
have a similar kind of approach currently. The Danes had it, but they have 
literally withdrawn. The [European] Commission has very much moved 
in that direction. The Canadians are very strong in supporting us like that. 
So primarily, that is the core group that will provide support to us in that 
way. 
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The rest of them pretty much come with agendas that are more than you 
and I could collectively work out. You know, it’s just an incredible amount 
of agenda (…). So you can see that, you know, we sign all of these grand 
accords in Paris and elsewhere, and everybody is part of it – and nobody, 
they just pay lip-service to it. (Interview 38)
Despite the emphasis on ‘demand-driven’ support in international agreements, 
donors tend to give primacy to their own political agendas in giving aid, 
irrespective of whether they are in line with the recipients’ priorities or not. As 
a senior official in the Tanzanian health ministry commented:
Some countries, their people are a little bit more flexible, they can discuss. 
But some, they are too rigid. For me, I see they all have an agenda and 
sometimes your agenda and their agenda just collide by coincidence. 
(Interview 54)
The precedence of donor priorities in development cooperation becomes 
manifest when agendas do not collide. In our study, several cases provided 
evidence for frictions which emerged from competing priorities on donor 
and recipient sides. A comparison of these incidents revealed three different 
patterns of incongruence.
First, donors intervened in the domestic political domain of recipient 
countries by pushing certain topics which had not genuinely been prioritised 
by the government. ICT for basic education, for instance, was driven forward 
in Tanzania by US assistance; the policy documents developed were mainly a 
product of donor-funded advisors. 
Second, governments explicitly requested external support for a problem 
identified, but donors refused to assist as the topic was not part of their agenda. 
A typical example is the common disinterest of donors in higher education. 
Both the South African and Tanzanian government struggled to secure support 
for this area. At the time of our interviews, Tanzania’s Higher Education 
Development Programme was shelved due to a lack of funding required for 
implementation. 
Third and most notably, we found cases of colliding priorities which caused 
either open or covert conflicts between donors and recipients. The treatment 
versus prevention controversy in the field of HIV/Aids, which created tensions 
between the US government and various developing countries, is a blatant 
case in point. 
All of the examples mentioned above are discussed in-depth in the case 
studies below (see Chapter 7). What should be illustrated at this point is that 
donors’ political agendas play a decisive role in giving aid. This has significant 
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implications for advice in the context of development cooperation: experts are 
used to leverage certain subjects on behalf of their funding governments which 
do not necessarily match the primary problems articulated by the recipients. 
If advice, however, does not take the concerns of policy-makers into 
account, it fails to meet a crucial criterion of quality: expert knowledge 
provided by advisors must not only be technically (or scientifically) sound, but 
also “politically useful and acceptable. In short, it must be epistemically and 
politically robust” (Lentsch & Weingart 2009a: 7–8, italics in original).100 In the 
realm of aid, one finds various examples of advice which does not meet the 
second requirement as it is driven by the preferences of the supplier (i.e. the 
funder) rather than responsive to the priorities of the recipients. 
While this mismatch concerns the political layer of advice, vested interests 
related to aid also create a discrepancy between expertise provided and expertise 
required or requested. Evaluation reports repeatedly criticise insufficient needs 
analysis as a major reason for the failure of technical assistance, with donors 
paying little attention to organisational capacities on the recipient side (Forss 
et al. 1988; Berg 1993; Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway & Asplan 
Analyse 1994; DFID 2006; ECDPM & ACE Europe 2006; Land 2007; European 
Commission 2008). While such studies usually suggest a more systematic 
diagnosis of needs as a solution, we argue that improving methodologies will 
not solve the issue. The core problem consists in the use of capacity assessments 
as a tool for justifying advice which serves donors as a means of influence and 
control.  
In aid-receiving countries, capacity gaps in state bureaucracies are 
predominantly defined by external actors. It is usually donor-funded consultants 
who compile sector analyses which commonly find ‘severe capacity constraints 
at various levels’. Such assessments, however, are invariably biased: they are 
financed by donor governments who seek to get involved in the policy field 
under investigation. They are commissioned by aid agencies intrinsically 
interested in providing assistance. And they are written by professionals whose 
primary goal as individual consultants is to satisfy their clients in order to get 
follow-up assignments. While we do not insinuate that the authors of such 
studies consciously generate skewed results, we argue that they inevitably 
adopt the perspective of their principals. For the latter, assessment reports 
fulfil the function of justifying the deployment of experts in that they provide 
‘evidence’ for the need on the recipient side. A lack of ‘capacity’ as stated in 
100 At length, Lentsch and Weingart (2009a:  8) define political robustness of expertise as follows: 
“Political robustness of knowledge refers to the acceptability and the feasibility to implement 
recommendations based on it. An advice is robust if it can be politically implemented and meets 
the needs of the policymakers. Political robustness normally implies that the knowledge and the 
preferences of those who can be considered stakeholders are taken into account.”
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such documents thus serves as “a generalized (and depoliticized)  means of 
legitimizing external intervention” (Gould & Ojanen 2005: 45).
Given its legitimating implication, ‘capacity’ has become a sensitive notion 
in the aid arena. An expert working for the Canadian Embassy in Tanzania 
told us: 
It is actually whenever we mention that word ‘capacity’ to the government, 
it says, ‘Who do you think you are?’ And the question is, what do you 
mean by ‘capacity’? So this is also now being taken as a badge, you know, 
‘Why are you wishing us that? We are ok’. (Interview 31)
Several interviewees on the donor side expressed the sentiment that the 
government did not acknowledge capacity gaps and, as a matter of principle, 
rejected any advice offered despite – in the view of donors – being in need of 
assistance. 
Interviews with government representatives revealed a different narrative. 
In their perception, donors come with a “mentality that there’s nothing on 
the ground” (Interview 17), disregarding the local capacity available. Leading 
officials both in South Africa and Tanzania find themselves under constant 
pressure to repel the glut of advisors donors try to embed into their systems 
– “there is always the attempt of ‘let me bring some people’”, a Tanzanian 
interviewee commented (Interview  63). As an example, she told us an 
anecdote about tedious negotiations with the government of Japan which had 
proposed a project with a plethora of advisors attached to it: 
That proposal for support of maternal and child health had everything, 
including people working for the mortuary. I think that is abuse! Because 
the starting point should be what are the needs? So we negotiated, we 
negotiated, we negotiated and negotiated. Finally, after something like 
just over a year and a half of negotiations, we ended getting a laboratory 
– which was not the starting point. But it was like extracting a normal 
tooth – a long painful process. So why does one come to negotiate with the 
assumption that everybody is asleep and the only people who are awake 
are coming from Japan? It’s wrong. (Interview 63) 
While this particular incident happened in the Tanzanian health sector a 
while ago, it is still a prevailing pattern that donors seek to place advisors into 
recipient countries’ institutions, irrespective of articulated capacity needs. A 
WHO officer in Tanzania frankly stated that he sees the majority of external 
experts in the health ministry as ‘supply-induced’: 
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We [the development partners] ask the ministry: How many can we bring 
to you? They don’t request it from us. They don’t request from us, they 
don’t request in terms of numbers, and in what areas. And sometimes we 
generate demand for them. (Interview 44) 
The observation that development partners ‘generate demand’ indicates 
that they pursue other interests in providing experts, aside from supporting 
recipients. In some cases, it is pretty obvious that donor agents bargain for 
technical assistance in order to care for the careers of their colleagues in the 
aid market. The following experience, which illustrates such an attempt at job 
creation, was reported by a leading functionary at TACAIDS: 
There’s one particular donor who – we agreed they will give us a technical 
assistant for a period of one-year negotiable and we said one and we agreed 
one. Six months down the line, he dares come to me and say, ‘We have an 
excellent person, his contract has ended at ministry X, I think he could be 
very useful to help you in one, two, three.’ I said, ‘Well, how do you know? 
You don’t work here. I work here and I’ve not identified that need, sorry.’ 
And it was like he couldn’t believe it, he went on and on for four months. 
Finally, I just decided ‘Look here, if you come here one more time for this, 
I’m going to the ambassador because it’s not right what you’re doing.’ 
(Interview 63)
While in this case, the recipient representative refused to accept the unrequested 
offer for expert assistance, decisions become more difficult when advice comes 
as an explicit or implicit condition for funding. Although the donor community 
officially agreed to untie financial from technical support (see United Republic 
of Tanzania 2006b), it is still common that organisations come with a “package 
[which] includes bringing in technical assistance” (Interview 69). 
Experts placed in ministries and departments grant access to the inner sphere 
of government and control over resources.101 This explains why donors insist on 
posting advisors to recipient units irrespective of capacity needs. The linkage of 
advice and money was picked out as a central theme by several interviewees; 
donor staff strongly criticised the prevailing practice of deploying experts for 
organisational self-interests. A World Bank specialist in Dar es Salaam sharply 
criticised the aid community for this kind of ‘imposed’ assistance: 
101 The merging of advisory, administrative and supervising tasks in technical assistance assignments 
has significant implications for the relationship between advisors and counterparts which will be 
discussed in Chapter 5.
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Because you are supporting a programme, because you are bringing money, 
then you would like to bring anybody to provide the technical assistance 
– irrespective of whether they need it, whether this guy has actually better 
capacity and there is no transparency in terms of how you get this guy from 
the mother country, whoever the supporting country is. (Interview 47) 
The question whether there is a genuine demand for expertise becomes 
difficult to answer when money is tied to it, even more so when governments 
are highly dependent on external funding. As an expert working for the 
Netherland’s Embassy in Dar es Salaam said: 
If a [donor] country would really come with a package: ‘We want to invest 
in the water sector over the next five years (…), but we definitely, we insist 
we want you to get two TAs because it’s really needed’ – I think that, if it’s 
good or bad, Tanzania would not refuse that. (Interview 38)
The assumption that policy-makers in Tanzania are not likely to reject support 
although it entails “prescribed technical assistance” (Interview 47) is proved 
true by the experience of interviewees. An example is given by a Tanzanian 
health expert who remembered Danida placing nine advisors in the ministry 
of health as a condition for money and material: 
We asked our bosses, ‘But how do you agree on this?’ They said, ‘No, 
without them we could have not got the EDP [essential drugs programme] 
drug kits.’ It was a condition that if you want EDP drug kits and this 
programme to run, you have to have these advisors. So you are aware, 
your people don’t have drugs – please bring them. (Interview 44) 
A government committed to improve the ‘quality of life and social well-being’ 
of its citizens (United Republic of Tanzania 2010) would face a moral dilemma 
if it waived the provision of essential drugs for its population (which it cannot 
afford to procure by itself) on the ground that it does not want to have experts 
sitting in its ministries. While there certainly are exceptions, decision-makers 
in Tanzania tend to accept external advice as it increases their scope of action 
rather than decline support due to its conditionality. 
This equally applies to the institutionalised interaction with donor experts in 
the context of joint funding mechanisms such as general budget support, sector 
budget support or baskets. Policy dialogue is an obligatory condition of these 
modalities which have brought about “intense and routine donor involvement” 
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(Harrison 2004: 88) in government decision-making.102 In technical working 
groups, SWAp meetings or annual reviews, donor representatives regularly 
meet with policy-makers and senior officials to discuss policy issues. From the 
recipient perspective, however, the starting point for this kind of interaction is 
the government’s shortage of financial resources and its interest in increasing 
the budget with external funding. Since consulting donors is a procedural 
conditionality for disbursements, policy-makers have little other choice 
than to accept being advised. A director in the Tanzanian education ministry 
pragmatically stated: 
They’re the funders. They’re the ones who support you, so you have to go 
into negotiation. (Interview 49)
In Tanzania, a lot of advice provided either through dialogue structures or 
technical assistance is pushed through by donors without an explicit request 
by the government. This can bring about situations where advisors end up 
placed in offices “with nothing to advise” (Interview 44). As will be shown 
in the case studies (see Chapter 7), it also leads to overt and covert resistance 
against external interference in the form of enforced advice which manifests 
in frictions between external experts and their counterparts.  
In South Africa, we found a very different picture. Neither is the 
government compelled to constantly interact with donors in dialogue forums, 
nor are departments ‘invaded’ by foreign advisors. The government tends to 
be selective in whose support to accept or reject. A director in the National 
Treasury delineated the country’s strategic approach towards expert advice as 
follows: 
There are some things we choose to bring in and some things we don’t 
(…). And we say that this is the type of expertise we need. So we already 
start directing it from that point of view. And we try to control this process 
so far that we don’t have experts coming in to redirect our policy space. 
(Interview 23)       
The government’s leeway in selecting assistance is, amongst others, grounded 
on its relative independence from external financing. Donors cannot use 
money as a lever to place experts in authorities against an explicit demand. 
South Africa is an exceptional case in terms of its strong standing against 
donors, however. The bigger the financial and political power imbalances 
102 For agreements which outline the conditions of joint funding mechanisms in Tanzania, see United 
Republic of Tanzania (2008a, 2008b, 2011).
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between donors and recipients, the more the latter are struggling to defend 
themselves against ‘imposed advice’ in the form of institutionalised dialogue 
or technical assistance which does not match their needs. 
Structural flaws pertaining to expert employment
Expert advice in the context of development aid is not only negatively affected 
by its linkage with politics. It is also impeded by several structural flaws related 
to conceptual deficiencies and employment practices on the donor side. First, 
aid agencies lack clear concepts of knowledge transfer and capacity-building 
without which expert advice becomes a black-box process with respect to its 
impact. Second, as a result of changing recruitment patterns in aid agencies, 
experts often lack adequate expertise, experience and competencies to provide 
valuable advice to recipients. Third, current employment practices obstruct 
the building of trust and interpersonal relationships which constitute crucial 
preconditions for knowledge sharing and learning processes. These obstacles at 
the micro-level of advice explain why external experts so often fail to achieve 
their proclaimed primary objective, namely to make themselves obsolete by 
capacitating counterparts in recipient bureaucracies. 
Vague concepts of knowledge transfer and ‘capacity-building’
‘Capacity-building’, ‘capacity development’ or ‘capacity enhancement’ are terms 
that are nowadays found in almost every donor document (Easterly 2002).103 
Yet, the aid community does not have a commonly shared understanding of 
what these terms mean. Some agencies have not even defined capacity-building 
internally and lack any kind of strategic vision of how it is supposed to take 
place. An OECD report compiled in 2009 found that out of 21 DAC members, 
only ten had “some form of overall capacity development guidance document 
– either in final or draft version” (OECD/DAC Capacity Development Team 
2009: 4). The vagueness of the term also becomes evident in the interviews 
of this study. Talking about capacity-building, some respondents referred to 
concrete activities such as professional training courses, while others used it 
as an umbrella term and framed it as an overall goal of donor support, stating 
that “all of it is capacity-building in a way” (Interview  1). Considering the 
ambiguous meaning and use of the term, it is not surprising that the role of 
103 As Easterly (2002: 53) points out, “capacity building has been a theme of donor recommendations 
since forever, although it continues to exert its fascination in the latest reports”. Easterly made this 
comment in 2002, but his statement would still be valid today, almost a decade and a half later. 
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experts in that context is similarly vague. Aid agencies lack precise concepts of 
advice and its transformational impact on the recipient side. 
A plethora of studies have identified the absence of knowledge transfer 
concepts as a major shortfall of technical assistance.104 In practice, the prevailing 
assumption among actors in advisory functions is that the interaction between 
external experts and their counterparts implies a learning process on the part 
of the latter. This is reflected by a statement of a Tanzanian policy-maker who 
commented:  
Transfer of knowledge is there because you take a report to the donor, 
they analyse the report, and they provide comments. On the basis of those 
comments you can improve your report. And you meet, you discuss, you get 
challenges through questions, you respond. In a way, there is an implied 
building of capacity. (Interview 60) 
This implicit process of capacity-building is somehow expected, but not ex ante 
articulated. Terms of reference for advisory positions and consultancies entail 
detailed lists of duties (e.g. participation in policy reviews, development of 
guidelines, conducting analyses etc.), but do not dwell on how knowledge 
transfer is meant to take place through these activities. The absence of a clear 
operationalisation makes external experts follow a “strategy of hope” (World 
Bank 2005a: 5) when interacting with their counterparts. An expert in the 
Finnish Embassy in Dar es Salaam admitted:
Sometimes it’s difficult to know, of course, what is it that you or the other 
person picks up from this collaboration, what are the things? Is it the way 
of working or is it the way of expressing yourself or a way of seeing things? 
Maybe you understand only later on how it happens. (Interview 36)
The performance of external experts is measured against the input they 
provided, not against their impact on the recipient side.105 Given that 
knowledge transfer is not “factored within the agreement” (Interview 47), as 
104 See, for instance, Forss et al. (1988); Berg (1993); World Bank (2005a); DFID (2006); ECDPM & 
ACE Europe (2006); Land (2007); JICA (2008).
105 A study on DFID-funded technical cooperation, for instance, states that “a significant problem in 
the assessment of capacity development impact is that the activities reviewed in general did not 
involve exercises to benchmark capacity and capacity targets were not set. As a result, monitoring 
of capacity impact was either not built into the project monitoring and evaluation system or was 
not done so using a consistent analytical framework (for instance one that distinguished the wider 
institutional setting, the elements of organisational capacity, or individual staff capacities). The 
absence of such a systematic framework or focus on capacity development limits significantly the 
quality of the information on which judgements about capacity development impact can be based” 
(DFID 2006: xiv et seq.).
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a Tanzanian World Bank expert put it, it receives less attention by advisors 
who are under pressure to fulfil the tasks agreed in their contract. Delivering 
products, meeting reporting requirements and carrying out projects on time 
often gains primacy over sharing knowledge with counterparts, which takes 
time and requires commitment on both sides. As a result, experts end up as 
‘doers’ instead of being ‘mentors’, with the risk that “when the advisor leaves, 
you are back to square one because the capacity was not transferred to the 
team” (Interview 33).
Cases of ‘gap-filling’ experts in government units who create a “vacuum” 
(Interview 23) after they leave have been reported many times. Interviewees 
of this study provided several examples from both South Africa and Tanzania 
where authorities faced serious setbacks when technical assistance ended, but 
no local staff had been capacitated to use a newly established software system 
or to conduct a follow-up analysis without external support. The absence 
of knowledge transfer as an explicit element in contracts and assessment 
frameworks for advisors is seen as a fundamental flaw in the design and 
management of technical assistance. The problem that experts thus lack 
incentives to train or mentor their counterparts (instead of taking over their 
work) is exacerbated by the fact that they have an interest in keeping their 
status: simply put, an advisor or consultant is not necessarily keen on making 
his or her service obsolete by sharing knowledge (for which he or she is hired) 
with others. As a high-level official in Tanzania commented: 
The thing I have noted with consultants, they don’t want to give you 
everything. They just give you very little because they want them to be 
unique, to be calling them every year. Now if they give you everything, 
you do it yourself, will they continue to have jobs? No. Consultants will 
always come, do a study, but also create a room for a second follow-up 
study. (Interview 60) 
The “competitive and money-based” (Interview 8) nature of the consultancy 
industry in particular creates the perverse incentive to keep knowledge exclusive 
instead of sharing it. That being the case, the assumption that knowledge 
transfer implicitly takes place through the interaction between experts and 
government officials is, to say the least, simplistic. If an expert activity is meant 
to have any transformational impact in terms of capacity-building, it would be 
a necessity to explicitly articulate how this is to be brought about and to make 
it a – if not the – decisive criterion for performance assessment. This is not yet 
common practice in the aid community, given the absence of clear concepts of 
advice and its linkage to capacity-building. Knowledge transfer is thus at best 
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a contingent by-product of advisory processes whose quality is dependent on 
the commitment and relationship of the individual actors involved. 
Insufficient fit of expertise, experience and advisory competencies
The composition of expert cadres is changing (see Chapter 4). Sector-specialists 
are increasingly being replaced by ‘hybrid advisors’ and generalists with a 
background in economics and administration. Work experience is becoming 
less important as a qualification criterion than high-level academic qualification 
and international mobility. These shifts in recruitment have significant 
effects on advisory processes insofar as experts often lack adequate expertise, 
experience and relevant competencies to provide valuable advice to their 
counterparts. The insufficient fit of expert backgrounds and the resulting weak 
quality of advice has repeatedly been criticised in evaluation reports (Forss 
et al. 1988; Jolly 1989; Williams et al. 2003; World Bank 2005a; DFID 2006; 
European Commission 2008; World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 
2008). In our study, the problem of inadequate expertise was broached as an 
issue by interviewees on both the donor and recipient side, particularly in the 
fields of health and education in Tanzania. Many expressed the sentiment that 
the dialogue in technical working groups has been negatively affected by the 
changing composition of donor representatives. Generalists and administrators 
have little to contribute when it comes to sector-specific problems which 
require specialist knowledge and a deeper understanding of the matters at 
stake. Since their expertise, instead, increasingly lies in areas such as project 
management, auditing and accounting rather than on technical issues, it 
has become increasingly difficult to “talk the same language” (Interview 44) 
in policy discussions, as an interviewee put it. A Tanzanian health expert 
with many years of experience participating in donor-government dialogue 
explained the frictions which emerge from this mismatch: 
You have Rik in the Netherlands [a foreign advisor with a biomedical 
background], he can understand why you are talking this. But others do 
not understand because they look at the money, not at the product and 
they do not know the challenges that are in the country (…). They will 
stick to these audit reports etc., but they will not see the performance on 
immunisation coverage and cases like that. (Interview 44) 
Similarly, a Tanzanian academic engaged in the education sector told us: 
Many of these development partners, they are not experts in education. 
But they are supposed to be coordinators or chairs for education and they 
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interact with the Ministry of Education. I have been with them, I have 
been to those meetings. It’s very different from a university professor of 
education talking to the Ministry that ‘this is how things can be done, this 
is how to change the mind set of science students, this is how laboratory 
work can be made interesting.’ It’s very, very different. Those people, the 
development partners, are interested in their money: ‘Has the next tranche 
been paid, have you received the letter for the next tranche?’ (…) That’s 
their main interest. (Interview 71) 
The managerial knowledge many aid experts nowadays hold helps to 
administrate programmes and to keep track of funding flows. It is, however, 
not the type of expertise suitable to fulfil the main objective of the dialogue, 
namely to provide ‘sound advice’ for tackling sectoral challenges in the 
respective areas (see, for example, Development Partners Group Tanzania 
2007, 2010a). 
In addition to the often inadequate expertise of advisors, interviewees 
expressed concerns about the tendency of donors to send young experts 
who might be highly qualified with respect to their academic credentials, 
but lack experience in dealing with complex policy issues. The fact that 
advisors increasingly become younger is a result of accelerated career paths 
in international organisations which attract graduates with a low starting 
age and fast-track promotion (see Chapter 4). While advisory assignments in 
developing countries push the careers of young professionals, the counterparts 
on government side often perceive their placement as little helpful if not 
burdensome. A Tanzanian health expert stated in this regard: 
You bring a person who has never worked in the government, who has 
read his or her books well and then has got a master just like the other 
one who needs to be advised. And you are now coming to advise. Then 
instead of advising, you ask too many questions. How does this work out? 
(Interview 44)
A third aspect related to the aptitude of experts that turned out to be a central 
theme both in South Africa and Tanzania was what interviewees framed as 
‘personality’. Whether recommendations are perceived as advice, constructive 
or destructive criticism or even interference is deemed heavily dependent on 
the way they are brought forward; several officials reported of tensions which 
evolved when external experts appeared overly assertive and dominant. 
Attitudes and behavioural patterns seem to play a decisive role in advisory 
contexts. Various reports confirm the significance of a certain set of competencies 
(often termed ‘interpersonal skills’) for the impact of advice, such as listening, 
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communicative sensitivity, an ability to empathise and a commitment to assist 
rather than to prescribe (World Bank 2005a; DFID 2006).106 In contrast to 
expertise and experience, however, such competencies are systematically 
neglected in the recruitment and assessment of experts.107 Even though this 
may result from the fact that it is more difficult to capture them as qualification 
criteria, it is nonetheless a structural shortfall which in many cases impairs the 
quality of advisory relations. 
The importance of adequate expertise, experience and advisory competencies 
on the side of advisors was repeatedly emphasised by interviewees of this 
study and illustrated not only by negative experiences, but also by examples 
of experts who were perceived as having the right ‘fit’ and were thus highly 
appreciated by recipients. A case in point mentioned by different officials was 
a health specialist working for GTZ (later GIZ) in Tanzania. Although at the 
time of the interviews, he had already left the country a couple of years earlier, 
his former counterparts still praised his support in the field of health and HIV. 
With a high level of specialist knowledge about public health systems and 
broad experience in other African countries, his advice was considered highly 
valuable. Officials of the Ministry of Health and TACAIDS described him as an 
outspoken, but respectful person who had shown sensitivity and commitment 
in engaging with his Tanzanian colleagues – “he truly believed in partnership 
as partnership” (Interview 63), a high-level decision-maker stated. 
Apart from the individual attributes recipients ascribed to this individual, 
they highlighted the strong bonds he had built from a long-term cooperation. 
Staying in Tanzania for eight years, the health expert had an exceptionally 
long period of assignment in the country. His case illustrates that building 
advisory relationships requires not only the right mix of expertise, experience 
and competencies, but also conducive employment conditions; the latter, 
however, are usually missing in the aid context. 
Lack of trust and social ties
A central theme throughout the interviews of this study was the lack of trust 
and continuity in advisory relationships resulting from employment practices 
106 A World Bank study suggests ‘listening’, ‘curiosity’, ‘patience’, ‘humility’, ‘flexibility’, ‘empathy’ 
and ‘building trust’ as core competencies for advisory processes (World Bank 2005a: xiii). While 
we would argue that ‘building trust’ is more a result of behaviour which is also dependent on other 
factors (e.g. time), the remainder are similar to the essential competencies that can be identified in 
this study. 
107 The World Bank report, for instance, finds that behavioural competencies are “hardly covered” 
in the bank’s Overall Performance Assessment framework used for assessing staff (World Bank 
2005a: 35). 
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on the donor side.108 The theoretical and empirical insights of organisational 
studies of firms are instructive for analysing conditions at the micro-level 
of expert advice in aid. While organisational determinants vary, the basic 
constellation at the individual level is similar: actors encounter each other 
as potential knowledge sources and potential recipients. The crucial question 
is which factors determine whether their interaction is a successful learning 
process that results in knowledge transfer. A major finding in this regard is the 
significance of social ties, trust and shared visions as manifestations of social 
capital (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998).109 
Social ties as a structural feature and interpersonal trust as a relational 
characteristic have proven to be two crucial elements for knowledge transfer 
which are closely interlinked (Tsai & Ghoshal 1998; Hansen 1999; Levin et 
al. 2003; Inkpen & Tsang 2005; Becerra et al. 2008). Several scholars have 
shown that a close working relationship, in which actors frequently interact, 
functions as a strong tie that stimulates trust; trust, in turn, enhances the 
potential of knowledge transfer, as actors are not only “more willing to give 
useful knowledge”, but also “to listen to and absorb others’ knowledge” (Levin 
& Cross 2004: 1478). Both elements, social ties and interpersonal trust, share 
two characteristic traits. First, they are actor-bound in the sense that ties or 
trusting relationships cannot easily be traded or passed from one person to 
others. Second, they depend on a “history of interactions” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 
1998: 244), making time and continuity key determinants for their emergence 
(Preisendörfer 1995; Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998; Adler & Kwon 2002; Inkpen 
& Tsang 2005). 
Looking at advisory relationships in the context of development aid, we find 
several conditions impeding the development of strong ties and trust between 
advisors and advised. A major obstacle in this regard is the high turnover of 
staff in donor organisations. Experts deployed as advisors spend around two to 
108 Interpersonal relationships have not yet received much attention in the literature on expert advice. 
In evaluation reports, they are, if at all, mentioned as a side note, but are not further investigated. In 
organisational theories and management sciences, however, the impact of interpersonal relations 
and trust in knowledge transfer processes within and across organisations have become key objects 
of research. See, for instance, Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998); Zaheer et al. (1998); Hansen (1999); 
Argote & Ingram (2000); Szulanski (2000); Levin et al. (2003); Levin & Cross (2004); Inkpen & 
Tsang (2005); Becerra et al. (2008); Hajidimitriou et al. (2012); Alexopoulos & Buckley (2013).
109 Social capital as a concept of social science is used in a wide range of theories and filled with 
different meanings. Adler and Kwon (2002) provide an overview of definitions across various 
disciplines. We follow Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) who defined social capital as the “sum of 
the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through and derived from the 
network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” (243), and differentiated three 
dimensions: a structural dimension which refers to the “overall pattern of connection between 
actors” (244); a relational dimension which focuses on the relationship between actors; and a 
cognitive dimension which includes “shared representations, interpretations, and systems of 
meaning” (244). The components of all three dimensions have been shown to significantly affect 
the outcome of knowledge transfer efforts within organisational contexts (Nahapiet 2011).
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three years in a country; consultants often only a couple of months.110 Similar 
to many other interviewees, a retired Tanzanian government member assessed 
the average stay of external experts as too short for building a fruitful advisory 
relationship: 
I think it needs a much longer period of time of interaction between the 
local and external experts in working together for a common goal (…). 
When it’s two years and an expert comes and goes, you don’t really have 
much, much impact. (Interview 65)
The impact of advice is seen as heavily dependent on the relationship between 
experts and their counterparts. The establishment of social ties through 
regular and continuing interaction between actors, however, is hampered by 
the “temporariness of interlocutors” (Interview 71), as an interviewee put it. 
Building up relationships and trust that constitute essential preconditions for 
advice requires a time span which exceeds the employment cycles prevailing 
in the aid community. As a World Bank expert commented: 
By the time you get even on a personal level to understand the guy, then 
there’s a new advisor coming in. (Interview 47) 
The development of trust is not only hampered by discontinuity but also 
by the double role of experts as advisors and administrators. In many cases 
experts not only have the function to provide advice to government officials, 
but also to monitor the progress of programmes, the adherence to agreements 
and the proper use of funds. Particularly in the case of technical assistants 
embedded in ministries or departments, the merger of advising and controlling 
responsibilities causes accountability conflicts and distrust. The perception 
among many recipients is that experts placed in state authorities primarily 
serve as donor agents. A Tanzanian professor expressed the sentiment he 
observed among government officials in ministries: 
Why do you want them to be in our offices? They will just be here as spies 
and looking at what we are doing. (Interview 71)
The practice of linking advisory and supervisory tasks reduces the trustworthiness 
of advice, as the intentions behind expert engagement get blurred. Recipients 
who are doubtful of the motivation of advice are less likely to be receptive 
to it. The fact that experts are perceived as working in the interest of donors 
110 Details on employment conditions are outlined in Chapter 4. 
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and that they appear to benefit from their intermediary position, which grants 
them control over resources and access to decision makers, complicates the 
emergence of a trustful relationship.111 Various statements of interviewees 
point to a mutual distrust on both donor and government side about the 
respective others’ purposes within cooperation. 
The perceived discrepancy of intentions and lack of common goals is also 
confirmed by questionnaire results of this study. Asked about their experience 
in working with their counterparts, many respondents assessed ‘sharing 
similar interests in reaching targets’ and ‘sharing a common vision and similar 
motivation’ as highly problematic issues within cooperation.112 A shared vision 
constitutes a major cognitive element in relationships and is proven to have a 
considerable effect on the emergence of trust in knowledge transfer processes 
(Tsai & Ghoshal 1998; Levin et al. 2003). 
In sum, developing a trustful relationship in a setting characterised by a 
discontinuity of actors, short time frames and non-transparent interests becomes 
an inherently difficult endeavour. While individual actors may still be able to 
build such relationships, the prevailing employment conditions of experts are 
not conducive to a “waxing process” (Interview 71) at the interpersonal level, 
thus impeding knowledge transfer processes in the context of aid.
Unequal relationships
With the rise of the ‘knowledge for development’ paradigm, ‘local knowledge’ 
and its importance for transformational processes have become a central theme 
in the international discourse on development.113 The debate affected the aid 
111 Delineating conflicting imperatives of the broker’s role in the political sphere, Stovel and Shaw 
(2012: 151) state that “acting as a middleman between these two spheres frequently engenders 
severe distrust from actors on both sides of the divide”. According to the authors, brokers face 
a constant dual-agency dilemma stemming from the tension between the personal ties essential 
for brokerage processes and the potential individual gains of their role: “Given that a broker – 
due to her greater access to information, control over resources, or structural power – has a clear 
opportunity to gain at the expense of either or both of the groups for whom she is brokering, how 
does she maintain the trust necessary to continue brokering between them?” (Stovel & Shaw 
2012: 154).
112 The distribution of answers in detail (missings not calculated in the percentage): ‘Sharing 
similar interests in reaching targets’:  10.9% extremely problematic; 36.4% problematic; 40% 
rather unproblematic; 12.7% definitely unproblematic. ‘Sharing a common vision and similar 
motivation’:  14.5% extremely problematic; 41.8% problematic; 30.9% rather unproblematic; 
12.7% definitely unproblematic. 
113 See Warren et al. (1995); Odora Hoppers (2002); Santos (2007). The term ‘local knowledge’ needs 
some clarification as it lacks a common definition. Post-development/post-modernism scholars 
often use it interchangeably with ‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous’ knowledge developed and used by 
a society, as opposed to scientific knowledge. In the context of development cooperation, ‘local 
knowledge’ usually refers to the knowledge generated in developing countries in contrast to 
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community insofar as it questioned the prevailing approach of knowledge 
transfer and shed light on the ignorance of scientific and non-scientific 
knowledge produced by developing countries (Torres 2001; King 2004). In 
response to the critique, donor organisations have come up with new policies 
and strategies which emphasise the commitment to recognise, use and thereby 
strengthen recipient countries’ knowledge base. Advice should no longer be 
a one-way street, but become a mutual learning process; experts should no 
longer only be sent from abroad, but also recruited within the ‘partner country’. 
Regulations on expert employment reflect this new approach. The World 
Bank in its guidelines for the selection and employment of consultants, for 
instance, highlights its “interest in encouraging the development and use 
of national consultants in its developing member countries” (World Bank 
2011a:  2). Similarly, Danida’s guidelines for technical assistance instruct 
preference to be given to national experts over external ones: 
The first possibility to consider for any TA needs is whether the required 
expertise is available nationally. If national expertise is available and 
most suitable for the TA input required, it would in most cases be preferable 
if the partner organisation recruits this expertise directly, and under 
national rules. Using national consultants and institutions for technical 
assistance can be considered part of capacity development of the human 
resources base of a country. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 
2009: 16, bold in original).114
Although the emphasis on local knowledge has become a key element of the 
rhetoric of aid agencies, development cooperation is still characterised by 
a predominance of external experts and an asymmetric flow of knowledge 
from the North to the global South. The unequal setting in which donors and 
recipients operate is reinforced through the creation of “knowledge hierarchies” 
(Girvan 2007:  16) which marginalise experts in developing countries, and 
increase the discursive power of the transnational expert community working 
for international organisations. Procurement practices and employment 
conditions of these organisations consolidate the hierarchical classification of 
expertise in the context of development aid. 
Western knowledge. In this study, we use the term to differentiate knowledge which is locally 
available in a given society (both scientific and non-scientific) from knowledge provided by 
external (foreign) experts. 
114 After arguing that the use of national experts would strengthen the local knowledge base in 
the recipient country, the text continues: “National consultants are generally better attuned to 
government officials and departmental cultures, as well as to the private sector in the country – 
and, using national consultants may be a cost-effective solution” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Denmark 2009: 16). 
123
CHAPTER 5 Intricacies of Expert Advice in the Aid Context
The creation of knowledge hierarchies
The procurement of experts turns out to be a sensitive issue in the cooperation 
between donor organisations and recipient institutions. The frictions that arise 
in the context of procurement point to power struggles underlying the process 
of assessing expert qualification in which donors – despite all claims of ‘local 
ownership’ – still hold the authority to set formal and informal rules. In some 
cases, the gap between donor policies and practice is appalling. According 
to the World Bank policy for the selection of consultants, for instance, the 
responsibility of procurement lies with the borrower (World Bank 2011a); a 
Tanzanian expert working for the World Bank in Dar es Salaam, however, told 
us: 
The participation of the ministry or the government is usually very 
minimal. I see in some areas they do participate in terms of selection, 
hiring and so on, but it’s just face value. (Interview 47) 
The cases in which recipients are potentially involved in procurement are 
limited. Experts for representative positions such as sector specialists or first 
secretaries are internally recruited by the employing organisation and, in 
the case of bilateral agencies, often require citizenship in the donor country 
and respective language skills.115 Consequently, while there may be some 
exceptions, representative positions are usually filled by foreign experts. 
This may not come as a surprise, but one has to bear in mind that experts in 
such positions are higher up the hierarchy and – at least in a country such as 
Tanzania – have the widest scope of influence in the sector they are concerned 
with. 
When it comes to procuring advisors and consultants, the extent to which 
recipients have a say in the process varies from agency to agency. Generally, 
Nordic countries and UN agencies are perceived as less prescriptive than 
other bi- and multilateral agencies such as GIZ or the World Bank which set 
115 Although English is used as a standard official language in the aid community, many of the bilateral 
organisations require advanced skills of their respective country’s language for leading advisory 
positions. The Swedish development agency Sida, for instance, states on its website that “most 
positions require good knowledge of Swedish (written and spoken), and also Swedish citizenship 
or a residence permit” (Sida 2013b). In our interviews, this was justified by the need to be able 
to report to and communicate with headquarters in the respective language. Interestingly, online 
adverts for job vacancies are often distributed only in the official language of the donor country and 
not translated into English or French or the language of the country of assignment. At the time of 
research, Sida published vacancies on its website only in Swedish. Similarly, many job descriptions 
of GIZ are only published in German (although posted on the English website), making it difficult 
for experts from abroad to identify potential job opportunities. 
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strict conditions and requirements. Consistent with many other interviewees 
in recipient institutions, a senior officer working for the Tanzanian National 
Environmental Management Council summarised his experience in the 
following way: 
Interviewee: In case it is a credit from the World Bank, they have a range 
of conditionalities that these kinds of projects must be internationally 
advertised and experts compete. 
Interviewer: And do they, have they got any influence on which experts 
you choose? 
(...)
Interviewee: Yes, they have the final say. Because you have a number of 
experts, you conduct the evaluation, the evaluation has to be submitted to 
the World Bank, then they are the one who say that ‘okay, this is the kind 
of expert we would like to work with based on the qualifications’ (…). You 
don’t have the final say as a country or as a project. Everything, whatever 
you raise, must have no objection from the World Bank. In fact, there is a 
little flexibility. Whenever we work with international organisations like 
the UNDP – they don’t attach strict conditions like the other one. Because 
at least there is the flexibility. If we work with the UNDP, they can bring 
money, then we will do everything in terms of advertisement, sourcing the 
experts and everything. (Interview 59)
While aid agencies differ in terms of setting procurement regulations and 
conditions, they share the practice of differentiating between “national” and 
“international” experts. National advisory positions are open only for nationals 
of the respective country. International posts, in contrast, are internationally 
advertised. The scope of recruitment, however, is not the only difference. 
Across all aid agencies, international experts tend to have superior positions 
in comparison to national experts. The hierarchy between the two becomes 
manifest in inequalities with regard to remuneration, authority and ascribed 
credibility of expertise. Prevailing procurement and employment practices 
create a market which structurally discriminates experts from developing 
countries.
Finding an answer to the question of how the distinction between 
national and international experts emerged and how it is legitimated is not 
easy. The categorisation is commonly used in human resources policies and 
staff management documents of donor organisations; it is, however, never 
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thoroughly explained on which justification it is based and which demarcation 
criteria are used. Asked what decides whether a job is tendered as a national or 
international position, interviewees provided two answers. The first referred 
to the assumed availability of domestic expertise: the donor and the recipient 
jointly decide if experts are likely to be found locally, and if not, they would 
advertise for an international expert. This approach would be in line with 
the principles set out in policies of recipient countries, for example, the Joint 
Assistance Strategy for Tanzania which states that “procurement of TA will 
use national rather than foreign expertise or supplies whenever these are able 
to meet VFM [value for money] and capacity development requirements” 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2006b: 11–12). 
The second answer justified the practice in terms of compliance with 
market rules: advisory jobs or consultancies that exceed a specific financial 
threshold require an international bidding process. In fact, aid agencies within 
the European Union which serve as public sector authorities are subject to 
EU directives and thus need to tender consultancy contracts amounting to 
EUR 200 000 and more in all EU member states (GIZ n.d.; European Union 
2012). Similarly, the World Bank has set monetary thresholds for each 
borrowing country which determine whether short lists for consultancies 
may be limited to national consultants or must include foreign candidates. In 
both South Africa and Tanzania, this ceiling is currently set at USD 300 000 
(World Bank 2016: 5). These regulations are justified with the aim to foster 
competition and ensure the best ‘value for money’. 
The differentiation between national and international experts in the 
context of development aid is so common that it is rarely questioned. Yet, it 
demarcates expertise, drawing a line between experts in recipient countries 
and experts from abroad. A Tanzanian government official in the Ministry 
of Natural Resources and Tourism remembered an occasion at which the 
differentiation of national and international experts was challenged:  
Actually at one time, we had a very strong debate at the steering committee 
meeting. We just wanted to hire an international expert and someone from 
the university actually asked the chair, ‘at least make a definition of an 
international expert. Who would be an international expert?’ And the 
consensus actually came that someone might be a Tanzanian, but also 
have an international qualification. (Interview 55) 
Similarly, a permanent secretary in Tanzania argued: 
Our professors learnt in universities from abroad, maybe similar 
universities. For example, at the University of Dar es Salaam, some of my 
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good professors there studied at Harvard. Some are better, they got their 
PhD there. So they have got good expertise and they are also used by some 
international organisations like UNICEF and they present papers abroad, 
outside there. So this connotation of international and local is not good. 
(Interview 60) 
Many interviewees expressed the sentiment that the differentiation between 
national and international expertise implicitly downgrades the expertise and 
experience of experts in recipient countries. The perception of a hierarchical 
classification is, indeed, formalised in prevailing employment conditions. 
National and international advisory positions differ greatly with regard to 
remuneration and assigned authority. It is common practice in the donor 
community to use different payment scales for the two categories: the 
international expert is paid according to the organisation’s headquarter’s 
salary scale, while national experts get a ‘local pay’ (see, for example, World 
Bank 2010b; GIZ 2011; United Nations 2013b). Although the latter is normally 
adjusted to the highest level of payment for similar work in the local market,116 
the salary of an international expert usually exceeds the rate of a national 
one by far. This applies to both longer-term advisory jobs and short-term 
consultancies. A Tanzanian professor with an international reputation sharply 
criticised the huge inequalities in remuneration he experienced in the context 
of aid projects: 
The international consultant being paid maybe EUR 1 500 per day, the 
local consultant, no matter how skilled you are, full professor, and you 
are told your rate is EUR 300; I think that’s even on the high side. But 
actually at the end of the day, you are the one to do the work because 
(...) those foreign experts, they don’t know the local environment, where 
to source the materials. They end up doing the editing of the document 
that you have done (…). And if you are lucky, you’ll be acknowledged 
in the final document. If you are unlucky, even the name will not appear. 
(Interview 69)
116 The United Nations agencies, for instance, pay locally recruited National Professional Officers and 
General Service staff members according to the principle that “staff should be compensated in 
accordance with the best prevailing conditions of service in the locality; consequently, they are paid 
not on the basis of a single global salary scale, but according to local salary scales established on the 
basis of salary surveys” (International Civil Service Commission 2013: 14). Similarly, the GIZ policy 
for national personnel states that remuneration should be “in line with usual market conditions”, 
specifying that “remuneration is comparable with that provided by private sector and international 
companies and other DC organisations competing with GIZ in the country” (GIZ 2011: 2).
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The huge discrepancy in remuneration was not only confirmed by several 
interviewees of our sample, but has also been documented by studies on the 
use of advisors and consultants in the aid context. A comprehensive report on 
technical assistance in the context of Global Fund grants, for instance, states: 
While precise details are not available, the studies showed clearly that local 
consultants in all the study countries receive far less than their international 
counterparts: local consultant rates were in the range of [USD] 100–350 
per day, whereas international rates ranged from [USD] 250–650 per 
day, with Ethiopia reporting international rates of up to [USD] 1000 per 
day. Although there is insufficient evidence with regard to cost effectiveness 
to draw any solid conclusions, it should be noted that in some countries 
local consultants are deemed to provide more effective support, in part 
because of their ability to understand and work within the local context. 
(Coordinating AIDS Technical Support Group 2009: 8–9) 
The difficulty in presenting concrete, comparable data results from the 
fact that most donor organisations do not disclose salary scales or rates for 
advisors – oftentimes, not even recipient institutions are informed how much 
international advisors get paid. Other organisations are not able to provide 
an official payment scale for the simple reason that they do not have one. 
A study on the use of consultants in the United Nations system found that 
UN agencies either used outdated or imprecise remuneration guidelines or 
did not have any internal policies or guidelines at all, resulting in “significant 
discrepancies and inconsistencies in remuneration across the system and within 
each organization” (Terzi 2012: 31). On its website, the UN provides indicative 
rates not for consultants, but for professional staff. In 2013, an internationally 
recruited senior advisor seconded to Dar es Salaam was offered a total annual 
salary between USD 142 614–183 934 (United Nations 2013a).117 A National 
Officer employed as senior programme officer received between USD 53 988–
88 537 (United Nations 2012).118 Although the two positions differ in terms 
of the scope of responsibilities and thus the salary data do not allow a direct 
comparison, the numbers shed light on remuneration levels for national and 
international senior positions. 
The unequal and opaque pricing of expertise in the context of development 
cooperation causes tensions and strained relationships, particularly when 
117 This is the salary band indicated for internationally recruited professional staff at the senior level, 
that is, senior experts hired as advisors or programme directors. 
118 This is the salary band indicated for experts categorised as national staff and employed as senior 
programme or senior administrative officers (total net remuneration: TSh 88 661–145 397 
thousand). 
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experts from within the country and from outside are paired and supposed 
to deliver as a team. A high-ranking senior official in Tanzania remembered a 
programme in which two senior professors complained about being paid less 
than their team leader, a relatively young consultant from the UK: 
The professor was saying: ‘We have almost the same job, we know this 
country, we travel a lot, we almost do everything. This fellow is just 
coordinating our efforts and is paid very highly and we are paid lower. We 
are professors; he is just a PhD holder. I have my professorship for the past 
20 years; this is just a doctor for seven years back.’ The professors were not 
happy. (Interview 60) 
This case points to the second aspect of hierarchy to be found in employment 
conditions, namely the practice of putting international experts into a higher 
position than their national collaborators. Irrespective of academic degrees or 
work experience, “the lead will be the external, then the national consultant 
will do kind of support” (Interview  68). Job descriptions advertised by aid 
agencies confirm this pattern. While international experts are delegated 
leading tasks, national ones are employed to assist.119 
Although donors vary, the status of international experts is usually higher 
than that of national staff in country offices.120 The discrepancy is a pattern 
found across the aid community and documented by workforce data. In 2011, 
49% of DFID’s total staff held senior posts as civil servants or advisers, whereas 
only 18% of the national staff in overseas offices (so-called “staff appointed 
in-country”) was employed at that top level (National Audit Office 2012). A 
similar picture is found at GIZ: national personnel in recipient countries made 
up nearly 70% of GIZ’s total workforce in 2012. While this is a high share of 
locally recruited staff, only 11% of this group were employed as leading or 
119 To give just one example of what these arrangements look like: a procurement notice published 
by UNDP announced a tender for one international and two national consultancy positions to 
support the implementation of the National Mine Action Programme in Vietnam. The roles and 
responsibilities were assigned in the following way: as the team leader, the international consultant 
should manage the team, design the scope and methodology of the study, and draft and finalise the 
report. The two national consultants, classified as team members, were given the tasks to collect 
and review documents, participate in the design of the study and its implementation, contribute 
and assist in the production of the required deliverables, and translate the reports into Vietnamese, 
amongst others (UNDP 2013b). This example reflects the prevailing division of labour when 
consultants are ‘paired’, as it is called in the aid community.
120 Generalising our observations, the discrepancies between international and national staff are 
greater in bilateral agencies and less pronounced in multilateral organisations. In UN agencies, for 
instance, national experts have a solid standing, forming the core technical cadre in country offices. 
In the World Bank country office in Dar es Salaam, key positions for certain sectors such as the 
senior health or education specialist were filled with Tanzanian experts at the time of our research. 
One level up the hierarchy, however, the posts of task team leaders in health and education were 
held by international experts, namely, foreigners.
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senior professionals (GIZ 2013a).121 Aid organisations tend to boast about the 
use of national staff in their ‘partner countries’; however, as the data above 
show, this does not necessarily mean that they put local experts at equal level 
with experts sent from abroad. 
The internal divide of staff is, however weakly, noticeable in donor 
organisations. A South African expert who had worked for a foreign embassy in 
her country for over ten years told us that she had constantly been aware of the 
status difference between herself and foreign colleagues who were consciously 
or unconsciously suggestive of knowing ‘a little bit better’.122 Such kind of 
implicit downgrading of local expertise was broached as an issue by national 
experts and government officials in both countries of the study, particularly 
in Tanzania. Repeatedly one comes across the sentiment that donors consider 
foreign expertise as more ‘credible’. A Tanzanian health expert with years of 
experience working for the government reported: 
There could be six-month consultancies which you can recruit from domestic 
market or you can recruit from abroad. Now you need to look at where do 
I get these professionals? You might have somebody in the domestic market 
with experience and he has done similar work – then we have the problem 
of credibility of the report he will be writing. Because the credibility, (if you 
are with) GIZ or Danida, you are more credible (…). When local, national 
experts are reporting, you get a lot of criticism. We have experience here. 
We were developing the health financing strategy with Professors from 
the University of Dar es Salam. I tell you, that strategy has never ended. 
In fact, it ended up them saying ‘no, we cannot accept this document’. 
(Interview 44)
The term ‘credible’ in this context implies both a high quality of expertise in a 
technical sense and ‘objectivity’ or ‘independence’. The tendency to perceive 
international expertise as more neutral and local expertise as potentially biased 
is even reflected in official donor documents, in which the “lack of distance to 
the partner organisation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2009: 15) is 
mentioned as a potential risk of recruiting national consultants. Being aware of 
the subliminal disregard of local expertise on the donor side, decision-makers 
in government ministries and departments tend to adopt a very pragmatic 
strategy. A permanent secretary in Tanzania stated in this regard: 
121 The remaining national personnel were categorised as professionals (29%), junior professionals 
(10%), assistants (20%) and support staff (30%). The shares were calculated using data taken from 
the company’s 2012 Annual Report (GIZ 2013a: 55).
122 This statement was made during a feedback workshop in the context of the study. To preserve the 
anonymity of the person, no further details are provided. 
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For us, we argue that even the local ones have got expertise (…). But when 
they [the donors] say ‘if you insist on the local, we don’t provide money’ 
and you want this thing to be done in order for you to make progress, so 
you agree. (Interview 60) 
The unequal assessment of expertise leads to the paradoxical situation that 
experts in recipient countries come “behind the umbrella of the foreign 
companies” (Interview 59), as an interviewee put it. Local experts team up 
with consultancy firms abroad, creating a win-win situation for both: while 
the former increase their degree of credibility, the latter can claim to provide 
experts for the country of assignment, which increases their chance to win 
the bidding process. An officer in the Tanzanian National Environmental 
Management Council remembered such a case in the context of the World 
Bank/GEF ‘Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project’: 
There was an assignment which was given to a Netherlands company, 
a consultancy firm. But you find most of the activities were being done 
by the Tanzanians. But the company which was engaged came from the 
Netherlands. They were just coming for about two or three weeks and 
went back, but all the fieldwork, data collection, everything was being 
done by professors from the University of Dar es Salaam. But as professors, 
they could not have that assignment (…). (Interview 59)
Local experts are not necessarily excluded from an international bidding 
process. Depending on the financing agency’s procurement rules, they are in 
some cases also eligible to apply for international posts.123 The rules of the game 
in that competition, however, put them in a rather inferior position in contrast 
to applicants from abroad. The process of selecting experts in the aid market 
is guided by standards set by donor organisations. Expertise is rated against 
qualification criteria such as university degrees, publications and previous 
assignments, and the quality of technical proposals. Applying such assessment 
123 Unfortunately, it was difficult to obtain clear answers to the – at first glance – simple question 
whether experts from recipient countries are eligible to apply for internationally tendered advisory 
positions in their own countries. We were not able to obtain relevant information from documents 
publicly disclosed by donor organisations. Hence, we tried to clarify this issue by contacting 
some agencies directly by email (emails sent on 05 November 2013). DFID’s press office did 
not reply at all. Two contacts at GIZ could not provide a definite answer, adding that this was a 
‘complicated question’; one of them explained that he had never worked with a national holding 
an international position, but he had heard from colleagues that there are exceptional cases. Only 
an agency commissioned by Danida for administering bilateral positions made a clear statement: 
“All bilateral Danida adviser positions are available to all nationalities, meaning that also experts 
in recipient countries are eligible to apply for the advertised positions” (Email of Mercuri Urval 
Denmark, received 05 November 2013). 
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factors tends to marginalise experts from developing countries, as they are not 
able to keep up with experts from the North, as the NEMC officer pointed out: 
They [foreign experts] come with big CVs, so it is difficult to compete (…). 
In fact, in most cases – in my opinion – I think you find that whenever they 
submit their financial or technical proposals, probably they are quite good 
compared to our national experts. And you find that in most cases they 
have a track record. They have done quite similar kind of studies in other 
countries. So when it comes to competition, in most cases you find that they 
just win. (Interview 59) 
This experience of a Tanzanian natural scientist points to a couple of structural 
obstacles which diminish the competitiveness of local experts, irrespective of 
their actual individual expertise. First of all, given the constraints of science 
systems in developing countries,124 the academic records local experts are 
able to provide are usually less comprehensive and, again, less recognised. 
In this context, two points were raised which concern local experts working 
as scientists and likewise as consultants, namely the problems of unequal 
credit distribution and a hierarchical classification of research output. An 
internationally well-respected Tanzanian scientist touched on both issues, 
reflecting what has been said in other interviews: 
There is this misconception that there is this categorisation of the 
publications. Something published in Africa is ‘grey literature’. Something 
published in the West, in America, that’s top class literature. So even in the 
IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change], in the beginning we 
were told you have to handle ‘grey literature’ with care because it doesn’t 
merit scientific credibility. Those kind of insulting sort of statements – and 
sometimes you get annoyed.
And further: 
Actually, if you find most of this good piece of work which has been done 
in Africa, much of it has been done by Africans, but they don’t feature 
them in the documents. Mostly, scientists from the West take the credits. 
(Interview 69)
124 For a comprehensive analysis of the state of public science in countries of southern Africa, see 
Mouton et al. (2008). 
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The problem of unequal credit distribution was reported for both scientific 
articles and consultancy reports. As the majority of publications are financed 
from outside, experts in developing countries frequently experience 
‘disappearance’ when it comes to authorship, making it difficult for them to 
document research or consultancy experience.
The fact that funding usually comes from Europe or North America limits 
the employment opportunities of experts from developing countries, as there 
is a clear tendency of financiers to select advisors from their own region. A 
Tanzanian policy-maker summarised his experience in the following way: 
EU member states, if they give your government money to recruit foreign 
consultants, if you take one from outside the EU member states, I can tell 
you even the report may be rejected. I don’t know why. May I ask you 
because you come from the EU member states – do you have an implied 
policy that money from your state should be financing consultants from 
same countries? (Interview 60) 
The pattern that European or US financiers prefer experts from their own 
countries or regions was confirmed by various interviewees and mentioned as a 
major obstacle hindering the development of an African consultancy industry. 
Although international organisations increasingly emphasise the importance 
of South-South exchanges and make some sporadic attempts to create regional 
consulting pools,125 there is still a funding gap and a lack of institutional backing 
for experts from developing nations. That, in turn, makes them less competitive 
in the international market. They are disadvantaged as they are less able to 
provide a comprehensive track record of previous assignments as advisors in 
other countries. Due to the lack of experience and institutional support, they 
may also be less conversant with the codes of the consultancy industry. As 
one interviewee put it, “a consultant is not here to create new things. He’s 
here to package them well” (Interview 68). This packaging requires the use 
of certain terminologies, formats and methodologies developed and certified 
by international organisations. As Evers and Menkhoff (2002: 21) point out, 
“choosing the right language and the appropriate concepts is an essential 
prerequisite for success” in the market. To demonstrate such consultancy 
skills in applications and technical proposals is often a challenge for experts 
in developing countries with little experience in the market. The competitive 
edge they could claim over foreigners, namely profound knowledge of their 
countries with regard to political structures, societal and cultural issues, and 
125 An example is the PEPFAR-funded Grant Management Solutions project which employed 
consultants from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean to advise governments receiving 
Global Fund grants (Anderson 2008). 
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local language skills, is usually given less weight in the selection process than 
formal qualification criteria and certified technical competencies. Comparing 
adverts for international advisory positions, it is noticeable that in most cases 
previous experience in the country and/or basic skills of the local language in 
the country of assignment is – if at all – mentioned as an asset, but not as a 
decisive requirement.
In sum: with the authoritative power to define expertise, donors have 
created a market which ranks “international (that is, Northern) knowledge 
at the top and so-called local (that is, Southern) knowledge at the bottom” 
(Girvan 2007: 16). Procurement practices and employment conditions in that 
market reinforce the hierarchy between external and local expertise, and thus 
marginalise expert communities in recipient countries instead of strengthening 
them. The donor community thereby preserves the prevailing epistemic 
hegemony of the North which sets specific conditions for knowledge transfer 
between external and local actors. 
Hierarchical relations between advisors and counterparts
The hierarchy between international and national knowledge characterises 
not only the expert market, but also the relationship between external experts 
and their local counterparts in their practical operations. Commenting on 
the manifest status difference between the two parties, a Tanzanian advisor 
working for a foreign embassy stated: 
Once you are a recipient, the relationship cannot be equal. That cannot be. 
(Interview 31)
Donor organisations frame advice as a process of mutual learning, but in reality 
the actors involved still perceive it as a one-directional transfer of knowledge, 
with foreigners imparting their knowledge to local officials. Many interviewees 
expressed the sentiment that external experts are generally ascribed superior 
expertise and competency. Even in cases where advisors and counterparts 
have a similar training background and scope of work experience, there is an 
implicit asymmetry in authority, as a Tanzanian professor pointed out: 
We have been to school together, we know each other, we know our 
capacities. But of course, when they’re here, they’re treated as people who 
can give you instructions. (Interview 69) 
From the recipient perspective, donors often come with the attitude that local 
counterparts are not capable to perform without their assistance. This becomes 
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evident in reactions on policies, plans and programmes which, if prepared 
without external support, are sharply criticised by the aid community. This 
leaves senior officials in government ministries and departments under 
the impression that donors generally downgrade local capacity in order to 
legitimate the placement of external experts within their organisations. 
The fact that foreign experts, coming with expertise and money, often have 
regular access to high-level decision-makers exacerbates the status difference 
perceived by government staff. South African and Tanzanian officials 
interviewed for this study expressed their frustration about how foreigners 
work themselves into powerful positions and claim to interact only with 
the leading figures of recipient authorities. A director in the South African 
Department of Health said: 
Sometimes they come here – which is a big, big, big problem – they come 
here and they prefer to work with people at the highest, highest level. 
For example, the head of the department or the deputy of the head of 
the department. And then they don’t want to work with us. And we are 
the people that are more skilled and we are the people that have more 
information on this (…). I’m knowledgeable about these policies and 
frameworks. So their preference of wanting to meet with the highest level 
makes frustration. (Interview 18)
Another factor that creates discrepancy and inequality in what is supposed to 
be a ‘partnership’ between local officials and external advisers is the obvious 
differences in living standards and salary. In the questionnaire sample, every 
second respondent assessed this as a problematic or extremely problematic 
issue within cooperation.126 Again, it is difficult to provide data on donor and 
government pay which allow a sound comparison. 
Table 4 provides only exemplary figures to give an impression of the existing 
salary differentials.
In extreme cases, consultants earn more in one day than what government 
officials get paid in a month.127 Salary differentials of that extent create 
resentment among government staff towards experts from outside. Though 
not an openly addressed issue, the stark discrepancy implicitly affects the 
cooperation, as a Tanzanian World Bank officer pointed out: 
126 Incidentally, a similar impression is also expressed by Tanzanian programme officers in the study 
Eriksson Baaz (2005:  94). The distribution of questionnaire answers in detail (missings not 
calculated in the percentage):  13.2% extremely problematic; 37.7% problematic; 39.6% rather 
unproblematic; 9.4% definitely unproblematic. 
127 A study conducted by ActionAid International provided concrete numbers for Cambodia where 
“adviser fees of $17,000 per month are several hundred times higher than the salary of a typical 
government employee, at only $40 per month” (Greenhill 2006: 34).
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Here is a foreign and here is a guy, local, and they’re all experts according 
to their level. One, of course, is remunerated by his own government – very 
high, his living conditions and everything. This [other] poor guy is on a 
very rudimentary salary, a miserable salary, and they are supposed to be 
equal. That would also bring in some kind of tension (…). Now they are 
supposed to work at that level with somebody who definitely is different. I 
mean, they are equal but different. You see what I mean. (...) Although it’s 
not straight outspoken, but you see that kind of element.      
[The local guy] probably would just continue doing business as usual. Not 
really then having willingness to learn, readiness to learn from this guy – 
he will know it won’t make any difference to me. But who would like to 
make a difference to the system, you see. So that commitment is a problem.
(...) Basically you are bringing in advisors to try to strengthen a system 
which is a de-motivated system (…). At the end of the day, you just go back 
home and nothing has changed. That’s my own experience, how I see it. 
(Interview 47) 
All the different aspects delineated above – knowledge, influence, living 
standards – demarcate a boundary between external and local actors, and 
128 To provide a sound comparison, salary data in this table have been converted into USD and 
inflation-adjusted.
Table 4: Monthly salary bands of advisors, consultants and government staff
Rank Recipient country USD min. USD max.
TZ, PMO-RALG Senior forest officer (government scale TGS F)  – 727
TZ, PMO-RALG Principal economist Policy and Planning Division 
(government scale TGS H) 
– 1 365
SA, DHET Deputy director, Academic planning, monitoring 
and evaluation 
– 4 867
DFID Senior advisors (band A2) 7 036 10 145
DFID National health advisor in Tanzania 2 539 3 754
United Nations Senior level professionals in Dar es Salaam 11 885 15 328
United Nations Senior level professionals in Pretoria 11 280 14 549
AusAid Long-term advisor (discipline group c, job level 4, 
e.g. senior advisor on biodiversity)
13 017 19 525
AusAid Short-term advisor (discipline group c, job level 4, 





Source: DFID (2007: 224); Crown Management Consultants (2009: 72); AusAid (2012: 14); Best Jobs Tanzania Blog (2013); 
Department of Higher Education and Training (2013b); United Nations (2013b).128
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rank them in an order in which the former is higher than the latter. The 
extent to which that hierarchy is pronounced certainly varies. In both South 
Africa and Tanzania, however, policy advice in the context of aid takes place 
in an unequal setting in which “knowledge serves the function of justifying 
hierarchical relations” (Girvan 2007: 6).
The intricacies of expert advice in the context of aid highlighted in this 
chapter can be summarised as follows: policy advice within development 
cooperation takes place in a setting permeated with conflicting interests and 
power inequalities between donor and recipient countries, with the latter 
being in a weaker position due to their dependency on external support. 
Given the strong linkage of aid and politics, advisory processes are affected 
by shifting fads in terms of topics and modes of operation, legitimation and 
accountability pressures, and a potential mismatch of donor interests and 
recipient needs. At the micro-level, structural flaws in expert employment and 
hierarchical relations create conditions that obstruct the knowledge transfer 
between advisors and their counterparts. As a result, expert advice largely fails 
to achieve its main objective, namely to increase the capacity of recipients in a 
way that ultimately makes them independent from outside assistance. 
Consequently, governments in developing democracies find themselves 
caught in a perpetual cycle of being advised by external experts who circulate 
in core government institutions and are involved in all stages of policy-
making. Considering that these experts share a certain epistemic culture and 
are primarily accountable to their financiers, that is, the donor community, 
the expertise they communicate to their client governments is not neutral, 
disinterested expert knowledge, but is shaped – often implicitly – by particular 
paradigms and interests. Expert advice in the context of aid thus becomes a 
conduit for external influence under the guise of knowledge transfer. This 
raises the question how this affects especially young democracies such as South 
Africa and Tanzania, as these are particularly vulnerable to the loss of decision-
making autonomy and, thus, legitimacy. To what extent are they threatened 
by knowledge transfer as it was characterised and under which conditions 






IN DEALING WITH 
ADVICE: STRUCTURAL 
CONDITIONS 
A key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the 
government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals. 
(Dahl 1971: 1)
A core idea of democracy is that the rulers in power are responsive to the 
state’s citizenry, whereby ‘responsive’ implies that they take the will of the 
governed into account (Dahl 1971). Thus, a central dimension of quality in 
democratic governance is the degree to which decision-making is guided by 
the needs and demands of the voters. Ideally, government policies reflect the 
majority preference of the people. This is, of course, a normative stance. A 
perfect congruence between what the citizens want and what the government 
does is utopian in any real world democracy, where unpopular decisions – for 
example, an increase in taxation – also need to be made. Yet, the legitimacy 
of democratic governments is based on the premise that they consider the 
demands of their constituencies “at least in broad outlines over the long run” 
(Gilens 2005: 779).
In aid-receiving democracies, the question whose interests are taken up in 
policy processes is often difficult to answer. Given the dependencies pervading 
aid and the omnipresence of donor-funded experts in the power centres of 
recipient countries, one can assume that a plethora of decisions are imposed 
from outside, reflecting the preferences of donors rather than those of domestic 
publics, that constitute the electorate. We want to explore the extent to which 
policy-making in South Africa and Tanzania is shaped by external experts 
acting on behalf of the aid community, focusing on education, health and 
environment as fields of investigation. These areas are particularly relevant for 
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three reasons: first, they are high on the development agendas of both states; 
secondly, they have been target areas of foreign support; and thirdly, expertise 
and ‘evidence’ are deemed crucial for legitimating policy decisions in these 
fields. Aside from the policy content, which is different in each sector, we pay 
particular attention to the process of policy development, the actors involved 
therein as individuals and members of groups, and the context which provides 
the ‘setting’ for their interaction (Walt & Gilson 1994). Adopting a political 
economy perspective, this approach starts from a number of assumptions, 
namely that (a) structural conditions decisively impact on the outcomes of 
policy negotiation; (b) contemporary processes and relations are affected by 
past experiences which requires a historical perspective; and (c) conflicts of 
interest between local and foreign actors may well be grounded on legitimate 
political differences (Whitfield 2009b).129 To what extent aid recipients in 
South Africa and Tanzania have been able to defend their views and set their 
own agenda against outside advice, and what accounts for their strengths or 
weaknesses in doing so, are the guiding questions of the six case studies that 
follow. 
The extent to which developing democracies are able to defend their 
decision-making autonomy in the political realm primarily depends on three 
structural conditions: financial strength, administrative capacity, and the local 
knowledge base they can draw on. We explicate the relevance of these factors for 
aid-related advisory processes and look at South Africa’s and Tanzania’s status 
with regard to corresponding indicators in the fields of health, environment 
and education. 
Financial strength
Let me tell the truth: If our relationship is also influenced by donating, do 
you think you have much power if you are a recipient? (Interview 60) 
This statement by a permanent secretary in Tanzania hints at a pervasive 
experience of aid recipients, namely that due to their dependency on donor 
resources, they are invariably the inferior party in negotiations. We assume 
that the degree of asymmetry in donor–recipient relations notably depends 
on the financial strength of the soliciting country. Hence the first hypothesis: 
the higher the financial dependency, the weaker is the recipient’s position in 
defending the local agenda against external pressure.  
129 See also Whitfield & Fraser 2009.
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Governments in need of donor money are inevitably forced to accept that 
they have to enter some sort of negotiation with potential financiers and 
may need to compromise on the terms and conditions of assistance (Nissanke 
2010); “…conditionality is the price the recipient pays in order to get access 
to transfers in case of nonaligned preferences” (Martens 2008: 289). Previous 
studies indicate that one factor determining the bargaining discretion of the 
beneficiary is the degree of dependency on aid as an essential source of finance 
(Gould 2005a: 143). When aid is constitutive of the overall performance of 
the domestic economy and a government’s capacity to act, recipients are likely 
to accept external interference in policy-making for the sake of keeping their 
economy and state apparatus running. In extreme cases, the dependency on 
donor funding erodes governments’ agenda-setting function since “priorities 
turn to whatever brings in the most money” (Polidano 2000: 812).
Among the various definitions and variables of aid dependency the indicator 
commonly used at present is the share of aid to the recipient country’s gross 
national income (GNI).130 Figure 7 displays the ratio of official development 
assistance and GNI in Tanzania, South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa from 
1993 (the first year in which data for South Africa are available) until 2011. 
Most notably, it shows that the percentage of aid to South Africa’s GNI ranging 
from the lowest value of 0.21% in 1993 to the highest of 0.47% in 2002 
remained basically insignificant. Tanzania, in contrast, has very high ratio 
levels, both compared to South Africa and to sub-Saharan Africa as a region. 
Although the proportion of ODA to the country’s GNI declined by more than 
half from 23.07% in 1993 to 10.32% in 2011, it is still significant, implying the 
high impact of aid on the Tanzanian economy. 
Relating aid volumes to the gross national income (or the gross national 
product previously used as denominator) points to the significance of external 
finances to recipient economies and invites assumptions about the consequential 
influence of external financiers in spending decisions (Bräutigam 1992).131 For 
our purposes, however, such measures have two flaws. First, they describe 
aid dependency of recipient economies rather than governments; and second, 
they are not useful for a sectoral analysis.132 
An indicator which may be disaggregated by sectors is the ratio of aid as 
a percentage of government expenditure. The underlying argument: when 
130 Glennie & Prizzon (2012); see also Lesink & White (1999); Bräutigam (2000); Knack (2001).
131 In an early article on the interdependencies of governance, economy and foreign aid, Bräutigam 
(1992: 11) stated that “when aid transfers reach ten percent or more of total GNP (as they did for 
at least 24 countries in 1989) and exceed total current revenue from other sources, those with the 
loudest single voice on revenue and expenditure issues are international lending agencies”. 
132 This equally applies for other commonly used indicators such as ‘Net ODA received per capita’ 
or ‘Net ODA received as % of imports of goods, services and primary income’ which cannot be 
disaggregated by different sectors. 
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donors fund a substantial share of sector budgets, they are likely to have a say in 
defining the priorities for which their money is spent. If a line ministry is highly 
dependent on external financing for implementing a national programme, 
its leaders can hardly reject support, even if it comes with conditions. These 
conditions may not even be explicitly written down in agreements, but 
conveyed in policy forums where donor experts and government officials 
interact. The latitude of decision-makers to take decisions against advice is 
severely restricted when their capacity to deliver basic services depends on 
donor money.    
While the share of external contributions in government expenditures 
constitutes a suitable indicator for (sectoral) aid dependency, it has some 
crucial constraints pertaining to the accessibility and accuracy of data. As 
several scholars have pointed out, figures for this measure are scarce and not 
necessarily consistent, which makes it difficult to carry out time-series analyses 
and cross-country comparisons (Knack 2001; Glennie & Prizzon 2012). In the 
WDI database, the indicator “Net ODA received (% of central government 
expense)” lacks information for 15 out of 48 states in sub-Saharan Africa, 
including Tanzania; for the remaining ones, data are at best erratic. In addition 
to the limited availability of data on recipient government expenses, donor 
statistics pose a major problem. Aid agencies apply different definitions and 
standards in reporting which are not always clearly spelled out; for instance, 
many do not disclose which amount of a certain programme budget is actually 
transferred to the recipient or used for advisors and administration.133 In many 
133 In interviews and during a feedback workshop held in Stellenbosch in 2013, government 
officials from both South Africa and Tanzania strongly complained about donors not disclosing 
disaggregated data on financial disbursements and technical assistance, pointing particularly to the 
Figure 7: Aid as share of GNI in South Africa, Tanzania and sub-Saharan Africa 
Source: World Bank database (World Bank 2014a).

























2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
TANZANIA SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SOUTH AFRICA
141
CHAPTER 6 Retaining Autonomy of Agenda-Setting in Dealing with Advice: Structural Conditions
cases, one finds appalling discrepancies between aid commitments and actual 
disbursements (Bulíř & Hamann 2008; Celasun & Walliser 2008). Moreover, 
donor figures are often different from those reported by recipient governments 
(Wood et al. 2011).134 This is exacerbated by huge amounts of off-budget 
funding channelled outside government systems. Hence, information on aid 
flows varies depending on the sources selected. 
In light of such constraints on availability of reliable data, any numbers 
related to aid have to be taken with caution. The data we present in Table 5 on 
donor funding as a share of total expenditures in different policy fields, thus 
need to be considered as indicative rather than accurate. Extracted from annual 
reports and expenditure reviews of government ministries and departments, 
they are based on different systems which are not methodologically congruent 
since the way external funding is accounted in South Africa and Tanzania 
varies. A common feature in financial statements of ministries and departments, 
however, is the indication of actual expenditures and the amount of aid thereof. 
Juxtaposing the calculated shares based on these figures may help to get an 
impression of the financial impact of donors in different policy areas:
Table 5: Aid as share of government expenditures in 2010/2011 (%)
Total Education Health HIV/Aids Environment
South Africa 1.0 1.3 0.8 16.4 1.1
Tanzania 28.2 8.5 38.4 97.5 n/a
Source: Fölscher et al. (2010: 1); Policy Forum (2010b: 1); Department of Basic Education (2011: 21); Department of Health (2011a: 150); Education 
Sector Development Committee (2011: 115); Department of Environmental Affairs (2012a: 71); Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (2012: 14); Republic 
of South Africa (2012: 67); TACAIDS (2012: I). Our own percentage calculations. 
Table  5 provides a snapshot of the impact of donor contributions on line 
ministries’ and departments’ spending for the fiscal year 2010/2011. A salient 
contrast is the generally low level of external funding amounting to around 
1% (except for HIV/Aids) in South Africa, while in Tanzania aid is a substantial 
part of both total and sector expenditures. The extreme is represented in 
the field of HIV/Aids where donor funds made up 97.5%. Yet, to draw the 
conclusion that South Africa can do without aid would be too simple, since 
plain numbers never paint a whole picture. We therefore contextualise the 
non-transparent practice of USAID which poses a severe problem for government planning and 
budgeting. 
134 In a report on the second phase of implementing the Paris Declaration, the authors comment on 
the ‘statistical obstacles’ observed as follows: “It is not clear to what extent these reported problems 
result from poor or late reporting (at the international or national levels), to unsynchronised cycles 
and/or to actual discrepancies in commitments and/or disbursements. In any case they perpetuate 
uncertainty and do not encourage trust” (Wood et al. 2011: 13). 
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figures presented above with additional material in order to further delineate 
dimensions of aid dependency in the different areas.
South Africa’s financial strength by sectors
A case in point that illustrates the limited informative value of numbers 
refers to the impact of donor funding in the South African environment 
sector. At the national level, the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) 
is the most important government organisation in charge. With 1.1%, aid 
made up only a small share of DEA’s expenditures in 2010/2011, implying a 
very limited role of external funding.135 Although the significance of aid for 
DEA has declined considerably over the last decade, it remains an essential 
source of income for other public entities and nature conservation agencies 
that are severely underfunded. The South African National Biodiversity 
Institute (SANBI), a national statutory body responsible for monitoring the 
state of biodiversity and providing research and policy advice on biodiversity 
matters, is heavily dependent on external funding in key areas of its mandate 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2012). In 2011 and 2012, around half 
of the resources required for generating science-based evidence to inform 
decision-making related to biodiversity management and climate change 
were obtained from donors. In its strategic plan for 2013–2018, SANBI warns 
that “certain deliverables are at risk if the nature or extent of the external 
funding changes during the five-year planning period” (SANBI 2013:  20). 
Provincial conservation authorities such as CapeNature in the Western Cape 
face similar challenges. In recent years, grants from domestic and international 
donors have amounted to half of the organisation’s total budget (Hamman 
2009: 1), making the implementation of programmes and services contingent 
on external financiers. Given such resource constraints of key agents in the 
field of environment, the sector is to some extent dependent on donor money, 
although it appears marginal from a national perspective. 
In education, aid is an issue of historical importance, but rather negligible 
in financial terms. During the apartheid era, various countries from Europe, 
the US and from other world regions provided overseas scholarships and 
extensive funding for educational initiatives in order to support the oppressed 
non-white population, bypassing the isolated government (King 1999).136 
When in 1994 the new democratic Government of National Unity came into 
135 This is down from 20% in 1999/2000 and around 4.5% in 2004/2005 (Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism 2006:  72). In 1999/2000, the department was still named “Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism” (DEAT). 
136 Details on the historical background of donor support to education in South Africa will be outlined 
in the respective case study (see Chapter 7). 
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power, the international community was ready to shift its assistance from civil 
society to the Department of Education and its envisaged reform activities. 
In the early years of the new state, “requests for educational collaboration 
were arriving virtually on a daily basis from prospective partners as large 
as the Russian Federation and as small as Croatia” (King 1999: 260). While 
an enormous number of bi- and multilateral agencies contributed to the 
subsequent transformation process, the financial volume of aid in relation to 
government spending remained marginal, making it “almost impossible to 
identify individual contributions of donors” (Ngeleza et al. 2000: 29). 
This is still the case today. As in Tanzania, the education sector in South Africa 
receives the largest part of the government’s budget. In recent years, its share 
gradually increased from 18.2% in 2010/2011 (ZAR 165.1 billion) to 20.2% 
in 2013/2014 (ZAR 232.5 billion). The resources are primarily allocated to the 
Department of Basic Education and the Department of Higher Education and 
Training responsible at the national level, and to the nine provincial Education 
Departments.137 The figure on aid assistance as a percentage of expenditures 
indicated in Table 5 pertains to the Department of Basic Education in fiscal year 
2010/11; with 1.3%, the share of foreign funding was negligible. In subsequent 
years, it remained at a similarly low level, increasing only slightly to 2% in 
2012/13.138 External contribution in expenditures of the newly established 
Department of Higher Education and Training consistently made up less than 
1% in its initial years of operation.139 
Given such small numbers, it is evident that the role of foreign money in 
the South African education system is marginal. Yet, various government 
officials interviewed emphasised the value of aid as a means for co-financing 
pilot projects and ‘niche areas’ such as inclusive education, for which the 
regular budget provides only limited resources. In 2010/11, donor funds were 
used for the development of the Human Resources Management Information 
System in education and for teacher training in special schools, amongst others 
(Department of Basic Education 2011: 128). For such initiatives, ODA provides 
an ‘added-value’ in education. Largely, however, the sector can be assessed as 
financially independent from donor assistance. 
137 In 2009, the former Department of Education was split into two ministries. While the Department 
of Basic Education is now in charge of early childhood development, and primary and secondary 
education, the Department of Higher Education and Training covers tertiary education up to the 
doctorate level, adult basic education, and technical and vocational training (skills development) 
which was previously managed by the Department of Labour. Details on educational governance 
structures are provided in the respective case study (see Chapter 7). 
138 The percentages are calculated from data on aid assistance in actual expenditures as indicated 
in the financial statements of the department’s annual reports: Department of Basic Education 
(2011: 144), (2012: 128), (2013: 242). 
139 This is drawn from financial statements in DHET’s annual reports: Department of Higher Education 
and Training (2011: 146), (2012a: 160), (2013a: 209). 
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In health, we find a similar situation if looking at the sector in general. 
Although gradually increasing, external resources for health make up a very 
small percentage of total health expenditure in South Africa, as shown in 
Table 6:
Table 6: External resources as share of total health expenditure in South Africa
Year 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
% 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.9 2.2 2.1
Source: WHO Global Health Expenditure Database (WHO 2014).140
Budgetary figures of the Department of Health confirm the financial strength 
of the South African government. Aid assistance accounted for only 0.8% (of 
the department’s actual expenditures in fiscal year 2010/2011, see Table  5. 
Department of Health 2011a: 150), equivalent to previous years. Such numbers 
suggest that foreign money is insignificant for public health financing. While 
this holds true in principle, there is one important exception: in HIV/Aids, the 
focus area of donor engagement, external funding plays a critical role. 
Although the South African government “is the primary investor in its own 
national and provincial response to the HIV/AIDS and TB epidemic” (Republic 
of South Africa 2012:  92), donors substantially contribute to financing 
interventions. In 2009/2010, external sources amounted to ZAR 2 126 million 
(equivalent to USD 265 million), which made up 16.4% of all HIV/Aids and 
TB spending in South Africa (Republic of South Africa 2012: 67). Compared to 
other African countries where over 80% of HIV programmes are funded from 
outside (Venter 2013), this figure may still seem moderate. Yet, the significance 
of assistance recently became manifest when the two largest external 
financiers, that is, the United States through PEPFAR and the Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), cut their contributions.141 
Since 2004, the PEPFAR programme has channelled nearly USD 4 billion to 
South Africa (Kavanagh 2014). The bulk of resources were allocated to NGOs 
offering direct services for patients in need of antiretroviral drugs. Now that 
the US has ceased funding in the course of the PEPFAR ‘transition’, many 
specialised HIV treatment centres have been forced to close (Katz et al. 2013); 
the South African government has struggled to absorb patients and staff into 
140 The figures presented in Table 6 relate to all channels of health spending (i.e. government, private 
sector and NGOs). Data were extracted on 20 February 2014 (WHO 2014).
141 Over the period 2008–2010, ZAR 2 500 million were channelled through the PEPFAR programme 
and ZAR 680 million through the Global Fund, which together amounted to 58.3% of external aid 
for tackling HIV/Aids (Republic of South Africa 2012: 92/95).
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an overstretched public health system (Kavanagh 2014).142 Thus, aid funding 
has some relevance in South Africa’s HIV/Aids response, despite its limited 
volume in relation to domestic resources.
Tanzania’s financial strength by sectors
Assessing Tanzania’s financial strength in the environment sector is challenging 
since it is handled as a cross-cutting issue for which various ministries share 
responsibility. In contrast to HIV/Aids (which is also termed cross-cutting), 
environment is not captured in a separate ‘code’ in budget books. Hence, as other 
authors have pointed out, it is impossible to give accurate figures or percentages 
of government and donor spending in this policy area.143 In order to nonetheless 
delineate the impact of external funding on environment, it is instructive to 
look at the budgetary situation of major players involved.144 The Division of 
Environment in the Vice-President’s Office (VPO-DoE) and the Forestry and 
Beekeeping Division in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) 
are primarily concerned with the matter. Table 7 displays actual spending of these 
units as indicated in the government’s budget books, that is, disaggregated into 
recurrent and development expenditures. While the former cover operational 
expenses (e.g. for salaries and wages, purchases of goods and services), the latter 
are used for development projects and investment activities. Two issues stand 
out: first, development expenditures are almost entirely financed from foreign 
sources (except for VOP-DoE in 2009/2010); and second, external contributions 
are notably volatile in terms of their financial volume.
Table 7: Environment-related expenditures (TSh million)








Foreign as % 
of dev. total
Foreign as 
% of total local foreign
dev. 
total
2009/10 957 0 957 6 316 7 274 0.0 0.0
2010/11 0 481 481 3 682 4 163 100.0 11.6
2011/12 168 3 713 3 881 4 548 8 429 95.7 44.1
142 In 2012, the US announced it would gradually reduce PEPFAR funding to South Africa from USD 
484 million in 2012 to USD 250 million in 2017 (Kavanagh 2014: 9). 
143 See Luttrell & Pantaleo (2008); Kulindwa et al. (2010). Trying to compile an overview on the 
environment budget in Tanzania, Kulindwa et al. (2010) itemised allocations to environment-
related programmes carried out by 13 different ministries; the contribution of donors to these 
programmes unfortunately cannot be traced. 
144 Details on organisational structures and responsibilities related to environmental governance in 
Tanzania are provided in the respective case study (see Chapter 7). 
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Foreign as % 
of dev. total
Foreign as 
% of total local foreign
dev. 
total
2009/10 19 6 740 6 759 13 068 19 828 99.7 34.0
2010/11 0 3 287 3 287 13 354 16 641 100.0 19.8
2011/12 0 68 68 14 491 14 559 100.0 0.5
Source: Tanzania Budget Books (Government of Tanzania 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b).
Again, it needs to be stressed that the figures do not take into account the 
large sums of foreign funding provided outside the government system. Yet, 
they reflect the consistently high aid dependency of divisions concerned 
with environmental issues. The former director of environment in the Vice-
President’s Office confirmed that during his term in office more than 90% of 
funding for programmes was provided by donors. This made implementation 
reliant on continued support. At the time of our interviews, the Ministry 
of Natural Resources and Tourism experienced the consequence of this 
dependency when major donors withdrew aid due to recurrent corruption 
allegations, causing a serious funding crisis. 
Without external resources, not only development programmes grind to a 
halt. In some cases, public entities are under-funded to an extent which imperils 
their core operations. The National Environmental Management Council 
(NEMC), established as a technical advisory, coordinating and regulatory 
agency in charge of environmental protection, struggles to meet its recurrent 
expenditures without donor money. According to a newspaper article citing 
the director-general, NEMC received only TSh 1 billion out of TSh 7 billion 
requested from the government in fiscal year 2011/2012 (Rugonzibwa 2012). 
An environmental officer working for the council delineated the situation as 
follows: 
Even if you had the approval maybe that the government is giving one 
million, at the end of the day you are getting 200 000 thousand out of the 
million. So you find within the financial year, you have the promise, you 
have an approved budget, but the fund is not coming. (…) It is unpredictable 
when you are going to get the funds to implement the activities. That’s why 
there are a lot of problems. (Interview 59)
The fact that environment comes out at the short end in resource allocation 
is not surprising in a country with “tremendous needs and huge budget 
shortfalls” (Interview 46), as a World Bank environmentalist put it (see also 
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Mwalyosi & Sosovele 2001). External funding has become a substantial source 
of income for government units concerned with environmental issues. Hence, 
the dependency on donor support in the field of environment is significant. 
In contrast to environment, education is a priority sector in Tanzania. As in 
South Africa, it has repeatedly received the largest portion of the government’s 
budget in recent years, with shares fluctuating between 17% and 23% during 
2008–2013.145 As in other African countries, aid accounts for only a minor part 
of education spending (Samoff 2009). For the MoEVT, foreign contributions 
made up 8.5% of total expenditures in 2010/2011 (see Table 5) which implies 
a rather limited relevance of donor funding. However, the leveraging impact 
of external assistance needs to be considered. Education is a sector with high 
operational costs. Given that the bulk of resources are depleted by recurrent 
expenditures such as salaries and allowances, “there is little money for teacher 
education, textbooks, building construction and maintenance, even pencils, 
paper, and chalk” (Samoff 2009: 11). This is where donors come into play. While 
their contribution appears small in relation to the overall education budget, 
it makes up a significant portion of development expenditures. In 2010/11, 
foreign funds accounted for 60% of the education ministry’s development 
budget, an increase compared to the previous two years where the share was 
between 45% and 50% (Policy Forum 2010a). Development programmes are 
thus highly dependent on donor support and subject to external priorities. At 
the time of our interviews, the Primary Education Development Programme 
suffered from decreased funding as a result of diminishing donor interest; 
the Higher Education Development Programme was shelved due to a lack of 
financial assistance. The fact that donors regularly fall short of meeting their 
pledges causes serious setbacks for the implementation of programmes.146 The 
significance of external funding in the development budget makes donors 
more relevant than they may seem at first glance. In interviews in this study, 
Tanzanian policy-makers concerned with educational issues made clear that 
for them aid is a central source of revenue besides taxes. Assessing the financial 
impact of donors in the sector, one needs to consider that “a relatively small 
amount of money is a large portion of discretionary resources and purchases a 
great deal of influence” (Samoff 2009: 11). 
145 See Policy Forum & HakiElimu (2011); Ministry of Finance (2012); United Republic of Tanzania 
(2012b); PER Macro Group (2013). Data on education spending as a share of total government 
budget provided by different sources vary. The discrepancy in figures, however, is marginal, 
amounting to 1–2%. In 2010/11, a sum of TSh 2 045 billion was destined for education, of which 
one third was allocated to the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT) and the 
remainder to the Ministry for Social Development, Gender and Children (MSDGC) and the Local 
Government Authorities (LGAs).
146 See Policy Forum (2010a). According to HakiElimu, a leading civil society organisation focusing on 
education in Tanzania, donors provided only 43% of their commitments in 2008/2009 (TSh 27.6 
from 64 billion) and 48% in 2009/2010 (TSh 30.3 from 63.4 billion) (HakiElimu 2011: 4). 
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Looking at the health sector, the financial dependency is obvious at first 
glance. Table 8 displays external resources for health as a percentage of total 
health expenditure in Tanzania.147 While in the mid-1990s, donor share was 
still less than 10%, it quadrupled in the new millennium. 
Table 8: External resources as share of total health expenditure in Tanzania
Year 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
% 9 18 19 35 28 18 11 30 31 35 43 40 44 48 40 40
Source: WHO Global Health Expenditure Database (WHO 2014).
The share of external resources in the spending of the Ministry of Health 
and Social Welfare (MoHSW) ranges at around the same level, amounting 
to 38.5% of total expenditures in 2010/2011 (Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare 2012: 14). As in the case of the MoEVT, the situation appears worse if 
one takes only the development budget into account: donors funded 97.8% 
thereof, which in practice means that the implementation of development 
programmes is almost entirely based on aid (Sikika 2011: 3). The fact that 
external money is largely earmarked and to a considerable extent provided 
off-budget leaves the ministry with little discretionary power over the use 
of development funding (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 2009: 31). 
Although decision-makers complain about donors tying money to certain 
areas and topics, they hardly reject support – due to the budgetary situation 
of their ministry, “it is difficult for them to say no” (Interview  44), as a 
Tanzanian WHO officer put it. A retired health expert from Germany who 
had been working with officials in the health ministry for several years 
observed: 
They say ‘we have to take every penny we can get.’ Never would someone 
say ‘well, that actually doesn’t fit’. (Interview 73) 
The dependency on external resources is particularly extreme in 
HIV/Aids governance. With a share of over 97% of expenditures, donors 
almost entirely finance the country’s national response. Table 9 displays the 
appalling discrepancy between government resources and donor spending on 
HIV/Aids in the period 2006–2011.
147 The figures presented in Table 8 relate to all channels of health spending (i.e. government, the 
private sector and NGOs). Data were extracted on 20 February 2014 (WHO 2014).
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Table 9: Government and donor expenditures on HIV/Aids in Tanzania 
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
Government expenditures in TSh billion 22.0 23.0 14.0 12.5 11.0
Donor expenditures in TSh billion 282.0 383.3 566.9 566.3 431.8
Total expenditures in TSh billion 304.0 406.3 580.9 578.8 442.8
Government share of total expenditures in % 7.2 5.6 2.4 2.2 2.5
Donor share of total expenditures in % 92.8 94.3 97.6 97.8 97.5
Source: TACAIDS Public Expenditure Review 2011 (TACAIDS 2012: 1).
As the figures indicate, the dominance of external resources has slightly 
increased in recent years from an already high level in 2006/2007.148 Just as 
in South Africa, the United States through PEPFAR and the Global Fund are 
by far the largest funders: in 2010/2011, they provided 91% of total aid on 
HIV/Aids of which the large majority was channelled outside the government 
system (TACAIDS 2012: 1), depriving the government of control and oversight. 
The absolute dependency on donors in tackling the epidemic poses a high 
risk for the country, making the implementation of the government’s national 
programme, the National Multi-Sectoral Strategic Framework for HIV and 
Aids, highly vulnerable to external decisions and developments (see case 
study, Chapter 6). 
Comparative assessment of sectoral financial strength 
Drawing conclusions from budgetary figures is an intricate endeavour, given 
the lack of reliable and comparable data on government and donor spending 
at the sector level. Moreover, numbers always imply calculation and choice.149 
Therefore, we tried not to rely on aid shares in departmental expenditures as 
an indicator of donor impact in the respective sectors, but complemented the 
figures with additional quantitative and qualitative material. Aggregating the 
information we obtained for each sector, we assessed their financial strength 
as follows: in South Africa, education and health are strongest in terms of 
finances; donor money only plays a minor role in these areas, apart from 
HIV/Aids where aid is a relevant contribution. Environment was assessed as 
148 Unfortunately, figures for earlier years which would allow a comparison of government and donor 
spending on HIV/Aids over a broader time span could not be found. Data presented in the public 
expenditure review for 2003, the earliest version we have on hand, are based on rough estimates 
and the authors stress that spending figures of both government and donors are incomplete and 
inconsistent (Foster & Mwinyimvua 2003). Making calculations based on these numbers seems 
unrewarding and questionable in terms of reliability. 
149 See Rottenburg (2000). The constructed character of figures is discussed in Chapter 5 on legitimation 
and accountability pressures in the aid context. 
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weaker. Although from a national perspective, donor funding is marginal, it is 
a crucial source of income for environmental agents at national and provincial 
level. In Tanzania, education has the strongest position, although external 
money noticeably affects the implementation of national programmes. Health 
is more dependent on aid, with donors providing the bulk of the development 
budget. The weakest fields in our comparison are the cross-cutting issues of 
HIV/Aids and environment which are almost entirely financed from outside. 
Table 10 displays our assessment, with ‘++’ indicating a high level of domestic 
resources (implying low financial dependency), and ‘--’ a low level of domestic 
resources (implying high financial dependency) at the opposite end of the scale. 
Admittedly, this illustration is over-simplified and not devoid of subjective 
interpretation. 
Table 10: Sectoral strength in terms of finances
South Africa Tanzania
Environment - --
Health HIV/Aids ++ + - --
Education ++ +
Source: Authors’ own illustration.
Administrative capacity 
The implications of aid dependency for the bargaining power of recipients was 
a prime topic among interview partners. Yet, various narratives indicated that 
the financial situation is not the only structural condition that determines the 
scope of donor influence. A retired government member in Tanzania who 
previously held a high-ranking position in the Vice-President’s Office-Division 
of Environment, a unit in dire need of external funding, summarised his 
experience as follows: 
The extent to which [advisors] can influence the process depends on 
the strength the particular institution has. What carries the day is the 
arguments put on the table. If the technical advisor swallowed the 
arguments, it will carry the day. So it’s important to have a strong national 
team to be able to see through the presentations of technical advisors, so 
that the nuances or deviations or preconditions can be addressed there, 
transparently. (Interview 66) 
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His statement points to the significance of what can be termed ‘absorptive 
capacity’ as a crucial precondition for dealing with expert advice (i.e. the 
ability of recipients to scrutinise expertise for its quality, relevance and implicit 
interests). Absorptive capacity requires the availability of adequate technical 
knowledge and critical competencies in public administration, which enable 
civil servants to utilise instead of being swayed by external advice. The weaker 
recipient bureaucracies are in terms of the critical competence of their internal 
staff, the higher is the risk that policy processes are influenced from outside. 
One could paraphrase this second hypothesis with the comment of a Tanzanian 
policy-maker in the Prime Minister’s Office referring to decision-makers in the 
senior government cadre: 
If they’re competent enough, they can really drive. But if they are not, 
they’ll be driven. (Interview 60) 
The argument is based on the cognisance that the senior administrative cadre 
plays a substantial part in policy processes. Bureaucrats are not only the decisive 
agents in operationalising political decisions into strategies, implementing 
programmes and managing public service delivery; as coordinators and 
informants of their political leaders they are also potentially able to exert 
significant influence on the government agenda. In theory, 
a well-institutionalized bureaucracy makes a vital contribution to the 
quality and coherence of decision-making through policy advice and the 
structuring of the decision-making process, even though the decisions 
themselves are taken outside the bureaucracy. (Polidano 2000: 810)
In many developing democracies, however, bureaucracies are hardly capable 
of fulfilling this central policy function. While fragile institutions and low skills 
bases are legacies of the colonial rule in Africa, the erosion of the public sector 
was further exacerbated by decades of economic crisis.150 Structural adjustment 
programmes imposed by the international financing institutions compelled staff 
lay-offs and retrenchments, leaving administration with financial and human 
resources barely sufficient to run government operations (Weissman 1990). 
Given sharp declines in wage levels and worsening working conditions, highly 
skilled and experienced civil servants fled out of the public sector, poached by 
the private sector and international organisations which offered salaries vastly 
exceeding government pay.151 
150 See Bräutigam (1992); Bräutigam & Botchwey (1999); Ocheni & Nwankwo (2012).
151 See Olukoshi (1998); Bräutigam & Botchwey (1999).
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In light of such developments, today’s ‘capacity gaps’ identified in 
bureaucracies all over Africa should not be a surprise to donors whose policies 
and practices contributed to the problem. The common response of the 
international aid community has been to supply government organisations 
with advisors and consultants commissioned to assist policy-makers and 
senior officials. As outlined above, the expertise these professionals provide is 
inevitably infused with a distinct set of norms and values shared by the epistemic 
community of development experts; their advice must finally comply with 
the policy preferences and principles of their respective home organisation. 
From the angle of the recipient, it would thus be crucial to scrutinise advice 
offered in order to detect implicit interests and to assess its ‘political robustness’ 
(i.e. to examine whether it supports the domestic agenda and if respective 
recommendations are politically feasible). If this is not done, governments run 
the risk of adopting external policy ideas and concepts which may collide with 
the expectations of their constituencies or are just not implementable in the 
local context. Administrative capacity translated into absorptive capacity on 
the receiver’s part is thus crucial in three respects: first, to prove that external 
advice takes local needs and interests into account; second, to make knowledge 
from outside applicable by adjusting it to the local context and conditions; and 
third for the reason that without addressees capable to take up and utilise 
expertise provided, expert assistance may fill gaps, but not help to increase the 
policy capacity of government bodies in the long run. Without a critical mass 
of competent civil servants, advice is reduced to a form of external interference 
perpetuating the dependency on foreign expertise. 
This implication, however, is wittingly or unwittingly disregarded by donors 
who justify the deployment of experts exactly with the weakness of recipient 
bureaucracies. The state of public administration in developing countries has 
entered the limelight since, parallel to the rise of the ‘new public management’ 
paradigm in economics, ‘good governance’ emerged as a core issue on the 
aid agenda in the 1990s.152 Although the latter has remained a fuzzy concept 
lacking a commonly shared definition, scholars have constructed a range of 
indices for measuring the state of ‘governance’ across the world. Most of them 
incorporate the quality of public administration into the assessment, focusing on 
152 Since academic literature on these two concepts is too broad to be adequately summarised here, 
we point to only a few contributions: a central article laying the foundations for the concept of 
‘New Public Management’ was Hood (1991); Hood and Peters (2004) provide a review on how 
NPM developed as a subject of administrative science and explore its intended and unintended 
effects on public sector reform. ‘Good governance’ as a core element of a new development strategy 
after the decade of structural adjustment was pushed to the fore by the World Bank (1989, 1992). 
Various scholars have discussed the relevance and implications of ‘good governance’ in developing 
countries, as, for instance, Appiah et al. (2004); Smith (2007); Kötschau and Marauhn (2008); 
Booth and Cammack (2013). 
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issues such as service delivery, management performance, resource efficiency, 
corruption or statistical capacity. Table 11 provides a compilation of the most 
widely known governance indices, displaying indicators related to public 
administration and the latest ratings of South Africa (SA) and Tanzania (TZ). 
In spite of using different methodologies, data sources and concrete variables, 
indices consistently rank the former higher than the latter. The Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (BTI) – highly criticised for its normative and simplified 
approach of assessing governance systems – complements its numeric rating 
with narrative analyses. In the country report on Tanzania, the state of basic 
administration is delineated as follows: 
The state maintains a basic infrastructure throughout the country. 
Administrative capacity however is weak and ineffective. Staff is poorly 
trained and often unprepared to carry out government goals; what’s more, 
the administration suffers under political interference, a result of more 
than 50 years of one-party rule (despite, according to the constitution, the 
country’s multiparty democracy established since 1992). As pay is low, 
administrative staff is uncommitted, often not accountable and susceptible 
to corruption. (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014c: 8)
South Africa is rated two points higher achieving a score of 7 for basic 
administration, which according to the BTI codebook indicates that 
“administrative structures of the state provide most basic public services 
throughout the country, but their operation is to some extent deficient” 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014b: 17). The country report points to the following 
constraints:
The quality of administrative bodies varies considerably, with capacity 
generally declining from the highest to the lowest levels of government. 
Major technical and managerial skill shortages exist and have an impact 
on efficiency with which various levels of government execute their 
mandate. In addition, corruption, nepotism, and maladministration, 
which drain state coffers, are causes for great concern. (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2014a: 8)
While the BTI surveys countries in transformation processes from all world 
regions, the Ibrahim Index on African Governance (IIAG) focuses only on 
African states. Despite the diagnosed deficiencies in administration, South 
Africa tops the IIAG ranking in the category Public Management with 76.9 
points, and achieves the fifth rank out of 52 in Accountability. In both categories, 
the country scores much higher than Tanzania which ranges slightly above 
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the average level, but achieves only ranks 18 and 23, respectively.153 In the 
African Development Bank’s governance rating, Tanzania comes off slightly 
better in light of a smaller score difference to South Africa which is only 
superseded by Botswana in the country ranking. Referring to the Institutional 
Profiles Database and the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the discrepancy 
in administrative quality between South Africa and Tanzania appears even less 
pronounced. 
This divergence of assessments hints at an important point regarding the 
use of governance indices: given that the strength of public institutions is not 
directly observable, all of them draw on proxy indicators which – as the term 
implies – can only indicate administrative capacity rather than give a realistic 
representation of it. The indicators are highly constructed and imply certain 
normative ideas of ‘good governance’ and sound public management. The 
level of accessibility to source data varies, and if one takes a closer look, one 
finds self-referential links across indices which to some extent call the validity 
of results into question.154 Aside from such methodological flaws, the indices 
present our research with the problem that they do not allow for a sectoral 
differentiation. To our knowledge, there is currently no measurement of 
bureaucratic quality disaggregated by sectors. In order to delineate the strength 
of public administration in the different policy fields under investigation, we 
therefore turn to interview material which we complement with ministry 
workforce data and information extracted from government reports. As we 
already know from the governance indices presented above, South Africa is 
stronger in general than Tanzania with regard to public service performance. 
In the following section, we examine whether we find sectoral differences 
in administrative capacity within the two countries, particularly in terms of 
staffing levels and in-house expertise. Thereby, the focus is mainly on the 
relevant line ministries as frame of reference.
Sectoral comparison of administrative capacity in South Africa 
For the sectoral comparison of administrative capacity in South Africa, we 
primarily look at the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), the 
Department of Health (DoH), and the two national departments responsible 
153 The African average score was 53.4 for Public Management and 41.5 for Accountability. 
154 The extent to which the different governance indices mutually resort to each other’s ratings as 
source data or decision guidance is noticeable. To give just one example: for measuring ‘governance 
effectiveness’, the WGI rating takes scores of the AfDB CPIA into account, namely on the quality 
of public administration, the quality of budgetary and financial management and the efficiency 
of revenue mobilisation. The experts doing the assessment for the governance rating of the AfDB 
CPIA, in turn, are advised to draw on ‘key sources of evidence’ amongst which the WGI category 
‘government effectiveness’ is listed (African Development Bank Group 2009). 
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for education, that is, the Department of Basic Education (DBE) and the 
Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET). As part of their annual 
reports, these ministries disclose data on human resources in their organisations. 
Table 12 provides a compilation of (filled) post numbers, vacancy and turn-
over rates in 2011/2012. These figures reflect administrative capacity in terms 
of staffing levels: a high share of unfilled posts implies that the department 
has a rather insufficient number of officials to cope with the workload; a high 
turn-over rate of staff is obstructive insofar as it means a permanent loss of 
practical knowledge in the organisation. Judged on the figures presented below, 
Environmental Affairs is the strongest department in terms of its staffing level, 
although being affected by a high turn-over of personnel. With a vacancy rate 
of almost 30%, the Department of Health seems to be less adequately staffed, 
followed by Higher Education and Training with over 20% shortage.
Table 12: Staffing levels of South African line departments 2011/2012
Posts total Posts filled Vacancy rate Turn-over rate
Environmental Affairs 1 628 1 441 11.5% 10.6%
Health 1 819 1 293 28.9% 9.7%
Basic Education 823 628 17.1% 8.7%
Higher Education and Training 1 077 843 21.7% 7.6%
Source: Department of Basic Education (2012: 190/192); Department of Environmental Affairs (2012a: 142/144); Department of Health (2012: 186/189); 
Department of Higher Education and Training (2012a: 353/358).
There are various root causes for the problem of vacancies in the different 
departments. A common challenge for all departments is to fill vacant posts with 
adequately skilled applicants in line with the employment equity regulations. To 
overcome the racial discrimination and disparities in the labour market created 
under apartheid, the South African government pursues an affirmative action 
policy formalised in the Employment Equity Act which requires employers to 
ensure the equitable representation of previously disadvantaged groups in their 
workforce (Department of Labour 1998). The legacy of apartheid and its racially 
segregated school system, however, is still manifest in lower educational levels 
among the black population (Van der Berg 2007). Given that highly qualified 
professionals from the designated groups are scarce and attracted by higher 
salaries outside the public system, state organs are struggling to find suitable 
candidates for vacant positions. This is particularly an issue in environment as 
a knowledge area which previously was a “preserve of the whites” (Interview 
8), in the words of a South African UNDP officer. A director in the provincial 
conservation authority CapeNature reported on the tedious search for black 
project managers with an environmental background: 
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We advertised up to four times to get someone. In the end we didn’t get one 
and then fell back to appointing a white male. (Interview 13) 
As this example indicates, filling vacant posts with adequately trained 
professionals is often a complicated and lengthy process for government 
departments which are under pressure to ‘get equity figures right’ 
(Interview 13). Aside from this structural problem pervading all government 
bodies, the departments face distinct challenges in sourcing and retaining in-
house expertise; these challenges emanate from political and institutional 
developments in the respective policy fields. 
The Department of Health, which in 2011/2012 had the highest vacancy 
rate of the entities compared, is still struggling to recover from the era under 
President Mbeki and his Health Minister Tshabalala-Msimang who became 
infamous for the denial of Aids and antiretroviral treatment. During their 
leadership, “capacity fled out from the government system” (Interview 27), 
as a civil society representative put it. Many knowledgeable and experienced 
officials left the department due to its controversial policies, draining into the 
private sector or international organisations. A South African who resigned 
from public service during that time to work for a foreign embassy instead told 
us:
I was a project manager in government working in the Aids unit. And I 
must say it was very, very nice – very exciting work. But at that stage we 
had this terrible minister of health – Manto Tshabalala-Msimang. (…) 
And in 2003 I found myself apologising for where I worked and when I 
caught myself I realised I can’t do this anymore. (Interview 5) 
When the new minister Motsoaledi came into office in 2009, he brought about a 
radical policy shift and initiated an organisational reform process reconfiguring 
administrative structures and staffing patterns. Nonetheless, it has remained 
difficult for the department to salvage the lost expertise. According to an HIV 
civil society activist, “very few people go in there other than as consultants” 
(Interview 27). The insufficient number of competent permanent staff severely 
weakens the administrative capacity of the department. This was mentioned 
as an issue by various South African interviewees with close contacts and 
working relations to the Department of Health, with one saying: 
It’s shocking, because you can count the skilled people inside the government 
on one hand. And the same skilled people are trying to do everything – 
writing a human resource plan, writing Aids plans, writing national 
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health insurance. And they make a mess all of the time, because it’s just 
too much. (Interview 27)
At the sub-national level, the situation appears even worse. In 2009, reports 
on the performance of provincial health departments revealed fundamental 
shortcomings, “ranging from strategic planning and leadership, through to 
financial management and monitoring and evaluation” (Barron et al. 2009: 8). 
While much has already been tackled by the vigorous new minister, challenges 
in health administration at both national and provincial level still persist. 
Another field in which renewed governance structures are a major cause 
for current capacity constraints is education. The low staffing levels in the 
basic education department and in higher education and training are largely 
a result of the fact that the two entities were formed out of one ministry. 
When the national Department of Education was split in 2009, financial and 
human resources needed to be divided and apportioned to the two newly 
structured administrative bodies, leading to budgetary and staff constraints on 
both sides (Department of Basic Education 2011). At the time of our research, 
this organisational transformation process was still underway. The newly 
established Department of Higher Education and Training was particularly 
affected by a high vacancy rate which posed serious operational problems, as 
the Annual Report for 2011/2012 states: 
The high number of vacancies inevitably had a negative impact on human 
capacity and therefore also on implementation. (…) The University 
Education Branch has severe capacity constraints which impact on the 
delivery of services. The most significant capacity problem is at a high level 
professional end. The post of Deputy Director-General remains unfilled. Of 
the nine director posts, only four are filled. In addition, some sections with 
high workloads have insufficient staff to cope with these. (Department of 
Higher Education and Training 2012a: 143)
Interviewees from both the government and donor side confirmed that there 
is currently a huge vacuum at the higher education department, hampering 
policy development and implementation. The situation is thus equal to 
the one in the field of health: despite highly qualified individuals in office, 
administrative capacity is constrained due to an insufficient staffing level. 
The Department of Environmental Affairs, in contrast, has a comparatively 
low vacancy rate and a strong team of competent officials. Various interview 
partners engaged in the environment sector highlighted the high degree of 
in-house expertise across government bodies at the national level, ranging 
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from the line ministry to public entities such as SANBI. A UNDP programme 
manager praised his counterpart officials in these institutions as follows:  
Extremely well capacitated, you know, there are knowledgeable people 
writing articles and stuff, globally respected. Some of them are part of the 
negotiating team on biodiversity perspective. When you run the projects 
through them, you can see these guys are in full control. You have less stress, 
they deliver, they know what they want, they know where they are going, 
they are pretty at the play. They are on top of the game. (Interview 8) 
The workforce of DEA and SANBI is largely made up of environmental 
specialists qualified with an academic degree up to the masters or PhD level; 
many are engaged in key policy platforms at the global level and strongly 
networked with the domestic and international science community. By way of 
example, a leading official in the biodiversity planning unit of the department 
sketched his professional background and work environment as follows: 
Interviewee: I’m a conservation biologist. I’ve got two masters degrees, 
one from the UK. Presently, I’m a member of the Society for Conservation 
Biology. And I think that’s my link with the technical academic research 
(…). I’ve been affiliated with the TWNSO, the Third World Network of 
Scientific Organizations as well. So again, that is keeping me up to date in 
terms of what is currently happening in terms of research. And that actually 
informs the way the government addresses issues because the cutting edge 
research is flowing into these processes, whether it’s the minister’s speech 
or the presentations or participation in these various platforms that do 
exist. My job is predominantly to mainstream some of that thinking into 
the national processes. 
Interviewer: ‘Thinking’ meaning scientific evidence? 
Interviewee: Yeah, scientific evidence, scientific concepts we hear on the 
international platforms of engagements because South Africa is very 
prominent in international circles in the sense that we have many multi-
national environmental agreements. And our international work is quite 
robust because we’re always engaging in the technical working groups 
of the CBD [Convention on Biological Diversity]. I’m a member of the 
Ad Hoc Technical Working Group ‘Biodiversity for Poverty Eradication 
and Development’. And then there are other people as well deployed to 
various other technical working groups like SUBSTTA [Subsidiary Body 
on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice] as well. (Interview 15) 
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While in general South Africa has an outstandingly strong administration 
in the environment sector, interviewees raised some flaws pertaining to the 
knowledge base in government. First and foremost, as mentioned earlier, 
environmental expertise is largely held by a group of people which is not 
representative of the South African demographics; the expert community in 
both government and science is still racially skewed, and the number of black 
scientists coming out of university is very limited. Moreover, there is a stark 
discrepancy in capacity between national and sub-national levels, as a UNDP 
officer commented: 
At national level they’ve got tall expertise, you know, PhD people leading 
policies and stuff. (…) But you go to the provinces and then it becomes 
obvious, never mind the local municipalities – to find a person who can be 
able to tell you how climate change links with the development work that 
they’re doing sometimes can be a challenge. (Interview 8) 
The lack of environmental expertise in provincial and local government is 
particularly profound in distinct knowledge areas where specialists are required. 
The Environmental Sector Skills Plan for South Africa published in 2010 
identified a scarcity of soil scientists, taxonomists, ecologists, environmental 
and resource economists, climate change scientists, or biotechnologists, 
amongst others (Department of Environmental Affairs 2010a: 19).
Despite such constraints related to the dispersion of (specialist) knowledge, 
however, the in-house expertise in government entities dealing with 
environment is substantial; this manifests itself in the fact that South Africa 
leads the way in certain areas such as spatial planning and in adopting 
innovative concepts of biodiversity management. In addition, there are well-
established structures for policy dialogue and consultation in which domestic 
advisory bodies play a central role. In our sample, environment can thus be 
assessed as the strongest sector with regard to public administration and, 
hence, absorptive capacity. 
Sectoral comparison of administrative capacity in Tanzania
Due to a lack of access to contrastable workforce data, assessing the 
administrative strength of sectors in Tanzania proves to be intricate. The 
shortfall of qualified staff is mentioned in literally all reports on sectoral 
performance in Tanzania. Most of them, however, remain superficial; very few 
authors support their claim with some sort of concrete evidence, which makes 
it difficult to differentiate the extent of the problem in different areas. 
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A comprehensive in-depth study on public sector capacity is available only 
for education. The Education Sector Human Resources Situation Analysis 
published in 2012 discloses detailed information on staffing levels on the 
delivery side of the education system (i.e. in schools and academic institutions, 
as well as on the governance side, i.e. authorities concerned with education at 
national, regional and district level). Aside from chronic shortages of teachers 
all across the system, the report reveals massive capacity gaps in the respective 
ministries, both in terms of numbers and expertise (Omari & Baser 2012). 
A case in point is the Department of Policy and Planning, a key unit within 
the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT). At the time the 
study was conducted, the planning section entailed only seven officials most 
of whom lacked training or experience in planning; out of the eight persons 
working in the Education Management Information System unit in charge of 
producing and processing educational data for the department, only four had 
adequate IT qualifications (Omari & Baser 2012). The lack of professionals 
with specialised training is also a sign of the generally low educational level of 
staff. As Table 13 indicates, less than 50% of the workforce holds an academic 
degree (including bachelors, postgraduate diplomas, masters or PhDs): 
Table 13: MoEVT staff by educational level
Educational level Number Share of total
Certificate 142 34.6%
Ordinary Diploma 42 10.2%
Advanced Diploma 44 10.7%
Bachelors 70 17.1%




Source: Education Sector Human Resources Situation Analysis (Omari & Baser 2012: 171).
At the sub-national level, the situation looks similar if not worse: regional and 
district offices are affected by high vacancy rates and insufficiently skilled staff. 
The authors of the report made the observation that “many district education 
officers, even sometimes the primary and secondary DEOs [District Education 
Officers], were not comfortable in English” (Omari & Baser 2012: 179). 
In addition to the weak bureaucratic workforce in the national ministry 
and local government authorities, governance in education has further been 
exacerbated by the lack of overall guidance. For years, a range of decisive 
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leadership positions, including the Commissioner of Education, the Chief 
Inspector of Schools, as well as various director posts, were only filled with 
acting managers who were neither adequately qualified nor able to develop a 
strong steering capacity (Omari & Baser 2012) – “there are not the right people 
in the right position” (Interview 45), a Tanzanian expert working for the World 
Bank commented. All in all, the administrative capacity in education can be 
assessed as severely constrained. 
The situation in health does not look much better if looking at the overall 
sector which is facing a serious human resource crisis (School of Public Health 
and Allied Sciences 2009). The Health Sector Strategic Plan III 2009–2015 
illustrates the dimension of the problem with alarming numbers: 
The total of staffing in the health sector stands at 35% of the actual need 
according to defined staffing norms. The available number of professional 
health workers in the public sector is 35,202 and deficit is 90,722 (…). There 
is an enormous shortage of human resources for health across all cadres: 
clinicians, nurses, pharmaceutical technicians, laboratory technicians, 
radiographers, physiotherapists, health officers and health administration 
cadres. (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 2009: 29)
The human resource scarcity also affects the Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare as the main national governance body, translating into insufficient 
staffing levels, particularly in terms of certain specialists. At the time of our 
research, for instance, the ministry had only three health economists at 
its disposal who were hardly able to cope with the immense workload on 
their desks. Yet, while the administrative capacity is constrained in terms of 
numbers, the staff in office is said to be skilled and competent – an issue which 
was emphasised by various interviewees from both government and donor 
side. A Tanzanian WHO officer pointed out:  
It is the numbers and the skills mix in the ministry which need to be 
made right. But the level of qualification is tough, certainly very high. 
(Interview 44) 
In a similar vein, a German health expert with years of working experience in 
Tanzania commented: 
In the ministry of health as well as in the universities, we do have fairly 
competent people. The issue is, simply put: While in Germany we have 
6 000 competent people, there are six of them in Tanzania. Those who are 
really capable are thin on the ground. (Interview 73)
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One of the few health economists within the Ministry of Health confirmed this 
outside perception from her perspective as follows: 
We can manage. We’re doing it. We really stretch ourselves, but it’s not 
as serious as it was. (…) A challenge might be the shortage, but not the 
capacity – few people, many tasks, but not the capacity. (Interview 54)
That the Ministry of Health, although being understaffed, can resort to a civil 
servant cadre which is comparatively strong in terms of in-house expertise 
is a crucial asset for health governance. There are however also constraints 
which hamper the overall bureaucratic performance: varying capacities in 
regional and district authorities which obstruct the implementation of policies 
and health service delivery, a high level of staff circulation and brain drain 
into international organisations and the private sector, and poor recruitment 
practices leading to intervals in which decisive positions are filled with acting 
officials who lack the confidence and competencies to assume leadership.155 
Yet, the dimension of such problems appears far smaller than, for instance, in 
education.
Rating the administrative capacity in environment is intricate insofar 
as different public entities are concerned with the matter – the Division of 
Environment in the Vice-President’s Office, the Forestry and Beekeeping 
Division in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, the National 
Environmental Management Council and the Local Government Authorities, 
to name just the most important ones. A cross-cutting assessment made by 
internal and external evaluations is that overall, environmental governance is 
severely constrained by a shortage of qualified staff across all bodies, particularly 
at district level (Vice-President‘s Office 2007; Edwards et al. 2012; Nindi 2012). 
Similar conclusions were drawn by government and donor representatives 
dealing with environment-related issues such as climate change or forestry. A 
World Bank specialist put it straight, saying: 
They just don’t have enough people, they don’t have the skills. 
(Interview 46) 
This statement hints at one important point made by many of those interviewed, 
namely that skills related to leadership, management, strategic planning and 
analysis are lacking in national ministries, rather than environmental expertise. 
155 At the time of interviewing in 2013, the positions of the permanent secretary, the chief medical 
officer as well as the director of policy and planning within the Ministry of Health were filled with 
acting officials. 
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A Tanzanian programme officer working for the Danish Embassy commented 
on the capacity of her counterparts in government: 
These guys are well trained experts. But in the field of leadership and 
management, there they have a problem. (Interview 33) 
At least for the Division of Environment, the claim that individuals in national 
bodies are well-trained can be confirmed with information on the educational 
profile of its workforce. In 2008 when the Human Resources Training Strategy 
for DoE was drafted, the unit had 54 employees made up of 38 professionals 
and 16 support staff. Three officials held a PhD and 29 a masters degree, that is, 
60% of all staff were educated to masters degree level or higher (Draft Human 
Resource Training Strategy, VPO-DoE, April 2008, as cited by Inka Consult 
2008: 7). Compared to the education ministry, where masters and PhD holders 
together made up only 22.5%, the DoE has a highly qualified team in terms 
of technical knowledge. Nonetheless, there is a fundamental flaw in capacity 
which a counsellor in the Finnish Embassy described as follows: 
Having a kind of strategic view of the things – where do we want to move? 
What do we want to do? How do we make it happen? This kind of strategic 
thinking I see is very often missing. (Interview 36) 
In addition to the deficiencies in terms of these kind of competencies, the 
division of environment as well as other public entities are short of specialists 
in certain knowledge areas, as a high-ranking official admitted: 
There are some emerging issues on climate change, for example, on the 
capture for greenhouse gases. We don’t have experts in Tanzania. Even if 
we have, there are very few who are not ready to be employed for a long 
time period under contract. (Interview 67) 
Aside from climate change specialists, interviewees pointed to a shortage of 
professionals trained in issues such as resource and risk assessment, geographic 
information systems, or private forestry management. Given the scarcity of 
specialist knowledge, the deficiencies in terms of critical competencies and 
the enormous lack of adequately trained officials at sub-national level, the 
administrative capacity in the environment sector is severely limited. 
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Comparative assessment of administrative capacity in South Africa and Tanzania
The initial assumption was that administrative capacity on the recipient side 
is a crucial dimension determining the extent to which external experts are 
able to influence policy processes through advice, administrative capacity 
being understood as the strength of public entities in terms of their in-
house expertise and staffing levels. Based on the findings presented above, 
we rank the capacity of administration in different policy fields as follows: 
the strongest area in the comparison is environment in South Africa, having 
a capable cadre of civil servants and in-house expertise at its disposal. The 
qualification levels of officials in health and education are similarly high, but 
the two sectors are affected by relatively high vacancy rates in line ministries, 
which to some extent limit their bureaucratic performance. In Tanzania, public 
administration generally suffers from insufficient staffing levels and a scarcity 
of specialists. While governance in health and environment stems from a small 
number of highly qualified individuals which ensures a certain level of in-
house expertise, the education sector lacks a critical mass of competent staff 
at all levels. Table 14 displays our assessment, with ‘++’ indicating a high level 
of administrative capacity, and ‘--’ a low level of administrative capacity at the 
opposite end. Again, it is important to note that the table serves as means of 
illustration, not as a quantifiable scale. 
Table 14: Sectoral strength in terms of administrative capacity




Source: Authors’ own illustration.
Local knowledge base
Equally to the absorption capacity of administrations, the third dimension of 
recipient strength relies on the general educational level of a given society: 
we refer here to the strength of the local knowledge base in the widest sense, 
and more specifically to the size and quality of a country’s science community. 
Again, the assumption is that a crucial condition for recipients to develop 
their own agenda without being driven from external advice is the availability 
of domestic sources from which alternative expertise can be obtained. The 
argument put forward reads: the stronger the local knowledge base and its 
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voice in the policy discourse, the smaller is the scope of influence for outside 
actors. 
This hypothesis implies two basic premises of democracy theories and 
sociology of science. The first is that in modern democracies, scientific knowledge 
serves both a problem-solving and legitimating function for political rule: it is 
required to find solutions for societal challenges and to demonstrate rational 
decision-making based on certified ‘evidence’ (Weingart 2003; Stehr 2010). 
The second is that scientific knowledge, despite its universal truth claim, is 
always – though to a varying extent depending on the discipline – contextual 
and culture-specific, transmitting certain constructs, beliefs and values of the 
epistemic community from which it is generated (Knorr-Cetina 1981; Knorr-
Cetina 2007). For democratic governments, it is thus essential to have an 
endogenous knowledge base to draw on in order to take decisions informed 
by and sensitive to a society’s historical, cultural and political imprint. 
Many developing democracies, however, lack this fundamental requisite 
and resource of governance, given the weak state of their science systems. 
The persistent import of Northern knowledge is problematic insofar as it keeps 
them in a perpetual status of dependency, and restrains them from developing 
a genuine policy agenda which rests on their own societies’ set of norms and 
experiences implied in local knowledge. As Girvan (2007: 40) points out, 
autonomy – the right to choose one’s path to development and to act in 
function of that choice – cannot be secured without a knowledge base. As 
long as the South is dependent for its development knowledge on the global 
centres of power, its own autonomy will be compromised.
This argument does not convey the claim that autonomy emanates from 
“intellectual autarchy” (Girvan 2007: 32) which in a globalised world would 
neither be viable nor helpful. Instead, it makes the point that developing 
countries require a local knowledge base as a counterweight against the 
dominant body of knowledge provided by the North that transmits certain 
ideologies, shutting off alternative meaning and interpretation. Ideally, domestic 
science communities are able “to filter this [knowledge] through a conscious 
process of selection, evaluation and adaptation to local circumstances” (Girvan 
2007:  32), and to provide the intellectual ground for problem solutions 
which take the existing social conditions into account. Without endogenous 
science systems which serve as absorptive and knowledge-producing entities, 
recipient governments are likely to be driven by external expertise, remaining 
“consumers (of knowledge) and implementers (of advice)” (Girvan 2007: 22). 
As early as in 1969, the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science 
and Technology to Development of the UN Economic and Social Council stated 
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in its ‘World Plan’ “that there is a fundamental necessity to build up indigenous 
scientific capability in the developing countries” (United Nations Economic 
and Social Council 1971: 102) which would enable them to define, analyse 
and solve nation-specific problems and boost economic production. The report 
expounds the problem of deficient knowledge production and points at the 
hurdles obstructing the development of solid science systems in developing 
countries. Today, the situation seems little better, if not worse in some respects. 
Africa’s share in global science as measured in publication output has been 
steadily declining over the past 20 years, which reflects the widening gap of 
knowledge inequality between the Northern hemisphere and the global South 
(Mouton et al. 2008; Weingart 2006).156 Despite some sporadic improvements, 
science in developing countries faces the same problems today as identified 
more than 40 years ago: a deficient research infrastructure, scarcity of human 
resources exacerbated by brain drain of scientists, poor science governance, and 
chronic underfunding which results in a destructive dependency on foreign 
financiers, to name just the major hitches (United Nations Economic and 
Social Council 1971; Mouton 2008; Mouton et al. 2008). Assessing the state 
of public science in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
region,157 Mouton et al. (2008: 199–200) diagnosed a “de-institutionalisation” 
of science systems of which many operate in a “subsistence mode” struggling 
to reproduce themselves. 
A country which counts as an exception is South Africa. With regard to 
scientific productivity, it is at the forefront of the continent and by far leading 
in the region (Mouton et al. 2008; African Union–New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development 2010). Table 15 displays publication output and other indicators 
which are widely used to compare the strength of science systems across the 
globe, using data published by the African Innovation Outlook 2010 (African 
Union–New Partnership for Africa’s Development 2010). A standard measure 
in this context is the gross domestic expenditure on research and development 
(GERD) as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP). While the countries 
with the highest research and development intensity in the world exceed 3% 
(e.g. Finland, Sweden or Japan), the African Union has recommended a 1% 
GERD/GDP ratio to its member states (Executive Council of the African Union 
2006; European Commission 2014). Yet, among the countries reviewed by 
the African Innovation Outlook 2010, this target has only been reached by 
156 According to Mouton et al. (2008: 199), “Africa has lost 11% of its share in global science since its 
peak in 1987; Sub-Saharan science has lost almost a third (31%).”
157 The SADC comprises 15 member states in southern Africa, namely Angola, Botswana, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Southern African Development 
Community 2012). The bibliometric analyses by Mouton et al. (2008) did not include the Seychelles. 
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Malawi, Uganda and South Africa; the percentages of the remainder ranged 
between 0.20% and 0.48% which was achieved by Tanzania (African Union–
New Partnership for Africa’s Development 2010). A look at the human 
resource base in science reveals an even greater discrepancy between South 
Africa and Tanzania. With 825 researchers per million inhabitants (40 084 as 
headcount), the density of researchers in South Africa is more than ten times 
higher than in Tanzania, with only 67 researchers by million population (2 
755 as headcount). As Weingart (2006: 173) argues, it is questionable whether 
such a small number of scientists can make up a “critical mass to even sustain 
an internal intellectual community, let alone a differentiated one”. 
Given the stark contrast in human resources for science, it is not surprising 
that there is a similar divide in terms of research productivity as measured in 
the number of publications. According to the Scopus database, South Africa 
produced 86 649 scientific articles during 1990–2009, around fifteen times 
as many as Tanzania (5 642) (African Union–New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development 2010). Broken down per million inhabitants, the average annual 
output during 2005–2009 was 135 papers in South Africa against 12 papers 
in Tanzania (African Union–New Partnership for Africa’s Development 2010). 
Table 15: Research and development indicators for South Africa and Tanzania
R&D indicators South Africa Tanzania
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % of  
GDP (2007)
1.05 0.48
Number of researchers (headcount) 40 084  2 755
Researchers per million inhabitants 815 67
Scientific output by country in papers listed in the Scopus 
database (1990–2009) 
86 649 5 642
Average annual papers per million inhabitants (2005–2009) 135 12
Source: African Innovation Outlook 2010 (African Union–New Partnership for Africa’s Development 2010).
Using the standard indicators for measuring research and development, it is 
evident that South Africa in general has a much greater scientific potential 
and higher level of research productivity than Tanzania, whose participation in 
the global science system – equivalent to most other African countries – seems 
miniscule.158 Yet, one needs to consider that the set of indicators presented 
in the table above is tainted with a fundamental bias which discriminates 
against developing countries in several regards. First, it sets a Western 
158 According to a bibliometric analysis based on the Scopus database and conducted by Arencibia-
Jorge et al. (2012), Tanzania’s share of the world scientific production from 1996 to 2009 was 
0.03% while South Africa accounted for 0.39% in the same period. 
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concept of science systems and respective features as frame of reference for 
the assessment which has fundamental implications (Weingart 2006). For 
instance, the scope of databanks used to measure scientific output is limited 
to prestigious journals, most of which are published in the North (Gaillard 
2010). Given that a large part of research findings of developing countries is 
disseminated in media and journals which are not captured by the common 
indexes, their contribution to global knowledge production is marginalised if 
solely assessed on the basis of the highly selective data sources. Hence, various 
authors point out that the standard indicators most probably fail to provide an 
adequate account of science in the developing world, emphasising the need for 
additional descriptors and narratives (Mouton 2007; Gaillard 2010). 
In the following attempt to briefly sketch out the strength of science in South 
Africa and Tanzania by sectors, we therefore complement bibliometric data with 
qualitative information drawn from different reports and interview statements. 
Aside from delineating the size and quality of the local knowledge base in the 
respective fields, we also consider the extent to which institutionalised links to 
the policy sphere are existent.
The starting point of the analysis is Table  16 which presents publication 
output by relevant subject areas from 1990 to 2013 on the basis of scientific 
documents captured by the Scopus database: 
Table 16: Scientific output by subject area in South Africa and Tanzania 1990–2013
Subject Area South Africa Tanzania
No. of papers % of total output No. of papers % of total output
Health related
  Medicine 41 644 17.0 4 492 29.0
   Immunology and 
microbiology
8 837 3.6 1 816 11.7
  Health Professions 1 995 0.8 124 0.8
  Nursing 1 660 0.7 167 1.1
Environment related 
   Environmental 
science
13 587 5.6 1 137 7.3
   Earth and 
planetary science
15 021 6.1 549 3.5
Education 1 552 0.6 81 0.5
Source: Scopus database.159 
159 For the bibliometric data, the Scopus database was accessed on 11 and 12 March 2014. We did 
not limit the search to articles, but included all document types (e.g. conference papers or book 
chapters) as they also contribute to scientific output in a wider sense. Since education is not a subject 
area of its own in the Scopus database, we set the search condition that education must either be 
mentioned in the article title or be a keyword; we specified the results further by limiting them to 
those related to the subject areas social science, psychology, arts and humanities, mathematics and 
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Strength of Tanzanian science in health, environment and education 
In the Tanzanian science landscape, the leading role of health is reflected by 
the composition of the country’s scientific output: in the period 1990–2013, 
health-related areas (medicine, immunology and microbiology, health 
professions, nursing) together accounted for 42.6% of all publications. 
Environment is also a relatively strong research area, making up 10.8% if 
summing up contributions of environmental science and earth and planetary 
science. Education, in contrast, is almost insignificant in terms of publication 
output, with only 81 papers over a period of 14 years which amounts to a 
share of only 0.5%.160 
Health research in Tanzania is conducted by government and private health 
research institutions of which the most productive and prestigious are the 
Muhimbili University of Health and Allied Sciences (MUHAS), the National 
Institute for Medical Research (NIMR) and the Ifakara Health Institute (IHI). 
While MUHAS is the only public university in Tanzania offering degree 
programmes in health sciences, NIMR serves as a parastatal entity under the 
Ministry of Health, mandated to conduct and coordinate medical research; 
the IHI is an independent non-profit organisation founded by the Swiss 
Tropical Institute which has acquired international renown, particularly for 
its contribution to malaria research. According to interviewees, the scientific 
capacity of these bodies varies; Ifakara is said to have the most capable cadre of 
highly skilled and well-trained scientists. A cross-cutting constraint, however, 
is the small human resource base of the relevant organisations. Referring to 
IHI, a Danida health advisor stated: 
I think they’ve got some excellent people, but a few excellent people aren’t 
enough to do a huge amount of work. (Interview 34)
The small number of researchers is certainly a major cause of the limited 
capacity of health institutions. Another problem obstructing the production of 
policy-relevant science is their huge dependency on foreign financiers. While 
computer science. The remaining articles clearly dealt with issues related to education. To prove 
the validity of results, we cross-checked the number and share of articles with those listed in Web 
of Science (WoS) under the category ‘Education Educational Research’. In WoS, the timespan of 
article search was limited from 1995 to 2013, with 1995 being the first year accessible. Despite 
the shorter period, the number and share of documents listed was slightly higher for South Africa 
(1  691 articles; 1.3% of total); for Tanzania, absolute numbers were lower, but the share was 
equivalent (38 articles; 0.5% of total). Hence, while the results slightly differ, their scale is similar, 
supporting the argument that education is a rather minor research area in both countries. 
160 The dominance of health and relative strength of environmental science in Tanzania have also 
been pointed out by previous studies using bibliometric data, as for instance African Union–New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (2010) and Arencibia-Jorge et al. (2012). 
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the Tanzanian government contributes some core funding, research activities 
are almost entirely financed from outside: from 2007 to 2010, NIMR did not 
receive any research budget from government side (Magesa et al. 2011); the 
Ifakara Health Institute states on its website that 80% of its annual income 
comes from competitive grants provided by foreign sources (Ifakara Health 
Institute 2014). Given this situation, focusing on national research priorities is 
more or less impossible, as a senior scientist working at IHI reported: 
So basically, you can set your agenda saying I’ll work in these areas. But 
working on what you really can’t determine, because you are responding 
to a call for proposals. (Interview 68) 
Given that health research in Tanzania is mainly driven by external funders, 
it is not surprising that the uptake of findings by policy-makers is limited. 
Although IHI is increasingly recognised as a source of expertise by both 
government and donors, the exchange between research bodies and the 
Ministry of Health is still sporadic. Hence, the impact of Tanzania’s scientific 
community on health is rather small, although there are “pockets of long-
established research excellence” (Irikefe et al. 2011: 558). 
Similar patterns, but an even more strained situation are found in the area 
of environment. The Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) in Morogoro and 
the University of Dar es Salaam with its Institute for Resource Assessment (IRA) 
are the most productive producers of environmental science in Tanzania.161 
While individuals working for these institutions are highly reputed scientists 
engaged in international research activities and expert forums, they are too 
few in numbers to build a sustained local knowledge base. Academic staff lack 
the time and financial resources for carrying out independent quality research 
on a larger scale. On its website, the Sokoine University of Agriculture indicates 
that 98% of its research activities are externally funded (Sokoine University 
of Agriculture Directorate of Research & Postgraduate Studies 2014). While 
we were unable to obtain concrete figures on IRA’s budget and the share of 
foreign funding, a high-ranking staff member made the following statement 
on this:  
The way it is, is that in the absence of donor support from outside, we 
cease even to be called researchers because there aren’t much resources 
available. (Interview 69)  
161 The National Environmental Management Council (NEMC), the government’s advisory and 
regulatory agency, is supposed to carry out research according to its mandate, but its output is 
miniscule. In the Scopus database, only nine articles in the period 1990–2013 are listed with 
institutional affiliation to NEMC.
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Aside from occasionally contracting individuals for consultancies, the 
government does not regularly use the local science community available as 
a source of environmental expertise. There are a few, mostly donor-funded, 
initiatives to establish dialogue between policy-makers and scientists on 
environmental issues – as, for example, the ‘Environment for Development’ 
centre or the ‘Decision Makers Forest Academy’ – but their scope of impact is 
limited. All in all, Tanzania’s local knowledge base in environment is small, 
and there are no structures in place through which national research findings 
would be disseminated to inform policy-making. 
The weakest area in terms of scientific capacity, however, seems to be 
education. With only 81 articles over a period of 14 years, the output in 
this field is marginal. The University of Dar es Salaam is the most significant 
producer, accounting for almost 50% of all publications; the only other 
institution which has a double-digit number of contributions is the Tumaini 
University in Iringa. The figures confirm the perception articulated by various 
interviewees that educational research in Tanzania hardly takes place. A 
civil society representative described the state of the local knowledge base in 
education as follows: 
I’m going to say something politically incorrect. You are assuming there 
is a local expert community – I don’t think there is one that is worth its 
salt. There are local experts, individual experts, but we don’t have serious 
think tanks (…). The universities, I can’t point you to a single department 
or programme of work that I can say, this is incredibly solid research and 
analysis and thinking and creative programme development. So what 
are universities, what is the state of our universities? We have expanded 
them dramatically to democratise access; they have become large factories 
of lecturing. Most professors and lecturers are busy doing consulting, and 
so you quickly do what you have to do at the university, often not even do 
that, you know, they’re often away. If somebody did a careful noting of 
attendance, you’ll find they are often away even for your basic lectures. 
And then they’re going round doing consulting work, of which each 
piece may have some utility, but it doesn’t add up to a body of work. So 
I don’t think there is a local expert community in Tanzania (…). There 
are individual experts, but there is no community, there is no coherence. 
(Interview 70)      
While interviewees from the donor side put it less bluntly, they consistently 
assessed the capacity of the science community in education as very low. 
Notably, the only one articulating that the local knowledge base would be 
sufficiently strong was a director in the education ministry who stated: 
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Well me, I think we have capacity (…). In the Institute of Education here 
which is working with the curriculum development, we have enough and 
learned sort of personnel. And we have people in the universities who have 
travelled widely. They have been engaged in different consultancies here 
and there, they are knowledgeable (...). (Interview 49)
The Tanzania Institute of Education (TIE) the official referred to is a parastatal 
organisation under the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training in charge 
of curriculum development, teacher training, quality assurance and technical 
advice; it has a so-called ‘Research, Publication and Consultancy Section’ which 
is commissioned to conduct evaluations and research on educational matters 
(Tanzania Institute of Education 2014). While TIE is used by the government 
as a source of in-house expertise, it is not producing scientific output in a strict 
sense. 
As both statements quoted above indicate, cooperation with university 
experts on education is limited to ‘consultancies here and there’. From the 
perspective of various interview partners, there is no serious engagement 
between policy-makers and academia, and little receptiveness towards research 
on the part of the education ministry. A university professor of education 
commented in this regard:  
You need a minister who shows interest. But we have (a) minister who 
I don’t think shows interest in any research of the academic world. 
(Interview 71)
This lack of interest on the part of the political leadership is reflected by the 
absence of a “formalised system” (Interview 45) facilitating exchange between 
policy-makers and scientists in education. In light of the interview narratives 
and the bibliometric figures presented earlier in the chapter, it can be said 
that independent educational research in Tanzania is almost non-existent; the 
impact of the country’s few academic educationalists is narrowed down to 
consultancy work which does not result in the emergence of an endogenous 
local knowledge base. 
Strength of South African science in health, environment and education
South Africa has a solid science community which in many fields significantly 
contributes to global knowledge production. Comparing productivity in terms 
of publications, health-related sciences are at the top of the three areas under 
review, accounting for 22.1% of the total output from 1990 to 2013 (see 
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Table 16), followed by environment-related sciences with 11.7% and, at the 
low end, education with 0.6%. 
In health-related science and particularly in HIV/Aids research, South Africa 
has a whole range of universities which are internationally renowned for their 
scientific performance, such as the University of Cape Town, the University of 
Witwatersrand in Johannesburg or the University of Stellenbosch, to mention 
just the most prolific ones. In addition, the country has well-established 
parastatal bodies such as the South African Medical Research Council (MRC) 
and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) which cover a broad 
spectrum of relevant subject areas. While these institutions deliver high-level 
and sometimes “global ground-breaking research” (Interview  27), as a civil 
society activist put it, they are yet faced with structural constraints typical of 
science systems in developing countries, namely a small human resource base 
and dependency on external financing. Expertise is stretched rather thinly, 
particularly offside the HIV/Aids research field. Reputed scientists are under 
constant pressure trying to cope with teaching obligations, generate third 
funding streams through conducting studies for multiple clients and respond 
to national priorities, while being dependent on foreign financiers. In HIV/
Aids and TB research, for instance, more than 70% of the total funding comes 
from outside, less than 30% from local sources (Senkubuge & Mayosi 2013). 
Health research in South Africa is thus heavily influenced by the agendas of 
overseas sponsors; a senior scholar at the Institute of Infectious Disease and 
Molecular Medicine of the University of Cape Town stated upfront:   
Of course you’ve got the potential conflict of who sets the agenda, who 
owns the agenda. And in a way I think we need to acknowledge that we’ve 
become scientific prostitutes in the sense that we are giving in to the highest 
bidder for our services. And it is actually much easier in the health field to 
get your money from abroad.162
This issue of domestic underfunding was also raised at a National Health 
Research Summit held in 2011 to discuss the state of South Africa’s health 
research and to make it more responsive to national challenges (Mayosi et 
al. 2011). The event was deemed an attempt to strengthen the ties between 
the health department and the science community after the breakup of 
relations during the Mbeki administration caused by the conflict around Aids 
and antiretroviral treatment. Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi is perceived 
162 This statement was made in the context of an exploratory interview for the research project 
conducted in 2007. 
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as hardly trying to establish a closer dialogue with the country’s science 
community; as a professor at the University of the Western Cape commented: 
That’s a shift from a kind of vacuum at the centre to the re-emergence 
of a leadership that is willing to engage in a much more explicit way 
with South African knowledge communities, there’s no doubt about that. 
(Interview 28) 
All in all, it can be stated that South Africa’s local knowledge base in health is 
made up of a cadre of researchers which is small, but highly productive and 
increasingly used by policy-makers as a source of endogenous expertise. 
The country’s strongest scientific impact, however, is in environment-related 
disciplines. According to the Thomson Reuters Global Research Report Africa 
2010, South African plant and animal sciences had the highest share of world 
publications (1.55%) out of any field in Africa, followed by environment and 
ecology (1.29%); the report further states that “many of South Africa’s most 
highly-cited papers in this field pertain to climate change and its effects on 
plant propagation” (Adams et al. 2010). Among the most prolific producers are 
some which are also leading in health, such as the University of Cape Town, 
the University of Witwatersrand, and the University of Pretoria. Aside from a 
range of universities, parastatal bodies such as the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR) with its Natural Resources and the Environment 
unit, as well as SANBI, are key contributors to environmental research. The 
science community operating within these institutions is regarded as “one of 
the tops in the world” (Interview 8), as a leading UNDP expert stated. Similarly, 
as in health, however, it is small in terms of human resources and still racially 
skewed, as an environmental specialist explained: 
There is just a selective few individuals that are champions for the various 
initiatives. In terms of capacity, we don’t have capacity in the sense that 
– it’s lying only in a group of people and that group of people is not 
representative of the South African demographics. So in that respect, the 
skills development is needed – especially black scientists, it’s very limited 
in the country, because science does not support a fast track transformation 
agenda. (Interview 15)
In addition to this structural problem, there are some imbalances with regard 
to the performance in particular subject areas. Animal sciences are traditionally 
weaker than the botanical sciences, and there are some areas such as resource 
economics and biotechnology where expertise is scarce. Nonetheless, the 
South African science community in environment is broad enough to build 
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a solid local knowledge base which substantially informs policy-making 
through its presence in advisory task teams or its contribution to the State of 
the Environment report. In 2012, the Department of Environmental Affairs 
published an ‘Environment Sector Research, Development and Evidence 
Framework’ seeking to further enhance and institutionalise the exchange 
between researchers and policy-makers (Department of Environmental Affairs 
2012b). In short, environmental science in South Africa is highly recognised in 
academic and policy circles, both at the national and international level. 
Finally, we look at South Africa’s capacity in educational research. As the 
bibliometric figures indicate, its contribution to the overall science output is 
rather small, at least compared to health and environmental sciences. The 
most prolific producers in this area are again the well-known universities, with 
the University of Cape Town leading the way, followed by the universities 
of Witwatersrand, Pretoria and KwaZulu-Natal. Moreover, the Education 
and Skills Development Unit in the Human Sciences Research Council is a 
key body conducting studies on all kinds of educational matters related to 
schooling, teaching and learning from primary school to higher education. 
As an analysis of publications and academic projects indicates, South African 
educational research covers a broad spectrum of topics and disciplinary areas, 
ranging from educational theories to studies on classroom practice (Deacon 
et al. 2009). Yet, its methodological scope is rather narrow: in the period 
1995–2006, “94% of education research has been small scale research, usually 
qualitative, often conceptual and frequently eclectic, (…) while hardly any 
(costly, time-consuming and often quantitative) large scale research has taken 
place, with only 1% of the database falling into this category” (Deacon et al. 
2009: iv). 
The authors of the analysis attribute the lack of longitudinal large-scale 
studies, which would provide more systemic findings, partly to the prevailing 
‘publish or perish’ pressure on academics, but also 
“to the limited availability of research funding, the equally limited 
availability and often poor quality and unreliability of existing data, a 
widespread lack of research capacity and experience, and reduced time 
available for research due to increased teaching and administrative 
workloads.” (Deacon et al. 2009: 14)
Despite constraints in terms of funding and human resources, however, 
educational scholars form a solid knowledge base which the government 
regularly draws on. There seems to be a frequent exchange between the two 
educational departments and the academic community through conferences 
and workshops (see, for instance, Department of Basic Education 2014a, c), and 
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a variety of key reports informing policy decisions are compiled by university 
experts (see, for instance, Van der Berg et al. 2011). Hence, although the size 
and output of educational research in South Africa is small compared to other 
disciplines, it is recognised and used. 
Comparative assessment of the local knowledge base in South Africa and Tanzania 
On the basis of the bibliometric figures and qualitative information presented 
above, we rank the different fields under review as follows: environmental 
sciences in South Africa provide the strongest local knowledge base which 
substantially contributes to global science and has a strong presence at the 
national and international level. Although health sciences have a higher 
output in terms of numbers, the local knowledge base in this field is assessed 
to be weaker since it is highly concentrated on one particular subject, that 
is, HIV/Aids, and due to its dependency on external financing subject to the 
agendas of outside players. Educational research does not face this problem to 
the same extent, but the size and output of the research community is much 
smaller. We nonetheless rank it at the same level as health, since the core of 
educational scholars provides solid research which to a considerable extent 
informs policy-making. Tanzania’s scientific capacity is much lower than that of 
South Africa which dominates African science in general. Given the prevailing 
lack of human and financial resources, science communities in Tanzania across 
all disciplines are struggling to maintain their basic subsistence, let alone to 
produce research under poor working conditions. Yet, “pockets of significant 
science” (Mouton et al. 2008: 200) are found, particularly in the areas of health 
and environment where small cadres of highly qualified scholars operate. In 
education, however, such a core of excellence is missing. While individuals 
in academic institutions do have substantial expertise, a science community 
in the common sense is non-existent. Table 17 displays our assessment at a 
glance, with ‘++’ indicating a very strong local knowledge base, and ‘--’ a very 
weak local knowledge base. Again, we want to make the remark that the table 
is an oversimplification and should be seen only as a tool of illustration. 









THE IMPACT OF EXPERT 
ADVICE ON POLICY-
MAKING IN YOUNG 
DEMOCRACIES:  
SECTOR STUDIES
There are, as was shown, significant variations between South Africa and 
Tanzania with respect to their financial power, administrative capacity and 
the local knowledge base and also across the different sectors. In the following 
chapter, we will investigate whether and how these differences impact on 
policy processes. It is of particular interest how the influence of external 
experts on these processes is conditioned by them. 
Comparative empirical research is inherently confronted with diverse 
matters and material. Thus, the case studies presented below unavoidably 
differ in terms of their complexity and depth. Yet, they share some core themes 
and a broad texture. Each case is introduced with shortly delineating sectoral 
challenges and governance structures before sketching donors and their ‘entry 
points’ in the respective field. Then follows a detailed description of policy 
processes and players involved, with a particular focus on whether, how and 
in which roles external experts were engaged. While the narrations are not 
squeezed into a fixed grid, they are guided by some key questions, namely: 
At which stage and on which grounds (e.g. ‘capacity gaps’) did foreign actors 
enter the policy space? How did actors from government, aid organisations and 
academia position themselves and at which levels did they interact? Whose 
expertise and interests were finally taken up and reflected in policy decisions? 
The case studies are concluded with an assessment regarding external experts’ 
impact on policy-making and governance in the field under review, taking the 
structural conditions found into account. A synthesis of findings that can be 
drawn from comparing the empirical accounts concludes this chapter.
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Tanzania education: The hijacked agenda 
Sectoral context
In the light of international goals for education, Tanzania’s performance appears 
commendable at first glance: access to primary education is nearly ‘universal’, 
the completion rate stands high at 90%, and gender parity has almost been 
achieved (UNESCO  Office Dakar and Regional Bureau for Education in 
Africa et al. 2011:  7). In secondary education, the Gross Enrolment Rate 
has gone up from 20.2% in 2006 (Sumra & Rajani 2006) to 35% in 2012 
(UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2014), while in the same period enrolment 
numbers in higher education quadrupled (see Education Sector Development 
Committee 2012).163 
Yet, this rapid expansion has put substantial stress on the education 
system, manifesting in plummeting literacy skills and mass failure in national 
examinations (see, for instance, Twaweza 2013; Uwezo 2013). While 
children have successfully been brought into school, they struggle to learn 
under deteriorating conditions in overcrowded classrooms without adequate 
furniture, basic learning material and pedagogical support (see Mhonyiwa et al. 
2011); as of 2011/2012, the teacher-to-pupil ratio in primary education stood 
at 1:70 (Education Sector Development Committee 2012). The quality crisis 
in education has become a prime concern among educational stakeholders, 
sparking off serious dispute between the government and the aid community. 
Governance structures
The two main authorities in charge of formal education from pre-primary 
to tertiary levels in Tanzania are the Ministry of Education and Vocational 
Training (MoEVT) and the Prime Minister’s Office Regional Administration 
and Local Government (PMO-RALG). While the former is responsible for 
policy development, the provision of regulations and guidelines, standard 
setting, quality assurance and teacher training (Ministry of Education and 
Vocational Training 2014), the latter is mandated to oversee and coordinate 
the administration of schools which are managed by local government 
authorities (President‘s Office Public Service Management 2011). Hence, while 
MoEVT is the central body regarding policy issues, PMO-RALG is directly 
concerned with the day-to-day running of the school system. Both ministries 
collaborate with a range of other institutions concerned with educational 
163 Total student enrolment in higher education increased from 40 993 in 2005/2006 to 166 484 in 
2011/2012 (see Education Sector Development Committee 2011). 
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matters, such as the Tanzania Institute of Education (TIE) which develops 
curricula, teaching and learning materials, the National Examinations Council 
of Tanzania which designs and administrates national examinations and the 
Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children dealing with Folk 
Education.164 
Donor presence in the education sector 
Compared to other policy areas, the number of donors engaged in education 
appears rather limited; as of 2012, the ‘Education Development Partners 
Group’ (ED-DPG) comprised seven active members, namely CIDA, DFID, Sida, 
UNESCO, UNICEF, USAID and the World Bank.165 Depending on the respective 
focus of these organisations, representatives participate in one or more of the 
eight Technical Working Groups (e.g. ‘Quality Improvement’, ‘Enrolment 
Expansion’, or ‘Resource Allocation, Cost Efficiency and Financing’) to discuss 
issues coming up in these areas and to share information about their activities 
with ministry officials. If required, topics are brought forth to a higher-level 
task force and eventually to the Education Sector Development Committee 
chaired by the permanent secretary of MoEVT. While all actors are supposed 
to stick to this structure, both ministry and aid officials conceded that “it isn’t 
really working that way” (Interview 30), and a lot of things are “sort of decided 
upon and shared outside” (Interview 40). Various interviewees reported that 
the tone of the ‘dialogue’ has become tense. 
Understanding current aid relationships and the government’s positioning 
towards the donor community requires an awareness of the history of 
cooperation. Tanzania has gone through different phases in this regard. 
The rise and fall of Nyerere’s ‘Education for Self-Reliance’ vision 
When in 1961 the state of Tanganyika became independent, it inherited a 
society which was deeply affected by more than seven decades of imperialist 
rule. Both the Germans and British colonisers had installed a racially segregated 
formal education system whose main objective was to form a submissive yet 
productive workforce serving the external regime (Mushi 2009).166 Very few 
Africans attained more than two years of formal education (Galabawa 1990). 
164 Detailed information on mandates and functions of these institutions is provided on their websites: 
www.tie.go.tz/ (last accessed on 18 January 2015); http://www.necta.go.tz/ (last accessed on 18 
January 2015) and http://www.mcdgc.go.tz/ (last accessed on 18 January 2015). 
165 Moreover, GIZ and the World Food Programme are mentioned in some documents, but their 
engagement seems to be quite focused on cross-cutting issues (e.g. HIV prevention and awareness 
raising in schools) and specific concerns (e.g. community-led school feeding), respectively. 
166 For a detailed account of colonial education in Tanzania, see Mushi (2009). 
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At independence, about 85% of the population could not read and write 
(Nationalist Newspaper, 24 August 1967, as cited in Bhalalusesa 2003). Aside 
from one university college affiliated to the University of London (which later 
became a constituent college of the University of East Africa), there were no 
higher education institutions in the country (Ngirwa et al. 2013). 
Building a literate and capable citizenry became a central endeavour for 
Tanganyika’s first post-colonial leader, Julius K Nyerere, who became Prime 
Minister in 1961 and was elected President in 1962. Himself a teacher prior 
to his political career, Nyerere considered education a fundamental pillar for 
realising his vision of a socialist state based on his philosophy of Ujamaa (the 
Swahili term for ‘familyhood’) which should free the society from the yoke 
of domination. Right after coming into power, Mwalimu as he was popularly 
called (meaning ‘teacher’ in Swahili), issued an Education Act which legally 
abolished all forms of discrimination in education, nationalised primary schools, 
streamlined school curricula and examinations, and promoted Swahili as the 
national language (Ministry of Education and Culture 1995). This first step of 
change was followed by the release of Nyerere’s influential ‘Education for Self-
Reliance’ policy of 1967. As a sequel to the Arusha Declaration, the document 
emphasised the essential role of education in ending external dependence and 
delineated the principles of the envisaged socialist education system; amongst 
others, it stated: 
The education provided must therefore encourage the development in each 
citizen of three things: an enquiring mind; an ability to learn from what 
others do, and reject or adapt it to his own needs; and a basic confidence 
in his own position as a free and equal member of the society, who values 
others and is valued by them for what he does and not for what he obtains 
(…). 
The education provided by Tanzania for the students of Tanzania must 
serve the purposes of Tanzania. It must encourage the growth of the 
socialist values we aspire to. It must encourage the development of a 
proud, independent and free citizenry which relies upon itself for its own 
development (…). (Nyerere 1967)
In Nyerere’s vision, primary education was to become ‘a complete education 
in itself’, preparing students for life in a socialist society; an overhauled 
curriculum should include ‘non-academic’ subjects and practical activities such 
as agriculture and farming. Schools were to be integrated into villages and 
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communities; education should be regarded as a process of lifelong learning 
rather than a formal system leading to white-collar skills (Nyerere 1967).167 
A cornerstone of Nyerere’s philosophy was the idea of compulsory and free 
primary education. Following the abolition of school fees as provided by the 
Musoma Resolution of 1974, the intake in primary schools almost doubled; by 
1980, the gross enrolment rate stood at 98% (Galabawa 2001: 13). Galabawa, 
a Tanzanian professor affiliated with the University of Dar es Salaam, expressed 
the excitement about the government’s successful campaign at that time as 
follows: 
Both internal and external observers witnessed something akin to a miracle 
as enrolments in primary schools across the nation soared and the nation 
was gravitated in the frenzy to implement the call for education for all in a 
poor country committed to an equitable and fair provision of education to 
all the citizenry. (Galabawa 2001: 17)
Yet, the ‘miracle’ of having all children in school entailed some serious 
drawbacks. Absorbing masses of new students required not only additional 
facilities and learning materials (which were not available), but also teachers. 
Since expanding teacher training was not sufficient to meet the exploding 
demand, the government introduced “teaching in turns, distance training of 
teachers and using secondary school students to teach in primary schools” 
(Galabawa 1990:  13). Such alternative measures, however, led to a serious 
decline in educational quality as reflected in the cognitive capabilities of 
school leavers. By the end of the 1970s, there was a public outcry about the 
‘falling standards’ in the education system, with parents complaining about a 
“universalization of illiteracy” (Omari et al. 1983: 45). 
The overt discontent about the deteriorating quality in education coincided 
with “a period of stress for Tanzania on many fronts” (Samoff 1994:  134) 
exacerbated by the global economic crisis during the mid-1980s. Initially the 
government had financed programmes such as the UPE campaign mainly from 
its own resources. Now it was forced to turn to foreign donors to maintain the 
system; as Samoff (2003: 380) illustrates, this shift had significant implications 
for educational governance: 
167 The notion of life-long learning is not explicitly discussed in the ‘Education for Self-Reliance’ 
document, but prominently featured in later publications and speeches of Nyerere. In his New 
Year’s Eve Broadcast on 31 December 1969, he particularly emphasised the importance of adult 
education and learning throughout life, stating: “Education is not just something which happens in 
the classrooms. It is learning from others, and from our own experience of past successes or failures 
(…). To live is to learn; and to learn is to try to live better” (Nyerere 1973: 138–141). 
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As the director of planning in Tanzania explained, planning had in fact 
become marketing. His task was less a process of exploring needs and 
developing strategies to address them than an effort to study the market of 
prospective funders. He then identified its priorities and value points, using 
that market knowledge to craft, advertise, and sell projects and programs. 
That strategy was perhaps effective for coping in difficult circumstances. 
Nevertheless, it entrenched the role of the funding agencies in setting 
national education policies and priorities. It also reinforced the status and 
influence of a particular set of actors within the country, not those with 
the clearest or most dynamic education vision or those with the most solid 
national political base but rather those who proved to be most effective in 
securing foreign funding. 
When after a period of resistance (and Nyerere’s replacement by Ali Hassan 
Mwinyi as president) the government gave in and began to adopt structural 
adjustment policies as required by the IMF and the World Bank (see Hyden 
& Karlstrom 1993), it was pressured to reverse fundamental features of the 
education system. In 1993, an inter-ministerial committee was commissioned 
to develop a new Education and Training Policy which should serve as a 
framework for both government action and donor support.168 The final 
document released in 1995 clearly reflected the move from a socialist to a 
liberal vision of education geared to a market economy (Buchert 1997). 
The policy confirmed the re-introduction of school fees (promoted as ‘cost-
sharing mechanism’), encouraged private education providers to establish and 
manage learning institutions, and decentralised administration responsibility 
to the sub-national level (Ministry of Education and Culture 1995). The 
imprint of external agencies whose representatives provided comments and 
participated in discussions was manifest not only in the turn to privatisation 
and liberalisation, but also in the emphasis on issues such as gender equality 
and local autonomy which were key areas of donor support (Buchert 1997). 
Without any wider public discussion in the media or by parliament, the policy 
was approved by the Cabinet in February 1995. The respective amendment of 
the Education Act following in October finally provided the legal basis for a re-
168 Buchert (1997: 46–51) provides a detailed account of the different stages of policy formulation 
and actors involved therein, concluding that it remains an open question to what extent “certain 
areas were truly reflecting [government] thinking as compared to being imposed through agency 
pressure” (p. 51). According to her research based on interviews with stakeholders and observers, 
the document was perceived as a product of negotiation between technocrats in ministries and 
agency representatives; teachers, parents or students had not been invited to contribute their views 
to the debate. 
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structured education system which was now broadly in accordance with the 
ideas and principles prevailing in aid circles at that time. 
Reform initiatives from 1995 onwards: Invading experts and a plethora of plans 
The adjustment of Tanzania’s macro and education policies to the international 
agenda paved the way for immense donor engagement in the sector. Adding 
up the activities listed by Buchert (1997), at least 86 education projects were 
carried out by different agencies during the 1990s, with the information 
provided not being exhaustive. The fact that the various funders, including the 
World Bank, UNICEF, EU, Danida, Norad, Sida, GTZ, Irish Aid, France, CIDA, 
the Netherlands, and the UK, operated largely disconnected from each other 
became a serious concern on both government and donor side (Buchert 1999). 
Proposing a ‘sector-wide approach’ (SWAp) as a new, ‘harmonised’ mode of 
assistance, the aid community pushed for the development of a comprehensive 
‘Education Sector Development Programme’ (ESDP) which aimed to 
synchronise interventions and to pool resources for the implementation of 
the new Education and Training Policy. Yet, this was seen as an ambitious 
undertaking which – from the donors’ point of view – was not doable by the 
ministry on its own. An education advisor working for Canada, herself being 
Tanzanian, expressed the sentiment in aid offices at that time as follows: 
You see, there were new concepts coming around with the development. But 
then your counterparts are not talking that language. The challenge we 
also had was how much of the preparatory work should be done and who 
should do it? Even doing the needs assessment, doing the initial situation 
analysis to find out where we start, where we go? We ended up bringing a 
lot of TA [technical assistance] input – a lot. At a moment, that was a year 
we counted, I think almost between 25 to 30 different TAs were coming to 
do different things from different donors (…), and the ministry was like 
invaded, literally. And some donors even felt we should have offices in the 
ministry to make it feel that we are working with the government, for the 
government. So you go along the corridors of the government ministry, and 
you are seeing this mzungu and that one and this one. (Interview 31)169
The fact that these ‘mzungus’ came not only with expertise but interests of 
their organisations was obvious; a Tanzanian consultant who had worked for 
the World Bank commented in this regard: 
169 Mzungu is a Swahili term which is commonly used in East Africa for talking about or calling white 
people; literally translated it means ‘someone who wanders without purpose/someone constantly 
on the move’. 
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It was not an easy one. I saw all of that game coming up, you know, every 
donor will see what they are doing is more important [and] how to push 
that onto the agenda. (Interview 32) 
Many priorities outlined in the final draft published in 2001 obviously match 
what were key issues of donor concern and investment (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2001:  14). The focus on strengthening management capacity and 
introducing a computerised Education and Training Management Information 
System, for instance, reflected the technocratic-managerial approach to 
education championed by external consultants. Some paragraphs virtually 
read as if copied from donor documents; the following extract, for instance, 
more or less echoes the World Bank’s human capital view on education as 
reflected in various publications of that time (see, for instance, World Bank 
1988, 1995, 1999a):
The ultimate goal of any education and training system is to provide 
relevant and high quality education and training services to a broad range 
of clients in the most equitable, effective and efficient ways. This entails 
building the management capacity at all levels in the education sector. 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2001: 20)170
The terminology used here indicates a stark conceptual shift: as opposed to 
the previous notion of education as a public responsibility with the aim to 
transmit “the accumulated wisdom and knowledge of the society” to the 
younger generation (Nyerere 1967:  1), education was now regarded as a 
‘service’ provided to ‘clients’ that was to be managed ‘in the most equitable, 
effective and efficient’ manner. It is questionable whether this kind of wording 
was a deliberate choice of ministry officials or – what seems more likely – of 
technical assistants writing the draft. 
The language used in such strategic documents is significant insofar as it 
structures and constrains the policy discourse; it conveys particular conceptions, 
directions and policy preferences (Samoff 1992:  67). In this case, the new 
emphasis on ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’171 implied the need to prioritise 
basic (understood as primary) education on the grounds that it had the highest 
‘rate of return’ – an argument which had been pushed particularly by World 
170 Nyerere, in contrast, had formulated the goal of a nation’s education and training system as 
follows: “That purpose is to transmit from one generation to the next the accumulated wisdom and 
knowledge of the society, and to prepare young people for their future membership of the society 
and their active participation in its maintenance or development” (Nyerere 1967: 1). 
171 For an early conceptualisation of ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ in education which was published 
by the World Bank, see Lockheed and Hanushek (1994). 
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Bank economists (see, for instance, Psacharopoulos 1994; World Bank 1995) 
who deemed higher education with its high unit costs “a fiscal nightmare” 
(Youssef 2005: 20) in developing countries.172 
Consequently, the first sub-sectoral plan developed as a sequel to the 
‘Education Sector Development Programme’ addressed primary education. 
The so-called ‘Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP)’ (2002–2006) 
outlined four major goals, namely expanding enrolment, improving the 
quality of teaching and learning processes, building capacity and strengthening 
institutional arrangements for better educational planning and service delivery 
(Basic Education Development Committee 2001). While in the foreword, the 
involvement of “a variety of stakeholder groups” (Basic Education Development 
Committee 2001) in the formulation of the document was emphasised, it was 
regarded as mainly made by donors, first and foremost the World Bank which 
“allegedly [used] its Mozambique strategy as a template” (Holtom 2002: 24). It 
was also the Bank which was the largest external financier of PEDP, providing 
a grant of USD 150 million to be released over a period of three years; other 
donors (including the Netherlands, Canada, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, France, 
Norway, Ireland and the EU) pooled their resources and contributed around 
the same amount (USD 154 million) through a joint basket fund (World Bank 
2005b: 4). Even though the latter was set up to support government priorities 
as outlined in PEDP, conflictual discussions on what the money should be 
spent emerged. A Tanzanian education specialist working for the Canadians 
remarked: 
This issue of prioritisation then came up to be quite an issue. What is 
it that we want, and what is it that the government really wants? The  
biggest issue, for example, at that time – 2000 to 2005/6 – there was 
this huge enrolment taking place, all over the country (…). So the main 
challenge for the government was having classrooms’ constructed. As 
donors we stood there and we said, ‘We are not supporting construction 
work. We would like to see more inputs, but not buildings. So put your 
money into capital assets. Put your money in buildings, we’ll come in 
with inputs.’ So that’s a clear case where the government’s cry was on 
more construction (…), where if the government was left on its own – and 
172 An important point here is that ‘basic education’ for most donors meant primary (and lower 
secondary) education whereas for the Tanzanian government, the term included pre-primary, 
primary, adult, secondary, and teacher education. This divergence in definition led to tension, as an 
education advisor working for the Canadian embassy reported: “So there is already that conceptual 
issue: You have to argue between Canada and Tanzania: ‘When we support you, this is what we 
mean’. So the issue becomes then: Who is the interlocutor there? And how do you interpret that?” 
(Interview 31)
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knowing my government counterparts – maybe that is what they would 
have first done, put those structures in place. (Interview 31) 
The decisive role of donors in determining the content of PEDP and the 
tight earmarking of resources in the basket dampened enthusiasm about the 
programme on the part of ministry officials. Observers of the process saw 
the insufficient internalisation – or to use the buzzword ‘ownership’ – of the 
programme by government bodies as a predictable consequence of external 
interference. Holtom (2002: 25) cites an aid representative (!) acknowledging: 
PEDP was formulated mainly by donors and according to the donor 
programme, and donors have allocated their resources. So how can the 
Ministry of Education be involved in the process with ‘their’ ownership? 
Actually they cannot! And of course they cannot deny [accepting] aid from 
donors because, yeah, something is better than nothing.
Amongst ministry officials the sentiment that the education agenda had been 
‘hijacked’173 by the donor community (particularly the World Bank) slowly but 
surely solidified. 
A case in point which fuelled this perception was the abolishment of school 
fees which surprised Tanzanian officials, academics and civil society alike. As 
indicated earlier, the government had re-introduced school fees at the end of 
the 1980s as a condition of structural adjustment loans (Samoff 1994), with 
the result that enrolment rates dropped immediately (Mbilinyi 2003). Against 
internal critique, this decision was confirmed in the Education and Training 
Policy of 1995, with the education ministry allegedly anticipating that donors 
still advocated for cost-sharing mechanisms (Jerve 2006). Five years later, 
however, the World Bank suddenly signalled a reversal of its stance: in a late stage 
of preparing Tanzania’s first poverty reduction strategy, the country director 
“announced to the President directly that the Bank had changed its position 
on user fees in primary education and was prepared to finance the shortfall 
in revenue” (Jerve 2006: 14). To the surprise of even high-level officials, the 
final draft of the strategy entailed the proclamation that “in a reversal of past 
policies, it is intended to abolish primary school fees, starting in FY 2001/2002” 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2000: 19). That this about-turn had not at all 
been discussed internally is reflected by the fact that after the release of the 
document the permanent secretary of the education ministry publicly deemed 
the passage a mistake (Jerve 2006). While civil society organisations welcomed 
173 Both ministry officials and observers from NGO and academia are quoted using this notion in the 
context of the ESDP and PEDP processes; see Buchert (1997: 54) or Holtom (2002: 22). 
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this shift, leading academics who had advised against a blanket removal were 
shocked (Jerve 2006). Nonetheless, the commitment was confirmed in PEDP 
which followed shortly after (Basic Education Development Committee 2001). 
The external influence on key issues in PEDP is particularly remarkable 
considering that the adoption of a sector-wide approach as introduced by the 
Education and Training Sector Development Programme and the establishment 
of a basket fund were actually meant to strengthen national leadership and 
foster “a new kind of partnership” (Basic Education Development Committee 
2001:  21) based on consultation as opposed to conditionality. Therefore, a 
sophisticated ‘dialogue’ structure was put in place, ranging from technical 
working groups to sub-sectoral development committees to a high-level 
steering committee for education (see United Republic of Tanzania 2001: 70). 
Donors were ‘invited’ to participate at various levels in order to share 
information and provide policy advice. The cooperation should culminate in a 
joint annual review process of the education sector to evaluate the success of 
specific programmes and plans. The creation of these institutions as an attempt 
to align activities under the guidance of government was highly commended 
by stakeholders and observers; with similar mechanisms installed in other 
sectors (e.g. health), Tanzania was considered a forerunner in realising the 
new ‘partnership’ principles formalised by the 2005 Paris Declaration a few 
years later. 
Since then, aid experts as members of the dialogue have routinely been 
involved in the development of various policies and programmes brought 
forth during a decade of reform, including two sequels of PEDP, equivalents in 
other subsectors and a revised version of the comprehensive Education Sector 
Development Programme.174 Yet, there are strong indications that this ‘new 
kind of partnership’ has not grown as planned.
The return of the quality crisis: Frustration and frictions 
By 2013, both government and donor officials conceded that while the 
institutions of the dialogue formally continued to exist, they were de facto 
174 The list of pivotal programmes developed since 2001 includes (in chronological order of publication 
year): Primary Education Development Programme for 2002–2006 (Ministry of Education and 
Vocational Training 2008), Secondary Education Development Plan 2004–2009 (Ministry of 
Education and Culture 2004); Primary Education Development Programme II 2007–2011 (Basic 
Education Development Committee 2006); Education Sector Development Programme 2008–2017 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2008a); Higher Education Development Programme 2010–2015 
(Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 2010a); Secondary Education Development 
Programme II 2010–2015 (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 2010b); Primary 
Education Development Programme III 2012–2016 (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 
2012b). 
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‘barely functioning’ (Interview 30). A Tanzanian education specialist working 
for Canada commented in this regard: 
The membership or representation in those working groups is very, very 
erratic, if I may use that word. And I think to some extent the government 
is using it to its advantage. When they feel they need something to get 
that support, they will champion an issue, make sure it goes to the right 
channel, it’s discussed and off it moves. If they are not really with you, (…) 
they may just decide, ‘No, I’m not attending. I’m delegating my third level 
down to chair the meeting.’ So there you are just talking. (Interview 31) 
In a similar vein, the education team leader in the Canadian Embassy remarked: 
We find it very frustrating, because we try to follow these structures, but 
it’s clear the government finds it very frustrating also. So it’s not really 
working. (…) I think from their side, they really feel it’s a donor imposed 
structure. And we feel like this is their structure that they created – so it is 
sort of both sides pointing fingers. (Interview 30) 
Given the high level of frustration on both sides, relationships between the 
government and donors were palpably strained. The worsening condition of 
primary education became the issue which exacerbated the frictions and sparked 
off serious dispute. The government had been praised for its ‘outstanding 
achievements’ made through its first Primary Education Development 
Programme for 2002–2006 (see Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 
2008), but the evaluation of the second phase covering the years 2007–2011 
produced rather disappointing ‘results’: pass rates for primary school leaving 
examination significantly declined from 70.5% in 2006 to 53.5% by 2010 
which together with a constantly high number of drop-outs levelled down 
the transition rate to secondary education from 67.5% in 2006 to 52.5% in 
2011 (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 2012a:  90–95).175 The 
poor performance was to a large part ascribed to the unfavourable learning 
environment found in many schools where teachers and pupils were squeezed 
into over-crowded classrooms with few desks, books and learning materials, 
housed in buildings which often lacked even basic infrastructure such as toilets 
and clean water (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 2012a). The 
massive enrolment expansion which had previously been celebrated as a 
175 The failure of learning was further documented by a study carried out by Uwezo, an education 
NGO which found out that many children in their last year of primary school were not able to read 
simple passages in Kiswahili or English or do basic arithmetic (Uwezo 2013).
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success now turned out to negatively affect educational quality as reflected in 
plummeting literacy rates at both primary and secondary levels.176
The education crisis became a major issue in both public debate and donor–
government relations. Media reports focused on the failure of learning and 
the resulting implications for the future of Tanzania’s school children (see, 
for instance, Nkosi 2012; Kaijage 2013; Mgaya 2013; Tambwe 2013), whereas 
donor–government discussions rather turned on ‘missed targets’, as the 
following narrative of the DFID advisor reflects: 
The evaluation which is commissioned by government overall is quite 
negative and pointed out that a lot of the resources weren’t released by 
government, some particular things like the amount of school grants 
that were rewarded on a population, or school enrolment ratios which 
weren’t delivered in full – it’s been very large. They have missed many of 
the targets by (a) very large amount, particularly inputs around building 
buildings, deploying teachers, providing books … The government systems 
to decentralizing things haven’t worked particularly well. (Interview 35) 
According to the DFID officer, the fact that the government had not nearly 
‘delivered’ what has been expected created “a sort of difficult dynamic” 
(Interview 35) with respect to future aid. Major donors considered reducing 
budget and sector support through which PEDP II had mainly been financed, 
arguing that these modalities had failed to show results. The education team 
leader of the Canadian Embassy stated in this regard: 
For the education side, we are looking at options. I don’t know whether 
we will carry on with sector budget support, we might, we might not. This 
is exactly the discussions we are having right now in our team because 
there’s pros and cons. I mean we are getting a lot of pressure – all donors, I 
think, are getting a lot of pressure to demonstrate results. (Interview 30) 
Similarly, the first secretary responsible for education in the Swedish Embassy 
reported: 
At present, we really don’t know when it comes to General Budget 
Support and so on, I think, that is clearly questioned by our Minister 
for Development Cooperation (…). So she has clearly stated we are not 
going to continue with GBS. This is not the government’s official stand 
176 According to Wedgwood (2006: 4), observers with a morbid sense of humour allegedly jest that the 
abbreviation of Universal Primary Education ‘UPE’ in Tanzania stands for Ualimu Pasipo Elimu in 
Swahili, meaning ‘teaching without education’.  
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at present – they are discussing this. That’s why we had to prolong the 
present strategy. So there’s an on-going discussion. We are trying to find a 
way within – not only focussing on General Budget Support but having a 
mix of modalities. (Interview 40)
DFID had already decided to significantly reduce its contribution to budget 
support on the grounds that its 2010 country programme evaluation “suggested 
that GBS was not the most effective way to deliver results in the current 
circumstances” (DFID Tanzania 2011: 3); in DFID’s view, the ‘unsatisfactory 
performance’ of PEDP II corroborated this evaluation. 
The donors’ turn-around was not only based on the negative assessment 
report but followed a general trend reversal regarding aid modalities (see 
Chapter 5). They used the education crisis to legitimate the pulling out from 
joint funding mechanisms. This is remarkable insofar as the decline in quality 
was in a way a predictable implication of mass enrolment, as a DFID advisor 
acknowledged: 
You could argue that perhaps it was never feasible to have such a major 
expansion against the MDG goals which are very much focused on gender 
equity and universal access (…). If you tried this in any country in the 
world, you wouldn’t expect it to have anything like the same level of pass 
rates measured by a standard pass mark because you’re putting huge 
pressure on the system to deliver the schools, the teachers, the learning 
resources needed. But also you’re promoting up into the system children 
who come from very poor, underprivileged, remote, rural backgrounds, 
children entering primary schools who are much more likely to have 
illiterate parents themselves coming from very poor backgrounds. All of the 
things which are the best predictors of how well children do, how educated 
your parents are, how much opportunity you’ve got from other resources 
to help you learn. So clearly there are many more children who are coming 
in very disadvantaged, so the system is struggling to cope. So given that 
background, the government very reasonably can say, ‘Well, what did you 
expect when you encouraged us to expand this way’. (Interview 35) 
Hence, although enrolment expansion had significantly been pushed by the 
aid community in order to achieve Universal Primary Education by 2015 (the 
second Millennium Development Goal), it was now the government which 
was held responsible for coping with the consequences and regarded as not 
taking sufficient action to improve the situation. Tanzanian policy-makers, on 
the other hand, felt unduly blamed, and perceived the announced reduction 
of budget support as a breach of agreement and sign of distrust; from their 
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perspective, donors and their unreliable disbursements were at least partly at 
fault for the failure of reaching certain goals, as a high-level official in PMO-
RALG remarked: 
Three months you can continue discussing, you know, what and why the 
government is not up to its promises. But in actual fact, it is both. The 
government depends on collection (…). Tax payers, fine, that’s one resource. 
The donors are another source – borrowing. Now, if the donor funds are 
not forthcoming and it was included in the budget, then that’s the reason 
why we cannot get the amount of money this time. (Interview 60) 
In the course of tedious discussions over indicators, ratings (as essential 
‘triggers’ for the release of aid money) and the reasons why targets were not 
met, donor–government relationships increasingly soured.177 The friction 
between the two parties culminated when the education ministry in August 
2012 distributed its PEDP III draft for comments – and received abrasive 
criticism from the ‘Education Development Partners Group’ (ED-DPG) which 
assessed the document as ‘quite weak’ (Interview 30), recommending 
that significant changes need to be made (…) to ensure that it becomes 
a credible plan – attractive for both internal and external financing and 
an implementable plan that will deliver the human capital needed to 
put Tanzania on the right track to development. (cited in Education 
Development Partners Group in Tanzania 2013: 19)
Amongst others, donors criticised the – in their view – unconvincing costing 
scenarios, deficient sector analysis and strategic orientation. Referring to the 
latter, the education team leader of the Canadian Embassy who acted as chair 
of ED-DPG in the interview commented: 
It was a grouping of activities without a strategic orientation with a clear 
flow of: ‘These are our objectives, and this is how we are going to do it’. It 
was just sort of a piecemeal document of well, we do much of these activities 
and we will do some of this, we do some of this. It didn’t really have any 
coherence to it and it didn’t seem to have any connections between obviously 
whatever is coming out of – when students leave primary, they should 
177 Given the numerous meetings dealing with rating frameworks and the like to ‘measure’ progress 
in education, Languille (2013) remarks that the “processes of performance quantification (…) 
contribute to crowd out the policy space of government staff: target setting and endless discussions 
over numbers are so time-consuming that no time is left to deliberate, in substance, upon the 
quality challenge and the policies to address it”.
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be prepared to go to secondary school, and there should be appropriate 
numbers who are passing to fill the places in the secondary and none of 
that had been considered. So there were some weaknesses in that way, and 
there was no monitoring framework at all which we felt was a major gap. 
(Interview 30) 
When donor representatives put forward their fundamental ‘concerns’ 
regarding the draft to the government, ministry officials made no pretence 
of their irritation which was a rather unusual reaction. Canada’s education 
team leader attributed the blunt annoyance of his counterparts to a lack of 
receptiveness for critical feedback: 
They were seeking editorial comments, I think. They said, ‘Look, this is 
our plan’. But they were going through the formality of consulting, ‘Let’s 
consult the donors because we have to’, but I’m not sure they were really 
interested in serious consultations – which is why when we came back 
with major revisions, they were kind of upset. (Interview 30) 
A second version circulated by the MoEVT by mid-October responded to some 
of the issues raised but still did not please the aid community. Given the – from 
their perspective – need for substantial changes, donors suggested resorting to 
experts to help rework and finalise the document: 
We had said, ‘Look, we think this isn’t just something for comments, it 
really needs to be worked on a lot more.’ And so we said, ‘We are happy 
to help you with that, we can provide our experts to do that.’ We can 
hire experts to do that, but in this case because of timing, we just said we 
all have experts here. And so the government thought that was a good 
idea and they invited a couple of us to provide technical expertise and 
to sit down in a room with their technical experts and they rewrote the 
document over a few days. They went off to another city and they just got 
it done. (Interview 30) 
To what extent the government, in fact, judged the use of external assistance 
a ‘good idea’ remains an open question; one can find at least indications that 
there were certain issues at stake which led the government to accept the 
suggestion, such as its application to the ‘Global Partnership for Education’. 
Eventually, a small group of ministry officials, civil society representatives 
and educational specialists provided by CIDA and UNICEF spent six days in 
Morogoro, a town around 200km west of Dar es Salaam, in order to rework the 
PEDP III document. As stated in the Minutes of the Education Development 
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Partners Group Meeting of 17th October 2012, the draft was “significantly 
revised” (ED-DPG 2012) in the course of the retreat exercise. Most notably, 
it now entailed a comprehensive costing and budgeting framework, as well 
as a logframe matrix including quantified targets – as, for instance, to raise 
the percentage of a cohort completing Standard VII (the last year of primary 
school) from 54.8% in 2012 to 72.8% by 2016 (Ministry of Education and 
Vocational Training 2012b: 48). 
Interestingly, it also contained a passage insinuating that the government 
had given up the insistence on budget support for education; after reference 
to the Joint Assistance Strategy of 2006 which clearly emphasised GBS as the 
preferred aid modality, the text declares:  
The Government has been encouraging Development Partners to channel 
their development assistance through General Budget Support (GBS) rather 
than basket funds and direct project support. However, the Government 
will continue to be flexible to accommodate assistance from Development 
Partners who have decided not to use the GBS funding modality but who 
are interested to support education interventions. (Ministry of Education 
and Vocational Training 2012b)
It is questionable whether this concession of individual interventions derived 
from a changed government position or – what appears more likely – from 
donors’ return to projects through which they are more easily able to trace 
their investments and put their flag on results. 
The conditionality of consultation and the centrality of aid in policy-making
The PEDP III process reveals pervasive patterns which in their interplay severely 
affect educational governance in Tanzania. One pertains to the conditionality 
of donor consultation and the effects on the nature of interaction; another to 
the (perceived) dependency on aid money and the resulting implications for 
agenda-setting in education. 
As to the former, the education team leader in the Canadian Embassy, 
reporting on the great deal of annoyance caused by the donors’ feedback on the 
PEDP III draft, assumed that the harsh reaction of government officials derived 
from the fact that they ‘were going through the formality of consulting’ without 
actually seeking advice, but with the stance ‘let’s consult donors because we 
have to’ (Interview 30). This perception is supported by various narratives of 
government officials. Asked to assess the usefulness of regular meetings with 
donors, the primary education director in the MoEVT responded: 
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You know, sometimes it may not be useful – but they’re the funders. 
They’re the ones who support you, so you have to go into negotiation. 
(Interview 49) 
In fact, the ‘dialogue’ in the education sector (and similarly in other policy 
fields) has been constructed as a requirement of budget support modalities 
(i.e. GBS and basket funding for education). Clearly, the point of departure 
for the institutionalised interaction between donors and the government is 
the financial need of the latter. Hence, while the ‘dialogue’ is formally framed 
as “an open space for discussions, challenges and agreements on technical 
and policy issues” (United Republic of Tanzania 2012b:  1), it is inherently 
based on a dependency relationship structured by financial power. From a 
government perspective, policy discussions are primarily held to comply with 
funding requirements and not because there is a genuine request for advice. 
The ‘process conditionality’ (Gould & Ojanen 2005: 25) of donor consultation 
renders actual demand for advice irrelevant. Against this background, it is not 
surprising that ministry officials – as in the case of the PEDP III draft – were not 
receptive to and were displeased about critical feedback. 
The obligatory interaction with external experts forced upon the 
government due to financial needs has resulted in a rejection of additional 
technical assistance offered by donors. Referring to her ministry counterparts, 
a Tanzanian advisor working for Canada reported:   
Consequently they have been refusing, at least in our sector education, 
when you touch issues of – ok, we don’t have money to do X, Y and Z, 
but what you people need may be just somebody to take you through, so 
that you know how to plan better, how to implement better. How about us 
providing that resource, not in money, but we are bringing [someone] to 
sit with you to do X, Y and Z? They are not very willing. (Interview 31) 
Since deliberation with donors has become an inevitable feature of educational 
governance, the reflexive refusal of technical assistance can be interpreted as 
an attempt to secure a last resort of autonomy on the part of policy-makers 
whose discretionary power is markedly constrained. Ministry officials have 
become used to bargain convictions against money, as a statement from the 
director of Primary Education reflects: 
Sometimes you have to lose what your belief is. And the other side also has 
to lose some of the elements … And you come to a place where you win a 
little bit of it and the other side wins a little bit of it as well. (Interview 49) 
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The understanding that the feasibility of policies and plans depends on the 
approval of donors is widely internalised among leadership ranks and civil 
servants in the education ministry. Many consider the government’s scope 
of action as determined by the consensus and agendas of external funders 
who eventually hold the ‘whip hand’, as a high-ranking official in PMO-RALG 
pointed out:
You cannot implement unless you agree, and you have agreed this 
dialogue should be consultative, respecting one another, you need to listen 
to a colleague, you see. So there are times when these strategies and the 
policy get stuck to stand still because you have not agreed with the experts 
from the embassies, from the donor cooperation agencies. (Interview 60) 
Similarly, a senior official in the higher education department explained:  
There’s finance from someone who says, ‘Yes, if you do this, I’m willing to 
convince someone somewhere to release that sum, so that you can do this’. 
But that ‘this’, what is it? Is it the real that you want? (…) But what you 
want to address, you have no funding for it. (Interview 48)
Asked to give a concrete example, the interviewee pointed to the ministry’s 
first Higher Education Development Programme (HEDP) approved in 2010 and 
covering the years 2010–2015. As the outcome of almost a decade of research, 
consultation and retreats, the document presented a detailed list of activities 
proposed to enhance access and quality in higher education, focusing on 
institutional reforms, service delivery and sustainability mechanisms (Ministry 
of Education and Vocational Training 2010a). Despite being commended 
for its clarity and thorough analysis (see Education Development Partners 
Group in Tanzania 2013), HEDP has not yet received much attention from 
the aid community. As the following statement reflects, the lack of support 
for implementing the suggested interventions caused much frustration among 
officials in the higher education department: 
It is just in our shelves now. When it started, there was the idea that 
someone would fund that – none came up to now (…). But you have spent 
the department’s budget for almost two years or so on that. Nobody came 
up and said yeah, I’m willing to even pick a portion in that, nobody is 
there. Of recent, we have been advised to go through it and – I don’t know 
how to put it, but to make different portions, so that you can sell each 
portion separately (…). But even doing that, again we had to dig into the 
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department’s budget to prepare that, in hope that someone would come up 
to support that one. (Interview 48)
The terms used here are telling: The government had to ‘portion’ its programme 
in order to make it ‘sellable’ to external financiers. The fact that aid providers 
showed little interest to buy-in is used as an explanation why HEDP was put 
‘on the shelves’. In this case as in many others, officials experienced themselves 
as being at the mercy of the donors. 
The dependency on external funding proved to be the predominant point 
of reference across interviews with education policy-makers. The centrality of 
the theme as the decisive condition structuring relationships and its use as a 
legitimating pattern for action/inaction is striking. Although education is de 
facto less dependent on foreign funding than other sectors (see Chapter 6), aid 
money constitutes the prime concern of all actors in the field and the linchpin 
of debate, as a Tanzanian education specialist emphasised: 
So the resource issue becomes the driving – it’s like you talk around the 
needs, you talk around, yes, a little bit on the priorities, but how much on 
those priorities. (Interview 31)
The claim that aid money and resource flows have indeed become the prime 
subjects of discourse is supported by various narratives and documents related 
to the PEDP III process presented earlier; to iterate just two extracts for 
illustration: 
Now if the donor funds are not forthcoming and it was included in the 
budget, then that’s the reason why we cannot get the amount of money this 
time. (PMO-RALG official, interview 60) 
Significant changes need to be made (…) to ensure that it becomes a credible 
plan – attractive for both internal and external financing. (DPs cited in 
Education Development Partners Group in Tanzania 2013: 19)
The fact that ‘development partners’ called for significant changes of the PEDP 
III draft on the grounds that it should be made ‘credible’ and ‘attractive’ for local 
and foreign financiers points to the central role of aid as a frame of reference in 
the education sector. In this particular case, PEDP III was considered important 
not only for donor decisions on future budget support for education, but also 
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for prospective funding held out by the ‘Global Partnership for Education’,178 
a multi-lateral financing body which signalled it would allocate about USD 
100 million if Tanzania applied; a successful application, however, required 
the endorsement of educational plans by ‘development partners’. In their 
view, the first PEDP III versions were ‘not good enough’ to be approved, as a 
representative of the Canadian Embassy reported: 
We said, ‘If you submit this, they are not going to accept it.’ And we were 
quite confident that it wasn’t good enough. (Interview 30) 
Because of the ascribed and perceived centrality of external funding for 
educational governance, the assessment of policies and programmes against 
donor standards and agendas has become a common pattern. If need be – 
as obviously in the case of PEDP III – the government very pragmatically 
adjusts strategic documents or reports to make them ‘fit’ by including formal 
elements (e.g. tabular logframes) or the ‘right’ catch-words that match the 
aid community’s current concepts. Often, the reframing is not even done by 
ministry officials but by technical assistants familiar with the terminology and 
formats required.179 Gratifying funders in order to ensure that ‘money flows’ 
seems to have become a priority of policy-makers. Canada’s education team 
leader commented in this regard: 
When there’s a cheque on the horizon, again GPE is a good example, 
it’s 100 million dollars, that caught their attention. (…) And then I do 
think they sort of figure out, ‘Okay, what do we need to do to satisfy the 
donors so that we can get the money?’ Yeah, I think that’s a big part. 
(Interview 30) 
The ‘charade’ of ownership in educational policy-making
The significance of donor agendas as a point of orientation, the focus on 
compliance with aid organisations’ requirements and the intense involvement 
of external experts in formulating decisive documents infer that educational 
178 The ‘Global Partnership for Education’ (formerly known as the Education for All Fast Track 
Initiative) is a multilateral financing mechanism providing grants to low-income countries aiming 
at accelerating the achievement of free, universal primary education. Its budget is made up of 
contributions from European and North American donor countries which are represented on the 
governance boards. The GPE secretariat is based in Washington. 
179 Referring to the formulation of annual sector reports, an advisor in the Canadian Embassy 
explained: “Even though we say we read and we provide input, it is not quite just an issue of 
reading and providing input. Sometimes you are actually writing the sentences” (Interview 31).
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policy-making in Tanzania has been externalised. This claim is supported 
by the first secretary for education in the Swedish Embassy who critically 
acknowledged: 
We have all these very good policies and programmes and on paper, but it’s 
not owned. It’s very much from the outside. (Interview 40) 
Donors have become involved in policy-making to such an extent that it 
has become difficult to trace where priorities originate. After decades of 
interference, they find themselves in a situation where they are trying to guess 
whether there is a genuine government agenda and if so, what it looks like. 
An advisor working for the Canadian Embassy – herself being a Tanzanian – 
remarked:  
My biggest challenge over the years has always been: What is the government 
thinking, when they sit on the other side and we are on this other side? 
They know their need; they know their priorities as a government. And 
that’s why even right now, as we are talking, they are busy finalising their 
national budget speech for the year, so they will definitely have to go look 
backwards and forward. So they are planning! They have issued the Five 
Year Plans, now they are talking of a long-term plan, those things are on 
the table (…). The question is still, is that what the recipient government 
would wish to see happen? (Interview 31)
In view of the well-entrenched involvement of donors over more than 20 
years, it is hard for many to imagine what educational governance in Tanzania 
would look like if the government was in a position to decide and operate 
independently from external interference. The first secretary of education in 
the Swedish Embassy commented:  
I’ve stated … at least ten times in the dialogue from last year, ‘What 
would happen if we suggested that we took time out and just supported the 
Tanzanian government to come up with a curriculum with a starting point 
from the Tanzanian context on the African continent. How would it look 
like? Would the subjects be the same? Would the content be the same?’ And 
I’ve raised this question a couple of times. And then the government people 
say, ‘Well, that’s an interesting idea’, but they know that the charade must 
go on. (Interview 40) 
The ‘charade’ going on in the education sector is outlined by a civil society 
leader who, similarly to the Swedish official, used the notion of an ‘act’ being 
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played. The main protagonists are a “weak, distracted government not clear 
on what it wants” and donors who “start filling the gaps and trying to make 
things happen, because of the absence of strong clear government leadership” 
(Interview 70):
When that is not there in our government, the donors start stepping in. But 
we have to all pretend that government is in charge, in the ‘driving seat’. 
So you live this kind of double life of officially everything has government 
stamps and leadership and so on, but in reality, the people pushing things 
are the donors. (Interview 70)      
The fact that donors collectively and individually start “creating what they 
want to see in Tanzania” (Interview 40) can be observed in various processes. 
Two examples, the push for re-entry of girls in schools and ICT in primary 
education, are briefly sketched. 
“There are different, mixed feelings”: The issue of pregnant girls in schools
By 2012, the large number of girls who dropped out of school due to pregnancy 
had come up as a serious matter of concern in Tanzania (IRIN News 2007b). 
According to media reports citing ministry statistics, 5 157 girls had to leave 
primary school in 2011 due to pregnancy even though no law explicitly 
prescribed the expulsion of students for that reason (Assey 2012; Robi 2012).
Donors strongly pushed the government to include a clear policy statement 
on the re-entry of teenage mothers into a revised Education and Training Policy, 
emphasising Tanzania’s international commitments regarding gender equality 
and the right to education for all children. According to aid and government 
officials alike, the issue became a controversial point of discussion which was 
repeatedly put ‘in and out’ during the drafting process. An assistant director 
in the MoEVT Department of Policy and Planning delineated the sensitivity of 
the topic as follows: 
The DPs are of the idea that the right should be given. But then … 
education stakeholders are many and they are different from cultural 
thinking. They think maybe from our culture it is not right if you do this. 
There are religious groups, they have different ideas, they say, ‘No, once a 
girl has been pregnant to us, it’s a sin’ and so and so. There are different, 
mixed feelings. (Interview 50) 
Similarly, the director of Primary Education argued: 
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Me, I think that the entry programme is a good programme if you want 
to have every child in school. But the question is on how to implement 
that. Because education is cultural-based. And we have our culture. Our 
communities in Mtwara and Lindi have their cultures. And so I think we 
have to merge these two things. We want children to go to school but without 
compromising the culture of the children, the culture of the community 
of that particular, specific community. But also I think we should not do 
something that tomorrow will turn against us – that will speed up the rate 
of pregnancy, rather than stopping or rather than curbing the problem. 
And so I think those factors have caused this programme to delay. Because 
you take the idea to the parliament and find a lot of comments come in. 
(Interview 49) 
In fact, members of parliament seemed to be divided over the issue, with 
some arguing for alternative training of teenage mothers instead of bringing 
them back to the formal system. A commission formed to examine the matter 
reported that many teachers opposed the idea of allowing re-entry of girls with 
children (Tanzania Daily News 2012). 
The government found itself caught between these positions. Perceiving 
resentment on the part of educational stakeholders, communities and religious 
leaders, the minister clearly signalled to donors that Tanzania was “not ready 
for this yet” (Interview 40). However, aid representatives continued to exert 
pressure, as a high-ranking official in PMO-RALG reported: 
They say: ‘You know you are late, you signed the human rights convention, 
you know, the rights of the child, a child must get this [education].’ But 
you see: Good, we like it. But don’t we need preparations for that? But 
some of these want it immediately. That’s where we have a problem. 
(Interview 60) 
Clearly, educational decision-makers are aware of international obligations 
and of the necessity to deal with school dropouts, but they considered the 
implementation of a re-entry policy unfeasible, expecting little acceptance 
on the part of their constituency. According to ministry officials, the on-
going disagreement on the subject led to the ‘unsmooth running’ of donor–
government meetings due to ‘some sort of resistance’ among MoEVT 
representatives. During this research, the issue remained unresolved, and the 
Education and Training Policy continued to be revised. Commenting on the 
state of affairs, the PMO-RALG leader stated: 
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The ministry was forced to change that policy, but it’s still in the draft. At 
least three years have elapsed without that policy being out. (Interview 60) 
Waiting for computers: USAID’s ‘Tanzania 21st Century Basic Education 
Programme’
Another process which resulted in deadlock was USAID’s ‘Tanzania 21st 
Century Basic Education Programme’, commonly known as ‘TZ21’. Running 
from 2011 to 2015 with an overall budget of USD 94 million, the project’s 
stated goal was to integrate information and communication technology (ICT) 
into primary education in order to enhance children’s learning achievements 
(Embassy of the United States Dar es Salaam 2012). Similar to an equivalent 
project set up in Kenya, schools in two pilot areas – Mtwara and Zanzibar – 
are to be equipped with computers, learning and management software, 
with teachers and administrators getting trained in how to use the new 
technology.180 Thereby, the project was closely aligned to USAID’s new global 
education strategy which explicitly encouraged the use of ICT for achieving 
the goal of “improved reading skills for 100 million children in primary grades 
by 2015” (USAID 2009: 21).
When we met the USAID education team leader in his office on the US 
Embassy compound in May 2012, he was excited about the recent launch of the 
initiative on Zanzibar and the upcoming inauguration in the Mtwara region, 
stating that all partners were ‘jazzed up’ about the ‘fantastic opportunity’ to 
try out the ‘totally experimental’ approach: “There’s the feeling ‘let’s do it, let’s 
get started!’” (Interview 42).
The partners he referred to comprised a whole range of stakeholders: 
Creative Associates International, a US-based development firm which was 
contracted as implementing agent; Microsoft, Cisco and Intel, as well as two 
Tanzanian companies – UhuruOne and Zantel – which had been selected 
as technology supply companies; regional government authorities; and the 
national education ministries of Zanzibar and Tanzania Mainland.181 With the 
180 Initiated in 2009, the “Accelerating 21st Century Education” project in Kenya focused on providing 
PCs for classrooms, wireless internet connectivity, digital content, and ICT skills training for teachers 
(Microsoft News Center 2009; Kenya Ministry of Education 2012). In Tanzania, USAID chose 
Mtwara region due to its ‘growing population, gas and oil’, and Zanzibar due to the new US focus 
on investing in ‘Islamic communities’ as a strategy to prevent terrorism (Interview 42). According 
to the USAID education team leader, local officials from both places had asked USAID “to help 
introduce computer literacy”, expressing concern “that the digital divide was widening between 
developed and developing countries and they didn’t want to be left behind” (email correspondence 
25 July 2015).
181 Upon reading the first version of this text, the USAID team leader emphasised that representatives 
from all five technology companies, as well as from the national and the regional governments 
of Mtwara and Zanzibar, were involved in the competitive selection process of the implementing 
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latter, he conceded, USAID had ‘a rough time’ during the design stage of TZ21 
insofar as the MoEVT was ‘not very enthusiastic’ about the idea, and objected 
to the project approach in favour of budget support. Undeterred by the 
reluctance at the national level, USAID directly approached local authorities 
in the areas where the project should be carried out, and encountered ‘very 
cooperative’ counterparts. Eventually, when the opening of the project in 
Zanzibar went through the news, the MoEVT signalled interest in becoming 
involved; according to the USAID education team leader, the minister was 
suddenly thrilled by the initiative which he allegedly deemed ‘incredible’ 
(Interview 42).
Speaking to national government officials ten months later, we found little 
of that enthusiasm in the ministry.182 Asked how the project was proceeding, 
the primary education director responded: 
Well, the computers are still in Dar es Salaam. They have not been sent 
to Mtwara. I saw the computers for the first time when the vice-president 
went to inaugurate. But at the moment they are only in two schools – 
in Kambarage Primary School there in Mtwara, and the other one is at 
Naliendele, another school. There I found about two, three computers or 
laptops. And the rest of the computers have not been sent to Mtwara. 
Just last week I was talking to one of their representatives here. So I said, 
‘Do you think it’s important for our … computer personnel in here, to go 
and see the specs’ – the computer specifications. Because the project is three 
years – sooner or later, it’s going to come to an end. So what will happen 
if our people, our own people here, do not know the computers – specs of 
the computer, when they were made, where they were made and all these 
kinds of things? (Interview 49) 
While the director refrained from articulating blunt criticism, his dissatisfaction 
with the course of the cooperation was implied in various narratives. Aside 
from the annoyance about the deadlock in computer installation, a salient 
point seemed to be the fact that the MoEVT was only marginally (if at all) 
involved by its project ‘partners’, for example, in identifying or procuring the 
technical equipment which was meant to be supplied to schools. This was 
confirmed by a Tanzanian education specialist who had temporarily been 
partner, Creative Associates “from the very beginning of the design of the activity” (email 
communication 6 April 2015). 
182 We did not speak to officials in the regional governments of Mtwara and Zanzibar whose perspective 
on the project might be a different one.
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contracted as an advisor for TZ21. Herself being highly critical about the way 
the project was carried out, she stated: 
For ownership purposes, you would need also to bring into the process the 
government, the technical people, so that they know when we procure an 
equipment, let’s say for the primary education, it should be of this kind 
because it cannot be an equipment that can be sent to secondary or colleges, 
you know, because of young children. Let that be documented and let that 
be a process that everybody understands. So there are a lot of implications 
of ICT implementation at the school level (…). But when you discuss with 
other people in the project, they don’t see that. (Interview 32) 
An implication which had obviously not been considered and thoroughly 
discussed with national authorities concerned the incorporation of localised 
‘e-content’ into the curriculum. While the delivery of education and the 
management of schools in Tanzania fall under the responsibility of local 
governments, the development of syllabi and learning materials is centrally 
done by the Tanzania Institute of Education (TIE), a parastatal organisation 
under the MoEVT. Already prior to the release of the government’s ICT policy 
for basic education in 2007, TIE had designed an ICT curriculum (‘Teknolojia 
ya Habari na Mawasiliano’ or TEHAMA in short) to be applied in pre-primary 
and primary schools with adequate infrastructure (Ministry of Education and 
Vocational Training 2007). Thus USAID’s aim to introduce externally designed 
ICT modules on TZ21 project sites seemed highly problematic to the director 
of Primary Education: 
You cannot have a module which is not compatible to other modules 
that are applied in other regions in Tanzania, or a module that is not 
compatible with the curriculum that is being implemented. Otherwise you 
have to dismantle everything. And who is ready to do that? Nobody is 
ready for that; we are not ready for that yet. We may wish to review, revise 
our curriculum, but not because there is this one thing in Mtwara going 
on. It might be very difficult. (Interview 49)
The potential deviation of curricula was not the only unresolved issue which 
caused irritation among MoEVT officials. Frictions also emerged with regard to 
suggested modifications of the ministry’s Education Management Information 
System (EMIS). In order to strengthen school administration, TZ21 consultants, 
together with technology suppliers, had developed software for capturing 
real-time data on the attendance of teachers and students; in their view, the 
information collected through this tool could also be used constructively for 
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decision-making and planning if aggregated at the national level. Unluckily, the 
programme offered was not compatible with the system UNESCO had installed 
in MoEVT, amongst others, since its scope was restricted. Yet, USAID and other 
donors pushed the ministry to adopt their software solution and adjust the one 
currently in use. A senior director in the M&E unit who participated in the 
ensuing debate reported: 
We told them: ‘Look, here you have only collected the information for lower 
primary, from standard one to standard four. But here in the ministry 
we have a system which collects information from pre-primary to higher 
education institutions (…). Why can’t you mainstream it to the ministry 
data base rather than the ministry mainstreams yours which covers 
only standard one to standard four level?’ So there was some discussion. 
(Interview 50) 
The tensions arising on issues such as EMIS, ICT modules and procurement 
show a common pattern: the root cause of conflict can be found in a pervasive 
disregard of local institutions. Bypassing national decision-making entities, 
USAID drove forward a project in line with its own agenda but detached from 
the field it encountered. Against this background, the difficulties and frictions 
which emerged in the course of the operation were predictable. 
TZ21 seems to be symptomatic for the particularity of ‘ICT in education’ as a 
policy subject in the Tanzanian context and its lack of local grounding. In fact, 
all-round table conferences and workshops held in previous years to explore 
the opportunities of ICT in education had been facilitated with donor support 
(see Nielinger 2006; Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 2007). A 
Tanzanian education specialist tentatively indicated that the ICT policy for 
basic education had primarily been created to please foreign funders, but apart 
from existing on paper, lacked political concern and feasibility. She supported 
her claim by stating: 
The urgency of preparing that policy, you know, I remember it was not very 
systematically done because otherwise – by then I was in the World Bank 
– I would have heard about the process. Usually when it is time to prepare 
policy, you will know even if you are a donor that something is going on. 
I didn’t hear about that until when something was there (…). Since that 
time up to now, that policy has not been developed for operationalization, 
in terms of operational guidelines at the school level, at the regional level 
or being budgeted for nothing. So as a donor, how will you prepare such a 
project? I mean the risks should have been seen by then. (Interview 32) 
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At the time of writing, the project was still on-going. Aside from photo galleries 
with children in front of computers and anecdotes of ‘success stories’ on the 
project website (e.g. about communities mounting iron door gates in schools 
“to ensure the safety of the ICT equipment that will be installed” USAID & 
Creative Associates International 2014), no information on what TZ21 has 
actually achieved until now could be obtained (USAID & Creative Associates 
International 2014).183
Signs of resistance
Among policy-makers and senior officials in the MoEVT, there seems to be 
mounting resentment about being exposed to aid activities that consume staff 
time and energy, yet constantly result in failure. While Tanzanian government 
members are usually known for their outwardly calm countenance, their 
frustration has reached a level where it occasionally erupts, as the first secretary 
of education in the Swedish Embassy reported: 
In our monitoring and evaluation technical working group last week, 
there was an outburst almost when the government officials said, ‘We 
are so tired of all your projects and there’s no sustainability, you, the 
development partners should really take responsibility’ and so on. And 
then we said, ‘Well, ok, we’ve tried to coordinate ourselves, but you 
could also say no, if you don’t want the money. We come with all those 
proposals, but you should make sure that you say no if you don’t want 
them.’ (Interview 40) 
The claim that government counterparts did not make clear statements and 
did not direct donors in education was repeatedly brought up by interviewees 
in country offices and embassies. A Tanzanian education specialist who had 
worked for both the government and donors critically stated: 
At the end of the day, it is the government receiving aid that has to be 
organized, and helping to guide anybody coming in. If the government is not 
going to do that, then you have all these scattered things. (Interview 32) 
In the experience of aid officials, most of the issues debated in policy discussions 
are brought up by themselves. Referring to the technical working groups 
183 The external impact evaluation which was to assess the success of TZ21 was eventually “discontinued 
as the portfolio was realigned to focus more on reading to meet [USAID’s] Education Strategy and 
respond to the BRN’s [Big Results Now initiative’s] focus on the 3Rs” (email communication with 
USAID official 28 July 2015).
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and committee meetings which are formally chaired by the government, the 
Canadian team leader for education commented: 
To be honest I find a lot of the meetings are donor-driven. I’m not sure if 
it’s because we are more impatient than they are. I mean it was often – 
this was interesting about being the chair [of the Development Partners 
Group], because it meant I would meet with their secretariat weekly (…), 
and we would sit down and say, ‘Okay where are things at?’ And they’d 
say, ‘Well, we’re going to do this’. They have a work plan, and they’d say, 
‘We’ll do this that, this, that, this, that’. We’d say, ‘Okay, what about this, 
this, this, this?’ – ‘Alright’, and they’d start filling in all these other boxes 
they had apparently not thought about or not considered, it just seems like 
there was too much going on. So, I mean, I wonder if we said nothing, 
what would happen? Would nothing happen? I don’t think so. I think 
they would eventually just pick up the slack and do something. But I think 
they’ve become very accustomed to us sort of setting the agenda, saying 
‘well, maybe we should do this then, this then and this then’ and they say, 
‘Well, yeah, okay’. (Interview 30) 
As the accounts above indicate, ministry officials seem to have adopted a 
conduct of compliance towards the aid community. Various circumstances 
lend themselves as explanations for the failing leadership. One reason 
preferably stated by donor representatives is the lack of capacity on the part of 
MoEVT, which – in their view – results in an ad-hoc way of working, devoid 
of prioritisation and forward planning.184 In this reading, the failing leadership 
derives from deficient administrative strength.185 
The ministry’s lack of resolve can also be interpreted as a coping strategy in 
a relationship of dependence: based on accumulated experiences, many high-
184 The Canadian education team leader, for instance, stated: “When they focus to do something, they 
can do it. But they can only do one thing at a time. (…) And so, once your issue comes up, it’s great 
because you get immediate action and it’s, you know, pretty, pretty strong commitment and I mean 
there are very dedicated people who work long hours. So it’s not that they’re lazy or anything like 
that, but they do seem to be very sequential” (Interview 30). 
 Similarly, a Tanzanian education specialist remarked: “Things are done ad hoc, you know? Oh, the 
priorities today, oh, the minister wants this, oh this is that, oh … There’s no concentration on the 
priorities that were set” (Interview 32). 
185 That donors may exacerbate the ministry’s human resource situation by poaching the most 
qualified and skilled education specialists was brought up by a Canadian official who commented: 
“I sometimes am a bit concerned; it’s quite difficult to get good experts, I think. We’ve been lucky, 
I’ve been lucky. I have colleagues on different programmes who really struggled to get good experts. 
And I also worry, of course, if all the donors are hiring the best experts, who’s actually running the 
system? Because I don’t think - unfortunately, we try not to do this, but I think it’s a reality that if 
you’re really good at something, you’re more likely to go on a job with the Canadians than with 
the government” (Interview 30).
208
The Delusion of Knowledge Transfer
ranking officials and policy-makers seem to have internalised the fact that overt 
objection against the aid community leads to nowhere and may eventually 
result in the withdrawal of money. As securing funding has precedence, 
concurring with donors opens up more room for tactical manoeuvring than 
taking an unequivocal stand. That this kind of strategy might be adopted 
is implied by a Canadian official who, when asked about the government’s 
receptiveness to donor advice in policy meetings, responded: 
Most of the time they are like, ‘Yes, good idea, great, we will do something 
about that, we will think about that, we will include that in our next plan’ 
– most of the time they receive it fairly positively. Whether things change, 
that is another story. (Interview 30) 
As the last part of the quote implies, agreement with donor suggestions is 
not necessarily followed by action. In fact, various reports from interviewees 
suggest that the ministry deliberately uses inaction and delay as a tool of 
resistance. The persistent postponing of a decision about how to deal with 
pregnant girls in schools and the resulting deadlock of policy revision can be 
seen as a case in point in this regard. 
Jamming processes may help to thwart plans pushed from outside, but it does 
not really help to generate a local agenda, let alone execute it. Some observers 
claim that after years of external domination there is no local agenda left. 
Conclusion
In a nutshell, the state of education governance in Tanzania could be 
sketched as follows: the need for foreign financing has legitimated an intense 
involvement of external actors in the policy space in which aid money has 
become the central preoccupation. The prevailing sentiment of being at the 
mercy of donors has paralysed leadership and administration which fails to set 
or refrains from articulating an agenda of its own. The pervasive entrenchment 
of donor interference in policy issues has blurred distinguishing what comes 
from within and what from outside. A civil society leader engaged in the 
education sector commented: 
It’s almost like you don’t know now, the players, you don’t know what 
is the truth and what is not the truth because we are all doing this act. 
(Interview 70) 
The government is formally ascribed the starring role in this ‘act’, but the scene 
is set by aid providers whose experts have become the pivotal protagonists of 
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the play. Their role in driving forth policy and decision-making processes has 
become so central that an advisor of Tanzanian origin working for Canada 
critically remarked:  
You ask yourself: When will this end? If we did leave this support, does that 
mean education in Tanzania would collapse? We don’t have an answer, 
because we have always been there. (Interview 31) 
South Africa education: Exploiting outside expertise to 
create a local vision 
Sectoral context 
Education is one the most central topics of post-apartheid politics in South 
Africa. In its first White Paper on Education and Training, the new democratic 
government stated its conviction that education is an essential driver of 
transformation: 
Appropriate education and training can empower people to participate 
effectively in all the processes of democratic society, economic activity, 
cultural expression, and community life, and can help citizens to build 
a nation free of race, gender and every other form of discrimination. 
(Department of Education 1995) 
The persistent prominence of education on the political agenda after 20 years 
of democracy arises from the massive challenges the country still faces in terms 
of building a society in which citizens are provided equal opportunities to 
attain well-being and prosperity. The development of South Africa’s education 
system and its deficiencies cannot be understood without knowing about the 
role and structures of education in the apartheid era. Thus, before looking at 
current challenges, we sketch the educational politics of the apartheid regime 
whose devastating effects are still felt today. 
Black South Africans had experienced educational marginalisation already 
during colonial times. The Bantu Education Act passed by the apartheid 
government in 1953 cemented the establishment of a segregated and 
suppressive education system. The racial law brought an end to the relative 
autonomy of mission schools attended by more than two-thirds of black South 
Africans at that time, centralising control over education in the Department of 
Native Affairs which imposed a curriculum designed to ‘prepare’ the African 
population for serving the white minority as labourers and workers (Fiske & 
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Ladd 2005). The then Minister of Native Affairs HF Verwoerd legitimised the 
Act before the South African parliament by stating: 
There is no space for him [the “Bantu”] in the European Community 
above certain forms of labour (…). Until now he has been subjected to a 
school system which drew him away from his own community and misled 
him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he is 
not allowed to graze. This attitude is not only uneconomic because money 
is spent for an education which has no specific aim but it is also dishonest 
to continue it. (Verwoerd cited in Christie & Collins 1984: 173)
In the course of the apartheid rule, separate schools for each of South 
Africa’s ‘ethnic groups’ were established, creating an educational hierarchy 
with ‘whites’ at the top, followed by ‘Indians’, ‘coloureds’ and ‘blacks’ at the 
bottom.186 Governed by different authorities, the parallel systems differed 
immensely in terms of syllabi and ideological thrust, facilities and funding. By 
1960, the per capita expenditure on education for whites (ZAR 144.57) was 
more than ten times higher than for blacks (ZAR 12.46) (Christie & Collins 
1984). White students enjoyed conducive learning environments, while the 
remaining majority was confronted with overcrowded classrooms, dilapidated 
school buildings, a lack of text books and learning materials, and inadequate 
instruction. According to figures from 1987, 87% of teachers in black schools 
were underqualified (i.e. had achieved an educational level of less than 
Standard 10 and no Matric Certificate). The teacher-to-pupil ratio averaged 
1:41, whereas in white schools it was about 1:16 (File et al. 1989). 
The unequal conditions led to high discrepancies in terms of educational 
attainment, as reflected by data of the 1996 census:187 taking persons aged 
20 and older into account, two-thirds of the white population had achieved 
education at the level of Grade 12 (39.3%) or higher (26.8%). Almost all 
remaining had at least some secondary education; the percentage of people 
who had no schooling was marginal (1.1%). In contrast, among black 
Africans only one out of six had reached Grade 12 (12%) or higher, with the 
percentage in higher education being minimal (3.6%). Almost one out of four 
black Africans (24%) had received no formal schooling at all (Statistics South 
186 The use of race as a form of classification in South Africa is still widespread in both official statistics 
and academic literature. As Spaull (2012: 2) states, “this serves a functional (rather than normative) 
purpose and any other attempt to refer to these population groups would be cumbersome, 
impractical or inaccurate”. 
187 The 1996 census was the first statistical exercise which provided accurate demographic and socio-
economic data to describe South Africa’s situation after apartheid. The statistical system under the 
apartheid regime was deeply distorted insofar as it was racially fragmented and disjointed (National 
Statistics System N/A). 
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Africa 2012:  34). While coloured people fared only slightly better, Indian/
Asian people were markedly better off regarding educational levels. Yet, all of 
them were structurally discriminated in the system imposed by the apartheid 
regime. The highly unequal educational opportunities translated into huge 
discrepancies in labour market status and income: as of 1996, only 3% of 
white people aged 15–65 were unemployed, as opposed to 23.4% of black 
Africans (Statistics South Africa 2004: 51). Of those black Africans who were 
part of the formal employment system, one third (33.3%) earned only R 500 
or less per month, whereas only 5% of white employees had such a low salary 
(Statistics South Africa 2004). 
The statistics above reflect the deep impact of apartheid rule on education 
in South Africa that over four decades “reinforced the inequalities of a divided 
society” (Msila 2007: 147). Twenty years after the end of the ‘rogue regime’, 
its legacies are not yet overcome. Although the Constitution of 1996 made 
education a basic right for every South African (Republic of South Africa 
1996, section 29), many still face tremendous difficulties in fully utilising this 
right (Nevondwe & Odeku 2013), and educational opportunities continue to 
be racially skewed (Yamauchi 2005). Although significant progress has been 
made in terms of providing access – with a gross enrolment rate of 99% at 
the primary level – the quality of education remains at an alarmingly low 
level (Department of Basic Education 2014b: 7). In comparative international 
studies on literacy or numeracy (e.g. SACMEQ III or TIMMS 2011), South 
African pupils lag behind those in poorer African countries such as Ghana or 
Tanzania (Moloi & Chetty 2010; Human Sciences Research Council 2011).188 
This is even more concerning in light of the enormous differentials with 
respect to learning outcomes between historically ‘white’ schools (attended 
by a small minority of students from middle and upper class backgrounds) and 
former ‘black’ schools in township areas (attended by the majority of African 
children).189 The persistent inequality is documented by various assessments; 
the National School Effectiveness Study (2007/08/09), for instance, found 
that Grade 3 pupils from former white schools scored higher on the same test 
than Grade 5 pupils at former black schools, indicating large discrepancies in 
learning achievements visible already by the age of eight (Taylor et al. 2012). 
188 For an overview of empirical assessments on the quality of education in South Africa, see Spaull 
(2013).
189 As Yamauchi (2011) points out, high-quality schools situated in urban, well-off areas (with 
predominantly white residents) are neither geographically nor financially accessible for many 
African children. Hence, although racial segregation was abolished 20 years ago, the composition 
of students is still skewed along racial lines. While historically ‘white’ and ‘Indian’ schools have 
become more diverse, former ‘black’ schools remain racially homogeneous.
212
The Delusion of Knowledge Transfer
The appalling gap regarding learner performance, resources and teacher 
qualifications points to the “dualistic nature” (Spaull 2012) of South Africa’s 
school system which seems to consist of two parallel subsystems: 
One which is functional, wealthy and able to educate students; with the 
other being poor, dysfunctional, and unable to equip students with the 
necessary numeracy and literacy skills they should be acquiring. (Spaull 
2012: 14) 
Given this situation, the lag of black youth in terms of educational attainment is 
little surprising. According to Moloi et al. (2014: 471), “almost 58.5% of whites 
and around 51% of Indians enter higher education. The rate for coloureds is 
14.3%, while that for blacks is even lower at 12%”. Many universities in South 
Africa are internationally recognised as “world-class academic institutions, at 
the cutting edge of research in certain spheres” (Moloi et al. 2014: 470). For 
the majority of learners, however, they are out of reach. 
All in all, it appears that – despite massive resource shifts and several 
interventions put in place by the state – the South African school system in its 
current form contributes little to support upward mobility of the poor in the 
labour market (Van der Berg 2007). The economy, in turn, is severely affected 
by a shortage of skilled workers which hampers productivity and “reduces the 
country’s capacity to develop a knowledge society” (Rasool & Botha 2011: 9). 
Providing equitable opportunities of education and training for all citizens in 
order to foster individual prosperity and economic growth has been on top of 
the political agenda since South Africa turned into a democracy; yet, it remains 
one of the greatest challenges for that country.                                 
Governance structures
Since 1994, South Africa’s institutional landscape in the field of education has 
been in a state of flux, with multiple bodies and structures being replaced, 
revised or recreated in the course of governance and policy reforms. Since 
2014, the major policy-making bodies at the national level have been the 
Department of Basic Education (DBE) and the Department of Higher Education 
and Training (DHET); both were formed in 2009 when the former Department 
of Education was split into these two separate ministries. The DBE deals with 
primary and secondary education, early childhood development and adult 
literacy programmes; it provides national policy and legislative frameworks to 
give direction to the provinces which have their own education departments 
responsible for financing and managing schools in line with their needs. DHET 
is in charge of all post-school education and training components provided at 
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universities, colleges and adult education institutions. It took over the Skills 
Development Branch from the Department of Labour, which shifted the Sector 
Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) concerned with workplace-related 
occupational training to DHET. An important role-player in this area is the 
National Skills Authority which liaises with SETAs and advises the minister of 
higher education on skills development matters. 
Donor presence in the education sector 
Similar to other sectors but certainly more pronounced, the nature and 
scope of aid for education and training in South Africa has shifted over time. 
One can roughly distinguish three different phases: the transitional era up 
to 1994, the period of system building until the early 2000s, and the phase 
of retreat lasting to the present. During the apartheid era, various countries 
such as Denmark, the United States and Australia supported non-state actors, 
which acted in opposition to the regime, by providing education grants and 
overseas scholarships, training programmes and study tours for blacks and 
anti-apartheid activists (King 1999). As will be shown below, this informal aid 
had a huge impact insofar as it put key actors of the democratic movements 
in touch with education and training systems in Europe and elsewhere which 
greatly impregnated their thinking. A witness of that time who participated in 
the exchange commented: 
Many people had studied in Britain and in America; they themselves 
had gone that route to study. So they came back believing in those systems 
because those systems had been the ones that had given them the step up. 
(Interview 20) 
With the turn to democracy, the government and its administration – now 
staffed with many of those who had received support as civil society and union 
protagonists – became the main recipients of financial and technical assistance. 
Between 1994–1999, a whole range of bi- and multilateral donors addressed 
the education sector, amongst others Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Belgium, Japan, Canada and 
the United States (Ngeleza et al. 2000). The majority of their funding was spent 
on human resource development (e.g. teacher training), followed by school 
building, the development of new institutions (notably the South African 
Qualifications Authority), mathematics, science and technology programmes 
and curriculum development (Ngeleza et al. 2000). Hence, aid was used in 
almost all areas in order to build a new education and training system. 
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During what we demarcate as the third phase starting in the mid-2000s, 
both the scope of aid and the number of donors significantly diminished. 
After a decade in which new policies, institutions and structures had been put 
in place, many foreign supporters pulled back from the education sector or 
phased out ODA to South Africa in general. While the Department of Higher 
Education and Training continues to cooperate with a range of partners, the 
only donor from which the Department of Basic Education received additional 
funds during the fiscal years 2010–2013 was the European Union (Department 
of Basic Education 2011, 2012, 2013). The government went over to using the 
remaining aid resources for niche areas (e.g. inclusive education) or innovative 
pilot projects which would otherwise be difficult to undertake, given the 
pressure of national and provincial education budgets (Fölscher et al. 2010). 
Starting from scratch: The creation of a post-apartheid education vision 
Design of a policy to radically overhaul the South African education system 
had already started prior to the official end of apartheid. In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, key players of the anti-apartheid movement began to liaise with 
counterparts and like-minded organisations abroad in order to develop visions 
for education in a new democratic South Africa. Funded by an NGO called 
Australian People for Health, Education and Development Abroad (APHEDA) 
and by the Swedish Sida, the National Union of Metalworkers (Numsa) and 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) carried out research 
projects which included travels to both developing and industrialised countries. 
The exchange with colleagues in Australia, in particular, heavily influenced 
the thinking of South African union leaders (Carton & King 2004; Badroodien 
& McGrath 2005).190 A leading protagonist involved summarised the phase of 
policy exploration as follows: 
We had ideas of what we wanted and how we wanted to do it – but we 
were keen to learn other ways, to hear ideas. (Interview 20) 
A unified attempt to conceptualise a future education and training system 
was undertaken in 1993 through the National Training Strategy Initiative 
(NTSI) which for the first time brought actors from the government in power 
and its opponents to one table. Faced with dysfunctional and racially divided 
schools, masses of illiterate and insufficiently trained people, and a fragmented 
governance system, including 19 disconnected departments of education, the 
190 Details on the Numsa Vocational Training Project and the COSATU Participatory Research Project 
which had a great influence on the thinking of lead unionists are provided by Carton and King 
(2004) and Badroodien and McGrath (2005). 
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list of issues to be addressed was virtually endless. The challenges confronted 
with ranged from overcoming materially and symbolically the racial 
inequalities of the apartheid system to establishing a legitimate governance 
for all educational institutions, and from reducing spending on personnel to 
designing new curricula, assessment and accrediting procedures. Also, the 
national system of examinations and their results had to be reorganised and 
the teachers’ capacity to participate and get engaged in these efforts developed 
(Christie 2006: 376).  
The National Training Board, at that time an advisory body to the ‘Minister 
of Manpower’, formed a National Task Team comprising eight committees 
including representatives from the state, trade unions, employers, providers of 
education and training, the ANC Education Department, and the democratic 
alliance movement. Each of the eight working groups was commissioned to 
investigate a certain topic with a view to South Africa’s situation, ranging from 
integrated career paths and certificates to legislation and financing.191 Task group 
7 was charged with compiling an international overview on ‘systems building’, 
drawing on experiences from industrialised countries, emerging markets and 
developing states (Heitmann 2010).192 The research of this working group was 
supported by various donors, most notably Germany, which sponsored study 
tours to their own but also to other countries. Members of the task group 
thus travelled extensively to distil lessons and best practices from successful 
vocational education and training systems around the world. Their findings 
strongly shaped the principles and ideas adopted in the Discussion Document 
on a National Training Strategy Initiative which came out of the NTSI process 
in 1994 (National Training Board 1994). A key person who was part of the 
National Task Team described the influence of the international comparative 
work on the preliminary policy document as follows: 
It’s very hard to distinguish between what came from the other countries 
and what was the product of debate here. A lot of people were reflecting 
on the experience here and drawing bits and pieces, like: We like this 
Scandinavian work on women’s training. So we had extensive sections 
from Scandinavia, where we said, look, we’ve got to train women to do 
traditionally male work and things like that. We knew that – but to see 
it in practice was very encouraging, and we thought now we can do this. 
And there were other things from other countries, I mean, we’ve known 
some stuff from some countries in Africa even who had come from a similar 
191 For a detailed list of the eight task groups established, see Heitmann (2010: 104–105). 
192 The countries included in the analysis were Australia, Brazil, Germany, England, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
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context to us. So that amalgam pot that had been created was captured into 
a policy document which included a chapter on international experience 
and was then used as a (…) first training document that had been agreed 
between the old apartheid officials and the new ones coming from the trade 
union movement. (Interview 20) 
The centrepiece of the proposed model was a single National Qualification 
Framework which would fully integrate general education and vocational 
training in a system of life-long learning. Key to the concept was the idea 
that skills, knowledge and abilities would be measured against a general 
qualification scale which is so to speak ‘blind’ as to where those have been 
acquired – whether in a full-time or part-time school, at the workplace, by 
distance education, at college or university, or a combination of different sites. 
Most notably, it would also take into account learning that took place outside 
formal institutions and thereby “give value to the kind of learning people have 
already achieved in their lives” (Human Sciences Research Council 1995: 3, 
as reprinted in South African Qualifications Authority 2012). People would 
receive transferable credits for their competencies which would allow them 
to move across different fields and to progress within education, training and 
career paths. The features of the construct thus signalled a transformative 
endeavour which becomes apparent if one considers the prevailing conditions 
at the end of the apartheid era: the majority of the population had received few 
years of schooling and lacked formal qualifications which denied them access 
to and promotion in the labour market. The new model aimed at redressing 
the discrimination in education, training and employment opportunities 
by removing the “obsession with institutional learning as the measure of a 
person’s worth” (Human Sciences Research Council 1995:  12, as reprinted 
in South African Qualifications Authority 2012). Instead, learning outcomes 
were to be the decisive denominator for qualification in a system which gives 
equal value to education and training. 
Adopting the principles of outcomes-based learning, integration and 
progression, the NQF proposal was heavily influenced by education and 
training systems applied in other countries. In some Anglo-Saxon states, 
the concept of National Qualification Frameworks had evolved during the 
late 1980s. South Africa strongly followed the New Zealand model in that it 
envisaged a comprehensive framework for all sectors and a unified quality 
assurance system. Whereas the New Zealand model was favoured by business 
representatives, union members leaned on Australia’s competency-based 
education approach which allowed for incremental learning (Keevy 2013); 
the latter was seen as a crucial aspect in the South African context, as an 
official who was member of the task team explained: 
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Within the trade union movement we had started (…) a policy debate and 
visited Australia in 1990 and they were talking policy ideas that I was 
extensively influenced by. I still think they were great, whether they were 
implementable in the form we thought, that’s another story. But those 
[were] ideas which had to do with a national qualification framework 
and the ideas that workers could come in at a low level and could progress. 
Now the German system is more: you get a good schooling and then you 
train. In South Africa, you have many, many people who have not had a 
good schooling, so we were very keen to look at this progression idea that 
you might start as a semi-skilled worker [and] learn skills incrementally. 
(Interview 20)193 
Inspired by Australia’s competency-centred approach, unionists advocated an 
outcomes-based system which would allow flexible career paths, offer lifelong 
learning opportunities and link education and skills ladders. Integrating 
general education and vocational training was deemed crucial to eliminate 
the hierarchy between the two. Labour representatives, sympathising with 
the German dual system, conveyed the view that in a new democratic South 
Africa vocational training “should stand alongside the academic tradition with 
its head held high” (Interview 20). 
Although the blueprint NQF presented in the Discussion Document thus 
entailed elements which had been adopted from outside, it was widely 
conceived as a product of South African origin and debate. In part, this was 
a result of the National Task Teams’ resolved adaptation of the findings from 
the international experiences into local policies. The team explicitly criticised 
the ‘importation’ of external models without adaptation to the local context 
as ‘highly undesirable’, emphasising that a future education system must 
“be indigenous to the needs of South Africa to suit our needs, cultures and 
values” (National Training Board 1994: 7 as cited in Carton & King 2004: 24). 
Nonetheless, it was seen as helpful to take cognisance of others’ experiences. 
An actor involved commented on the extent of external influence as follows:  
We were quite heavily influenced – but we were influenced because it served 
our purpose, it met a need for us (…). And whilst I don’t see external 
influence in the sense of individuals come into play, I see those ideas 
straining a little against each other, trying to find the best of combination. 
(Interview 20) 
193 Referring to key role players, Carton and King (2004) describe in detail how the strong linkages 
between Australian and South African metal unionists evolved and how this exchange subsequently 
influenced the unions’ positioning in the policy debate. 
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It is to be stressed here that external policy ideas and concepts were induced by 
committee members connecting with specialists abroad, rather than imparted 
by consultants from outside. Although foreign governments certainly had 
an interest in offering and promoting their own educational models to the 
emerging decision-makers of the new South Africa, their role was restricted 
to facilitating the process of policy exploration. International study tours and 
workshops created a space for knowledge sharing and selective borrowing that 
was not confined to the donors’ own territories or expert communities but 
determined by local stakeholders (Carton & King 2004: 20). Hence, the policy 
document which came out of the National Training Strategy Initiative was 
seen as the outcome of a participatory, locally directed process, expressing a 
joint vision of post-apartheid education and training (Carton & King 2004). 
Shortly after the first democratic elections in 1994, the newly formed 
Government of National Unity presented its White Paper on Education and 
Training in a Democratic South Africa: First Steps to Develop a New System to the 
public which broadly incorporated the principles of the Discussion Document 
(Department of Education 1995). In October 1995, the parliament passed 
the South African Qualifications Authority Act (No. 58 of 1995) which 
formally introduced an integrative NQF approach and created the South 
African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) as a parastatal body responsible for 
developing and implementing the NQF (Republic of South Africa 1995). 
The Act thus laid the legal foundation for the transformation of the 
education system, institutions and structures such as quality assurance bodies, 
although new outcomes-based curricula and funding frameworks were still 
to be designed and set up. Coping with the scale of the radical reform would 
have been difficult enough for any administration, even in firmly established 
democracies. In South Africa, the situation was exacerbated by the fact that the 
authorities faced with this challenge were themselves in a state of flux, both in 
terms of structures and personnel. People from the democratic movement who 
entered bureaucratic bodies were highly committed to bring about change, but 
“did not, by definition, bring years of experience to the work of government 
administration” (Bird 2001: 266). They found themselves in a vibrant, but still 
fragile working environment and were confronted with a massive task which 
required both governance and specialist knowledge. The decision to approach 
donors for support was thus not only based on financial demand, but also on 
the need for external expertise, as a high-ranking official in the Department of 
Labour pointed out: 
In order to change the whole system, we had to come up with a new 
legislation, new systems, processes, procedures and we wanted to deliver 
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on a mass scale, we wanted to come up with a funding framework. And 
all those things could not have been achieved [without external support] 
because we didn’t have local expertise. (Interview 22) 
Bringing aid into line with the local agenda: The case of higher education 
The two line departments in charge of education and training, the Department 
of Education and the Department of Labour thus entered into negotiations 
with the aid community which seemed eager to provide assistance. In the 
early years of democracy, “requests for educational collaboration were arriving 
virtually on a daily basis from prospective partners as large as the Russian 
Federation and as small as Croatia” (King 1999:  260–261). A high-ranking 
official who then worked for DoE described the dynamism of donor meetings 
during that time: 
I must say that in the beginning it was like, it was a wonderful terrain to 
work in. You had 23, 24 partner countries all in one room and what we 
would do is, we would give them our priorities for the three years – this 
is what, where do you see yourself fitting in? Okay? America said: ‘We 
want to do curriculum development’. Japan: ‘Oh no, we will give support 
for schools (…)’. Germany: ‘No, we have got skills, you know, yes, we 
can work with the Department of Labour and give a little support here to 
science education’, for example. (…) So donor coordination meetings were 
critical – firstly, to share with them our plans, to get buy-in, to say ‘look, 
this is where we get to go’ or ‘this is where we are going to collaborate with 
another donor’. (Interview 21) 
Naturally, not all went well in the beginning. In contrast to non-state actors, 
government authorities in the education and labour sectors had absolutely no 
experience in dealing with aid; hence, “the complex universe of development 
cooperation was an unknown quantity” for them (King 1999:  261). Aside 
from the pressure of meeting multiple donor requirements and procedures 
which, as one official stated, were a ‘nightmare’ during the first years, it proved 
difficult to get external assistance under control: the line departments soon 
realised that aid providers also used other entry-points to offer their services, 
particularly the provincial governments which were responsible for delivering 
reforms at the classroom level. Given that these implementing authorities did 
not sit around the table in national negotiations, aid projects often ran parallel 
and uncoordinated; in the worst case, high expectations were belied, as an 
official remarked: 
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Then you get a call later [from a provincial official] saying, ‘but you know, 
Mr So and So came to our province, he promised us X, Y, and Z, I’ve 
never seen him again’. So we had to coordinate this thing much more 
effectively. And only after years did we manage to get the coordination. 
(Interview 21) 
It also became apparent that donors, although being supportive of South 
Africa’s transformative agenda, had their own interests and priorities. This 
was evident in that they clearly focused their support on areas which were 
historically relevant to them; a government official commented: 
Obviously, the donors also had their own intelligence gathering – they knew 
exactly where and who they want to support, where their missionaries 
were before, and now they were closely related to those geographic areas 
and therefore they wanted to support them. (Interview 21)
For South African negotiators, it often turned out challenging to shift 
support to geographic and subject areas identified as being in particular need 
of technical assistance or funding. A case in point in which a mismatch of 
priorities became manifest was the struggle for aid to the higher education 
sector. From the government’s point of view, higher education was a key issue 
to be addressed in order to foster national development and social change in 
post-apartheid South Africa. The first White Paper on Education and Training, 
recognising “the massive influence which higher education experts on the 
cultural, social, scientific, technological and professional formation of the 
country’s leadership” (Department of Education 1995), emphasised the need 
to tackle the various challenges of the system, including fragmented structures, 
chronic financial pressure and absorption difficulties. Transforming the higher 
education landscape and advancing access to universities and tertiary learning 
institutions for students from historically disadvantaged communities were 
thus central concerns of decision-makers in the then Department of Education, 
as an interviewee involved pointed out: 
Our view even at that stage when we were still a single department was 
that the heart of the system was higher education, was universities. If you 
get that wrong, you can’t train – you can’t train your intellectuals, you 
can’t train your teachers, you can’t train anyone. (Interview 21) 
Yet, the focus on higher education was not in line with the international 
agenda of that time. The government’s request for support targeting higher 
education reform engendered little response from the aid community. Only 
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a few development partners, notably Finland and Norway, promptly catered 
to the priorities articulated by the Department of Education by setting up 
programmes which addressed higher education issues.194 The majority of donors 
preferred to give resources for basic learning needs and schooling – hence for 
matters which had been strongly pushed by the international community 
since the Jomtien World Conference (1990) and the related Education for All 
movement during the 1990s (World Conference on Education for All 1990). 
Officials negotiating with donor representatives on behalf of DoE had to make 
strenuous efforts to attract assistance for higher education priorities from their 
international counterparts: 
We kept on having to make overtures and to give more bides for higher 
education because they just wouldn’t bid (…). A few scholarships were 
thrown in. But that wasn’t what we wanted. We wanted budgetary 
support to reconfigure, restructure our higher education system. And I 
think that’s what we managed to do and we got support. (Interview 21) 
The persistence of South African officials in bargaining aid evidently bore fruit. 
According to an evaluation of development cooperation during 1994–1999, 
46% of official development assistance to the education sector was channelled 
to higher education (Ngeleza et al. 2000). The review team found that overall 
objectives of ODA were well aligned to those of the national and provincial 
departments of education, and that the distribution of aid “closely mirrored 
the prioritisation of the South African government” (Ngeleza et al. 2000: 14). 
The success of department officials in bringing aid into line with the South 
African agenda mainly rested on two structural advantages. First, despite 
financial needs, the education sector was not substantially dependent on 
donor money. Second, since many international players competed to be part 
of South Africa’s educational transformation, government negotiators had a 
strategically advantageous position in which they were able to set the direction 
and conditions of support, as a former DoE official indicated: 
We could be slightly cheeky to a donor to say ‘no, thank you – another 
partner is going to come (…)’. And so we could push the envelope and 
say: ‘No that’s not what we want. We want this instead. We want you 
to support us in developing X, Y, Z.’ I think in retrospect why we could 
194 Pertinent programmes set up to target higher education issues were the South African–Norway 
Tertiary Education Development Project (SANTED) which focused on enhancing access for and 
retention of people from previously discriminated groups and capacity-building of historically 
disadvantaged institutions, and the South African–Finnish Co-operation Programme in the 
Education Sector (SCOPE), which, amongst others, helped to transfer teacher education and 
training into higher education. 
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get possibly the highest percentage of support to higher education, to 
universities, was because we could be cheeky. We could tell the donors: 
Either you support it or not. But we can assure you that we will do it either 
way. (Interview 21) 
The relative financial strength and the role as much-courted recipient enabled 
the Department of Education to strategically decide whose support and which 
kind to accept. In doing so, it adopted a rather wary attitude towards external 
expertise. Advisors or consultants were only brought in after thorough 
consideration for specific, clearly determined tasks; most notably, department 
leaders were vigilant about keeping foreign actors outside the centre of 
decision-making. As the following statement reflects, this caution had grown 
out of both a strong notion of self-reliance among the new leadership ranks 
and their awareness of the risks that advice from outside entailed: 
So we had that possibility now to shape and to change things, to use our 
own policy-makers and we have had the years of international exposure 
and experience to develop our policies. So never did we have experts or 
foreign policy people in our policy discussions to decide and to determine 
the route that we are going to take. And it’s not in a kind of arrogant 
way that we didn’t want that, but we’ve understood also what has been 
happening in other countries. We have had obviously technical advice and 
expertise coming from all over the show [but] we’ve used that expertise to 
support our policy development agenda. (Interview 21) 
There is one exception to this: in the area of vocational education and training 
decision-makers in charge have extensively drawn on external expertise to 
realise South African policy visions. In particular, the close and long-term 
cooperation with the German GIZ had a profound impact on policies and 
institutions addressing skills development in the new South Africa. 
Expert involvement in constructing a new skills development architecture
When the democratic government came into power in 1994, it inherited 
an extremely poor skills regime which neither met the needs of society nor 
of the economy. With the majority of the population being insufficiently 
or inappropriately trained, the country faced a severe skills shortage across 
all sectors which had a negative effect on productivity and industrial 
competitiveness. The situation was a result of decades of apartheid rule under 
which institutionalised vocational education and training barely existed and 
non-formal skills training hardly provided prospects of qualification and 
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employment (Heitmann 2010: 101–102). Thus, it became a central concern 
of policy-makers in the Department of Labour (DoL) that bore the political 
responsibility for occupational training to enhance the skills base of workers 
and unemployed citizens by creating a new, demand-driven skills development 
system. 
Germany was the donor that, from the outset, lent its support to the 
envisaged reform. Already before entering an official agreement which 
defined skills development as one of three focus areas of bilateral cooperation, 
the German government had funded studies, invested in teacher training and 
supported the National Training Strategy Initiative in exploring vocational 
education and training systems in other countries. While by the mid-1990s 
almost all aid organisations had turned to basic education, the GTZ, as 
Germany’s implementing agency for development cooperation, maintained 
its focus on skills development and offered significant in-house expertise in 
this field (Carton & King 2004).195 When in 1996 the Department of Labour 
put in place a new chief directorate charged with developing policy and legal 
frameworks for a new skills development regime, it was agreed that GTZ 
would provide support to the process through a broad-based sector programme 
which included financial and technical assistance. In the course of the so-
called ‘Skills Development Strategy Initiative (SDSI) Support Programme’ 
and related projects,196 a close relationship between senior officials in the DoL 
and GTZ staff developed. The then head of the Pretoria country office became 
highly appreciated by key actors on the South African side for his flexibility in 
responding to the department’s needs and his approach of catering advice to 
the local agenda. A decision-maker in the Department of Labour described the 
contribution of the GTZ director as follows: 
195 As Carton and King (2004: 19) point out, GTZ obviously had a unique selling point at that time 
since the presence of donor staff with expertise on labour skills was significantly diminished by the 
mid to late 1990s: “Sida had only one vocational in-house expert left by the end of the decade, 
and DFID had none. Meanwhile the once very large staff of technical educators in the Bank had 
almost disappeared. CIDA too had no in-house professional capacity left. (…) Danida and Irish Aid, 
which were both to play important roles in relation to South Africa, drew more on the experience 
of Danish consulting firms and of FAS International Consulting (the commercial subsidiary of 
Ireland’s Training and Employment Authority) than on their own staff.” 
196 The DoL has collaborated with GTZ since 1996 through various skills development and labour-
market-related projects which in 2007 were merged under the umbrella of the ‘Employment 
and Skills Development Service (ESDS) Programme’. Running until 2011, the ESDS programme 
focused on the development of skills development systems for the first (formal) and the second 
(informal) labour market and the establishment of a technology transfer network system for 
small and medium-sized enterprises (GTZ 2007). South African–German cooperation in that field 
took place also through other organisations such as the Centre for International Migration and 
Development (CIM), DED and InWEnt who seconded experts and provided training for college 
teachers and private company managers; moreover, German provincial states (‘Bundesländer’) 
such as Bavaria and Lower Saxony established an exchange of experts with partner provinces in 
South Africa (Department of Labour & GTZ 2008: 7). 
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He came to assist – he didn’t come to tell us. And that was the big difference. 
Because once you had a personal debate with him I think he was quick to 
understand that the South African situation is completely different from 
the German situation. (…) He would go out and research what is it that 
we are trying to do and find out very good learning experiences from other 
places – he would say ‘look, this is what has happened in Sweden, this is 
what has happened in, for instance, Zimbabwe, (…). I know this is what 
you are trying but in these other places, this is how they approach this 
issue and it seems as if you have got these options, these are consequences.’ 
And where he could not come up with a clear recommendation, he phoned 
other people that he was working with to search for the solutions that 
were used in their countries and what were some of the problems. And 
he would get that information to us, so that we are able to get a balance. 
(Interview 22) 
In view of the internal capacity constraints of the newly established skills 
unit in the Department of Labour, the assistance of GTZ in exploring how the 
policy ideas for a new skills regime could be translated into action was highly 
valued. Most effective: the advice provided by experts funded or employed by 
GTZ was perceived as being geared to the local agenda, rather than driven by 
external preferences. The German so-called ‘dual system’ with its combination 
of theoretical and practical learning served as a central reference for advisors, 
but that did not foreclose that experiences and models from elsewhere were 
equally scrutinised for ideas and models that South Africa could take from 
them to develop its own unique institutions. 
The Green Paper: Skills Development Strategy for Economic and Employment 
Growth in South Africa, presented in 1997, sketched out core elements of the 
envisioned new system through which the government hoped to bring about 
the urgently needed “skills revolution” (Department of Labour 1997). First 
and foremost, it proposed the introduction of ‘learnerships’. As opposed to 
the previous apprenticeships which offered only a minimal level of theoretical 
knowledge often unrelated to skills required at the workplace, learnerships 
aimed at combining career-related learning in an accredited education and 
training institution with practical on-the-job experience; having succeeded 
in both areas, learners would obtain a registered occupational qualification 
signifying their work readiness (Department of Labour 1997). A key feature 
of the approach was that contrary to apprenticeships it appealed to a wide 
range of learners in multiple occupational contexts irrespective of their age 
225
CHAPTER 7 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policy-making in Young Democracies: Sector Studies
and employment status (Kraak 2004).197 As funding mechanism, a compulsory 
levy-grant scheme on payroll would be introduced; of the total revenue 
collected, 80% was meant to be channelled back to the sector via grants to 
enterprises that train, and 20% to a National Skills Fund to be used for strategic 
priority areas (Kraak 2004). The re-allocation of levies was to be managed by 
Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs)198 which would replace the 
previous Industry Training Boards and function as intermediary institutions 
commissioned to coordinate skills development in their respective sector. 
A central role in the new system was given to the National Skills Authority 
(NSA) which would substitute the National Training Board as an advisory 
body to the government, responsible for defining skills development policies 
and priorities in consultation with the Department of Labour (Department of 
Labour 1997). Both SETAs and the NSA should be governed by multipartite 
boards composed of representatives from government, employers and trade 
unions (Kraak 2004); the ‘social partnership’ between these stakeholders was 
seen as a crucial principle in the post-apartheid skills regime (Heitmann 2010). 
The mechanisms and institutions proposed in the Green Paper of 1997 were 
formally established through a range of laws passed in subsequent years, 
most notably the Skills Development Act of 1998 (Republic of South Africa 
1998b) and the Skills Development Levies Act of 1999 (Republic of South 
Africa 1999). While the reform was an ambitious endeavour due to the 
mere number of innovations, the government was under immense pressure 
to set up the new architecture promptly in order to ease the social situation 
and relieve the stressed economy by delivering skilled workers. In view of 
the urgency of the reform, the dimension of the workload and the rather 
small cadre of experienced officials in the Department of Labour, decision-
makers approached the aid community for support. External assistance was 
considered necessary to get the basic infrastructure and frameworks set up 
in a foreseeable time frame (Carton & King 2004). Hence, the DoL entered 
into agreements with a number of donors willing to provide financial and 
technical assistance, including GTZ, Danida, AusAid, Ireland Aid, USAID, the 
Netherlands Embassy, Korea, and the European Union; the latter accounted 
for the bulk of support, pledging EUR 46 million over a period of three years 
(Moodley & Vawda 2000).199 Various stand-alone projects were started, but all 
197 For a detailed itemisation of learnership features as opposed to the past apprenticeship system, see 
Kraak (2004: 120–124). 
198 This is how the intermediary bodies were eventually termed. In the Green Paper, they were 
presented as Sector Education and Training Organisations (SETOs). 
199 Out of the EUR 46 million committed by the EU, EUR 30 million were to be channelled to the 
DoL as work plan funds, almost EUR 14 million were set aside for consulting companies and the 
remaining kept for contingency. At that time, the EU support was the largest technical assistance 
programme of its kind in the world (Moodley & Vawda 2000). 
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of them were aligned to an operational strategy of the Department of Labour, 
the so-called Labour Market Skills Development Programme (LMSDP) which 
served as an umbrella framework for the implementation of the skills Acts. The 
Employment and Skills Development Chief Directorate which had designed 
the strategy took on an active leadership role in allocating resources to the 
different programmatic components. 
Foreign funding significantly backed up the financing of the reform, but 
the delivery of expertise was the more substantial element of aid in the 
context of the LMSDP. The EU agreement alone covered more than eleven 
hundred consultancy months (Moodley & Vawda 2000). Experts from both 
South Africa and abroad were used to execute critical tasks for which the 
DoL lacked staff of its own. GTZ consultants, for instance, were contracted to 
develop detailed guidelines for learnerships, to assist in demarcating SETAs 
and to train National Standard Body members for their critical role in relation 
to the National Qualification Framework. Teams of specialists from different 
EU countries were commissioned to work on various technical issues, for 
example, to sketch technicalities of the envisaged levy grant system (Moodley 
& Vawda 2000).200 All personnel brought in from outside had to report to the 
respective unit heads in DoL who issued directives, as a high-ranking official 
emphasised: 
We told them what exactly we would have to achieve – and they would 
never do anything else. (Interview 22) 
Hence, although a large number of external experts were intensely involved 
in key issues of the reform, the process was led by the Department of Labour. 
The crucial point is that essential decisions were made before consultants were 
brought in to operationalise the nationally negotiated vision of a new skills 
system. The recourse to donor support allowed the government to speed up the 
implementation of reform by trying out and bringing to scale key innovative 
schemes (e.g. learnerships) within a narrow time frame and thus to meet 
its own deadlines (Carton & King 2004).201 By the turn of the millennium, 
a radically revamped skills development architecture with a range of new 
200 The EU project drew on consultancy consortia from several countries which were selected through 
a competitive bidding process (Carton & King 2004). The tendering procedure prescribed by the EU, 
however, was criticised not only for being lengthy and cumbersome, but also for disadvantaging 
companies from outside the EU. A review stated that “the perception in the DoL is that the criteria 
excluded many capable South African organisations from effectively competing” (Moodley & 
Vawda 2000: 34). In fact, almost all contracted companies were European. 
201 A valuable project which helped to refine a new approach was carried out by Danida in KwaZulu- 
Natal where learnerships in the construction and tourism industries were tested; the experiences 
gained in that two-year pilot were taken up in the process of adjusting the learnership model before 
taking it to scale (Carton & King 2004). 
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institutions and governance bodies had been set up – from the perspective of 
key protagonists, it is unlikely that this would have happened at the same pace 
without external assistance. 
Governance challenges, structural revisions and changing relationships 
The integrative education and training system built by the first government 
of post-apartheid South Africa was internationally regarded as ambitious 
and ground-breaking; yet, getting this system to run and to deliver turned 
out to be challenging. While policies, laws and institutions had been put in 
place in quick succession, transformation on the ground could not keep pace. 
Difficulties emerged at various levels. Teachers in schools were struggling to 
implement the new outcomes-based curriculum (known as ‘Curriculum 2005’ 
and introduced in 1997), since they were unfamiliar with its concepts and felt 
alienated by its terminology (Chisholm 2003, 2005). The newly established 
SETAs faced severe governance problems, including financial mismanagement 
and fraud (Smith et al. 2005; Kraak 2008). Employers only slowly began to take 
up learnerships and showed little commitment to proactively invest in training 
(Moleke 2003). Although they generally embraced the new approach, many 
companies perceived processes as unduly bureaucratic and felt unprepared to 
offer learnership agreements (Mummenthey 2008). Hence, despite ‘pockets 
of progress’ in terms of enhancing the skills base and redressing apartheid’s 
inequities, education and employment patterns remained racially skewed 
(Moleke 2003).202  
A fundamental problem which indirectly contributed to the stagnation was 
the deep division between the Department of Education and the Department 
of Labour (Bird & Heitmann 2011). The decision to keep these two separate 
ministries – with the former being responsible for education and training in 
public institutions (i.e. schools, colleges and universities) and the latter for 
private providers of learning in the labour market – instead of merging them 
into one as expected in the early 1990s – had “serious ramifications, most 
importantly the failure of the new state to discard the political fiefdoms and 
territorial modes of working that characterised the divide between ‘education’ 
and ‘training’ in the apartheid state” (Kraak 2008). Both in a way pursued their 
own incoherent skills development agendas based on divergent philosophies, 
as a former DoL official pointed out:  
202 Kraak (2008) delineates some successes achieved during the first phase of the National Skills 
Development Strategy; amongst others, more than 6 million workers out of a total employed 
workforce of 10,8 million people embarked on and finished structured learning programmes 
over a four-year period; moreover, almost 900 000 achieved a National Qualifications Framework 
Level One qualification through adult basic education and training in the workplace. Yet, as Kraak 
himself emphasises, other scholars have raised doubts about the validity of these government data. 
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The Department of Labour was influenced I think quite a lot by the 
German thinking about skilled training, vocational training in particular. 
But the colleagues in education were moving things by the British. So you 
had one department influenced by the Germanic tradition and another 
department influenced by I think the Anglo-Saxon idea. And that led to 
quite a lot of tension. (Interview 20) 
The discrepancies between the two ministries manifested in a range of laws and 
strategy documents issued by both sides which lacked interrelation and in some 
cases even contradicted each other (Allais 2006; 2010).203 The tension between 
education and labour-side actors culminated when the minister of education 
in 2000 announced a first review of the National Qualifications Framework 
for which both departments shared responsibility. After much contestation as 
to whether there should be an assessment at such an early stage and what 
it should look like, an international study team comprising South African 
and foreign experts was commissioned to scrutinise the NQF with regard to 
its implementation (without probing its design) (Allais 2010). Finding that 
“broad malaise of discontent with the NQF and SAQA had taken hold among 
stakeholders” (Department of Education & Department of Labour 2002: 3), 
the authors provided a range of recommendations to overcome obstacles 
and take the process of implementing the NQF forward. Yet, the release of 
the report in 2002 was followed by years of inactivity and silence, although 
the DoE and DoL had brought themselves to publish a joint response in the 
form of a consultative document (Department of Education & Department of 
Labour 2003). Eventually, it took six years until an agreement was reached to 
make substantial changes through a set of (amendment) bills passed in 2008 
(Allais 2010).204 The reform provided for the split of the single, integrated NQF 
into three linked sub-frameworks managed by respective quality assurance 
bodies, namely Umalusi as Quality Council for General and Further Education 
and Training, the Quality Council for Higher Education (QCHE) covering the 
academic sector and the Quality Council for Trades and Occupations (QCTO) 
in charge of learning in a workplace context. Hence, while the NQF continued 
203 Several scholars hint at incoherent or conflicting legislation and structures related to further/
vocational education and training, and the resulting confusion of role-players in the field. Allais 
(2006) provides a detailed account of conflicts over roles and responsibilities particularly with 
regard to quality assurance and certification. Bird and Heitmann (2011: 10) note that the Further 
Education and Training Colleges Act No. 16 of 2006 initiated by the Department of Education and 
the Department of Labour’s Skills Development Amendment Act No. 37 of 2008 that followed 
shortly after did “not complement one another in any systematic way”. 
204 These included the National Qualifications Framework Act No. 67 of 2008, the General and Further 
Education and Training Quality Assurance Amendment Act No. 50 of 2008, the Skills Development 
Amendment Act No. 37 of 2008, and the Higher Education Amendment Act No. 39 of 2008 
(Republic of South Africa 2008a, 2008b, 2009b, 2009c). 
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to exist as a ‘meta’-framework and SAQA remained the national oversight 
and coordinating body, responsibilities and structures were significantly 
reconfigured (see Keevy 2013). 
The complex task of establishing this new system was exacerbated by a major 
reorganisation of line departments which followed shortly after the legislative 
changes. President Zuma, who came to power in 2009, decided to divide the 
Department of Education into one for Basic Education and one for Higher 
Education and Training which would carry over skills development (hence also 
for SETAs and the newly established QCTO) from Labour (Khumalo 2009). 
Shifting the responsibility for all post-school education and training was seen 
as an attempt to overcome the persistent conflicts which had blocked progress 
over the past decade. 
While many stakeholders welcomed this move, it involved the reallocation 
of staff which inevitably weakened administration in affected government 
units; in particular, the Department of Labour, which had lost the skills 
development branch to DHET, felt drained of experienced bureaucrats. In 
addition, it became evident how much the DoL and related bodies had relied 
on external expertise provided by long-standing partners. According to the 
head of the Employment and Skills Development Services (ESDS) Programme 
of GTZ who took the lead in 2009, the programme had about 120 consultancy 
contracts running at that time: 
Small ones, big ones, but too many. And I’ve never experienced a project 
with so many contracts. And I was asking my predecessor, why do you 
have so many consultants employed? He said ‘it’s because there is no 
capacity with our partners’. (…) He had contracts with universities, with 
the research councils, all the experts in South Africa on skills development 
were on our payroll. (Interview 2) 
With the shift of political responsibilities, GTZ and other supporters turned 
towards new counterparts in the field. For DoL, this shift meant a severe loss 
of administrative capacity, as a decision-maker in the employment services 
branch pointed out:  
Once [the programme] moved, the capacity disappeared and caused 
challenges (…). And that unfortunately is a setback because you can make 
that assumption if people who started were still there, but the minute they 
are gone through this transfer and so on, it’s like going four years ahead 
and then six years back. It becomes a problem because all the senior people 
had left here, almost all of the seconded experts that were working here. So 
it becomes very difficult. (Interview 22) 
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The technical assistants provided by GTZ and other aid agencies had functioned 
as an ‘extra pair of hands’ in various DoL units since the beginning of South 
Africa’s education and training transition, but their support obviously had not 
resulted in a strengthened administrative capacity of their host organisation. 
Already by 2000 a team reviewing ODA had warned that the use of external 
specialists who executed key tasks instead of mentoring officials would 
result in ‘minimal skills transfer’ and pose a serious challenge for the DoL 
once projects ended (Moodley & Vawda 2000).205 Almost a decade later, this 
scenario occurred, and the Department of Labour struggled to substitute the 
withdrawn specialists. 
Yet, not only government authorities faced difficulties in the course of the 
restructuring process. Donors as well had to adjust their programmes and 
establish relationships with new partners who themselves were trying to gain 
safe ground. As of 2011, the previously much-lauded Employment and Skills 
Development Services (ESDS) programme of GIZ (formerly GTZ) had reached 
deadlock since GIZ representatives were unable to enter into a dialogue 
with DHET decision-makers. For the head of the programme in the Pretoria 
country office, this caused mounting pressure as he was unable to demonstrate 
progress and thereby legitimate the on-going operations before headquarters 
in Germany. In late 2011, his frustration had reached a point where he felt 
compelled to call in political authorities in order to enforce communication 
with DHET decision-makers:  
So now what I try to do is, when you don’t get a response from a counterpart 
you invite for meetings (…), you use diplomatic interventions and this 
is what I have done. And diplomatic interventions I have to use in case, 
because it’s a lot of resources. If let’s say advisors are not needed, then I 
have to communicate this. I cannot just assume, ah, we have some progress 
here and there. You can cover up for 6 months maybe. But in this case, I 
really used the escalation ladder from zero to, I don’t know, the highest 
level. There was one letter sent from our ministry in Germany through the 
Embassy warning ‘if you don’t come to a conclusion now, we will wind 
down the project’, very clearly. Then they reacted. (…) 
And tomorrow we have consultations with Higher Education and 
Training. When I saw the people on the list that will come to the meeting, 
205 The review team stated in this regard: “As the practice of Technical Assistance is new within the 
DoL, officials have minimal capacity to effectively and efficiently utilise and absorb technical 
assistants into project activities and tasks. (…) With the already extensive and intensive workload, 
and inadequate number of staff to execute tasks, skills transfer is an additional challenge” (Moodley 
& Vawda 2000: 15).
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it’s a shame. It’s really a shame. Two people from international relations 
and only one technical person from the National Skills Fund; there’s only 
one person who really knows about the subject. So I don’t understand – we 
requested on the level of DG, please provide the DDGs for the meetings and 
technical people. (Interview 2) 
The head of the GIZ programme felt uncertain about whether to interpret the 
bearing of the counterpart as a lack of leadership, sign of disinterest – or simply 
as the result of the persisting capacity constraints in the department, which, 
after two years since its formal inception, was still struggling to adequately 
staff the department. During 2011/2012, DHET’s vacancy rate remained high 
at 21.73%, and many crucial positions at the senior level (e.g. directors) had 
not yet been filled (Department of Higher Education and Training 2012a).206 
In light of the fact that officials in place were already over-stretched with day-
to-day operations, it is not surprising that donor meetings were not attended 
or repeatedly postponed, which left programme leaders somewhat in the dark 
about their new counterpart’s vision. The GIZ director commented in this 
regard: 
There was almost no donor coordination for the last two years. There was 
a DG, Mary Metcalfe, until September last year, then we have DG Qonde, 
and each of the DGs just had one donor meeting. And on donor side, we 
have an interest to know the policy of the department vis-à-vis cooperation, 
what are other development partners doing and all this kind of exchange. 
But it was very clear in our case that the Department of Higher Education 
and Training just didn’t request for that. (Interview 2) 
Discussing the GIZ’s discontent and frustration about DHET’s disregard, a high-
ranking official who had closely collaborated with the Germans during her 
previous appointment in the Department of Labour provided the following 
explanation for the gridlock in cooperation: 
206 According to DHET’s Annual Report, the slow progress in staff appointment was caused by both 
insufficient funding and the difficulty in finding people with adequate expertise and experience: 
“The specialised nature of work in most of the areas of the Department necessitates the use of 
highly skilled people who are at some stages not readily available for permanent appointment 
and have to be appointed on contract for periods as may be required. (…) Some identified critical 
vacancies could not be filled due to limited funding. The prescribed time frame of four months for 
the filling of vacancies in some instances is not met or adhered to due to work pressure caused by 
the staff shortage in the HR section. We have identified a need for staff training and development 
and a request for the creation of additional posts was approved for filling in the new financial year” 
(Department of Higher Education and Training 2012a: 48–49).
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I honestly believe it was a transitional problem that the German 
government got caught up in but which had nothing to do with them. 
What happened was the new department here was set up late 2009, it had 
to be staffed. There was a change of Director-General in the middle of that 
process, and that’s a very important person in a new department. So that 
was still being sorted out. The new Director General, when he took over, 
he had to get his feel more secure around the policy debates and he didn’t 
want to commit himself to projects and things before he had that. So I don’t 
think it had anything to do with the German government or with any of 
the donors, I think it was a case of the department. What it reflects I think 
is that the South African government wants to lead any discussion – so it 
wants to be sure that it knows what it wants and why you’re having a 
particular conversation. (Interview 20) 
Eventually, the South African–German ESDS programme which had 
been running since 1995 ended in 2012. As a consequence of the tedious 
negotiations with DHET as counterpart during the last phase, GIZ decided to 
shift its focus to other players in the field when setting up a new programme 
called ‘Skills Development for Green Jobs (SDfGJ)’ (GIZ 2012b). While DHET 
formally remains one of the two ‘lead executing agencies’ (with the second 
one being the Department of Science and Technology), the actual cooperation 
takes place with other partners, such as the Office of the Premier in the Eastern 
Cape Province and the Manufacturing, Engineering and Related Services 
SETA (merSETA).207 Both organisations are assisted in establishing ‘green skills 
forums’ in order to boost the ‘green economy’, with support including the 
secondment of advisors, study tours and training programmes. 
Although GIZ promotes its new approach as a ‘bottom-up strategy’ with 
a “much greater potential for mainstreaming green skills” (GIZ 2012c), it is 
obvious that the shift towards this level was partly enforced by the fact that 
GIZ has lost its position in the policy-making space. While during the 15 years 
of cooperation with the Department of Labour, GTZ (as it was then called) 
had built itself up as an indispensable partner providing advice and assistance 
in the course of the education and training system reform, it was not able to 
transfer this relationship to DHET as the new political authority in charge. The 
reasons are at least twofold. First, the trust which allowed GTZ to be engaged 
in DoL processes rested to a significant extent on the personal bonds between 
key actors on both sides that had developed during more than a decade of 
207 Moreover, the programme includes support to the Technology Innovation Agency (TIA) focusing 
on technology transfer which is a continuation of previous cooperation. 
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cooperation. The importance of this aspect was repeatedly addressed by 
interviewees involved, with one official stating: 
It was a long-term partnership. If you speak to W. [the previous GTZ 
programme director], I know this is a strong point on his side that many 
donors work in the short-term, they go in, do a project and withdraw, and 
his feeling was always: No, you got to form partnerships at a personal 
level. And we certainly did form one with Werner. (Interview 20)
As explained above, such social ties are a key element for advisory processes; yet, 
as they depend on “histories of interactions” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998: 244), 
they cannot easily be passed on. Hence, it was not easy for the successor of the 
previous GTZ director to maintain the importance of the programme when he 
came into office in 2009 and even more difficult when it should be continued 
with DHET as the new partner. 
Second, it seems that the nature of support sought by policy-makers in 
charge has changed. While they still signal interest in expertise and experiences 
from other countries, they seem to refrain from requesting direct advice and 
assistance in policy development. Instead of bringing in consultants from 
outside to provide ‘hands-on’ support to understaffed units, DHET appears 
to prefer a much looser form of cooperation, excluding external actors from 
decision-making. This is reflected by DHET’s first major political undertaking 
of system reform in post-schooling education and training. The Green Paper 
released for discussion in early 2012 was largely a product of internal policy 
work (Department of Higher Education and Training 2012b). An extensive 
process of national discussion about the new post-school vision followed which 
included briefings, workshops and conferences with various stakeholders. 
International partners were invited to take part in some of these activities, 
but they did not play a decisive role therein. Moreover, the decision-making 
autonomy of the South African government was clearly evident throughout 
the process, as a GIZ interviewee commented:  
In April [2012], there was a huge, international conference. We had two 
speakers here from BIBB [the German ‘Federal Institute for Vocational 
Education and Training’] which was fine, that was great. But there were 
also Brazilians, people from Indonesia and Australia, six countries were 
represented, the Swiss as well. That means they [the South Africans] 
precisely pick what fits for them (…). And then it goes on: The South 
Africans have their own experts. Of course, they do not know the countries 
in great detail. But instead of bringing in consultants from Germany, they 
would compose a group of people travelling to Europe, visiting institutions, 
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interviewing professors and practitioners, developers and others in 
ministries and organisations. They have money, they travel. (Interview 3) 
The process of policy negotiation and refinement was firmly led by key actors 
within DHET (e.g. the Special Advisor to the Minister John Pampallis) who 
were assisted by a drafting team made up of six experts from South African 
research and advisory institutions, namely the Centre for Education Policy 
Development, the Centre for Researching Education and Labour of the 
University of Witwatersrand and Mzabalazo Advisory Services (Stuart 2014). 
After almost two years of consultation, in which nearly 200 public comments 
were received, the White Paper for Post-School Education and Training was finalised 
and approved by Cabinet in November 2013 (Department of Higher Education 
and Training 2013c). One of the main challenges it aims to address is providing 
prospects for young people who have hitherto fallen through the cracks, that 
is, the 3.4 million aged 15 to 24 currently not in employment, education or 
training (so-called ‘NEETs’). To cater for youth and adults who have never 
attended school and therefore were excluded from further studies at colleges 
or universities, a new institutional type of ‘community colleges’ is envisaged, 
which is expected “to facilitate a cycle of lifelong learning in communities by 
enabling the development of skills (including literacy, numeracy and vocational 
skills) to enhance personal, social, family and employment experiences” 
(Department of Higher Education and Training 2013c:  22). Moreover, the 
previous further education and training (FET) colleges are to be rebranded 
Technical and Vocational Education and Training Colleges on the grounds that 
this name “better reflects their nature and better defines their main role in 
the diversified post-school education and training system”, as DHET argues 
(Department of Higher Education and Training 2013c:  12). Turning TVET 
colleges into “institutions of choice” which constitute “the cornerstone of the 
country’s skills development system” (Department of Higher Education and 
Training 2013c: 12) is a prime endeavour of the government which sets itself 
ambitious targets: by 2013, it wants to have 2.5 million students enrolled in 
TVET colleges (as compared to 500 000 in 2011), 1 million in community 
colleges (from 265 000 in public adult learning centres in 2011), and about 1.6 
million students in universities (from just over 937 000 in 2011). At the time 
of writing, it is too early to assess the likelihood of success. 
Conclusion
When assessing the impact of foreign aid on education and training in post-
apartheid South Africa, the judgement has to be differentiated: certainly, 
financial and technical assistance significantly helped to revamp structures at a 
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pace which would not have been possible had the government relied on its own 
resources. Also, study tours sponsored and/or facilitated by donors conveyed 
models and ideas from abroad which inspired the thinking of key protagonists 
involved in shaping a new system for the country. Despite extensive foreign 
support, however, “the overall negotiation for a new skills architecture has 
firmly been in South African hands” (Carton & King 2004: 31). That policy-
makers, while drawing on external expertise and resources, managed to retain 
their decision-making autonomy appears to rest on at least four reasons. First, 
the sector was not financially dependent on donors. This is not to say that 
additional funding was not needed; yet, aid did not make up a substantial part 
of the budget. This allowed negotiators to tell international financiers: 
Either you support it but we can assure you that we will do it either way. 
It’s just going to take a slightly longer because we’ll have to wait, but we 
will do this. (Interview 21) 
Second, education in the broadest sense was a prime topic on the aid agenda; 
given that bi- and multilateral organisations competed to be part of South 
Africa’s education transition, government officials could select those which 
were most responsive to local needs and priorities. Third, policy-making 
authorities concerned with education and training seem to have adopted a 
careful approach towards advice and assistance from outside which is reflected 
by the following statement of a DHET (and former DoE) official: 
The experts that we had, that we used, were very few. And (..) they 
were coming in towards (…) the end (…) of the process to advise and 
give support and so forth. But (…) they were never sent through to the 
conceptualization of the direction. (Interview 21) 
Finally, it seems that the participation of various stakeholders with strong 
voices in the South African education and training landscape has mitigated 
the scope of direct influence from outside. While the vested and sometimes 
contradictory interests of education and training providers, trade unions and 
employers may have decelerated the pace or even blocked processes, such 
frictions enforced national negotiation about concepts developed internally 
or adopted from elsewhere. The academic community played a distinct role 
therein. 
All in all, in the field of education, the South African government was able to 
create its own vision and system, although it resorted to aid for both expertise 
and money. The fact that many institutions and structures were repeatedly 
revised in the course of reform indicates that the system put in place was not 
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‘perfect’ and entailed flaws which became evident in implementation. A DHET 
official, however, stated:
We’ve made mistakes; some of them were really unintended consequences 
of our policies. But those were our own mistakes. It’s worse what has 
happened in Tanzania because of the Bank’s and other agencies’ 
interference. (Interview 21)
Tanzania health: The normality of foreign involvement 
Sectoral context
The health situation in Tanzania has improved significantly in recent years. 
Life expectancy at birth rose from 51 years in 2002 to 61 years in 2012 (World 
Bank 2014c).208 Within the same period, infant and under-five mortality 
substantially declined; according to UN estimates, the rate of children dying 
between birth and five years of age decreased from 114 to 54 per thousand live 
births (UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation 2013). These 
positive trends are largely attributed to a high coverage of immunisation, 
expanded vitamin A distribution, and an increased use of insecticide-treated 
bed nets to prevent malaria which helped to reduce the prevalence among 
children under five from 18% in 2008 to 9% in 2012 (UNICEF Tanzania 2010; 
TACAIDS et al. 2013). 
Whereas much progress has been achieved in terms of child survival, 
maternal health remains an unresolved challenge. Tanzania’s maternal 
mortality rate is one of the highest in the world: in 2010, an estimated 8 500 
women died while being pregnant or giving birth (UN  Maternal Mortality 
Estimation Inter-agency Group 2010).209 While most of these deaths are 
caused by obstetric complications, the poor quality of health services and 
the existence of infectious diseases – most notably malaria and HIV/Aids – 
indirectly contribute to the persistent high number of cases (Shija et al. 2012). 
As one of the most perilous health problems in Tanzania, malaria continues 
to be the country’s major cause of morbidity and mortality. Although 
interventions in malaria control show signs of success, the tropical disease still 
 
 
208 According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, the average life expectancy 
at birth in developing countries of sub-Saharan Africa was 56.4 in 2012 (World Bank 2014c). 
209 In 2010, the maternal mortality rate was estimated to be 460 per 100 000 live births (UN Maternal 
Mortality Estimation Inter-agency Group 2010). 
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leads to about 60 000 deaths per year, of which 80% are children under five 
years (Massero 2013). The fight against HIV/Aids seems similarly challenging. 
Despite huge efforts undertaken since the disease was declared a ‘national 
disaster’ in 1999, the HI virus continues to spread in Tanzania.210 Even 
though knowledge about how to prevent transmission is relatively common, 
it is estimated that more than 100 000 Tanzanians are newly infected each 
year (Interview 62; UNICEF Tanzania 2014). The prevalence of HIV among 
the population has only marginally dropped in recent years (TACAIDS et al. 
2013); as of 2011/2012, 1.6 million people were living with HIV/Aids (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2012a). 
An impediment to scaling up interventions to combat the multiple epidemics 
is the massive shortage of health professionals in the country. As estimated in 
the Health Sector Strategic Plan (2009–2015), there is a lack of more than 
90 000 health workers which amounts to a deficit of 65% (Ministry of Health 
and Social Welfare 2009). The on-going human resource crisis is seen as one of 
the greatest obstacles hampering the implementation of Tanzania’s ambitious 
health sector reforms (Kwesigabo et al. 2012). 
Governance structures 
At the national level, the two main authorities dealing with health issues in 
Tanzania are the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) and the 
Prime Minister’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-
RALG). While the former is mandated to provide overall policy guidance and 
quality control, the latter is responsible for overseeing the delivery of district 
health services which form the centrepiece of the system and are managed by 
local government authorities (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 2009). 
For the fight against HIV/Aids, the government set up the Tanzania 
Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS) in 2001. Established as an independent 
department under the Prime Minister’s Office, TACAIDS has been mandated 
to provide strategic leadership, formulate policy guidelines, advise the 
government, and coordinate the implementation of the national response to 
the epidemic (TACAIDS 2014a). As the central institution for policy-making 
and resource mobilisation in the field of HIV/Aids, TACAIDS has become the 
focal point for donors engaged in HIV/Aids-related activities. 
210 The first three Aids cases on Tanzania mainland occurred in 1983. By the end of 1999, it was 
estimated that more than 2 million people were infected with HIV. At that point in time, then 
President Mkapa called the epidemic “an extraordinary crisis that requires extra-ordinary measures 
to deal with it” (TACAIDS 2014c).
238
The Delusion of Knowledge Transfer
Donor presence in the health sector 
Health and HIV/Aids are policy fields which are both characterised by a high 
‘donor density’ in Tanzania. As of 2014, the ‘Development Partners Groups’ 
in the two areas – DPG-Health and DPG-AIDS – each comprised more than 
15  members, including major bilateral funders such as the United States, 
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark, as well as multilateral 
bodies such as the World Bank and UN agencies (Development Partners 
Group Tanzania 2014a). Experts from these organisations interact with senior 
government officials through various Technical Working Groups (TWGs) 
which were established when a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) was introduced 
(see later in this chapter). TWGs in health focus on issues such as district and 
regional health services, health financing, and public private partnerships; in 
the field of HIV/Aids, they concentrate on prevention, care and treatment, 
impact mitigation, and evaluation, amongst others (interviews 32, 61, 62). Aid 
representatives also take part in higher-level forums concerned with policy-
making and resource allocation, for example, the SWAp Technical Committee, 
the Health Basket Financing Committee or Tanzania’s National Coordinating 
Mechanism for the Global Fund (see Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
2009; TACAIDS 2014b). As will be shown, donors exert significant influence 
on decision-making through such structures and beyond, both in health and 
HIV/Aids. 
Tanzania’s health system after independence
When Tanzania became independent in 1961, the country’s health system 
consisted of only a few hospitals and private doctors accessible to a small 
elite living in urban areas; the majority of the population relied on traditional 
healers and missionary centres (McIntyre et al. 2008). Providing essential 
health services for all became a major endeavour of the first post-colonial 
leader, Julius K Nyerere. Following the Arusha Declaration of 1967, the 
government made public healthcare free of charge, and invested in building 
health facilities in rural areas. Between 1969 and 1978, the number of state-
operated rural health centres more than tripled, and as a result of increased 
training, the health workforce grew significantly (Wangwe & Rweyemamu 
2001). The government financed the system through tax and donor funding; 
private for-profit practice was limited and later even prohibited by law on the 
grounds that health was seen as the sole responsibility of the state, assisted by 
faith-based organisations (McIntyre et al. 2008). 
When in the course of the economic crisis during the 1980s, Tanzania was 
forced to adopt structural adjustment policies as required by international 
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finance institutions, the health sector experienced a sharp decline in 
government spending, “with real per capita expenditure falling by 46% in the 
decade to 1988/89” (Kumaranayake et al. 2000: 360). In order to maintain 
the system, user fees were re-introduced, and the ban on private services was 
lifted, which “led to a rapid increase in the number of private health providers, 
many of them informal and unregistered” (McIntyre et al. 2008:  872). By 
the early 1990s, Tanzania’s health system was fragmented, underfunded 
and hardly functioning; while the country had a relatively wide network of 
facilities, these often lacked basic equipment, personnel and essential drugs to 
care for patients (Wangwe & Rweyemamu 2001).211 
The road to reforms 
Tanzania was not the only African country which experienced a deterioration 
in health services at that time. In its 1993 ‘World Development Report’, the 
World Bank highlighted the poor performance of health systems in developing 
countries with low cost-effectiveness, inefficiency and mismanagement, and 
called on governments and the aid community to invest in health sector reforms 
(World Bank 1993). In the same year, donors held a consultative meeting in 
Paris where the need for reform in Tanzania was discussed. Shortly after, a joint 
workshop with officials from the Ministry of Health was organised, following 
which a working group was established (Semali 2003). With funding from the 
World Bank and Danida, the group produced the ‘Proposals for Health Sector 
Reform’ (1994),212 the Strategic Health Plan for 1995–1998 and the Health 
Sector Reform Plan of Action 1996–1999, which sketched out major problems 
and suggested interventions to tackle them. In the process of developing these 
pivotal documents, officials regularly consulted with aid representatives whose 
support was deemed crucial for realising the reforms. 
Aside from being involved in revising and adjusting reform plans, donors 
in parallel began to test the feasibility of new tools and financing mechanisms 
through aid initiatives; the World Bank, for instance, carried out a pilot 
project introducing a community health fund in Igunga District, and the GTZ 
conducted a study on district planning and management in Tanga Region 
(Semali 2003).213 Following a series of ‘joint missions’, the government and 
donors eventually agreed on a final ‘Programme of Work’ (PoW) for the period 
1999–2002 which outlined eight priority areas of reform: the decentralisation 
211 As of 1985, an estimated 90% of the Tanzanian population lived within a 10km distance of a health 
facility which indicates a relatively wide coverage at that time (Hingora n.d.). 
212 The Proposals for Health Sector Reform were approved by the cabinet in March 1996 (Burki 2001).
213 For a detailed description of the various projects and studies carried out to test different reform 
proposals, see Semali (2003). 
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of authority to the districts which should be given full responsibility for the 
organisation and delivery of health services; the establishment of a referral 
system with back-up secondary and tertiary hospitals to support primary 
healthcare; the transformation of the national Ministry of Health into a 
facilitative policy organisation with a normative and standard-setting role; 
addressing the human resource shortage; ensuring central support systems are 
in place; diversifying health financing through insurance systems, cost-sharing 
mechanisms and user fees; providing for an ‘appropriate’ mix of public and 
private healthcare services; and ‘restructuring’ the relationship between the 
Ministry of Health and donors (Ministry of Health 1999). 
Regarding the last point, donors and the ministry had finally arrived at the 
decision to move towards a ‘Sector-Wide Approach’ (SWAp) with the aim “to 
dilute the administrative and planning burden of multiple systems imposed 
through the various donor-led approaches, and to promote coordinated 
planning and resource management” (Burki 2001:  13). The basic idea 
behind this was that stakeholders in health would collaborate to back the 
implementation of a shared programme under government leadership. After 
tedious negotiations, some of the ‘development partners’ – namely Danida, 
DFID, Swiss Development Cooperation, Ireland Aid, Norway, and the World 
Bank, later on joined by Germany, the Netherlands and Canada214 – also 
embarked on pooling resources in a basket fund which would be used for 
agreed priority areas and disbursed through the government system (Mapunda 
2003).215 
With the introduction of the new modalities, a range of ‘dialogue’ mechanisms 
were set up, including a SWAp Committee which would meet biannually to 
review the overall reform process, a Basket Financing Committee to approve 
disbursements and review budget execution on a quarterly basis, and various 
technical working groups to discuss specific topics such as hospital reforms, 
human resources for health, and performance monitoring (Burki 2001). The 
establishment of these multiple forums implied an institutionalisation of 
external engagement in health policy-making which enhanced rather than 
reduced donor interference. 
214 The number and composition of basket fund contributors changed over time; as of 2014, these 
comprised Canada, Denmark,  Ireland,  Switzerland, UNFPA, UNICEF and the World Bank 
(Development Partners Group on Health 2014).  
215 Donors staying outside the basket justified their decision in terms of internal rules and regulations 
which would prevent them from merging funds, whereby the loss of ‘control’ and ‘visibility’ was 
considered a major barrier (Hobbs 2001). 
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The role of donors in the sector-wide approach 
Introducing the SWAp and the health basket at around the turn of the 
millennium, Tanzania was seen as a forerunner in experimenting with new, 
‘harmonised’ aid modalities which became popular with the donor community 
at that time. In cross-country studies, the arrangements adopted in the health 
sector were deemed ‘most advanced’ and highly commended for increasing 
government ‘ownership’ (Brown 2000: v).216 Protagonists involved in donor–
government interaction also perceived a positive shift in relations. A retired 
official who then served as chief medical officer in the Ministry of Health 
remembered: 
With the new thinking of the health sector reform, one of the big changes 
was from thinking in terms of ‘a donor and a project’ to ‘donors agreeing 
and putting the money in one budget’ and getting also the government 
budget together to say ‘ok we have this money, what shall we do’? What 
shall we do? Not what shall I do? Big difference! (Interview 53) 
Similarly, a GTZ representative who at that time strongly championed the new 
approach remarked: 
During the good years of the SWAp, we talked to each other, like ‘what 
are you doing, what are we doing, how do we put that into the overall 
strategy’ – there was no ‘donor agenda’, but a national programme. It 
was a mutual process, we had a certain model in mind, we were kind 
of a ‘dream team’ which advocated for comprehensive primary health 
care, district health services, so the overall direction was fairly clear. 
(Interview 73, translated by authors)
The ‘dream team’ in that context comprised a number of like-minded aid 
experts and key figures in the health ministry who, sharing the same vision 
and convictions, pushed forward reforms in the following years. The same 
group also worked out the subsequent Health Sector Strategic Plan 2003–2008 
which more or less set out to follow up on the PoW priority areas, though with 
a greater focus on ensuring the delivery of essential health packages at district 
level, sharpening the role of the central ministry, and tackling the human 
216 This was emphasised by a research report commissioned by the WHO which investigated the status 
of SWAp arrangements in Cambodia, Vietnam, Mozambique, Uganda and Tanzania in early 2000. 
In the case study on Tanzania, the author noted that “despite high aid dependency, government 
ownership of the programme is growing and national commitment to sector programmes and 
public expenditure reform create a positive environment for health SWAp expansion” (Brown 
2000: v). 
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resource shortage (Ministry of Health 2003). Moreover, the fight against HIV/
Aids which had become a “serious problem on the country’s economy and 
development” (Ministry of Health 2003: viii) was for the first time taken up as 
a ‘special’ strategy. 
Overall, there seemed little dispute about the ‘rightness’ of reforms within 
the Ministry of Health, but they were considered as being driven by a rather 
small cadre of senior officials in the Health Sector Reform Secretariat who 
closely collaborated with donor experts, particularly from those organisations 
that contributed to the health basket (Hobbs 2001; Holtom 2002).217 Through 
the newly established forums, the latter were closely involved in developing 
policies and plans, doing situational analyses and ‘helping’ to think about what 
should be done; a health specialist in the Netherlands Embassy described his 
and other donor colleagues’ contribution as follows:  
We definitely assisted and facilitated the whole process around a new 
policy, a new strategic Health Sector Strategy Plan, which – I don’t want to 
say that those are seen as the most important documents by the Tanzanian 
ministry, but they’re definitely key documents. 
And for example, we, a number of DPs [development partners], helped 
to analyse (…): There are good gains in infant and child mortality, how 
do we sustain that? We do not see these gains yet in maternal health, 
why is there way too slow progress in that area? Has it to do with family 
planning, new diseases, non-communicable diseases... (…). 
In that case a small group of donors helped to formulate strategic plans, 
and made sure that at all levels monitoring and evaluation became more 
important, that evidence-informed decisions became more important. 
(Interview 38) 
The regular encounter with government officials through the various technical 
working groups and other forums enabled donor experts not only to impact 
on how issues were discussed (e.g. by promoting ‘evidence-based’ decision-
making), but also which issues were put on the agenda. In particular, the so-
called ‘Troika’ of the DPG-Health, a body comprising three elected officials 
from member organisations commissioned to advocate donor positions, had 
direct access to key figures in the Ministry of Health which could be used 
217 In contrast to donors, national stakeholders such as research communities, faith-based organisations, 
the private sector or civil society were only marginally or not at all involved in the early stages of 
the reform process (Semali 2003). 
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to turn the spotlight on issues of (donor) concern. A Dutch Embassy official 
reported: 
As the Troika, initially, we had a monthly meeting with senior management 
at the ministry, with the PS [Permanent Secretary], the chief medical officer 
and the directors. And they started then a monthly meeting – maybe it was 
then forced by us that they had that meeting – where they started the first 
half hour with us and then they went on with their own meeting. Even 
at that meeting, you would constantly raise priorities how you perceived 
them. Are they always taking and act upon that? No. But often, you will 
find that they act. (Interview 38)
As the statements above indicate, the SWAp dialogue mechanisms provided 
aid experts with the opportunity to become legitimate participants in the 
policy discourse and shape the agenda through formal discussions. At the same 
time, however, informal negotiations continued, with a lot of “side-meetings” 
(Interview  61) taking place behind the scenes. The entry of global health 
initiatives with massive financial power eventually depleted the potential for 
concerted action under Tanzanian guidance, particularly, but not only, in the 
field of HIV/Aids. 
The rise of global HIV initiatives and their impact on HIV and health governance
At around the turn of the millennium, HIV/Aids in Tanzania had become a 
massive “social and economic problem with devastating impact on national 
development” (TACAIDS 2014c). Although the creation of TACAIDS in 2001 
helped to shift HIV/Aids onto the political agenda as reflected by a considerable 
increase in domestic and foreign funding (Foster & Mwinyimvua 2003:  4), 
Tanzania remained far from reaching budget levels required to finance the 
national response outlined by the country’s first National HIV/Aids Policy 
(Prime Minister‘s Office 2001) and the related National Multi-Sectoral Strategic 
Framework on HIV/Aids 2003–2007 (NMSF) (TACAIDS 2003).218 The World 
218 Reliable and comprehensive information on HIV/Aids spending before 2004/2005 is hardly 
available; only then, HIV/Aids was given a separate code in the Tanzanian budget. In their Public 
Expenditure Review: HIV/Aids Multi-Sectoral Update for 2004, Foster and Mwinyimvua (2003) 
emphasised that both government and donor reports lacked complete and accurate figures on 
HIV-related expenditures. The data they were able to compile indicated an increase of TSh 4.75 
billion in government spending from 2001/02 to 2002/03, almost entirely accounted for by the 
establishment of TACAIDS. Moreover, the authors estimated that HIV/Aids-related aid channelled 
through government agencies increased by 107%, and aid directed to NGOs by 326%. Although the 
total amount of HIV/Aids resources which could be traced had almost doubled, it was considered 
“still less than half of the levels that have been estimated to be needed” (Foster & Mwinyimvua 
2003: 15). 
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Bank was the first donor to come up with the prospect of additional money, 
offering a loan of USD 70 million to be used over a period of five years (2003–
2008) under the umbrella of its Multi-Country HIV/Aids Programme (World 
Bank 2003). Given the massive financing gap, the government accepted the 
project, yielding to the Bank’s pressure, despite reluctance among its own 
ranks and resentment on the part of the remaining donor group which feared 
losing influence (Holtom 2002). The then chairman of TACAIDS remembered 
the situation he found himself in as follows: 
When the World Bank was coming in, they came in with a lot of funds. 
And so I was having a meeting predominantly with the donor group. And 
they began complaining that since the World Bank is stepping in, you 
are paying attention to the World Bank and forgetting us and you follow 
World Bank dictation, etc. So I was quick to point out to them that this is a 
Tanzanian programme and I’m head of this programme and therefore it’s 
going to be, you know, home-based. I don’t care where the money comes 
from, but we are going to make sure that it is Tanzanian-led and -oriented. 
(Interview 64) 
Whether enforced by Tanzanian negotiators or for other reasons, the World 
Bank indeed broadly catered the Tanzania Multi-sectoral Aids Programme 
(T-MAP) to the government’s priorities. The focus was on prevention and 
mitigation measures, and institutional support for TACAIDS which was charged 
with coordinating project-funded activities and submitting annual work plans 
and progress reports (World Bank 2003). 
The Bank undoubtedly made itself the lead agency in the field of HIV/
Aids by providing by far the largest share of resources, but it did not keep 
this position for very long. Shortly after T-MAP started in 2003, a range of 
global players entered the scene: the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria 
(GFATM), the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 
and the Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI), all together large-scale, vertical 
funding schemes offering enormous amounts of money. The Global Fund in 
its third round awarded Tanzania a total of USD 87 million for 2004–2008, 
PEPFAR held out the prospect of disbursing up to USD 100 million annually, 
and CHAI promised to raise a sum of USD 539 million over a period of five 
years (Barry et al. 2003). The hitch in these offers, however, was that resources 
were tightly earmarked; large shares – in the case of PEPFAR 55% – were 
destined to scale-up care and treatment, irrespective of the government’s actual 
prioritisation of HIV prevention and AIDS control. The fact that both local and 
foreign experts deemed the provision of life-long antiretroviral drugs neither 
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feasible at that point in time219 nor affordable in the long run did not prevent 
US representatives from advancing their agenda – a stance which outraged the 
remaining aid community, as a former GTZ representative recalled: 
Interviewee: The Americans had written a programme stating: ‘We have 
realised that HIV/Aids is a problem in Tanzania. We Americans know how 
to fight HIV/Aids, and we will fight HIV/Aids in Tanzania.’ No mention 
of Tanzanians or other actors. Nothing. It caused a scandal – at that time 
I was the acting chair of the donor group and there was a meeting where 
all non-US donors left, saying this is unacceptable (…). 
Interviewer: How did the Tanzanian side react to that? 
Interviewee: Well, there you encounter the actual problem and the limits 
of rational advice: When big money is on the horizon, there is a decision of 
the president or the minister and all the experts – Tanzanians, Europeans, 
Chinese, WHO, whoever else – stand in the corner with no say anymore. 
(Interview 73, translated by authors)
Being confronted with an increasing number of people dying of Aids, the 
government decided to accept the funding offers and to accommodate the 
requirements of the respective donators. The Clinton Foundation, for instance, 
demanded a new National Care and Treatment Plan (NCTP), although the 
Ministry of Health in March 2003 had produced a Health Sector HIV/Aids 
Strategy which entailed a detailed care and treatment section. Drafted by experts 
from the Clinton Foundation, together with Tanzanian officials and approved 
by the Cabinet in October 2003, the NCTP set highly ambitious goals: whereas 
the MoH strategy had proposed to put 13 000 patients on treatment until the 
end of 2006, the ‘Clinton’ plan increased this number to 151 000 (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2003; Hutton 2004).220 While the authors pointed out 
that the plan neither implied “a radical redirection of policy” nor replaced any 
“of the careful planning and wide-ranging action which the United Republic 
of Tanzania has taken” (United Republic of Tanzania 2003: 1–2), it did throw 
219 A Tanzanian expert who then worked for the US government at the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention commented: “We were advising: ‘yes, we should start care and treatment, but the focus 
should also be to strengthen the systems, because you cannot throw the ARVs [antiretroviral drugs] 
in the air and then they go and look for the mouth where to go into’. That is exactly an example I 
gave in the same way. But it was a push that we want ART [antiretroviral treatment] (…) and the 
budget was: more than 50% should go to the drugs. And the remaining should go to prevention, 
the agency costs and whatever. So it remained very little…” (Interview 68)   
220 The actual number of patients put on treatment fell far behind this ambitious target; according to 
TACAIDS information, 54 264 were on ART by end of October 2006 (TACAIDS 2014d). 
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over previous targets and schedules set by the Ministry of Health, and put 
treatment centre stage in Tanzania’s Aids response.221
Not only the Clinton Foundation imposed rigid conditions to its funding. 
PEPFAR in its early phase had a strict rule that only ARVs approved by 
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) could be procured with the 
programme’s funds, which excluded the purchase of most low-cost generic 
drugs (Dietrich 2007).222 Tanzania’s policy, however, was to give preference to 
generic alternatives which were ten to 40 times cheaper than the brand-name 
drugs provided by the US pharmaceutical industry (Venkatesh et al. 2012). 
The conflict led to difficult negotiations, as the then chief medical officer 
remembered: 
Interviewee: USAID just said ‘no’ to generics and we said ‘no’ to non-
generics because this would have been against the drug policy. But at the 
end we agreed.
Interviewer: You agreed? 
Interviewee: Yes, we agreed. We had to come to a compromise. 
(Interview 53) 
In late 2004, Tanzania started a nation-wide care and treatment programme 
financed mainly with money from the new HIV/Aids initiatives.223 
Overshadowing the government and the remaining donors all together in 
terms of funding volumes, PEPFAR and the Global Fund in a short space of 
time became the main sponsors of the overall Aids response: by 2007, both 
together accounted for almost 80% of total expenditures on HIV/Aids (cf. 
TACAIDS’ 2010 Public Expenditure Review, Table 18).
221 The participation of the Ministry of Health in drafting the new plan is said to have been limited; 
a study found that “there has been a certain amount of MOH leadership and ownership in this 
process, but this is still far from desirable levels” (Hutton 2004: 13). 
222 In May 2004, the FDA introduced a tentative approval process for essential generic antiretroviral 
drugs; yet, the number of generics eligible for purchase through PEPFAR only slowly increased. For 
details on PEPFAR’s changing drug policy and regulations, see Venkatesh et al. (2012). 
223 Despite large volumes of aid channelled through the new global HIV/Aids initiatives, the programme 
had a slow start (IRIN News 2006). Treatment figures remained well below the ambitious targets 
set by the National Care and Treatment plan; by 2007, 136 700 patients – only about half of the 
number envisaged and 22% of those eligible for ART – received antiretroviral drugs (National 
AIDS  Control Programme 2008).The lack of qualified medical staff, persisting stigma and low 
voluntary counselling and testing rates were seen as major challenges hampering the scale-up of 
ARV provision. 
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Table 18: HIV/Aids expenditures in Tanzania in 2007
Expenditures on HIV/Aids in TSh billion as share of total in %
Domestic expenditures 22.0 5.5
Foreign aid 380.0 94.5
thereof United States Government (PEPFAR) 230.3 57.3
thereof Global Fund 89.9 22.4
Total expenditures 402.0 100.0
Source: TACAIDS (2010: viii/22).
While the entry of new donors meant a stark increase in funding available for 
HIV/Aids interventions, it did not give the government a greater scope of action 
insofar as the money was channelled outside Tanzania’s budgetary system. The 
bulk of Global Fund and PEPFAR money was disbursed through NGOs and 
US agencies, leaving the government with little control over resource flows 
and clarity on what was being done in the country (TACAIDS 2010), as the 
Director of Finance at TACAIDS remarked:  
In the first phase when they started in 2004, nobody knew what the US 
government was doing (…). It was like when they come to the meeting, 
people will ask them and they will not be able to explain. (Interview 61) 
For the government, the lack of information on how the money was spent and 
where it went created problems not only with respect to resource allocation 
and planning, but also in terms of accountability. The TACAIDS’ director of 
finance commented:  
When USAID funds Non-Governmental Organizations, that money goes 
outside the system. And the way the government operates, you cannot 
capture that unless the money is passing through the government (…). 
But we’ve also discussed with US government that it’s very important for 
us to be accountable; and for them as well. Because if the money does not 
pass through the government machinery, it means it is not being reflected 
in the books of parliament and parliament passes the budget though the 
money is outside, and therefore they cannot follow how it was worked on 
and how it is accounted. (Interview 61)
Although TACAIDS officials reported that as a result of tedious negotiations 
information sharing on the part of US representatives has improved the problem 
of insufficient public oversight over large proportions of HIV/Aids funding still 
has not been solved. From fiscal years 2006/07 to 2010/11, the share of off-
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budget expenditures (i.e. expenditures which are not captured by the national 
exchequer system) actually increased from 78% to over 85% (TACAIDS 2010, 
2012). The fact that the Tanzanian government lacks discretionary authority 
over the larger share of financial resources spent on HIV/Aids makes it impossible 
to use budget allocation as a steering tool (United Republic of Tanzania 2012a). 
It also explains the discrepancy between policy statements and resource flows: 
although prevention was again prioritised by the Second National Multi-
Sectoral Strategic Framework on HIV and Aids covering the years 2008 to 2012 
(TACAIDS 2007) and further pushed onto the agenda by the formulation of a 
National HIV Prevention Strategy (Prime Minister‘s Office 2009),224 it received 
less than a quarter of the overall HIV/Aids funding (23%) in the period 2008 to 
2010 (TACAIDS 2012). The TACAIDS chairperson commented:
It shouldn’t be like that. The priority is HIV prevention. And HIV 
prevention should be allocated more money than treatment. We know that 
treatment is prevention, but at the end of the day, we’ll continue treating 
more people if we do not prevent! (Interview 63)225 
That more than half (59%) of HIV/Aids funding was spent on treatment, care 
and support can be attributed particularly to the United States’ strong emphasis 
on this. The government’s recent attempts to obtain a shift in PEPFAR spending 
patterns had only a limited effect. The TACAIDS director of finance described 
the difficulty in prevailing against the US agenda: 
I know when we were designing PEPFAR 2 which started around 
2009/2010, they wanted to fund more treatment and we wanted to fund 
more prevention (…). It was hard – it was hard, because for them it’s 
easy to account for how many test kits and how many drugs you have sent 
to Tanzania, because you can physically count them. But on prevention 
programmes, actually for any donor it’s hard, because you just educate 
people and you cannot measure it easily, you know. (Interview 61) 
The explanation that the US as well as other donors preferred to support 
treatment due to their internal legitimation pressure was also used by TACAIDS’ 
director for policy and planning who remarked: 
224 For a detailed analysis of the formulation process of the HIV Prevention Strategy and related 
interests, see Hunsmann (2013: 146–175). 
225 The ‘treatment as prevention’ agenda the interviewee refers to was pushed when a clinical study 
funded by the US National Institutes of Health found that treatment of a person living with HIV 
reduced the risk of transmission to partners by 96% (The Lancet 2011). The United States in 
particular strongly promoted the finding and highlighted the idea of ‘treatment as prevention’ in 
its PEPFAR II Blueprint released in 2012 (United States of America, Department of State 2012).  
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Any external support, they operate result-based. Prevention – whether based 
on condoms, whatever intervention, STIs and alike, these interventions are 
becoming very unpopular because the impact you don’t see now, you will 
see later. It takes longer to see the results. But if you put someone on ART, 
you monitor for one year, he or she recovers – that is the outcome. You can 
say now they are healthy living, doing her or his duty. So that’s the result. 
(Interview 62)
As a result of the massive amounts of aid provided for the scale-up of treatment, 
the number of people receiving antiretroviral drugs increased from 23 951 in 
2005 to 432 293 in 2012 which corresponds to 61% of those eligible for ART 
(World Health Organization et al. 2013; TACAIDS 2014d). While the rapid 
expansion of ART coverage was judged a notable achievement which saved 
the lives of many, it implied a substantive absorption of financial and human 
resources in a system which already faced a severe shortage of health workers, 
money and equipment for the supply of basic services. Health officials found 
it highly problematic that the roll-out of HIV care and treatment negatively 
affected other areas in terms of staff and budget availability. The head of Health 
Care Financing in the MoHSW remarked:  
When you focus your money on HIV, you know the impact: attraction of 
staff from other programmes to HIV, because you have money here. But 
again, the problem cannot be really solved because HIV patients should 
go to the labs which are not functioning. So you are focusing on an area 
which also depends on other areas (…). So the challenges are there. 
(Interview 54) 
This statement hints at one of the most problematic issues related to the entry 
of global health initiatives in Tanzania: they not only shifted the bulk of the 
HIV budget to treatment but also skewed the overall resource allocation in 
health towards HIV/Aids at the expense of other crucial areas and prevalent 
diseases (Hutton 2004). Imposing conditions and their own agendas, the new 
HIV players undermined the efforts and main goal of the newly established 
SWAp mechanism, namely to achieve a more harmonised form of health 
governance under which all stakeholders would act in concert. As in other 
recipient countries, the emergence and dominance of these actors in Tanzania 
profoundly impacted on both policy-making and aid relationships in the way 
of distorting national priorities and distracting the government from assuming 
leadership (Biesma et al. 2009). 
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The current state of aid relations in health and HIV/Aids
The reforms in the early 2000s were meant to increase national ‘ownership’ 
and to establish a new kind of partnership between the government and 
donors. However, the state of affairs ten years after seems far from ideal. 
The sophisticated dialogue structure which has repeatedly been refined and 
revised over the years exists primarily on paper. A Danida advisor placed in the 
MoHSW expressed her frustration about constant delays of meetings: 
The actual policy dialogue between the partners and the ministry has been 
very weak. It’s been very poor. I mean the Troika has had to fight to meet 
with the management to discuss how things are going. And meetings are 
barely kept on schedule – meetings that are supposed to happen within 
the SWAp all of which are kind of conditions for the basket funding (…). 
And it’s not very much as an advisor that you can do other than kind of 
remind people that now there is a commitment to have a meeting, that it’s 
important. (Interview 34) 
The meetings referred to in the statement above include, amongst others, the 
various technical working groups and the Technical Committee of the SWAp 
(TC-SWAp) which was meant to serve as a joint monitoring and advisory 
body of the health sector (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare et al. 2009). 
Commenting on the functioning of these forums, the first secretary for health 
and HIV/Aids in the Netherlands Embassy stated: 
Some of them work relatively well – M&E [Monitoring and Evaluation] 
because we have an initiative there, HR [Human Resources] is working 
relatively well, not so effective though. There’re other ones who hardly 
meet (…). Officially we still have four TC-SWAp meetings a year. Now if 
you have two, it’s much. (Interview 38) 
Both interviewees attributed the lack of adherence to meeting schedules first 
and foremost to management challenges in the Ministry of Health, pointing 
to unfilled positions, a high staff turn-over and an ‘ad hoc’ way of working 
which kept their counterparts ‘constantly running’. These problems were 
explained primarily in terms of inappropriate organisational structures, poor 
human resource management and a general lack of administrative capacity in 
the MoHSW. But the first secretary in the Netherlands Embassy also blamed 
the aid community for exacerbating the situation: 
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It’s also partly caused by the various partners who are coming in and out, 
etc. Because if you now look at the dialogue structure, the idea was that 
we would not as partners bother the government too much beyond those 
structures. That was the idea. If you had interest in HR, then you would 
be active in the HR group. [But] of course development partners still have 
their own direct lines. And strong governments, they would say more often 
‘sorry, but…’ You don’t have to be too Stalinist on that, but it shouldn’t 
be that you are constantly busy. (Interview 38) 
The fact that donors on their part do not comply with the agreed working 
arrangements and principles – such as to limit their interaction with decision-
makers to the formal dialogue in order to reduce ‘transaction’ costs and to 
increase transparency – was confirmed by various officials. The TACAIDS 
director of finance and administration, for instance, referring to the Finance 
and Auditing Technical Working Committee for HIV/Aids, reported: 
Apart from that committee, we have side meetings with bilaterals, for 
example, to discuss their funding and some of the issues they want. Because 
sometimes some of the development partners (…), they still want to do 
some of the things separately. So we accommodate them and we have these 
meetings and agree on various issues. (Interview 61) 
The continuation of bilateral ‘backdoor’ meetings and the persisting endeavour 
by donors to push individual interventions not only absorb immense staff time 
from the Tanzanian administration, but subvert transparent negotiation and 
concerted action as envisaged by the SWAp code of conduct and the respective 
terms of references for the DPG sub-groups Health and AIDS (see Development 
Partners Group on Health 2006; Government of Tanzania & Development 
Partners 2007; Development Partners Group on HIV/Aids 2013). Although 
‘development partners’ themselves have set up and signed these rules, they 
seem little committed to adhere to them. Commenting on the deficient 
compliance and the difficulty of ‘speaking with one voice’, the head of the 
German health programme and then chair of DPG Health remarked: 
Harmonisation is partly an arduous process since naturally each 
organisation, each country is driven by its headquarters, by the capital 
where political processes take place; and a change of minister can have 
quite an effect. This applies for Germany as well as for other countries – 
when governments and ministers change, foci and priorities are likely to 
shift. (Interview 37, translated by authors)
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Both Tanzania’s health reforms and its Aids response are highly vulnerable 
to the shifting priorities and preferences of external funders, given the 
considerable dependency on aid money. This has been particularly palpable 
in recent years when three of the largest contributors to the health basket, 
together accounting for about one third of the estimated budget pledged for 
2011/2012 (Government of Tanzania &   Health Basket Partners 2011),226 
almost simultaneously announced a reduction or termination of their support. 
The Netherlands decided to cut the number of its recipient countries from 33 
to 15. Tanzania was informed that Dutch aid would phase out (Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). Norway decided to withdraw from health 
in order to focus on five other priority areas (environment, climate and forest, 
management of natural resources, fiscal issues and illegal capital flight, human 
rights and democracy) (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
2014). Germany informed the government that it would scale back the overall 
financial volume of support to the sector and pull out from the health basket 
(GIZ Tanzanian German Programme to Support Health 2011). Approached 
upon this decision – which seems remarkable insofar as Germany had been 
instrumental in setting up this mechanism – the head of the German health 
programme responded with noticeable unease: 
Yes, in fact there has been a change of tack which indicates that political 
decision-making processes are not always coherent with technical advisory 
approaches (…) And quite recently, indeed, Germany in bilateral 
governmental consultations made clear its position that we pull out of 
basket funding. The partner was sitting on the other side and emphasised 
the importance of this contribution, asking ‘please do not withdraw, it is 
important for the health reform programme which runs until 2015 and 
we thought Germany would stay and provide support’. But there was a 
political decision (…) towards which we now have to orientate ourselves. 
(Interview 37, translated by authors) 
For policy-makers and senior officials in the MoHSW, Germany’s and other 
donors’ decision to terminate support was more than untimely insofar as it 
severely threatens the implementation of the Health Sector Strategic Plan III 
(2009–2015) which calculated on increased rather than reduced contributions 
 
 
226 The health basket side-agreement for fiscal year 2011/2012 estimated that partners would pledge 
an amount of USD 115.81 million; thereof, the Netherlands was expected to contribute USD 21.29 
million (EUR 15.00 million), Germany USD 9.93 million (EUR 7.00 million) and Norway USD 5.40 
million (NOK 30.00 million) (Government of Tanzania & Health Basket Partners 2011). 
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from foreign funders, particularly through the health basket (Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare 2009). In the view of the chief medical officer, the 
withdrawal of major funders jeopardises the progress under way: 
In the reduction in childhood deaths, there has been a downward trend 
very fast. There is also a downward trend in maternal deaths, though it 
is not as fast. But we believe that with all these developments, the speed 
will definitely pick up. And this is where we will start now showing the 
countries, our partners, there is the impact or the outcome of their support 
(…). [If the partners] pull out now, then definitely they will be doing a 
great disservice to all these efforts and the processes and the achievements 
that are starting now to emerge. (Interview 52)
Not only decision-makers in the MoHSW fear a setback through a decrease in 
foreign funding. Officials at TACAIDS face a similarly worrisome situation with 
respect to shifting aid priorities, as the chairperson of the organisation noted 
when interviewed: 
The reality is right now, funds are getting less (…). When I joined 
TACAIDS in January 2007, there were lots of resources, particularly from 
the World Bank, very flexible resources so that we could say ‘NGO so 
and so, you’re just starting and your work is on orphans, I think this is 
very good because nobody has gone to that area. Please take this money, 
this is how you report, this is how you will be audited, go ahead.’ Right 
now you cannot do that anymore. So the writing is on the wall that the 
shape is different, the interest is different and people have other priorities. 
(Interview 63)
Since 2011, TACAIDS has been confronted with budget cuts from several key 
donors: The United States and Germany decided to reduce financial aid for 
HIV/Aids-related activities, and Denmark and Canada announced they would 
terminate their support for the Aids response (i.e. the National Multi-Sectoral 
Strategic Framework) by 2015 (GIZ Tanzanian German Programme to Support 
Health 2011; Tanzania Daily News 2013). Moreover, the Global Fund cancelled 
its next round of funding due to insufficient pledges of its members, informing 
recipients that no new grants could be financed until 2014 (IRIN  News 
2011b). In response to decreasing aid volumes and the imminent phase-out 
of long-standing partners, the chairperson of TACAIDS has repeatedly called 
for increased efforts to raise domestic resources, warning that a failure to get 
prompt replacement for the funding would result in a ‘heavy blow’ affecting 
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the achievements made in the fight against HIV/Aids within the last 20 years 
(Tanzania Daily News 2013).227
Aid dependency and its implications 
The centrality of aid for the implementation of health reforms and the 
national Aids response seems widely internalised among leadership ranks in 
the responsible organisations. Given that about 97% of the health ministry’s 
development budget and the overall budget for HIV/Aids is financed from 
outside (see Chapter 6), programmes and initiatives which do not conform 
to donors’ expectations are unlikely to be realised. As a consequence of this 
experience, government officials appear to have accepted that policy-making 
and planning is done in close consultation with experts from the respective 
funding agencies. This is reflected by statements from the finance directors of 
TACAIDS and the MoHSW, respectively, who commented: 
HIV/Aids in Tanzania is heavily funded by donors and therefore it’s very 
important to have that relationship (…) – I would say that we have a very, 
very close relationship in everything that we do. (Interview 61) 
The way we have built our dialogue structures – we discuss technically 
with partners, we plan technically together with them, that’s how it has 
been meant to be; we don’t just go up while we have not shared with the 
working groups. That’s how we work. (Interview 54) 
Aid representatives were outspoken about the fact that despite all rhetoric of 
‘partnership’ the whole dialogue is based on the government’s financial needs. 
A Tanzanian World Bank specialist bluntly stated: 
It is inevitable that the government has a dialogue with the donors 
because there is a gap. If there wasn’t a gap, if the government was self-
sufficient, then probably it would not need any that kind of discussion. 
(Interview 47) 
The dependency relationship underlying the dialogue latently shapes the 
outcomes of discussions insofar as government officials are forced to reach 
some sort of agreement with donor representatives in order to maintain room 
 
227 As an attempt to mitigate its donor dependency in the field of HIV/Aids, the government is in the 
process of establishing an Aids Trust Fund through which it hopes to mobilise more local resources 
(Lamtey 2012; Kassim 2014). At the time of writing, however, the fund was still not effective.  
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for manoeuvre. Faced with extreme resource scarcity, rejecting ‘advice’ of 
‘development partners’ is hardly an option for decision-makers. That money 
is openly used as a lever to give ‘technical’ arguments more clout was bluntly 
confirmed by a Tanzanian health expert working for WHO: 
External experts would normally use the muscle of their financial support 
– ‘if you don’t do this, then I think I would advise my government not to 
give more money’. So the national experts will not win that war although 
they might have reasons behind it (…). So we have seen sometimes the 
agenda of external experts prevails simply because of the financial side of 
it. (Interview 44) 
This statement suggests that the mechanisms established in the context of the 
SWAp reform with the aim to strengthen Tanzanian leadership have not been 
particularly effective. Even in the case of the health basket fund which was set 
up to increase the government’s steering capacity and control over resources, 
donors are said to strongly determine what the money is used for, depriving 
the MoHSW of its discretionary authority. The WHO officer, himself a former 
ministry member, alleged the following examples: 
In terms of diagnostics, what is important in the hospitals [is that] there 
are x-rays. In its policies, the ministry says we want to rehabilitate x-rays 
– and we [the development partners] say ‘no, that one, we are not buying 
it’. (…) And then we go to the health basket fund and we say, you forgot 
to put iodine (…), we will give you money for that. The minister has not 
even requested that! (Interview 44)
In both the health sector and the field of HIV/Aids, the government’s capacity 
to exercise leadership in terms of defining its own priorities seems strongly 
limited, with donors still earmarking aid for specific purposes even though this 
contravenes the agreed principles of cooperation. Assessing the government’s 
options in terms of reacting against the dominance of external funders, aid 
officials acknowledged that in the current setting it seems to have little choice. 
The health programme manager of GIZ rhetorically asked: 
There is a health system which is utterly underfinanced (…). So don’t 
you take what comes along to at least support some of the most essential 
pillars? (Interview 37) 
In a similar vein, a Danida consultant placed in the MoHSW remarked:
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It has to be a very confident ministry that will kind of turn down money – 
even if it’s contrary to its own policies. (Interview 34) 
Yet, not all interviewees agreed with the ‘no choice’ narrative. Contrary to the 
aid officials quoted above, a Tanzanian health specialist with ten years of work 
experience in the MoHSW argued: 
You can say no! It does not always send the money away. But many 
people are worried that if you say no, then the support will go away. 
(Interview 68) 
There is an additional factor that further weakens the government’s stance 
towards donors: senior officials in the administration seem to encounter aid 
experts with a sort of resignation based on the experience or mere assumption 
that they are eventually dependent on the donor community’s consent. This 
sort of pre-emptive submissiveness was observed by the former executive 
chairman of TACAIDS who criticised: 
The natives are not sufficiently strong to impress upon the donor 
organisations that ‘this is what we want and this is how we want it’ 
(…). I notice that some of the people, some of the officials who get their 
assistance, they sort of say ‘well, he has the money, he wants to do this and 
that, well, why don’t we cut a long story short, and let’s agree with him’. 
That’s where things go wrong. (Interview 64) 
Given the perceived precedence of securing aid, officials in the MoHSW and 
TACAIDS appear to have internalised a conduct of compliance towards the 
donor community. The fact that ‘advice’ from aid experts is seldom contested 
would also explain why there are rather few occurrences of serious disputes in 
policy discussions, as interviewees from both sides noted. While in the official 
narrative, the lack of conflict is represented as an indication of the harmonious 
relationship of ‘partners’ in health and HIV/Aids, it can also be interpreted as 
a sign that aid dependency has eroded recipients’ resistance. 
Conclusion
Analysing Aids policy-making by investigating the formulation process of the 
HIV prevention strategy, Hunsmann (2013: 169) came to the conclusion that 
“international donors are not merely ‘influencing’ AIDS policy in Tanzania; 
they are co-constitutive of its very existence”. The observations of this case 
study not only support the finding that there is no sphere of independent, 
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endogenous policy-making in HIV/Aids, but suggest that this also applies to 
the health sector in general. A retired official, previously director of policy and 
planning at TACAIDS, stated: 
I don’t think we have policies really that are purely national (…) because 
it’s a process and this process always involves the partners. They have a say 
there, they do have a say. (Interview 65) 
With the introduction of the SWAp and related mechanisms, aid experts 
have become legitimate participants in the policy discourse with a strong 
voice in defining priorities and setting the agenda – as opposed to national 
stakeholders from civil society, the private sector or the research community 
whose role therein seems if at all marginal. While the dialogue forums in 
health and HIV/Aids were actually established to reduce donor influence and 
induce “a more distant form of advice” (Interview 73) it de facto brought aid 
actors closer to decision-making insofar as it entrenched their participation in 
policy development, analysis and evaluation. Given the intense engagement 
of donors in decision-making processes, it is questionable whether the new 
partnership approach has increased national leadership in health and HIV/
Aids governance as claimed by its proponents, or rather weakened it by 
institutionalising external interference.
South Africa health: Rebuilding relationships with local and 
external experts
Sectoral context
With an estimate of 5.26 million people living with Aids (roughly 10% of 
the population) as of 2013, South Africa counts the highest number of HIV 
infections in the world (Statistics South Africa 2013). At the same time, the 
country faces a high incidence rate of tuberculosis (TB) which has more than 
doubled since 2001 (The Lancet South Africa Series Executive Summary Core 
Group 2009). While the large numbers of HIV and TB cases would be enough 
to put any nation under stress, three other ‘colliding epidemics’ – chronic 
illness and mental health disorders, injury and violence-related deaths, and 
maternal, neonatal and child mortality – exacerbate the situation; the fact that 
the ‘quadruple burden of disease’ falls on a system which is still characterised 
by inequity and fragmentation makes matters worse (The Lancet South Africa 
Series Executive Summary Core Group 2009). The persistent inequality 
caused by apartheid is manifested in the huge discrepancy between the ‘first-
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class’ health services provided by private suppliers financed through medical 
schemes and out-of-pocket payments, and the dismal conditions in tax-funded 
public facilities which the vast majority of the population relies on. It is also 
reflected by a skewed distribution of health workforce between the private 
and the public sector, as well as between urban and rural areas (McIntyre et 
al. 2008). In the latter, the chronic shortage of qualified staff is particularly 
severe.228 Overall, the Department of Health identified a deficit of about 83 000 
health professionals in 2011 (Department of Health 2011b).229
Despite the challenge of multiple epidemics, systemic flaws and a severe 
workforce crisis, the government has achieved notable successes since 
Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi assumed office in 2009. Life expectancy at 
birth increased from 54 years in 2005 to 60 years in 2011, and the under-5 
mortality rate per 1 000 live births significantly declined from 56 in 2009 to 
42 in 2011; both developments are attributed to the extensive roll-out of 
antiretroviral treatment and massive efforts in the prevention of HIV mother-
to-child transmission undertaken by the new administration (Bradshaw et al. 
2012; Mayosi et al. 2012). Although immense problems remain, the health 
improvements brought about in recent years give rise to positive outlooks. In 
an article published by The Lancet in late 2012, authors assessing the changing 
health conditions in South Africa came to the conclusion that “for the first time 
in two decades, this progress instils a basis for hope” (Mayosi et al. 2012: 2040). 
Governance structures
The structures of health governance in South Africa are outlined by the 
National Health Act of 2003 which provides the framework for a uniform 
system encompassing public and private health establishments (Republic 
of South Africa 2004b). According to the Act, the overall responsibility for 
healthcare in the country lies with the Department of Health (DoH) which as 
the national line ministry provides strategic guidance to the sector by setting 
norms and standards, developing policies and plans, and monitoring their 
implementation. The provinces in turn are directly responsible for delivering 
and overseeing most health services from primary care level to specialised 
228 McIntyre et al. (2008) provide numbers which reflect the huge disparity: in the public sector, there 
are 4 200 people per general doctor, 10 800 people per specialist, and 620 people per nurse; the 
private sector, in contrast, counts only 590 people per general doctor, 470 people per specialist, and 
100 per nurse. Overall, “the majority of health care professionals work in the private sector, despite 
serving the minority of the population” (McIntyre et al. 2008: c).  
229 The human resources situation in health is exacerbated by the brain drain of health professionals 
to foreign countries, with an estimated attrition rate of about 25% per year (Department of Health 
2011b:  31). As of 2003, there were more South African medical practitioners working abroad 
(8 921 in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States) than counted in the 
public sector (7 517) (Department of Health 2011b: 22/32). 
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hospitals; each provincial government has its own health department with 
considerable autonomy in terms of resource allocation and programme 
implementation (Mills et al. 2012). 
The health departments at the national and provincial levels are supported by 
health councils which are assigned to provide advice on health policy matters; 
the Act further established consultative forums comprising representatives of 
key stakeholders from the public and the private sector, civil society, academia 
and donors (Republic of South Africa 2004b). 
The highest advisory and coordinating body on HIV/Aids is the South African 
National AIDS Council (SANAC) which was formed in 2002 to strengthen the 
country’s multi-sectoral response to the epidemic. After a decade in which 
SANAC existed in name but was more or less dysfunctional, the organisation 
underwent a major reform process initiated in 2012, through which its 
mandate was expanded and its structures were radically revamped. As an 
independent entity, SANAC brings together ministerial leaders, provincial 
government members and civil society actors from nineteen sectors who are 
represented in the decision-making plenary chaired by the deputy president. 
A small secretariat is supposed to facilitate and coordinate the work of the 
different SANAC institutions such as the Programme Review Committee 
which monitors implementation, technical task teams which process scientific 
findings and the Civil Society Forum which was established to foster dialogue 
and information sharing. The secretariat is also expected to support provincial 
and district AIDS councils and to help mobilise domestic and international 
resources. This makes it a focal point for the aid community. 
Donor presence in the health sector 
As a focus area and ‘cross-cutting issue’ of many aid organisations, HIV/Aids 
receives by far the largest amount of external resources provided for health 
in South Africa, “often in conjunction with support related to other sexually 
transmitted infections and tuberculosis or primary health care in general” 
(Fölscher et al. 2010: 59). 
According to a spending assessment covering the years 2007/08–2009/10, 
aid for HIV/Aids and TB interventions amounted to ZAR 5.57 billion 
(approximately USD 693 million) almost half of which was sourced from the 
US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) programme (see 
data cited in Republic of South Africa 2012: 92 and SANAC 2013: 3). Hence, 
considering the scope of financial contribution, the US government stood out 
as the preeminent player in the field, followed by the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom through 
DFID and the European Commission. All together, these five organisations 
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accounted for 82% of external funding. The list of donors which contributed 
smaller amounts and technical assistance is extensive, comprising more than 
14 bilateral and seven multilateral agencies (see Republic of South Africa 
2012: 93/95).230 
Given the significant number of foreign actors engaged, it is remarkable that 
only two of them, namely DFID and the EU, support the health sector beyond 
HIV/TB, and that aside from informal information-sharing there has been 
little coordination until recently.231 In order to improve the harmonisation 
and alignment of donor activities with the national agenda, the DoH in 2011 
launched an ‘Aid Effectiveness Framework for Health in South Africa’ which 
provided for the establishment of joint planning and coordination forums 
(Department of Health 2011e). At the time of our interviews, these institutions 
did not yet fully work as expected; both DoH officials and donor representatives, 
however, expressed the sentiment that communication had already improved, 
pointing to a renewed political leadership and cooperative spirit emerging after 
an era in which donor–government relationships had broken down.  
HIV and health governance in post-apartheid South Africa  
From today’s viewpoint, the history of health governance in post-apartheid 
South Africa can be told in three chapters structured along the respective 
response to the country’s most perilous disease: the first is about the initial 
years of democracy in which the rapid spread of HIV urged the government 
to take the issue onto the political agenda; the second covers the era of 
Aids denialism under the Mbeki administration resulting in a deep crisis of 
government legitimacy and break up of relations with the science and the 
donor communities; the third starts with the change of leadership in 2009 
which paved the way for a radical policy shift initiated by a “passionate” 
(Interview 11) new health minister with a “powerful presence” (Interview 27) 
in the DoH and beyond.  
Motsoaledi’s coming into office is widely regarded as the crucial turning 
point for HIV and health governance in South Africa. In order to provide 
the background for conceiving the paradigm shift he brought about, pivotal 
230 These included the governments of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, as well as IOM, UNAIDS, 
UNFPA, UNHRC, UNODC, WHO and the World Bank (Republic of South Africa 2012). In addition, 
various international foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Caritas, Red 
Cross, Médicins sans Frontières, Open Society Institute and the Ford Foundation provided funding 
and assistance (SANAC 2013).  
231 The only informal arrangement which has existed since around 2009 was the so-called EU Plus 
Working Group in which donors from European member states shared information about their 
activities, but without any government participation (Interview 5). 
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developments prior to his term are briefly sketched out before focusing on 
recent policy processes and the involvement of aid experts therein. 
An epidemic on the rise: The spread of HIV in an era of health system 
transformation 
When the first democratic government took over power in 1994 a central 
endeavour was to overcome the “racially discriminatory, fragmented, and 
poorly coordinated” (Benatar 1997: 1537) health system inherited from the 
apartheid regime. The White Paper for the Transformation of the Health System 
in South Africa released in 1997 envisaged a unified national system centred 
on comprehensive primary healthcare (PHC) at the district level. In order to 
redress past inequalities, emphasis “should be placed on reaching the poor, 
the under-served, the aged, women and children, who are amongst the most 
vulnerable” (Department of Health 1997). The realisation of reform, however, 
was hampered, first and foremost by the vast lack of human resources and 
managerial capacity in the public sector (Coovadia et al. 2009). As in other 
ministries, the new cadre of civil servants in the health department comprised 
often highly engaged but inexperienced officials “with little knowledge of 
large bureaucracies, let alone how to achieve innovation through these 
bureaucracies” (Schneider & Stein 2001: 726).
Such institutional constraints also impaired the implementation of the 
first National AIDS Plan (NAP) which was developed by the National AIDS 
Committee of South Africa (NACOSA) and adopted by the Department of 
Health in 1994 (Schneider & Stein 2001). With its emphasis on the need to 
adopt a multi-sectoral response and human-rights centred approach, the 
document represented to many an ideal policy, combining “the technical 
with the political” and being “comprehensive, practical and carefully costed” 
(Schneider & Stein 2001: 725). The fact that the fight against Aids was declared 
a ‘Presidential Lead Project’ signalled high-level commitment to combat the 
epidemic and granted preferential access to resources from the government’s 
Reconstruction and Development Programme for related activities (Schneider 
& Stein 2001). 
Yet, the plan did not materialise as expected; in hindsight, many observers 
attributed the failure to achieve the ambitious aims to the fact that the human 
resources at the government’s disposal in the throes of transition had been 
greatly over-estimated (Schneider & Stein 2001; Butler 2005; Wouters et al. 
2010). Lacking skilled and experienced personnel, the administration struggled 
to translate the plan into action and to effectively use the resources set aside 
by the government and donors. Of the ZAR 53 million allocated by the EU 
for the implementation period 1995–1996 only ZAR 7 million (equivalent to 
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13%) had been disbursed by May 1997 (Schneider & Gilson 1999; Schneider 
& Stein 2001).
Due to the inability to put intentions into practice and emerging policy 
contestation among Aids players232, HIV rapidly spread during Mandela’s 
presidency, with prevalence among adults aged 20–64 rising from 1.5% in 
1994 to 9.7% by 1999 (ASSA AIDS Committee 2011).233 
Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang: The era of Aids denialism 
When after South Africa’s second general elections in 1999 Thabo Mbeki 
took over power, “the HIV/AIDS epidemic had already taken on horrifying 
proportions: approximately 4.2 million South Africans were living with HIV, 
and an additional 1600 people were infected daily” (Wouters et al. 2010: 176). 
Right after assuming office, Mbeki directed the development of a new five-
year HIV/AIDS & STD Strategic Plan which was finalised in January 2000 
(Department of Health 2000). While the pace of its formulation seemed to 
signal the new leadership’s commitment to tackle the increasing Aids problem, 
the plan lacked clear activities, timeframes and budgets, and thus remained 
“somewhat generalised in terms of what is to be done and how resources are to 
be prioritised” (Grimwood et al. 2000: 292); most notably, it kept quiet about 
concrete treatment options. A novelty put forward was the establishment 
of a multi-sectoral South African National AIDS Council (SANAC) with the 
mandate to advise the government on HIV/Aids and STD policy and to oversee 
and enforce implementation (Wouters et al. 2010). That the institution was to 
be formed by representatives from government and civil society was widely 
commended; yet, when it came to the appointment of members, lead activists 
and renowned academics were excluded (Schneider 2002; Fourie & Meyer 
2010).
Mbeki’s relationship with the Aids and biomedical community had already 
been strained by his key role in the Virodene affair and his publicly articulated 
claims about ‘toxic side-effects’ of antiretroviral drugs (Baleta 1999).234 
Tensions culminated when Mbeki convened a Presidential Aids Advisory 
232 Serious disputes in the Aids context emerged about the Sarafina 2 awareness play project (1996), 
the quack remedy Virodene (1997), Aids notification plans (1997) and antiretroviral therapy for 
pregnant women (1998). For details on these controversies, see Schneider (2002).
233 Results extracted from the ASSA2008 AIDS and Demographic model of the Actuarial Society 
of South Africa, Summary (Prov) Output as downloaded on 22 July 2014 from  http://aids.
actuarialsociety.org.za/ASSA2008-Model-3480.htm.
234 In 1997, researchers from the University of Pretoria presented Virodene as an allegedly 
‘breakthrough’ treatment to cure Aids. Mbeki as deputy president was a key actor supporting the 
group despite strong scepticism on the part of the South African biomedical community which 
he accused of retarding access to life-saving therapy. Due to insufficient evidence and toxic risks, 
Virodene was eventually rejected by South Africa’s Medicines Control Council (Schneider 2002).
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Panel to re-examine causes and solutions to the epidemic, inviting a group of 
‘dissidents’ who denied the link between HIV and Aids. Mbeki’s championing 
of the latter evoked massive critique on the part of the local and international 
science community. Internal pressure led the president to withdraw from the 
debate, but not to reverse his stance (Schneider 2002).235 
Mbeki’s agenda was pushed forward by his Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang who persistently rejected the roll-out of antiretroviral treatment, 
portraying it as ‘poison’ and promoting unproven alternative remedies instead 
(Nattrass 2008). Even after being forced by the Constitutional Court to make 
ARVs nationally available to pregnant women as means to prevent mother-
to-child HIV transmission (PMTCT) and being pressurised by the Cabinet to 
introduce highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) for Aids-sick people, 
the minister continued to promote alternative remedies and preached the 
alleged benefits of garlic, olive oil and lemon juice for curing the disease (see 
Heywood 2003; Wines 2004; Nattrass 2006a, 2006b, 2008).236 Comparing 
the number of persons who received ARVs between 2000 and 2005 with 
an alternative of what would have been reasonably feasible in the country 
during that period, a study later estimated that more than 330 000 lives were 
lost due to the government’s reluctance to provide antiretroviral treatment 
(Chigwedere et al. 2008). 
During the era of Mbeki/Tshabalala-Msimang, the Department of Health’s 
relationships with other actors in the Aids field broke down completely. The 
local science community and civil society formed alliances internally and 
internationally to push forward PMTCT and ART programmes on the ground, 
supported by foreign donors who channelled their aid to NGOs and research 
projects, bypassing the ministry.237 The cleavage between the central leadership 
and lower levels of the system became apparent in that doctors backed by 
medical associations and provincial governments openly defied the national 
policy by supplying ARVs to patients (IRIN News 2002; Stoppard 2002). 
235 For a detailed analysis of the public discourse on the matter and its implications for the relationship 
between politics and science, see Weingart (2002).  
236 The government was taken to court by the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) which launched a 
constitutional challenge when the government restricted the provision of the antiretroviral drug 
Nevirapine to pregnant women for the purpose of preventing mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV. TAC alleged a violation of the right to healthcare services as granted by the South African 
Constitution. In 2002, the Court ordered the Minister of Health and the nine Health Members 
of the provincial Executive Committees to extend the availability of Nevirapine to state hospitals 
and clinics and to launch a national programme ‘without delay’. A detailed summary of the case 
is provided by Heywood (2003); all official documents related to the litigation are provided on the 
website of the International Network for Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (http://www.escr-net.
org/docs/i/403050, last accessed on 18 January 2015). 
237 For an analysis of HIV/Aids-related donor funding to South Africa in the period 2000–2005, see 
Ndlovu (2005). 
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In the light of increasing domestic and international pressure following the 
health minister’s speech at the Toronto Aids conference where she reaffirmed 
her renitent stance, the Cabinet eventually transferred the responsibility for 
Aids policy to Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka (Nattrass 2008). 
This shift of authority and the sick leave of Tshabalala-Msimang in late 2006 
opened up a ‘window of opportunity’ (Kingdon 1984) to overcome the impasse. 
As chairwoman of SANAC and the inter-ministerial Aids committee, Mlambo-
Ngcuka drove forward the development of a new strategic plan, incorporating 
Aids specialists who had previously been excluded from the policy terrain 
(Timberg 2006).238 After extensive consultations with health professionals, 
scientists, activists and officials from various sectors, the HIV&Aids and STI 
Strategic Plan for South Africa 2007–2011 (commonly abbreviated as NSP 
standing for National Strategic Plan) was finalised by an expert task team 
and approved by the Cabinet in May 2007 (Venter 2007). In contrast to the 
preceding document, the NSP set clear targets, such as halving the rate of 
new HIV infections and providing treatment, care and support to 80% of 
all HIV-positive people and their families by 2011 (SANAC 2007). The plan 
was praised by health experts, donor representatives and activists alike for its 
ambitious goals and vigorous commitments which signalled a clear policy shift 
(IRIN News 2007a; Sapa & AFP 2007). A key actor involved in drafting the 
document was more critical about the actual soundness of the strategy and 
expressed the importance of the NSP for civil society at that time: 
I don’t think it was a perfect policy paper – people say that, but it wasn’t. 
The current five-year plan was something we forced as a way to give us 
power to shape the policy and implementation agenda. So with that plan 
at the beginning of 2007, we just threw everything into it, because in 
2007 Manto Tshabalala-Msimang was still the Minister of Health, Thabo 
Mbeki was still the president – they’ve been forced to back down, but they 
were still there. So we didn’t have strong grounds. So the new strategic 
plan came along and we said, ok, ARVs, male circumcision, prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission – let’s just put everything in, because if it’s 
in there (…) it would strengthen our hand if we had to litigate, if we could 
go to the courts and say, look, the Cabinet has agreed to this as a matter 
238 Another key protagonist in that process was the Deputy Health Minister Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge 
who during Tshabalala-Msimang’s sick leave in late 2006 spoke out against her own government, 
admitting Aids “denial at the very highest level” (Bevan 2006). Together with the deputy president 
(allegedly an old friend of hers) she pushed for policy change, reaching out to civil society and 
scientists whom her absent superior had refused to consult. In August 2007, Madlala-Routledge 
was sacked by President Mbeki on the grounds of an unauthorised trip to the International AIDS 
Vaccine Initiative Conference in Madrid and “her inability to work as part of the ‘collective’”(Sosibo 
2007).  
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of policy, why is it that they are not prepared to do it when it comes to 
implementation? (Interview 27) 
The NSP was a strong symbol of policy change, but realising it with still reluctant 
protagonists in key positions proved challenging. Implementation was also 
hampered by the fact that expertise had “fled from the system” (Interview 27), 
as a civil society leader put it. Under Tshabalala-Msimang, experienced officials 
had left the health department on the grounds that they felt unable to justify 
the institution’s policy against their own conviction. A former official who had 
worked in the Aids unit quit public service in 2003 for this reason: 
I found myself apologising for where I worked and when I caught myself I 
realised I can’t do this anymore. (Interview 5) 
The era of Tshabalala-Msimang as head of the department ended in September 
2008 when Mbeki resigned after losing support of his own party. Interim 
President Kgalema Motlanthe immediately dismissed Tshabalala-Msimang and 
replaced her with Barbara Hogan, one of the few ANC members of parliament 
who had spoken out openly against the Aids denialism of the Mbeki government 
(Gilbert & Cherry 2008). 
Shortly after taking office, the new health minister in a landmark speech 
before leading scientists, clinicians and activists explicitly acknowledged the 
causal link between HIV and Aids and commended the contribution of science 
and civil society in the fight against the epidemic (Treatment Action Campaign 
2008). She also actively approached the donor community which over years 
had been ‘chased away’ by her predecessor, as an official in the Swedish 
Embassy put it, requesting for the renewal of cooperation: 
She asked us to do a lot of things, because she realized that we put ourselves 
in order and we knew what was going on. And one of the things she asked 
us was to do a mapping to see what money was going where, which we 
did, and she also asked us to assist with technical assistance and to assist 
with money. (Interview 5) 
Hogan’s cooperative stance and commitment to a decisive response to the 
Aids epidemic evoked much enthusiasm among donors, activists, and health 
professionals; after her first 100 days in office, the head of the Southern African 
AIDS Clinicians Society assessed her as “absolutely superb”, stating that “she 
hasn’t put a foot wrong” (Kapp 2009: 291). 
Despite such praise and to the disappointment of many, Hogan’s term as 
health minister ended after only nine months. In the course of a cabinet 
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shuffle in May 2009, the newly elected President Zuma moved Hogan to the 
less influential public enterprises portfolio, replacing her with the largely 
unknown medical doctor and previous provincial education minister Aaron 
Motsoaledi (Smith 2009; Wouters et al. 2010). While his successor had put 
an end to the era of Aids denialism, the new health minister faced the dual 
challenge of bringing the epidemic under control and turning South Africa’s 
deteriorated health system around. 
Paradigm shift in HIV and health governance 
Given Zuma’s statement about showering after having sex with an HIV-
positive woman239 and the fact that he removed the popular ‘hero’ Hogan 
from the DoH, experts raised doubts whether the course prompted by the 
interim administration would be pursued under this president (The Lancet 
2008). Yet, there were signals that he seriously aimed to follow that direction. 
In a speech at the World AIDS day commemoration on 1 December 2009, 
Zuma proclaimed a set of changes and initiatives which signalled a radical 
break with past policies. Aside from pledging increased prevention efforts, he 
announced a massive testing campaign and a drastic expansion of access to 
treatment. With effect from April 2010, all children under one year would get 
antiretroviral drugs if tested HIV-positive; ARVs would also be made available 
to pregnant women and people with both tuberculosis and HIV having a CD4 
count of 350 or less (The Presidency 2009).240 
The new criteria for ART eligibility literally mirrored the revised 
recommendations on treatment, prevention and infant feeding in the context 
of HIV which the WHO had released only one month earlier (World Health 
Organization 2009a). According to a British advisor in the Department of 
Health, officials had even arranged a conference call between the WHO and 
the Presidency “to make sure every single line was totally in line with the 
international guidance because they were so paranoid of being criticised, 
because they’d gotten it so wrong before” (Interview 1). 
Not only the new ART guidelines, but also other decisions presented by the 
president were informed by analysis and advice from specialised aid agencies: 
239 In 2006, Zuma was on trial for an alleged rape of an HIV-positive woman. In his cross-examination, 
he testified that after having ‘consensual sex’ he took a shower thinking this “would minimise the 
risk of contracting the disease” (BBC News 2006). Zuma was eventually cleared of the rape charge 
but rebuked by the judge for “totally unacceptable” behaviour (Peta 2006).  
240 CD4 cells are white blood cells which are essential for the human immune system. If depleted or 
reduced through an HIV infection, the body is highly vulnerable to opportunistic illnesses and other 
infections. The CD4 count of a healthy adult ranges from 500 to 1500 cells per cubic millimetres of 
blood; an HIV-positive person with a CD4 count of less than 200 is diagnosed as having progressed 
to Aids (NAM Aidsmap 2014). Until 2009, access to treatment in South Africa was limited to those 
patients who had reached this stage.   
267
CHAPTER 7 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policy-making in Young Democracies: Sector Studies
shortly after taking office, the health minister had requested the UN to assist 
the national department in conducting an assessment of the health sector’s 
HIV/Aids response and a mid-term review of the NSP (see SANAC 2010). 
Specialists from UNAIDS and WHO partnered with senior officials of DoH to 
undertake these exercises which brought up a range of recommendations, 
such as to integrate HIV and TB services at the primary healthcare level, shift 
care and treatment tasks to nurses and auxiliary health workers, introduce a 
fixed-dose combination of ARVs and modify procurement costs (World Health 
Organization South Africa 2009; Interviews 6, 11). To the surprise of the 
experts involved, the government demonstrated an unexpected high level of 
receptiveness to their advice. A UNAIDS specialist commented: 
All the recommendations have been addressed to a large extent, so they 
were very responsive to everything (…), and it’s been very nice to see that 
responsiveness, I must say. (Interview 6) 
After a decade of confrontation and disconnect from the global health 
community, the South African government seemed anxious to regain 
legitimacy by aligning national policies to international standards and by 
revitalising cooperation with international players. The latter were now 
considered key partners for realising the new health vision of the ‘10 Point 
Plan’ which had been released as soon as the new administration was in 
place. The plan outlined the top priorities for the sector. It emphasised the 
need to provide strategic leadership, implement a National Health Insurance, 
improve the quality of health services and accelerate the HIV/Aids response 
(Health Systems Trust 2010).241 The commitments were later formalised in a 
‘Negotiated Service Delivery Agreement’ which entailed concrete targets to be 
achieved by 2014 such as increased life expectancy and reduced maternal and 
child mortality (Department of Health 2010). 
The new health minister’s and his director-general’s approach to the aid 
community to assist in implementing the targeted initiatives was perceived as 
a paradigm shift in country offices and embassies. A South African official who 
at that time still worked for the US government commented: 
241 The 10 Point Plan lists the following priorities: provision of strategic leadership and creation of a social 
compact for better health outcomes; the implementation of a National Health Insurance; improving 
the quality of health services; overhauling the healthcare system and improving management; 
improved human resources planning, development and management; the revitalisation of physical 
infrastructure; accelerated implementation of the HIV and Aids strategic plan and the increased 
focus on TB and other communicable diseases; mass mobilisation for the better health of the 
population; review of drug policy; strengthening research and development (see Health Systems 
Trust 2010). 
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I remember very well during the old administration, the international 
donors used to have a meeting outside the department where they would 
discuss strategies on how to assist the department and one of the biggest 
barrier by that time was that they were not really welcomed (…). But 
when the new administration came into place, it came up with ambitious 
plans. We want to put everybody on treatment to get rid of the backlog, 
we want to improve the sites, we want to come up with new programmes. 
And the new administration was very open because they went outside to 
all these donors and said: ‘This is the challenge that we have and this is 
our plan, where do you fit into this, what can you do?’ That’s when all 
the donors came and said now ‘we can offer this, we can do this, we can 
do that’. (Interview 17) 
This statement hints at two notable aspects pertaining to the renewal of 
relations. First, the way the government addressed potential partners signalled 
that the new decision-makers were willing to re-assume leadership and fill the 
void in which the health department had been deadlocked for a while.242 They 
‘opened the door’ to the donor community, but at the same time made it clear 
that the government’s agenda would be the frame of reference for support. 
Second, the fact that donors were immediately able to pledge assistance 
indicates that they had not been ‘passive’ while being excluded from the policy 
terrain and ‘waiting out’ Mbeki (Fourie et al. 2010). Instead, they had prepared 
themselves for leadership change by refocusing portfolios and setting aside 
resources which they offered as soon as new political protagonists entered the 
scene.243 Technical agencies such as WHO and UNAIDS had put HIV specialists 
in place ready to provide policy advice if requested.244 
How external expertise and money was utilised in the course of subsequent 
reforms is illustrated by two exemplary processes outlined in the following 
section, namely the development of the National Strategic Plan 2012–2016 
and the introduction of the National Health Insurance system. 
242 A DFID advisor who entered the health department in 2009 remarked: “When I first arrived (…), 
things were quite messy here, it was very difficult. The previous minister had left, there was a big 
vacuum, the director-general had been moved out, it was almost anarchic. There was no sense of 
who was in control” (Interview 1). 
243 DFID and GIZ, for instance, came up with new Aids and health-related programmes which were 
agreed in 2009/2010, namely the SARRAH programme (Strengthening South Africa’s Revitalised 
Response to AIDS and Health) and a Multi-sector HIV and Aids Prevention Programme (MHIVP). 
244 Both the medical officer for HIV/Aids in the WHO country office as well as the UNAIDS senior 
policy & programme adviser interviewed for this research started their work in South Africa in 
2009. 
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External experts’ involvement in developing the NSP II 
As indicated, the coming in of Motsoaledi meant a complete about-turn not 
only of politics, but also of donor–government relations in the field of health 
and HIV. A DoH official illustrated this by saying: 
Immediately all the donors came into the department again, you could see 
the faces of people whom you couldn’t see during the old administration. 
You couldn’t see them. But now they are all in the building, they are 
welcomed and there is continuous working together and collaboration. 
(Interview 17) 
Within a short period of time, external experts particularly from UN bodies 
such as WHO, UNAIDS or UNICEF established close working relationships 
with key officials in the DoH and SANAC whom they immediately assisted 
in setting up initiatives such as the mass HIV Counselling and Testing (HCT) 
campaign launched in 2010 (SANAC Secretariat 2010).245 
When the term of the NSP 2007–2011 for South Africa’s Aids response 
was coming to an end, a pending task on the agenda was the development 
of a succeeding document. Preparations for the process of policy formulation 
began in early 2011, though not in a very coordinated way, as a DFID advisor 
remarked: 
SANAC was approaching people for bits of work and it was very, very 
messy and not sustainable, and no one knew who was doing what. So 
we agreed to form a group of development partners that had funds or 
resources, and together with SANAC and UNAIDS – UNAIDS took on 
quite a strong role earlier on in helping to coordinate that – we formed 
a group and created a matrix of who would support what. So SANAC 
said they wanted consultants in these provinces and they wanted someone 
working on the national desk, and then we provided expertise as part of 
that. (Interview 1) 
In the following period, SANAC received technical assistance at various levels, 
with experts being deployed and funded by a range of donors including DFID, 
Sida and specialised UN organisations. A senior policy & programme advisor of 
245 The government launched the national HIV Counselling and Testing (HCT) campaign in April 2010 
aiming at encouraging citizens to know their HIV status and access counselling and treatment. 
While the ambitious goal of getting 15 million people tested by June 2010 was not reached, the 
initiative was still praised as the largest scale-up of HCT world-wide, with over 13 million being 
tested and 400 000 people initiated in ARVs within one year (Bodibe 2011; Mbengashe 2012). 
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UNAIDS was commissioned to assist the SANAC CEO in drafting a first road map 
for the whole NSP process which was taken to the Programme Implementation 
Committee for approval and subsequently presented to the plenary to be 
endorsed. The first key activity organised was a two-day think tank meeting in 
April 2011 where representatives from government departments, civil society 
and donors met to deliberate “what should be in the NSP, what’s the evidence 
showing us, what’s the guidance, where should we be going” (Interview 6), 
as a UNAIDS advisor put it. The discussions were informed by findings from 
a range of analyses which had been conducted since 2009, such as the mid-
term review of the first NSP for 2007–2011, the review of the health sector 
response, a national Aids-spending assessment, and comprehensive technical 
reports on the status of the epidemic, current policies and prevention efforts 
(see Fraser-Hurt et al. 2011; SANAC 2011a, 2011b). All of these studies had 
been realised with external funding and immense technical support, most 
notably from UNAIDS, WHO and the World Bank which had provided experts 
to coordinate and compile the evidence gathered. 
This brought to light that since the development of the first NSP, approximately 
1.5 million people had become newly infected with HIV, and despite massive 
expansion of treatment an estimated 2 million had died of Aids-related causes. 
It was strongly suggested that the only way to overcome the epidemic was 
“to rapidly intensify HIV prevention efforts so as to virtually halt all new 
infections” (SANAC 2011a: 5). The latter recommendation matched well with 
the new UNAIDS global strategy ‘Getting to Zero’ which the UNAIDS country 
director presented to participants of the think tank meeting. Aside from setting 
the target of zero Aids-related deaths and discrimination by 2015, it advocated 
for high-quality, cost-effective HIV prevention programmes to reach zero new 
infections (UNAIDS 2010). 
After two days of consultation, delegates arrived at some basic decisions. 
The three ‘zeros’ should be adopted as long-term vision of the NSP which for 
the first time should explicitly integrate tuberculosis, given the outstanding 
high co-infection rate of HIV and TB; moreover, prevention should become a 
prime pillar of the response. In August 2011, a first draft NSP was disseminated 
for public comment. In the following months, the editorial team received 
more than 100 written submissions from a broad range of organisations and 
individuals with diverse interests. Key issues of contestation which emerged 
in the process of consolidation related to the nature and scope of the policy 
document – how broad or specific it should become, what kind of concrete 
targets it should include (and how many), and to what extent it should or 
must be costed (Treatment Action Campaign & Section27 2011:  14). Some 
civil society organisations such as Section27 strongly pushed for costing and 
budgeting the plan to ensure implementation and be able to hold the state 
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accountable in terms of resource allocation (Section27 2011). In their view, 
the new NSP would need to serve as “a plan that people actually refer to rather 
than just (…) a symbol” (Interview 27), as a lead Section27 member put it, 
arguing:   
A symbol was good for a point. But that’s not what we need now. Now 
we need a plan that will actually guide implementation. (Interview 27) 
Other stakeholders, however, had a different conception of what the document 
should be, envisaging a framework strategy with overall goals and objectives 
rather than a detailed plan. A senior advisor representing the EU on the 
SANAC Programme Implementation Committee which oversaw the writing 
process commented: 
This is something that we found with working through the document time 
and time again, bringing people back again and again that this is not a 
plan, it’s a strategy! Because people want to go further every time. And I 
think the consultants that we have – they’ve chopped down every time and 
said no, this is not a plan, this is a strategy. The provinces and the people 
who are going to execute this, they will make this a plan. (Interview 5) 
The final version, approved by the SANAC Council in mid-November 2011, 
comprised a chapter on costing which estimated financial requirements at 
ZAR 131 billion (equivalent to USD 16 billion) for the whole period (SANAC 
2011c). However, it was explicitly emphasised that the amount should be 
indicative, “with detailed implementation plans being developed separately by 
the sectors and provinces” (SANAC 2011c: 76) by March 2012. 
On World AIDS Day in December 2012, the ‘National Strategic Plan on 
HIV, STIs and TB 2012–2016’ was officially launched by the president (IRIN 
News 2011a). The four key objectives forming the basis of the response were 
to address social and structural barriers to HIV, STI and TB prevention, care 
and impact; to prevent new HIV, STI and TB infections; to sustain health and 
wellness; and to increase the protection of human rights and improve access 
to justice (SANAC 2011c).
Despite some criticism on specific aspects,246 the new NSP was widely 
commended by actors from the government, civil society and donors who 
246 The Treatment Action Campaign and Section27, for instance, criticised insufficient attention to 
tuberculosis throughout the document, claiming that “TB has been integrated more deeply into 
each successive draft of the NSP, but often still seems overwhelmed by HIV” (Treatment Action 
Campaign & Section27 2011: 7). 
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particularly lauded the process through which the policy was produced. 
A South African HIV specialist in the Swedish Embassy commented: 
All of us pitched in, and we all supported this and we all funded this (…). 
I think a lot of people have worked really hard to get this together in a 
year’s time. It was a consultative effort, which has never really in the past 
been so much consultative like this time, and I think this was under the 
leadership of the minister and the new DG and other role players in the 
Department. I think it was really, really positive. (Interview 5) 
Even the usually highly critical Treatment Action Campaign (formerly attacked 
as a ‘disgrace’ by Tshablala-Msimang) stated that the “NSP 2012–2016 has 
been developed through an unprecedented degree of collaboration between 
civil society and the Department of Health, under the auspices of SANAC”, 
and proclaimed that it marked “the beginning of a new era in the response 
to HIV, TB and the social drivers of these epidemics” (Treatment Action 
Campaign & Section27 2011:  1). After a decade in which the cooperation 
between government and other players had completely broken off due to the 
leadership’s counteraction to international consensus on HIV/Aids, the NSP 
process signalled that South Africa was coming ‘back on track’. 
Creating a South African National Health Insurance system 
A second undertaking which marked Motsoaledi’s first term in office was the 
establishment of a National Health Insurance (NHI) system. That process has so 
far significantly been informed by expert analysis and international ‘evidence’. 
The idea of introducing some form of mandatory health insurance had been 
taken up several times in South African history, even long before its democratic 
transition. During the 1990s, several policy proposals were brought forward, 
but not followed up further (McIntyre 2010).247 At its 2007 policy conference 
in Polokwane, the ruling African National Congress passed a resolution which 
called for the realisation of a National Health Insurance system (African 
National Congress 2007). Yet, only two years later, the NHI emerged as an 
explicit priority on the government’s agenda. In his first budget speech as 
health minister, Motsoaledi justified the envisaged reform as follows: 
The present system of healthcare financing can no longer be allowed to 
go on, because it is simply unsustainable. No way can we perpetuate a 
247 The different proposals over time are outlined in the Green Paper on the NHI; see Department of 
Health (2011d: 12–14).
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system whereby we spend 8.5% of the GDP whereas 5% caters for 14% 
of the population or 7 million people, on the remaining 3.5% caters for 
a whopping 84% of the population or 41 million people. Nowhere in 
the civilised world can you find that state of affairs; the present model 
of healthcare financing is just outright primitive, and we are going to 
abandon it. (…) 
Hon Chairperson, what is NHI? – it [sic] is a system of universal 
healthcare coverage where every citizen is covered by healthcare insurance, 
rich or poor, employed or unemployed, young or old, sick or very healthy, 
black, white, yellow or people of whatever [persuasion]. (Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group 2009)
In late 2009, Motsoaledi established a Ministerial Advisory Committee (MAC) 
made up of 25 individuals with a cross-section of skills and expertise, including 
lead South African scientists, health practitioners, government officials, 
representatives from the pharmaceutical and medical schemes (health 
insurance) industries, and ‘international’ (i.e. foreign) health experts. Led by 
the CEO of the Human Sciences Research Council, the committee was given 
the task to compile recommendations regarding the NHI design and relevant 
health system reforms. 
After one-and-a-half years of preparation (and considerable public 
speculation), the government presented a first policy paper on the NHI. Issued 
in August 2011, it outlined the vision of an integrated healthcare system in 
which everyone would have access to appropriate, efficient and quality health 
services provided through appropriately accredited and contracted public and 
private providers. Financial risk protection for the whole population was to 
be ensured through a mechanism of cross-subsidisation, whereby funding 
contributions would be linked to an individual’s ability-to-pay and benefits 
would be in line with an individual’s need (Department of Health 2011d). In 
view of the need for a “complete transformation of healthcare service provision 
and delivery” and a “radical change of administration and management”, it 
was proposed to phase in the NHI over a period of 14 years, whereby the first 
five years would be used to establish core institutions and to introduce core 
features at selected pilot sites (Department of Health 2011d: 5). 
The launch of the Green Paper on the NHI was followed by immediate 
action on the part of DoH, such as entering stakeholder discussions and 
setting key interventions scheduled for the first phase of implementation. 
Thereby, it received substantial assistance delivered through the DFID-funded 
‘SARRAH’ (Strengthening South Africa’s Revitalised Response to Aids And 
Health) programme. Negotiated in 2009, SARRAH was set up as a programme 
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channelling technical and financial support to strategic initiatives related to 
South Africa’s health sector reforms. The budget of GBP 25 million was placed 
at the disposal of the national health department for selected priorities agreed 
with DFID. A central role in this flexible arrangement was given to a senior 
advisor from the UK who was seconded to the DoH with the dual mandate 
of advising high-ranking decision-makers and overseeing SARRAH-funded 
activities. HLSP, a UK-based, internationally operating firm specialised in 
consultancy, project management and policy advice in the health sector, was 
contracted to supply expertise and administrative support as requested by DoH 
leaders. 
The NHI became a key area for which these services were used. The range 
of tasks carried out by contracted specialists in the course of conceptualisation 
and implementation is comprehensive. The compilation of technical support 
and consultancies specifically addressing NHI matters was provided in the first 
four years of the SARRAH programme (2010–2013). The information was 
drawn from project briefs available on the programme’s website as of 1 August 
2014. Since not all activities might have been documented in this form, the list 
should be understood as indicative rather than fully comprehensive: 
Table 19: Expert support to the NHI process through SARRAH 2010–2013
Description / Purpose Time frame Provider
Logistical support for the Ministerial Advisory 
Committee on NHI
01/2010–12/2012 HLSP, N James
Consultancy for the provision of support services for 
the NHI communications strategy
03/2010–05/2012 Meropa Communications
Technical support for the purchasing sub-committee 
of the NHI Ministerial Advisory Committee
09/2010–11/2010 Team of consultants led 
by L Gilson & K Grant
Consultancy services for the purchasing sub-
committee of the Ministerial Advisory Committee
09/2010–08/2011 J Miot
Project planning and management support to the 
DoH project team
12/2010–12/2011 J Katzke 
Technical assistance to district specialist task team 04/2011–10/2011 K Jacobs
Consultancy on development of packages of services 
to be provided on NHI pilot sites 
03/2011–12/2011 L Ngubane, K Grant,  
D Whittaker, J Katzke
Project manager to coordinate work related to district 
clinical specialist teams
08/2011–01/2012 N Bandezi
Expert advice to the Office of the DG in developing 
NHI health-purchasing implementation steps
09/2012–09/2013 S O’Dougherty
Project manager to the Office of the DG in 
coordinating the national community outreach 
programme
10/2012–03/2013 E Paulus
Technical support for General Practitioners initiative 2012–2014 (sic) SARRAH team 
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Description / Purpose Time frame Provider
Technical and logistical support to NHI road shows in 
11 NHI pilot districts
2012–2013 (sic) SARRAH team
Provide revised national costing of NHI pilots 01/2013–03/2013 PricewaterhouseCoopers
Consultancy to DoH on strengthening management 
arrangements of central hospitals
02/2013–04/2013 S Hayes
Rapid assessment of the status of the 11 NHI pilot 
districts
02/2013–05/2013 SARRAH technical leads 
and consultants
Technical support for establishing prototype PHC 
facilities 
08/2013–11/2013 S Asmal
Source: Project briefs available on the SARRAH website accessed 1 August 2014.248
Categorising the assignments listed above, one can broadly differentiate 
between facilitating activities and analytical work, which was assigned to 
experts outside the DoH. They provided either administrative support or 
technical input. The former mainly helped to drive forward the NHI process 
insofar as consultants were commissioned to organise meetings and events, to 
ensure that timetables were adhered to, or that written documentation was 
distributed to all stakeholders. Such tasks were the main components of the 
logistical support for the Ministerial Advisory Committee, technical assistance 
to the district specialist task team or the project management support to the 
DoH project team. In the latter case, for instance, the consultant was expected to 
“develop and maintain a planning process and secure timely contributions and 
revisions from team members and stakeholders; monitor and report on project 
implementation plans with timelines, critical path and risk management; 
facilitate all Project Workgroup forums and record deliberations and findings 
for the Project Leader” (SARRAH 2011a). 
While these kinds of assignments required strong administrative/managerial 
skills, the second type presupposed specialist knowledge of a highly technical 
nature and analytical abilities. Experts were commissioned to generate 
‘evidence’ in the form of reports, analyses and assessments to be used for 
refining NHI components. The range of documents produced includes six 
technical papers on resource allocations and purchasing strategies distributed 
to the Ministerial Advisory Committee; a report for the director-general on 
the proposed packages of services to be available under the NHI with details 
on how these services could be delivered through a purchaser/provider split; 
a study to determine frameworks and modalities for contracting private sector 
general practitioners in public clinics; a revised national costing of the NHI; an 
assessment of ‘ideal’ primary healthcare facilities; a rapid appraisal of the 11 
248 http://www.sarrahsouthafrica.org/ABOUTSARRAH/SARRAHprojectbriefs.aspx (accessed on 18 
January 2015).
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NHI pilot districts after 12 months, covering their status in terms of quality, 
hospital reforms, primary healthcare (PHC) re-engineering, infrastructure, 
human resources, management performance, referral systems, and cooperation 
with private doctors. The list could be further continued. Notably, most of the 
analyses supplied through the SARRAH programme were done by renowned 
health experts from South African academic institutions such as the University 
of Witwatersrand or the University of Cape Town. Hence, while the expertise 
was mobilised by external agencies (i.e. DFID/HLSP), it was largely provided 
from ‘locals’ with national and international research experience contracted to 
serve as consultants to the DoH. 
Nevertheless, external health system ideas did play a significant role as 
points of reference in the development of the NHI. Many of the commissioned 
studies delineated ‘lessons learned’ outside South Africa, pointing out how 
models worked or did not work in other countries. The Green Paper on the 
NHI explicitly refers to international evidence and experience.249 Following the 
release of the Green Paper, DFID organised three study tours to the UK where 
high-level decision-makers such as the minister and DoH’s director-general met 
with their counterparts and visited health institutions to gain an understanding 
of the British system (SARRAH 2011b, 2012a, 2012b). Together with the 
EU, DFID also co-sponsored and facilitated an international conference held 
in Johannesburg where experts from aid organisations, foreign universities 
and health ministries presented experiences from a range of developing 
and developed countries, including South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Ghana, 
Germany, Australia, France and the United States. The event was attended by 
high-level decision-makers including the minister and the director-general, 
senior government officials, experts from academic institutions and private 
sector representatives (see Department of Health 2011c). In her concluding 
speech, DG Matsoso highlighted that the “lessons shared were eye-opening” 
(Department of Health 2011c: 43), and that insights gained would be considered 
in the process of refining the South African NHI system. 
The conference took place in early December 2011 and was a key event 
in the phase of public consultation on the Green Paper which formally ended 
on 30 December 2011. By then, the DoH had received over a hundred 
submissions from various stakeholders; main points of criticism were a lack of 
public deliberation in the initial stage of policy development, and vagueness 
with respect to crucial aspects of the reform, such as cost implications and the 
future role of private schemes (see, for instance, Helen Suzman Foundation 
2011; South African Private Practitioner Forum 2011; Van den Heever 2011). 
In early 2014, the minister announced that the release of an NHI White Paper 
249 See, for instance, Department of Health (2011d: 27/3).
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which would shed light on such details was ‘imminent’ (Kahn 2014a; at the 
time of writing, the much anticipated document had not yet been disclosed, 
but was said to be ‘in the final stages’, Jadoo 2014; Kahn 2014b). 
Patterns of current health governance 
The processes of NSP and NHI development were described in sufficient detail 
to illustrate the paradigm shift within the DoH which represents a radically 
changed stance towards the use of scientific knowledge and expert advice. 
In contrast to the preceding administration, the new leadership extensively 
draws on local and external expertise, adopting a governance approach which 
bears a number of characteristics.
First of all, it strongly features scientific knowledge as the point of departure 
for policy development. Documents such as the National Strategic Plan for HIV/
Aids and the Green Paper on the NHI entail numerous references to studies and 
analyses whose findings are used to justify decisions. The following extracts 
are exemplary for the prevailing pattern of argumentation:  
The NSP’s goals and strategic objectives are guided by evidence from 
various reports, including the Know Your Epidemic (KYE) report, a 
situation analysis of TB in the country and other epidemiological studies. 
These studies identified key populations that are most likely to be exposed 
to or to transmit HIV and/or TB (…). Within each strategic objective, these 
key populations will be targeted with different, but specific interventions, 
to achieve maximum impact. (SANAC 2011c: 13)
Evidence has demonstrated that those who are not adequately covered 
by any form of health insurance are among others women; children; the 
elderly; low income groups etc. It is for this reason that coverage should be 
extended to all these populations. (Department of Health 2011d: 12)
Whereas the previous government had openly questioned the robustness 
of evidence put forward by the mainstream science community, it is now 
used as the main means of legitimation for policy decisions. The importance 
of underpinning decisions with consensual scientific knowledge was also 
emphasised by the chief director of the HIV/Aids unit in the DoH who stated: 
We pursue evidence – evidence that’s relevant, that’s closer to the issues. 
We understand evidence is not sufficient; it has to deal with values and 
other issues. So we’re not ideological about what we’re trying to do. Our 
starting point because of the burden of disease that we need to fix [is that] 
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there are some things that we know that work and we want people to help 
us to do that. (Interview 19) 
Although the DoH director seemed wary of conveying the impression that the 
government blindly followed evidence without scrutinising it for its relevance 
and embedding it into the social context, his statement affirms the significance 
of scientific knowledge as a reference point in policy-making. 
A second feature which was manifest in both the NSP and NHI processes is 
the strong orientation towards international guidance; the uptake of WHO’s 
ART guidelines and of universal coverage as an overall objective of the health 
system (promoted by the WHO since 2005) illustrates efforts to realign 
policies with the international agenda. After an era in which the government 
deliberately ignored recommendations from global health players, decision-
makers in the DoH seemed eager to demonstrate that this has changed with 
the new leadership, as a DFID advisor pointed out:  
They went out of their way to make sure absolutely everything that they 
did was totally in line with international policy (…). HIV/Aids is the most 
obvious one but in other areas as well. And they are at pains to point out 
that they stick to international guidance. So when WHO suggests changing 
the CD4 count, the level at which you start treatment, South Africa takes 
it on immediately and they’ve been very proactive in keeping up with 
international best practice because they have this terrible history together. 
So they’ve gone to the other extreme now, they can’t now do enough in line 
with international guidance. (Interview 1) 
The fact that alignment with international guidance has become an imperative 
in the health department is reflected by the statement of a director who 
emphasised: 
Whatever we are doing has got to be internationally accepted (…); we need 
to make sure that we meet the international standards. (Interview 18) 
The new orientation towards scientific knowledge and international guidance 
has come along with an openness towards external assistance and receptiveness 
to advice which can be seen as the third characteristic of the current governance 
approach. In both the NSP and the NHI processes, the DoH extensively drew on 
advisors and consultants to realise the envisaged reforms. In seeking facilitative 
and analytical support, however, decision-makers seem selective in terms of 
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whom to approach for what kind of tasks and on which terms.250 Commenting 
on the consultants coming into the DoH, a senior official emphasised: 
Whatever work they are doing, it’s work that is a directive of the Director-
General or the minister. So they don’t come here and want to do their own 
things. (Interview 18) 
The statement points at what can be seen as the fourth outstanding feature 
of current health governance, namely the strong guidance executed by DoH 
leadership ranks, both in terms of setting the agenda and directing experts 
in supporting the department’s policy work. Various advisors engaging with 
the DoH reported on the firm stance of their South African counterparts. 
A UNAIDS specialist commented in this regard: 
They do close the doors if they don’t think you’re useful. And they don’t 
miss their words, they say it clearly – they fire the consultant on the night. 
(Interview 6) 
Since the DoH has been severely weakened in its capacity through the brain 
drain of specialists, it now depends on the support of outside experts to 
manage the massive reforms envisaged. Yet, it seems as if decision-makers use 
external assistance in a deliberate way, namely as a means to get things done 
quickly and to figure out how to achieve objectives rather than which objectives 
to achieve. This is reflected by a statement of the health department’s chief 
director for HIV/Aids who explained: 
You find that when the problem is quite substantial, you tend to spend 
your time on the things that need to be fixed today. So, what do experts and 
technical advisors do? My sense is that what they do is really look in the 
manner how we’re doing things and say: ‘Look, there is one aspect, if you 
would do this, this will release many of those things that you need to do.’ 
So, it’s like finding the disconnect between the things that we really want 
to do, the capacity that we have and the thing that’s holding us back not 
do it (…).
They can do the analysis of the composition of my finance, they can tell, 
look, you know, if you’re saying this where you want to go, in the manner 
how your budget is right now, it is unlikely you get there (…). When we 
250 A review of the SARRAH programme, for instance, reports that in many cases the DoH took over 
responsibility for the appointment of consultants, “and instructed DFID and HLSP accordingly” 
(Wright 2012: 13).
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hit bottlenecks on quality – when we’re not achieving our coverage, when 
we’re not being able to actually attract the right people and reach the right 
people, then there is some analysis that needs to be done (…) – that’s the 
role that they can actually play. (Interview 19) 
In this narrative it becomes clear that external experts are ascribed a 
facilitative function, rather than a determining role in policy development 
and implementation. The chief director of the HIV/Aids unit used a fitting 
metaphor to illustrate this approach in a nutshell: 
These people for me, when they come in, they are co-pilots; they’re not 
driving the plane. (Interview 19) 
Re-building relationships: Government interaction with the local science community 
As mentioned earlier, decision-makers in the DoH increasingly resort to 
members of the South African science community when seeking assistance, 
which indicates that after almost a decade of schism between government and 
academia, relationships are slowly building up. Yet, the lack of ‘histories of 
trust’ and of institutionalised dialogue still hamper the full utilisation of local 
knowledge resources. Various interviewees raised the issue that policy-makers 
tended to request support from donor organisations although expertise was 
locally available. A WHO representative in the Pretoria country office reported 
on her experience:  
South Africa is asking us for expertise when we use their South Africans 
to send elsewhere. So it’s like the proverbial biblical saying ‘the prophet is 
not known in his own home’ acts here. (Interview 12) 
Aside from the still existing disconnects between the political system and 
academia, another problem lies in the fact that the South African knowledge 
community in health is strong with respect to scientific performance, but small 
in terms of numbers (see Chapter 6). Given multiple obligations, the capacity 
of scientists to serve as advisors in policy processes is severely limited, as a 
professor at the University of the Western Cape stated: 
South African knowledge communities have an absolute place – there’s 
just not always enough of it and enough time. You know, I mean in a place 
like this, a) it’s quite difficult to travel to Pretoria for a meeting, b) we’re 
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training people and the universities have loads of other things to do, so the 
ability to provide the very kind of flexible, immediate expertise when it’s 
needed in very short time frames – the donors do that and mobilise it from 
international consulting communities. (Interview 28)
The local knowledge base is too small to cope with the burden of disease in 
South Africa. The lack in capacity of expertise is thus filled by aid organisations 
which source specialists from their country offices and from global expert 
networks. 
Conclusion
As shown by using the examples of the Aids plan and the National Health 
Insurance reforms, external experts do have a presence in the current era of 
South African health governance. Providing advice, analysis and administrative 
support, they impact on policy development and implementation in various 
ways. Yet, they do so at the request of leaders who demonstrate a high level of 
steering capacity both in terms of setting the agenda and dealing with donors. 
Not being dependent on aid money, decision-makers are able to determine the 
conditions of support and to be selective with regard to whom to approach for 
assistance. At the same time, a strong local science community and vocal civil 
society limit the risk of external interference. 
The fact that South Africa’s HIV and health policies have been radically 
revised and adjusted to international standards is less the result of outside 
pressure than of the government’s attempt to regain credibility in the global 
health arena and to redress the failures of past policies. In the reform of the 
health system, UN bodies such as WHO and UNAIDS have gained considerable 
influence, “not so much because they’ve come in and sought to be influential, 
but because what they have produced has been picked up internally and used 
to develop policy” (Interview 27), as a civil society leader put it. In a similar 
vein, a professor at the University of the Western Cape remarked: 
I would say (…) it’s not a kind of very overt and forceful colonisation of 
ideas; it’s a process of harmonization and emulation. (Interview 28) 
The policy shifts of recent years can thus be interpreted as a process of deliberate 
alignment pursued by a health administration which is characterised by both 
a high degree of receptiveness to expert advice and science and a considerable 
degree of autonomy in setting its own agenda. 
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Tanzania environment: Opportunistic adaption
Sectoral context
Tanzania is by comparison a rich country in terms of environmental wealth 
with respect to its natural ecosystems of forests, grasslands, savannah, wetlands, 
rivers, lakes and the Ocean (United Republic of Tanzania 2012c). The world-
famous Serengeti National Park is only one of several biodiversity hotspot 
areas.251 Tanzania’s territory is home to numerous endemic animal and plant 
species (United Republic of Tanzania 2009): by 2003, 10 008 plant species, 
316 mammals, 229 breeding birds, 335 reptiles, 116 amphibians and 331 
fish species had been counted in the country (UNEP 2014). Although almost 
30% of the terrestrial area and around 10% of territorial waters are protected 
(IUCN & UNEP-WCMC 2011), large parts of the natural habitat are at risk: 
many biosphere reserves such as Mount Kilimanjaro are severely affected by 
land degradation (Temba 2012). Coastal and marine areas are suffering from 
pollution and erosion that have led to a decline in living resources (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2009). To this is added over-harvesting, illegal logging, 
bush fires, and detrimental cultivation practices leading to rapid deforestation 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2009). According to the FAO Global Forest 
Resources Assessment 2010, Tanzania is among the top ten countries that 
had the largest annual net loss of forest area world-wide between 2000 and 
2010. (FAO 2010b).252 Poverty is seen as the main cause driving the persistent 
exploitation. The former director of the Forestry and Beekeeping Division 
sketched the linkage between poverty and deforestation as follows: 
People are heavily depending on [forests] for their livelihood. They don’t 
have another support. They don’t have another alternative, they need 
to survive. Sometimes climate change is causing havoc here. Crops don’t 
produce when they are about to produce. Drought at flowering stage or at 
the fruiting stage, maize and everything collapses, what do you do? And 
you need to see your children surviving. So the alternative is to harvest a 
tree (…). 
251 Other areas that are known as biodiversity hotspots are the Eastern Arc old Block-Mountain 
Forests (Usambara, Nguru, Uluguru, Ukaguru and Udzungwa Mountains); the coastal forests (e.g. 
Pugu, Rondo); the Great Lakes for Cichlid fishes (lakes Victoria, Tanganyika and Nyasa); the marine 
coral reef ecosystems; and the ecosystems of the alkaline Rift-Valley Lakes (e.g. Natron and Eyasi) 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2009).
252 From 2005 to 2010, Tanzania lost 403 000 hectares per year, equivalent to 1.16% of the total forest 
area (FAO 2010a). 
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In Dar es Salaam and other cities, 90% of the household energy is charcoal. 
You can’t use electricity, it is very expensive. You can’t use gas, it is very 
expensive. And sometimes availability of gas is a problem, acquisition 
of the gadgets, they are very expensive. So for a normal person, middle 
income and others – they use charcoal. Then those guys in the rural areas, 
they know there’s a big demand for charcoal. Some business people are 
going in the rural areas looking for charcoal. So if you cut more trees for 
charcoal making, you earn something. (Interview 58) 
Forest and nature degradation is a huge problem in Tanzania, threatening not 
only more than 700 plant and animal species, but also the livelihoods of large 
parts of the human population.253  
Governance structures
The structures of environmental governance in Tanzania are laid down by the 
Environmental Management Act (EMA) of 2004, which frames environment 
as a horizontal policy issue cutting across various sectors. Line ministries such 
as the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, which is also responsible for 
forests, are required to manage environmental matters in their respective areas. 
The Act, however, established the director of environment and his unit – the 
Division of Environment in the Vice-President’s Office (VPO-DoE) – as the focal 
body in charge of policy-making, coordination and oversight under the overall 
leadership of the minister of environment. EMA also specified the mandate 
of the National Environment Management Council (NEMC) which serves as 
the leading technical advisory and regulatory agency. Aside from conducting 
and coordinating research, its main functions are to enforce compliance with 
environmental quality standards by reviewing and monitoring environmental 
impact assessments. As in other policy areas, the actual implementation of 
policies and legislation falls under the responsibility of local government 
authorities (United Republic of Tanzania 2004). 
Donor presence in environment 
Since 2004, donors supporting and carrying out environmental activities in 
Tanzania have collaborated in the so-called ‘Development Partners Group 
on Environment’, or DPG-E in short. As of 2014, it comprised ten bilateral 
funders, namely Belgium, Canada, Denmark, DFID (UK), the European 
253 According to the IUCN Red Lists 2012, 302 plant species and 408 animal species are currently 
threatened, including species classified as critically endangered, endangered and vulnerable (IUCN 
2012a, 2012b). 
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Union, Finland, France, Germany (and GIZ), Norway and USAID, as well as 
five multilaterals, namely UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, the World Bank and the 
African Development Bank. Depending on their focus, these aid providers are 
related to sub-groups on climate change, natural resource management or 
environment in general. The members of these groups are supposed to interact 
with their main counterparts in government, that is, the Vice-President’s 
Office – Division of Environment and the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Tourism, through the established dialogue structure including meetings on 
thematic areas, cluster working groups, and discussions related to general 
budget support (Development Partners Group Tanzania 2014b). Yet, at the 
time of research, participants admitted that these forums did not work as 
they should. Government officials complained about being unduly occupied 
with aid meetings, and donor representatives were upset about the absence of 
policy-makers in the same and the consequent slow pace of decision-making. 
Overall, relationships seemed tense, with both sides accusing the other for not 
adhering to the agreed conditions of dialogue and cooperation. 
The making of environmental policies in Tanzania
Environment conservation has always been a playground for external actors in 
Tanzania. Under colonial rule, the British imposed preservation policies which 
restricted human activities in designated game parks and nature reserves. After 
independence, a range of external organisations such as the World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF) and the German GTZ took over and divided up the funding 
and management of national parks, while Tanzania’s first President Nyerere 
supported the expansion of protected areas primarily in order to boost the 
country’s tourist industry (Levine 2002). 
With the Brundlandt Report ‘Our Common Future’ published in 1987 
by the World Commission on Environment and Development, the notion 
of ‘sustainable development’ ascended to the international agenda, and 
environment gained centre stage as an issue of global concern (World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987). For Tanzania, this 
translated into generous funding offers arising in the run-up to the 1992 Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro, as the former Director of Environment remembered: 
When at that time, in 1991 January, these negotiations for the Earth 
Summit were going on, it gave rise to several meetings at the global 
level, at the regional level within Africa, at the sub-regional level, and 
at national level (…). And in order to be able to understand the process 
and to contribute meaningfully, you simply had to get time to participate, 
to travel – and that’s expensive. So in Tanzania, I put up together a team 
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of – at that time, I think it was twelve technical people from various 
ministries, and also representations from NGOs. And you couldn’t have 
the government to support these travels because per diems and flight tickets 
are expensive. I was simply fortunate that there was such a climate of 
giving from the donors – it was basically the donors who were just covering 
everything. They simply wanted me to produce the list of people that were 
going. So I wrote a letter, ‘this is what I want’. They were just happy to 
support. (Interview 66) 
Amongst the major aid providers sponsoring the participation were UNDP, 
the Netherlands, and Nordic countries such as Sweden. According to the 
former director of environment, their support enabled his delegation to take 
part in the summit’s preparation as well as in negotiations on the three Rio 
Conventions on biodiversity, climate change and desertification. From his 
perception, Tanzania was thereby given a voice in the global discourse. 
The increased donor interest in environment not only yielded new 
programmes and funding mechanisms (e.g. the Global Environment Facility), 
but also brought forth new conditions. The World Bank, for instance, made 
environmental impact assessments of varying depth obligatory for the 
approval of projects, and it required IDA borrowers to formulate ‘National 
Environmental Action Plans’ which Tanzania endorsed in 1994. As in many 
other recipient countries, this donor-initiated document led to the foundation 
of the subsequent national environmental policy. Aside from identifying 
six urgent problems – land degradation; lack of accessible, good quality 
water; environmental pollution; a loss of wildlife habitats and biodiversity; 
deterioration of aquatic systems and deforestation – it framed environment 
as a cross-sectoral issue and set overall policy objectives (United Republic 
of Tanzania 1997). The role of the lead organisation in the process of policy 
development was given to the Division of Environment in the Vice-President’s 
Office, which received substantial assistance from the Danish government.254 
Although, according to the former director of environment, the Danes did 
not set any conditions related to the policy content, it is remarkable that their 
financial support justified the presence of Danida representatives in policy 
discussions, as the following statement reflects: 
They supported the process. And I don’t remember any incident where 
we had any preconditions given by the Danish on what we should say in 
our policy. There was nothing like that. Of course, because they provided 
254 The Division of Environment was established in 1991 under the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Tourism. It was transferred to the Vice-President’s Office in 1995 to give it more political clout 
(Death 2012).
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funding, they would be interested in the process to ensure that the money 
they are giving is being put to good use. And so we would bring them on 
board in terms of the meetings we’d hold for our discussions and they 
would be giving their views. (Interview 66) 
The policy was primarily shaped by national consultations and a range of 
workshops attended mainly by government officials, donor spokespersons and 
a few NGO activists. Despite 
a clear bias toward an elite understanding of the problems of the 
environment and their solutions, (…) there was little public or private 
controversy over the guidelines and plans of the National Environmental 
Policy when it was finally adopted by the Cabinet in 1997. (Elliott-
Teague 2011: 849)
In the subsequent years, environment as a policy issue came to the fore on 
Tanzania’s agenda; the increasing importance can partly be attributed to the 
active lobbying of intellectuals with influence in political circles (Assey et al. 
2007), but also to an enhanced engagement of international organisations 
which supported environmental champions “to express their views” 
(Interview  66) and financed government activities. According to the then 
director of environment, donors accounted for over 90% of the funding for 
environmental programmes and projects undertaken by his unit. 
The Division of Environment also received external assistance in the course 
of two policy processes which took place in parallel in the early years of the 
new millennium: the development of the Environmental Management Act 
(EMA) and the poverty reduction strategy known as MKUKUTA. Donors 
backed up these processes through two major initiatives: the ‘Institutional and 
Legal Framework for Environmental Management Project (ILFEMP)’ designed 
to prepare environmental legislation, and the ‘Integrating Environment 
Programme’ aimed at ‘mainstreaming’ environmental issues into MKUKUTA. 
The former was primarily sponsored by the World Bank, USAID, Sida and 
the WWF; the latter was supported by UNDP, UNEP, Danida, DFID and 
the Norwegian government (Assey et al. 2007; Elliott-Teague 2011). Both 
initiatives were officially housed in the Vice-President’s Office, and included 
the use of national and foreign experts for various tasks.
The ILFEMP project started in 1998 with a team comprising an 
American technical advisor and three Tanzanian specialists from different 
research institutes commissioned to review the institutional framework of 
environmental management, and, in the second phase, to draft a respective 
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bill (Elliott-Teague 2007).255 The process involved consultative meetings with 
representatives from government ministries, non-governmental organisations 
and donors. Supporting studies and background papers were produced by 
individually hired scholars (Elliott-Teague 2011). After two years of analysis 
and discussion, the team published a report outlining viable options for 
institutional arrangements. Interestingly, they rejected initial donor concerns 
over institutional structures as unjustified (Elliott-Teague 2011). Taking up the 
report’s recommendations on future legislation, an expert group paid by the 
World Bank and made up of two members of the University of Dar es Salaam, 
the executive director of the Tanzanian law organisation LEAT (Lawyers’ 
Environmental Action Team) and the chief parliamentary draftsman in the 
Attorney General’s Office, developed a Bill which went for Cabinet approval. 
After a brief public hearing, the Environmental Management Act was finally 
passed by parliament in 2004 (Elliott-Teague 2007). 
The use of local expertise, the wide range of stakeholder workshops held and 
the fact that the final drafting team consisted of solely Tanzanian actors suggest 
that the act indeed reflects a national perspective on how environmental 
management should be organised.256 There is no evidence that international 
assistance for the preparation and formulation of the law presupposed any 
concrete policy demands (Elliott-Teague 2011). Yet, donors were intensely 
engaged in the process, pushing for the development of environmental 
legislation. It is questionable whether, without their sponsoring of the review 
and drafting process, EMA would have been developed in this form and at that 
pace. 
A similar ‘pushing effect’ of external assistance was attained through the 
‘Integrating Environment Programme’ related to the process of developing 
Tanzania’s National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA). 
Initiated in 2003, the aim of the programme was to make sure that the policy 
considered environment as a key component in poverty reduction efforts. 
The idea of ‘mainstreaming environment’ internationally came up at 
around the turn of the millennium when a number of influential World 
255 According to Elliott-Teague (2011), the Tanzanian experts consisted of Dr PJ Kabudi, a member of 
the Faculty of Law at the University of Dar es Salaam as well as the chair of the board of directors 
of a non-governmental organisation called the Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team (LEAT) 
who was brought in as the legal expert and project coordinator; Dr Suma Kaare who at that time 
was affiliated with the Economic and Social Research Foundation and served as the institution’s 
specialist, and Mr Deo-Gratias Gamassa, an ecologist at the College of Wildlife Management, who 
was hired as natural resources expert. The foreign member of the ILFEMP team changed. Finally, 
the position was filled by an international consultant from Great Britain.
256 The final team preparing the EMA draft consisted of two members of the Faculty of Law at the 
University of Dar es Salaam, the acting executive director of the Lawyers’ Environmental Action 
Team LEAT and the chief parliamentary draftsman in the Attorney General’s Office (Elliott-Teague 
2007).
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Bank publications such as the environmental strategy ‘Making Sustainable 
Commitments’ (World Bank 2001) established linkages between environment, 
poverty and growth, and made the claim that these needed to be better addressed 
in developing countries policies (see also World Bank 1996; Bojö & Reddy 
2002; Dale 2005).257 The aid community broadly adopted this agenda, and 
UNDP together with UNEP launched a global ‘Poverty-Environment Initiative’ 
through which governments in developing countries would be assisted to 
include environmental objectives into national plans and budgets (Bass & 
Renard 2009). Tanzania was one of the pilot countries receiving financial and 
technical assistance for this purpose. The Vice-President’s Office, which was 
assigned to coordinate the mainstreaming efforts, got a full-time advisor from 
the UK who played a central role by disseminating environmental information 
and analyses, keeping the process on track and assisting the MKUKUTA drafting 
team (Assey et al. 2007).258 Donors’ technical leads provided input through 
their participation in the Environment Working Group which was established 
“to improve consensus amongst environmental stakeholders” (Assey et al. 
2007:  18), bringing together representatives from government, the private 
sector, civil society and aid organisations. Moreover, the programme funded 
a range of analyses which substantially informed the MKUKUTA document, 
such as a review of expenditures on environment (Vice-President‘s Office 
2004) and the development of indicators of poverty-environment linkages 
(Vice-President‘s Office 2005).259 Ultimately, the MKUKUTA entailed at least 
15 environment-related targets (Rutasitara et al. 2010:  12), ranging from 
‘reduced land degradation and loss of biodiversity’ to ‘improved access to clean 
and safe water’ and ‘reduction in harmful industrial and agricultural effluents’ 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2005: 37, 33, 46). Progress in achieving these 
targets was to be measured against mostly quantitative indicators as specified 
in the MKUKUTA log-frame and monitoring master plan (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2005; Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment 2006). 
257 The World Bank’s publication list on the environment-poverty nexus has become too vast to be 
reflected here. Amongst others, the Bank has issued a range of ‘Environment Strategy Notes’ as 
well as an ‘Environment Matters’ series with annual reviews, all of which are accessible on its 
website. In 2012, the Bank launched its new environment strategy for the next decade (2012–
2022) (World Bank 2012e).  
258 The post of the ‘Poverty-Environment adviser’ was filled by David Howlett, a DFID specialist on 
food and climate change policies who during 2002–2005 had been seconded to UNDP (Assey et al. 
2007). 
259 The report on the poverty-environment indicators was contracted to two UK-based and one 
Tanzanian institution, namely the Environmental Resources Management (ERM) London, the 
Institute of Resource Assessment (IRA) Dar es Salaam and Oxford Policy Management Limited 
(OPML) Oxford (Vice-President’s Office 2005). The public expenditure review was contracted to 
NORPLAN Tanzania Branch, a consulting company linked to the Norwegian firm Multiconsult 
(Vice-President’s Office 2004). 
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UNDP/UNEP assistance continued during the implementation of MKUKUTA 
with a focus on reporting and generating statistics on environmental 
conditions (UNDP & UNEP 2014). Through the Development Partners Group 
on Environment, experts from various agencies and embassies substantially 
contributed to developing the subsequent strategy MKUKUTA II for the period 
2011–2015, as a UNDP environmental specialist in the Dar es Salaam office 
sketched out:   
At the point where you are doing sector reviews, partners are invited to 
provide their input. At the point where they are harmonizing and (...) 
finalizing the final document, donors are also invited – the entire plan is 
presented to stakeholders and you input in it. So we are mainly involved 
and we provide the input. And sometimes they may ask for even writing, 
so you provide that writing. (Interview 41) 
Concrete ‘input’ was provided, for example, in the form of comments on 
priority results areas which strongly proposed including climate change and 
sustainability aspects into operational targets (DPG 2010). In the final document, 
various references to these matters can be found. One strategy to reduce 
income poverty (goal 2), for instance, foresees “integrating, harmonizing and 
coordinating environmentally sustainable policies and strategies for growth 
in key growth sectors, including climate change adaptation and mitigation” 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2010: 42). 
Tanzania’s ‘environmental mainstreaming’ work has been widely praised 
as a success and has been promoted as a ‘best practice’ case in various reports 
(see, for instance, Assey et al. 2007 and Dalal-Clayton et al. 2009). All in all, 
Tanzania’s environmental policies, legislation and programmes are regarded as 
“very advanced” (Interview 36) by the international community.
A look beyond intentions and official narratives 
Looking at government action related to environmental management as 
opposed to intentions, however, reveals a picture that starkly contradicts the 
success story told about Tanzania in aid publications. A review assessing the 
progress made during MKUKUTA I found persistent problems “relating mainly 
to knowledge gaps and change in mind-set on the importance of environment. 
Lack of accurate data, capacity limitations in terms of requisite professional 
skills to suit the different sector situations as well as financial resources still 
remain major setbacks” (Rutasitara et al. 2010: v). Several interviewees from 
donor organisations pointed to an appalling discrepancy between policy 
statements and (perceived) government action; some bluntly conceded that 
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this divergence may partly derive from their organisations’ interference 
in environmental governance. A natural resources specialist in the Finnish 
Embassy was outspoken about the obviously divergent agendas of local and 
external players: 
Many of the policies and legislations that exist have been pushed by 
development partners. And the government has put a minimum of interest 
on that because they have another kind of agenda and another kind of 
economy where they work. (Interview 36)
For officials concerned with environmental issues in ministries and parastatal 
bodies, the lack of interest and support on the part of the government is 
manifested in deficient resources allocated for environmental interventions. 
A senior officer working at the National Environment Management Council 
stated: 
The integration of environment in most of the development plans is 
there. But in the budgetary process, that’s not happening. It is just in the 
documents, but we don’t see really the commitment. (…) So that’s the 
problem. It is acknowledged that environment is very important for the 
poverty reduction efforts, but whenever it comes to the resource allocation, 
it is not one of the priority sectors. (Interview 59) 
A retired director who had led the Forestry and Beekeeping Division in the 
Ministry of Natural Resources summarised his experience: 
The government has so many other priorities. Environment, forestry is 
not among the priorities. The priority here it is agriculture, it is energy, 
it is education and water, infrastructure. So those are the sectors heavily 
covered by the government, but forestry is not among them. So, you see, 
you get more money from donors, from workshops, consultancies. You 
analyse the situation through the consultant, you get the reports – but you 
can’t put those reports into action, simply you don’t have that ability. So 
that is the difference. (Interview 58) 
Given financial constraints and insufficient staffing levels in public entities, 
environmental policies and legislation are hardly put into practice. A case in 
point in this regard is the Environmental Management Act. 
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The Environmental Management Act: “Great”, but “ineffective”
The Environmental Management Act – according to a World Bank employee 
a “great act” that “is fantastic” – became operational in 2005. Yet, the progress 
in implementing institutional reforms prescribed by the Act is slow. By 2007, 
only a few ministries had established environmental sections as required, and 
none had prepared environmental action plans (Government of Tanzania & 
Danida 2007). Compliance with the environmental impact assessment system, 
a central component of the Act, remains poor, which partly derives from a low 
awareness of regulatory requirements among local government bodies and the 
fact that violations are rarely penalised (Sosovele 2011).260 Public authorities 
seem unable to fulfil the functions assigned to them by the environmental law, 
given the lack of a “clear and proper mandate to institutions and personnel 
with autonomous positions” (Pallangyo 2011:  517) as well as insufficient 
human and financial resources. An NEMC officer told us: 
Our institution, it has the mandate to oversee that the act is being enforced 
(…). But if we don’t have the funds to actually implement it on the ground, 
then really you find that we have a problem. Because I think there was 
the expectation that the government would provide support in terms of 
implementation of the act, but that is not the case. (Interview 59) 
In order to boost the execution of the new legislation, the Vice-President’s 
Office in 2006 proposed an ‘Environmental Management Act Implementation 
Support Programme’, in short EMA-ISP. The idea of the programme was to 
establish a basket fund which would increase financial resources. The anticipated 
‘medium-term outcome’ of the programme was to create an “enabling 
framework for EMA implementation – i.e. through policy harmonisation, 
planning, environmental assessments, enforcement, reporting, and awareness 
creation – (…) that significantly improves environmental management in 
Tanzania” (Government of Tanzania & Danida 2007: 54). In light of the broad 
assistance received from technical and financing agencies for the development 
260 According to EMA, public and private investors are obliged to commission an analysis of potential 
environmental effects in the process of planning development projects. Only registered experts 
are authorised to conduct such environmental impact assessments (EIAs), and the National 
Environment Management Council is mandated to review and oversee compliance with the EIA 
requirements. The legislation for this system is in place, but it is not yet working in practice. A 
recent study found that “even the central government was implementing construction projects that 
fell under mandatory EIA list, without subjecting them to the EIA process” (Sosovele 2011: 129). 
The author of the study found a low degree of awareness of the EIA requirements among decision-
makers in Dar es Salaam municipalities, stating that “up to 40% of those interviewed admitted to 
have no basic knowledge of the act and EIA regulations” (Sosovele 2011: 129).  
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of EMA, decision-makers in the Vice-President’s Office anticipated various 
‘partners’ to sponsor the programme. 
The interest on the donor side, however, was unexpectedly low. Only 
Denmark joined in 2007, pledging assistance in the amount of 35 million 
Danish kroner (around USD 6 million at that time) over a period of five years 
and thereby covering 15% of the estimated programme costs. In 2011, Canada 
came on board, with a contribution of USD 2.75 million approved until 2013. 
A retired high-ranking official who had initiated the programme in the Vice-
President’s Office surmised shifting agendas of donor governments as a major 
reason for the meagre support: 
In the development of the programme, we had all the donors together and 
the Canadians were looking at it. The Embassy here was for it, they had 
to convince their bosses in the centre in Canada; and that depends on the 
politics in the centre, and depends on which priorities they have. Sometimes 
priorities change, sometimes an initiative begins well – and then there 
are things called elections (…). You have a change of government and 
this change of government comes with different policies saying now we 
are getting out of environment, now I think we are looking at gender, you 
know. Those kinds of things can actually happen. (Interview 66) 
At the time of our interviews, frustration was high on all sides – government 
officials were disappointed about the lack of funding and donor staff at 
Danida despaired about poor progress. A mid-term review conducted in 2010 
recommended a ‘refocus’ of Danish support in order to achieve visible results 
until the end of the programme: 
Given the lack of success in establishing a functioning basket fund for support 
to EMA-ISP, the slow pace of implementation of on-going activities, the 
rapid development in some sectors (i.e.: the increased focus on agricultural 
productivity) and possible new needs in these sectors as a result, the ASR 
[Annual Sector Review] team strongly recommends a “refocusing” exercise. 
The ASR finds it urgent to look for the most appropriate modality to ensure 
that there will be documented results/ outcomes in the last three years of 
Danida’s support to EMA implementation. (Danida et al. 2010: 9)
Notably, government and donor actors concerned with EMA-ISP stated 
different root causes for the strained situation. An official at NEMC underlined 
the lack of financial resources as the major obstacle in implementing the Act 
and the programme, whereas the Danida officer in charge pointed to the lack 
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of capacity in the Tanzanian counterpart institutions. Her narrative on the 
problem is cited at length, since it entails a number of implications which are 
discussed below the quotation: 
Interviewee: Things have not been smoothly, because the capacity is very 
weak there. We did a capacity assessment for the Vice-President’s Office 
and NEMC. The report just said their staff is overstretched, they need a 
support, technical support. And still they couldn’t accept that. 
Interviewer: In which field of knowledge do they have the greatest needs 
where you would say that should be something that has to come from 
outside? 
Interviewee: We are not there to monitor day-to-day activities because that 
would be micro managing from the mission point of view. We are assessing 
the type of reports we receive, the quarterly reports, the annual reports, the 
work plans and budgets that we get. If you submit to us your annual work 
plan and we review it three or four times – what would your judgement 
be? There is a problem here. Because here is an individual coordinating for 
ten ministries to prepare everything – and you get various different reports 
with a different format, though they have a standard format. 
Then you look at the type of activities people are planning to implement – at 
times they are out of scope. Then you look at the person that is coordinating 
the programme, you look at his work, at his knowledge, and the skills and 
the capacity, is he a team leader? A real team leader, because a team leader 
has to be flexible and tolerant. How is he coordinating the crew? How 
are the people that he is coordinating responding to the issues that he is 
raising? Those are the things that we look at in general. And we find that 
maybe they need someone else to assist. And then, as the time goes, he’s 
trying to pull back and assist them to have that ownership. So you feel also 
the ownership is not there, you just get the ownership when they want the 
disbursement of funds. 
And now at the coming in of Canadian CIDA, the review team felt that 
no, the programme is suffering. There is very slow implementation; we get 
very low quality reports. And so we feel there is need for someone to come 
in and assist you in various areas. Especially they didn’t have a standard 
monitoring and evaluation system. If someone could come in and help 
them with that, maybe things would move. (Interview 33) 
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In her statement, the Danida programme officer indicates some important 
aspects pertaining to the understanding of ‘capacity’ and the nature of 
bureaucracy on the donor side. The fact that the capacity of government bodies 
is assessed on the basis of reporting, planning and management performance 
implies a strong technical perspective on public administration. The problematic 
framing of incongruent reporting formats and the missing monitoring and 
evaluation system confirms this notion. Adopting such a technical view – no 
reference to the content of the reports was made – it logically follows that 
if someone helped to settle administrative deficiencies, ‘things would move’. 
Consequently, the mid-term review urged the Danish Embassy to draw on 
the expertise of an international technical assistant, suggesting to contract a 
“process consultant, expert in results-based programming (…) with immediate effect” 
(Danida et al. 2010: 7, italics in original). 
This kind of argumentation implies that the main reason for the poor 
implementation of the programme is insufficient administrative capacity. 
What it seems to ignore, however, is the political nature of the issues at stake. 
Given that environmental management is handled as a cross-cutting issue 
involving various ministries which often pursue conflicting objectives (e.g. an 
increase in agricultural production or industrial investment vs. environment 
conservation), it is obvious that institutional reforms entail difficult negotiation 
processes. The constant delays in planning and approval procedures and the 
absence of key actors in decision-making meetings support what can be seen 
as an indication of a low priority of the EMA implementation on the Tanzanian 
agenda, or simply as a sign of the complexity of cross-sectoral governance. 
Through the technical lens of aid providers, however, such political 
intricacies seem to be blanked out. Danida’s and CIDA’s joint response to the 
lack of progress was to strongly push for an advisor to be embedded in the 
Vice-President’s Office who should drive forth the process and ‘assist them to 
have that ownership’. The negotiations about technical assistance turned out 
tediously, given that VPO officers in charge did not see a need for external 
support. Danida’s programme manager described the situation as follows: 
The Vice-President’s Office – in principle, they don’t want advisors. They 
feel that they have the capacity to implement activities on their own. And 
later on, they said ‘No, we don’t want an international advisor, we want 
a local advisor. But still, if you want to bring in an advisor, the funds 
to support the advisor’s role should not come from the programme. You 
should outsource somewhere, but not use the same funds (…).’ 
And so they have accepted now to have an advisor, but not long term, 
they want a short term advisor. We have just received the draft terms of 
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reference. We are now in the process of reviewing and seeing how we can 
bring in an advisor, because we would like the advisor to start in July. 
(Interview 33) 
Donors seemed unhappy with this arrangement, which might also have 
resulted from the experience that the ‘contextual analysis’ delivered by a 
short-term advisor in the inception phase of the programme passed unheeded: 
After the advisor left, the report was kept on the shelf, it was never revised. 
And so you find now, the start of the programme had a lot of challenges. 
From the beginning, they did not want to have a technical advisor. So for 
that case, the programme has also been affected by not having a technical 
advisor to assist them, also how the report should look like. (Interview 33) 
In 2014, Danida and CIDA funding for EMA-ISP was about to be phased out. 
At the time of writing, there was no final report publicly accessible which 
assessed the impact of technical assistance and the progress of the programme 
until external support ended. In light of the extensive donor engagement in 
the development of the Environmental Management Act and its international 
promotion when it was adopted, it is remarkable that the aid community’s 
interest in the actual implementation of the Act seems to have faded away. 
In line with the changing global agenda, the focus of donors in Dar es Salaam 
appears to have shifted towards a new prime topic on the rise, namely climate 
change mitigation and the related REDD+ process. Once again, Tanzania 
is among the pilot countries in which the feasibility of a new international 
approach is being tested.  
The emergence of REDD+ and the spread of related aid programmes in Tanzania  
REDD+ is the commonly used term for an envisaged global mechanism of 
channelling payments to developing countries which effectively contribute 
to climate change mitigation. REDD stands for ‘Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation’; the plus indicates that aside from 
a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, conservation, the sustainable 
management of forests and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks are 
considered as rewarding mitigation efforts. 
REDD+ evolved in the course of various high-level meetings related to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While 
the role of forests as greenhouse gas reservoirs has long been recognised, 
halting and reversing forest loss as an approach of the global climate change 
regime was formalised in the Bali Road Map agreed by the 13th Conference 
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of the Parties in 2007 (UNFCCC Conference of the Parties 2008).261 Although 
details of REDD+ continue to be negotiated and a financing mechanism is 
not yet in place, the concept has been taken up by the aid community which 
promptly designed a range of programmes in order to ‘prepare’ the potential 
beneficiaries. 
Norway was at the forefront of donor countries incorporating REDD+ into 
its development work through the ‘International Climate and Forest Initiative’ 
which the government established in 2008. According to the environment 
counsellor in the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Norway had a great 
interest in getting Tanzania to participate: 
Tanzania was already chosen as one of the countries that we wanted to try 
this out. And why Tanzania was chosen was because we wanted to have 
African countries and also wanted to have countries with dry forests. So 
Congo Basin is part of this initiative, but also then Tanzania and Zambia. 
It was in the beginning three countries on each continent. So very early 
the Embassy here, the ambassador started dialogue with the government 
in this country to see if there was an interest. And it was. (Interview 39) 
In April 2008, the governments of Norway and Tanzania signed a letter of 
intent on climate change collaboration for which Norway pledged 500 million 
Norwegian Kroner (equivalent to USD 83 million at that time) over a period 
of five years, with the money being destined for policy development, pilot 
projects, and research related to REDD+. Shortly after, Tanzania was also 
selected to join the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility through 
which financial and technical assistance is channelled to countries preparing for 
REDD+. In 2009, the United Nations came in with the UN-REDD programme, 
a collaborative partnership of FAO, UNDP and UNEP launched with the 
objective “to assist developing countries to build capacity to reduce emissions 
and to participate in a future REDD+ mechanism” (UN-REDD  Programme 
2011: 1). Other REDD+ related aid projects which started at around the same 
time included Finland’s support to the first comprehensive forest inventory 
in Tanzania, the so-called National Forest Monitoring and Assessment, and 
the Clinton Foundation’s Clinton Climate Initiative with a focus on the 
development of social and environmental standards for the implementation of 
REDD+ activities. In sum, donor commitments for REDD+ efforts in the period 
2009–2012 amounted to USD 93.5 million (Kaijage & Kuhanwa 2013). 
261 Already the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 referred to the “promotion of sustainable forest management 
practices, afforestation and reforestation” (United Nations (1997), Article 2) as a measure to achieve 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments. 
297
CHAPTER 7 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policy-making in Young Democracies: Sector Studies
The generous supply of assistance fostering REDD+ processes in Tanzania 
can be explained by the fact that the country serves as an ideal field of 
experimentation for this new approach: with 35.3 million hectares, the 
country is endowed with vast forest resources which cover almost 40% of 
the mainland area (United Republic of Tanzania 2012d: 5). Given an annual 
deforestation rate of 1.16%, forests are at a high risk (FAO 2010a). Aside from 
the ‘appropriate’ natural conditions which make Tanzania predestined for the 
new international approach, the preceding involvement of various donors in 
the country’s forestry sector might have been a factor boosting the prominence 
of Tanzania as a forerunner of the REDD+ regime. 
External influences on forest governance in Tanzania 
The history of foreign engagement in Tanzania’s forestry sector dates back to 
the early 1970s. Since forestry and related industries played an important role 
in their own economies at that time, Scandinavian countries which favoured 
Nyerere’s socialist vision of ujamaa were among the first to provide assistance 
by first sending experts and later on channelling money to Tanzania’s forestry 
administration, research and training institutes.262 Until the 1990s, their 
support focused on the expansion of village forestry and the commercialisation 
of forest plantation and logging activities, emphasising the potential of forestry 
for economic development. With the rise of ‘sustainable development’ on the 
international agenda, donors such as Sweden and Finland reframed their aid 
towards environmental aspects of forestry. At the programmatic level, this 
meant that support to state-led forestry industries was gradually phased out, 
being replaced by initiatives promoting community-based approaches and 
privatisation, and their incorporation into policies and law. In the course of 
this paradigm shift, ‘Participatory Forest Management’ evolved as the favourite 
theme of forestry-related aid in Tanzania. 
The notion of Participatory Forest Management (or PFM in short) subsumes 
a range of different concepts and arrangements varying from country to 
country.263 The basic idea of the approach is that local communities should 
be involved in the management and utilisation of natural forests and 
woodland, which in Tanzania, as in many other states, has historically been 
an exclusive domain of the central government. During the 1990s, various 
262 By 1972, ten Swedish forestry experts to Tanzania worked for the government’s Forest Division 
and the Tanzania Wood Industries Corporation (TWICO) paid by Sida; in the mid-1970s, Sweden 
accounted for almost 90% of the Forestry and Beekeeping Division’s and TWICO’s combined 
budget (Katila et al. 2003). 
263 In the understanding of the FAO, “participatory forestry refers to processes and mechanisms which 
enable people with a direct stake in forest resources to be part of decision-making in all aspects of 
forest management, including policy formulation processes” (FAO 2012). 
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donors, including Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Germany, UNDP and 
the World Bank started to pilot participatory management through a range of 
projects in different districts, while at the same time advocating and providing 
support for a comprehensive reform of policies and legislation. In 1998, the 
old forest policy which had been carried over from colonial rule was revised 
and a new version approved (United Republic of Tanzania 1998). This was 
followed by a new Forest Act passed by parliament in 2002 (United Republic 
of Tanzania 2002). Together, the new policy and legal framework meant a 
substantial change in forest governance in that it decentralised authority and 
formally allowed communities to own and (co-) manage forests under a set 
of arrangements. The Act notably encourages private sector involvement, and 
embraces the principle of subsidiarity, stating that the responsibility of forest 
management should be delegated to the lowest possible level. The reforms 
were widely praised by the donor community which lauded Tanzania for 
having “one of the most advanced community forestry jurisdictions in Africa 
as reflected in policy, law and practice” (Blomley & Ramadhani 2006: 94). 
In the years following the policy change, Participatory Forest Management 
spread from a couple of pilot sites to being implemented in various districts 
across Tanzania. By 2008, around 2 300 villages engaged in PFM under joint or 
community-based forest management arrangements covering almost 4 million 
hectares equivalent to 11% of the total forest land (Blomley & Iddi 2009).264 
Research conducted in recent years has found slight signs of improved forest 
conditions in PFM sites as reflected by increased basal areas and declined 
forest disturbance by human activities, and pointed to a few examples where 
villages have begun to see economic potential from forest management 
(Blomley & Ramadhani 2006; Blomley et al. 2008; Ngaga et al. 2014; Treue et 
al. 2014). Yet, the same studies also document a wide range of constraints and 
problems which seem to overshadow the improvements gained, ranging from 
persistent exploitation, illegal logging and elite capturing of benefits to massive 
governance shortfalls and pervasive corruption at all levels. 
Officials commenting on the situation referred to the lack of financial and 
human resources for controlling what is happening on the ground. Donor 
staff, in contrast, expressed that the government has little incentive to enforce 
compliance with its own legislation, given the vested interests of individuals 
and collusive networks in forest activities. A counsellor in the Finnish Embassy 
commented in this regard: 
264 Under Joint Forest Management agreements, ownership remains with the government while 
communities co-manage a designated forest area and in turn get shared benefits and user rights. 
Under Community-Based Forest Management arrangements, “villagers take full ownership and 
management responsibility for an area of forest within their jurisdiction and declared by village and 
district government as a Village Forest Reserve” (Blomley & Ramadhani 2006: 94). 
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There are politicians who interfere in the affairs of the ministry all the 
time. And the only person that could make any changes is the Minister 
for Natural Resources, not the others because they are more or less 
administrating, they are technicians. And as much as they want to change 
the things – even the director of FBD [Forestry and Beekeeping Division] 
when he was there or the CEO of TFS [Tanzania Forest Services Agency] 
– as much as they want to change things, there are limits to that. Because 
you always have somebody, a politician coming there and asking for 
favours and make sure that this functions like this, and this, and this. (…) 
There are lots of people who are looking for their own good. So the policy, 
the legislation and programmes are very good in Tanzania, very advanced. 
But they cannot function properly because of political interference – they 
cannot, absolutely. (Interview 36) 
A donor-financed report authorised by the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Tourism in fact found evidence of “self-dealing, nepotism and cronyism 
involving timber trade” (Milledge et al. 2007: 11) permeating all government 
levels, as well as “high levels of collusion, organisation and protection between 
different government institutions and the private sector” (Milledge et al. 
2007: 12); the authors of the study concluded that “current policy, as set out in 
the formal laws and regulations governing the management of these resources, 
was systematically being manipulated by domestic and foreign private sector 
interests in concert with senior Tanzanian and foreign government officials” 
(Milledge et al. 2007: 2). 
The outcomes of aid to the forestry sector: Discontent and frictions
Having spent around USD 30 million on introducing PFM in Tanzania (Treue 
et al. 2014), donors were rather dissatisfied with the state of forest governance 
at the time of our research and perceived the government as insufficiently 
committed to put any effort in changing the situation. A counsellor at the 
Finnish Embassy expressed the common discontent on the donor side as 
follows: 
All the funding for the community based forest management has been 
coming from the development partners. The government has not funded 
it as such at all. So I mean it’s very clear that they have the policy and 
the legislation on this. But it’s a clear sign if there is no funding from 
the government for this type of activity – they don’t see it as a priority. 
(Interview 36) 
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Budgetary figures do not confirm the claim that the government did not 
fund Participatory Forest Management “at all”, but they do show a significant 
imbalance between local and external resources: during 2005–2008, the 
government allocated around USD 16.8 million for development programmes 
of the forestry sector, while donors provided more than twice as much, namely 
USD 35.6 million which accounted for 68% of the total budget (Akida et al. 
2012).265 
Aside from the small financial contribution from the government, the slow 
progress in implementing activities seriously disgruntled staff in country offices 
and embassies under pressure to deliver results and disburse appropriated 
funds. As indicated by the following statements, their explanations for the 
various deadlocks ranged from capacity constraints to disinterest and deliberate 
jamming on the part of their Tanzanian counterparts. With regard to the first 
of these obstacles, a Danida officer commented: 
At the PMO-RALG, it’s one officer responsible with forest activities. And it 
is not only one donor who is supporting participatory forest management. 
For instance, you have Finland, you have Denmark, you have the World 
Bank. It’s over 60 districts in the country implementing Participatory Forest 
Management. But in the sector coordination, you have one component 
leader. Can this one person manage three different donors with three 
different headquarter demands? Those are the challenges that you see in 
terms of capacity. (Interview 33) 
Whilst acknowledging the additional burden donors put on already 
overstrained government units, the interviewee still complained about the lack 
of engagement as reflected by the absence of leading officials in environment 
working group meetings: 
You expect the people who should come to these technical meetings are 
directors, but they send in junior officers who are not decision makers 
or policy-makers. Then you have the steering committees, where you 
expect the permanent secretaries will be there for you to discuss the policy 
implementation. Then they bring in junior officers, not directors. But 
this is the meeting where decisions have to be made. So there is also that 
265 In the Tanzanian Five-Year Development Plan 2011–2016, the discrepancy between projected 
local and external resources is even wider, with the government being expected to provide 
USD 1 million (TSh 1 548 million) against USD 8 million (TSh 13 131 million) from development 
partners. According to the plan, the forestry sector would require an amount of TSh 71 563 million 
for the fiscal years 2011/12–2015/16; the open balance is to be covered by other sources such as 
the private sector whose contribution is not reflected in the figures (President’s Office 2012).
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weakness in not understanding the significance of the programme in that 
particular organisation. That is what you also see. (Interview 33) 
From donor experience, the only way to get their counterparts in government 
engaged is to provide tangible incentives in the form of individual payments 
to those attending the meetings and events. This practice, however, seems to 
have got out of control, resulting in a situation where the pace of programmes 
has become solely dependent on the extra amounts paid. Yet, it proves difficult 
for donors to abolish the incentive system they have created, as the Danida 
officer spelled out: 
We have reached a point where developing partners say ‘no, we will not 
give you top up allowances, we’re not giving you seating allowances, we’re 
not giving you honorarium. Now, here’s a project that does not support 
that’. But this is an officer who is not only responsible for this project; he 
also has to look at this project. Now this project pays more. Do you expect 
him to assist you in this? He is paid less. But there is a five days meeting 
where he will be paid 400 000 in the end of the week. Where will he go? 
(Interview 33) 
The sentiment that the ‘per diem’ culture has seriously affected programmes 
in the forestry sector in a detrimental way was not only expressed by the 
Danida officer. Her colleague in the Finnish Embassy also raised the issue, 
reporting on the support for Tanzania’s National Forest Programme which had 
been developed with Finnish assistance a decade ago. In order to boost its 
implementation, Finland set up a project which was supposed to run from 2009 
to 2011 and included a grant of EUR 6 million to be channelled through the 
MNRT. By 2012, however, only EUR 3 million had been used, with the result 
that the project was extended until 2014. Commenting on the disbursement 
difficulties and the poor financial management on the part of her counterparts, 
the counsellor in the Finnish Embassy stated: 
With the Ministry of Natural Resources, it’s not very easy to have a good 
relationship because things are not moving. (…) And there are reasons for 
that. And I can only guess because I am not in the ministry. But for me, it’s 
very much a deliberate thing. I mean people – it’s not rocket science. They 
could make those systems work. They know how to work them. But there is 
a lot of mismanagement of funds. Funds are directed to different directions 
where they shouldn’t go. And then I also think it’s deliberate that they 
were only able to use half of the money that we were giving them for two 
years – they used it in three and a half years. And you know, somehow in 
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my mind the idea is that if it lasts for six, seven years, it’s easier to get more 
daily allowances, all these per diems, discussion workshops organized and 
so on. So it kind of dilutes the whole thing. (Interview 36) 
The fact that the use of funds in the context of the National Forest Programme 
lacks transparency had already been attested by a review conducted in 2010. It 
found that documentations for training sessions, workshops and meetings were 
missing, funds had not been audited and procurement procedures had not been 
followed (Karani 2010). The on-going problems with regard to the financial 
management of MNRT and PMO-RALG finally led the Finnish Embassy to re-
allocate the remaining project resources towards service providers and private 
sector companies in the forestry sector, arguing that: 
This is the only way to support something that works instead of continuing 
this very confrontational relationship with them [the ministries]. (…) It 
doesn’t take us anywhere if we just continue doing audits. I mean, it’s 
difficult to give them money and see all the time that the audit reports are 
bad and their financial management is not in place and so on. So we try to 
find those alternatives where can we work. (Interview 36) 
Finland was not the only donor that withdrew funding from the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Tourism due to concerns of financial accountability and 
deficient progress. The World Bank had a similar experience with its Forest 
Conservation and Management Project starting in 2002 with the objectives 
to scale up participatory forest management, to get an endowment fund in 
place and to improve service delivery by establishing the Tanzanian Forest 
Services Agency, amongst others. With the MNRT as ‘implementing agency’ 
on the government side, the World Bank disbursed almost USD 35 million 
until the project ended in 2009. The ‘Implementation Completion and Results 
Report’ rated outcomes as ‘moderately unsatisfactory’, indicating significant 
shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of objectives (World Bank 
2010c). Asked for the Bank’s reaction to the negative assessment, the senior 
environmental specialist in the Dar es Salaam country office commented:  
Well, I can tell you with regards to that, we stopped financing MNRT. 
I mean right now there are no programmes or whatsoever with MNRT 
through the World Bank. So I think for a variety of reasons, because they 
weren’t able to deliver, because there were all kinds of corruption problems, 
I mean there was serious mismanagement of funds and – walk down the 
street and you’ll hear the same answer. (Interview 46) 
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As most aid agencies and embassies suspended funding or terminated 
cooperation with MNRT in the aftermath of corruption cases and allegations, 
the ministry faced a serious crisis at the time of research. The withdrawal of 
external assistance substantially weakened the MNRT not only in financial 
terms, but also with regard to its political influence in the evolving REDD+ 
regime. 
The changing nature of aid to the forestry sector under the REDD+ regime
The aid community’s turning away from ministries towards other players in the 
forestry sector, notably NGOs, private industry and academia, had significant 
implications for both the direction of resource flows and the power relations 
in the context of the REDD+. Norway as the most instrumental donor driving 
the process determined not to channel any funds of its REDD+ portfolio 
through the government, justifying the decision in terms of the misuse of 
aid money in its previous natural resources support programme.266 Instead, 
the available resources were transferred directly to NGOs implementing pilot 
projects, universities carrying out research and the secretariat of the National 
REDD+ Task Force. That the latter was established at the Institute of Resource 
Assessment of the University of Dar es Salaam and not in one of the key 
ministries assigned with the political authority to deal with climate change 
and forestry (i.e. the VPO-DoE and the MNRT) was to a significant extent the 
result of Norway’s objection to placing this central institution in one of the 
government ministries. Commenting on this arrangement, the counsellor in 
the Norwegian Embassy stated: 
Interviewee: This current process, of course, is part of government 
responsibility. But instead of having the secretariat within any of the 
ministries, it’s at the university. So that is also kind of giving the authorities 
support without channelling funds directly to the ministry. 
Interviewer: Is this a unique case due to this corruption case?    
266 From 1994 to 2006, Norway financed the so-called ‘Management of Natural Resources Programme’ 
in Tanzania, spending around USD 60 million, about USD 5 million per year. After 12 years of 
support, a final evaluation raised doubts about the use of funds; subsequent audit reports of a 
Danish consultancy firm found evidence of massive mismanagement and corrupt practices, such as 
(double) payments of per diems and allowances for workshops which did not take place as indicated, 
the coverage of undocumented travel expenses, and the purchase of over-priced or non-existent 
goods and services, amongst others (Jansen 2009). As a consequence, Norway stopped funding to 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism which was responsible for the programme. 
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Interviewee: Yes, as far as I know from the Norwegian side, it is, this kind 
of set up. Because usually they work much closer with the relevant sector 
ministry.      
Interviewer: And does that harm your processes? 
Interviewee: Of course some will think that we have a closer cooperation 
when the money is following the dialogue, so it might be. I mean, we 
know that the Ministry of Natural Resources very much would like also 
to have funds, of course. I also know that in some meetings, the ministry 
has not met. I should not say that they are boycotting, but almost…that’s 
suspicion. That might be because of this arrangement, but also I think 
it’s mainly because it’s an on-going competition between the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and VPO about who should be in charge. It’s forestry 
and climate change. Forestry, it’s within MNRT, climate change in VPO. 
So they are competing all the time. And for that reason, actually it is nice to 
have a body outside both of them. I think several times that it is not so bad, 
it’s a solution. Actually it might be very good. And also, now having this 
direct support to NGOs has secured the kind of bottom up process for the 
development of the REDD strategy. We feel that now the NGOs also have 
strong voice into the process. (Interview 39) 
In fact, NGOs such as the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group were strongly 
bolstered by the piloting role given to them by the aid community. Through 
implementing projects on the ground, they have gained sufficient strategic 
power to substantially influence REDD+ processes at both the local and 
national levels (Manyika et al. 2013). Already in the early phases of REDD+, it 
has become evident that their policy preferences are not necessarily congruent 
with those of the government-focused task force.267 In view of the vested 
interests of local actors seeking to profit from future forest carbon trading and 
the external influence of foreign financers, one can assume that “both strategic 
behaviour and power struggles may lead to political legitimacy concerns and 
subsequently affect the effectiveness of the chosen governance structures” 
(Manyika et al. 2013: 77). Another indication for struggles behind the stage is 
the fact that despite a long, consultative process, Tanzania’s REDD+ strategy 
approved in 2013 did not clarify “many unresolved and thorny issues such 
267 This is drawn from Manyika et al. (2013: 76) who found that governance structures proposed by 
NGOs “contradict what has been proposed at national led REDD+ governance process”. According 
to the authors, the case studies analysed reflect that “pilot projects envisage selling Carbon credits 
directly to the international markets, and thus propose establishment of their own local/project 
level Carbon credit marketing strategy, which does not necessarily link with the NRTF [National 
REDD+ Trust Fund] proposed at national level”. 
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as legal gaps, tree/carbon tenure, benefit sharing and financial mechanisms” 
(Nordeco & Arcacia 2013: v).
All in all, it seems that the REDD+ process in Tanzania is heavily driven and 
orchestrated by the aid community which during 2009–2012 accounted for 
95% of the funding for related activities (Kaijage & Kuhanwa 2013). Donor-
financed expert engagement ranged from delivering studies and providing 
administrative support to preparing strategies and commenting on drafts. 
Preparing Tanzania for the REDD+ regime was primarily a concern of the 
developed countries – the potential buyers of carbon credits – rather than a 
national request. 
Considering that Tanzania would potentially benefit from a future carbon 
trading market under the REDD+ regime, it is certainly true that the government 
was interested in getting engaged with donors on that matter. A retired official 
from the Forestry and Beekeeping Division delineated the decision-makers’ 
stance as follows: 
Donors are part and parcel of the REDD development process, globally 
and nationally. (…) REDD is not a one-sided business. We are talking 
of selling carbon and where are the markets for carbon? They are not in 
Tanzania; if they were in Tanzania, they would be very limited. So much 
of it will be a global market and at a particular point in time, we’ll need 
to negotiate with those. (Interview 58) 
Whether aside from the prospect of additional financing, the Tanzanian 
government sees the overall objective of REDD+ (i.e. mitigating climate change 
by reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) as a national 
priority, is another question. A high-ranking director in the VPO-DoE gave a 
very clear answer in this regard: 
For us, for the government, our priority is on poverty reduction. But donors 
maybe want to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions by implementing some 
projects here. They will say, ‘why don’t you say climate change?’ But 
they’re not giving us a room to say what the priority issue is. Although 
they may say: ‘You guys, you don’t see people are affected by drought 
and you are facing a lot of floods in some parts, why don’t you consider 
climate change as a priority issue’. That’s an imposed priority issue! It’s 
not an intrinsic priority issue. A genuine priority issue in our country, a 
genuine one is the one which is thought to come from the government. 
And that’s why I was saying: For the government, poverty reduction is a 
priority issue and the means to reduce poverty or to ensure food security 
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and nutrition. If it involves climate change, fine, then let’s address climate 
change. (Interview 67) 
“Tell me what you have money for, and I’ll tell you what my priorities are” 
As this account indicates, the evolvement of REDD+ put Tanzania under 
significant pressure to adjust its policies to the new paradigm (i.e. to reframe 
forest management as a matter of climate change mitigation). That aid is 
used by the international community to leverage such policy shifts is evident 
in respective changes to the funding portfolio. A Tanzanian environmental 
specialist at NEMC reported on the current situation: 
Every donor now is running with climate change. Even now here in 
Tanzania there are other things, we have a lot of problems here – like 
the desertification, we have land degradation, we have a lot of erosion, 
but that ones are not receiving attention. (…) It’s climate change now on 
top of the agenda, even if you go to the UN organizations, what is being 
supported is climate change now. It’s the order of the day. (Interview 59) 
In response to the ever-shifting aid agenda, Tanzanian decision-makers 
concerned with environment and natural resources appear to have adopted 
what could be called a ‘chameleon’ strategy, strategically framing their priorities 
according to the respective donor preferences in order to access money. A 
director in the VPO-DoE commented on this: 
You see, donors have their own political propagandas. If you can come up 
with a strong statement that climate change is a priority issue – for them, 
it is an advantage that now they can give you a lot of money. Maybe you 
can use that to address poverty – where in principle they won’t be happy, 
if you direct the big share to address poverty issues, because if you talk of 
poverty issues, it has its own parameters which may not tally with the 
climate change parameters. (Interview 67)
While at the surface, it may seem as if the government does not set clear 
priorities, various narratives of government officials indicate that for strategic 
reasons these are not openly communicated to the aid community. The tactical 
manoeuvring of decision- makers seems to have evolved from their experience 
that national requests are neglected by donors pursuing their own agenda, as a 
previous director of the Forestry and Beekeeping Division pointed out: 
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They come with already predetermined activities to be done – we can 
support this, we can support this, regardless of its impact on whatever 
you want to achieve on the ground. (…) On the issue of climate change, 
we said like in Dar es Salam here, it is the question of access to affordable 
energy. They made a study here in Dar es Salam to be able to network 
the use of natural gas which we already have here. Five years ago, they 
would have needed USD 35 million to be able to do that. And if they 
had connected maybe 70% of the households here in Dar es Salam, our 
demand for charcoal would have gone significantly down. But who is 
giving that money? You go to the government which says oh, we don’t 
have that, sorry, our budget, we have so many issues to respond to. You 
go to the donors who say: ‘Ah no, this is not my priority or I don’t have 
that money’. (…) They may have the money but if that money does not fit 
into their programme of work which has been already agreed through the 
parliament and the other decision-making machinery – to change it, it’s 
not so easy. (Interview 58) 
Learning from the recurrent neglect of their actual demands, decision-makers 
in Tanzania’s environmental authorities have adopted a stance of ‘take 
what you can get’ which is clearly recognised by staff in country offices and 
embassies. An interviewee in the Norwegian Embassy resignedly stated: 
I think here you can ask them for anything. Are you interested in? And 
they will say yes. (Interview 39) 
The environmental specialist in the World Bank’s Dar es Salaam office put this 
notion even more bluntly: 
If you ask here, give me what your priorities are, they say ‘well, you tell 
me what you have money for and I’ll tell you what my priorities are’. 
(Interview 46) 
Conclusion 
As the detailed description of previous and current policy processes has shown, 
aid has been an essential driver of environmental policy-making in Tanzania: 
the majority of environmental policies and laws have been stipulated and 
financed by the donor community whose experts were substantially involved 
in its development. The immense external engagement helped to shift the 
issue on the country’s political agenda, but it has also narrowed down the 
decision-makers’ autonomy in the policy space, with aid providers using their 
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relevance as financiers to push priorities in line with their own portfolios. 
A professor at the University of Dar es Salaam commented: 
On the forest management part, you see in some areas the forests are being 
well managed, so I wouldn’t totally say that the support that is given from 
the foreign countries is useless. But I think the only thing is that we would 
wish to see that, okay, you give resources, but you allow for the locals or 
rather the nation to set priorities – what they think is a priority; even 
within the forest sector, how one would like to be supported, for example. 
There should be a leeway for the respective nations to dictate on what 
needs to be done. (Interview 69) 
As they have experienced that their agenda-setting authority is constrained 
by the dominance of foreign funders, Tanzanian decision-makers have 
adopted a strategic stance in dealing with them: the alignment of priorities to 
the prevailing aid agenda enables them to secure resources which are direly 
needed in the underfunded sector. What then happens on the ground is 
another story. The appalling gap between policies and implementation may 
thus be seen not only as a result of deficient capacity and budget constraints 
(as it is usually explained and certainly true to some extent) but also one of 
tactical manoeuvring on the part of recipients who thereby aim to preserve 
discretion, while being dependent on aid.
South Africa environment: On top of the game
Sectoral context
Occupying only 2% of the earth’s land surface, South Africa is one of the 
world’s richest countries in terms of natural habitat, home to 10% of 
the planet’s plant species and 7% of all reptile, bird and mammal species 
(Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2009). Exceptionally high 
levels of biodiversity can be found in three hotspots: the Succulent Karoo, the 
Maputaland-Pondoland-Albany hotspot, and the Cape Floristic Region. The 
latter is unique insofar as it is the only floral kingdom world-wide that falls 
entirely within the borders of a single country (Conservation International 
2013). 
Yet, Red List assessments indicate alarming figures: around 20% of 
freshwater fish and mammals and 15% of birds face a high risk of becoming 
extinct in the near future. Already under threat are 2 500 (12% of all) 
domestic plant species. Nearly half of the country’s wetland ecosystem types 
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which are vital for ensuring water quality and regulating water supplies are 
critically endangered (Driver et al. 2012). While nature degradation, invasive 
alien species, pollution and waste, over-exploitation of resources and climate 
change are seen as the main drivers of habitat loss, the tension between 
conservation measures and conflicting interests evolving from an emerging 
economy is a core problem in the country (Driver et al. 2012). A director in 
the Department of Environmental Affairs described the major challenges with 
regard to preserving biodiversity as follows:  
I think the biggest one is probably covered under the broad term sustainable 
development where the biggest threat is the economy – the question how do 
we protect and enhance and reap a benefit from sustained ecosystems (…). 
We’re grappling with rhinos, with species management, and that is the 
one thing that is keeping us all running a lot in the biodiversity space. We 
are grappling with issues of land use and land use change and what that 
then means; with issues of mining and protected areas, and how to make a 
case for conservation versus the extractive use. (Interview 14) 
Reconciling environmental protection with economic growth is a challenge 
many emerging countries are confronted with. Yet, it is a particularly sensitive 
issue in South Africa, given its long, but problematic history of conservation. 
Under colonial and apartheid rule, racial policies led to the forcible removal 
of thousands of South Africans from their ancestral land. Black communities 
were ‘re-settled’ to make way for game parks open exclusively to whites, while 
the majority of the population was deprived of access to desperately needed 
natural resources (Crane et al. 2009). The fact that “billions of rands were spent 
on preserving wildlife and protecting wild flowers while people in ‘townships’ 
and ‘homelands’ lived without adequate food, shelter, and clean water” 
(McDonald 2002: 1) reflects the perverse politics of that time. As a result, “the 
environment was seen to be a white, suburban issue of little relevance to the 
anti-apartheid struggle. At worst, environmental policy was seen as an explicit 
tool of racially based oppression” (McDonald 2002: 1, emphasis in original).
When the new democratic government came into power in 1994, it made 
huge efforts to replace the destructive approach of the apartheid regime with 
a re-framed notion of environment as a human rights and development issue. 
This is reflected by the South African Constitution of 1996 which in section 24 
grants all South Africans the right: 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; 
and 
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(b)  to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that 
(i)  prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii)  promote conservation; and 
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural 
resources while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development. (Republic of South Africa 1996)
This paradigm shift went along with the development of a whole set of 
environmental policies and laws. Following an extensive process that 
comprised widespread national consultation, the White Paper on Conservation 
and the Sustainable Use of South Africa’s Biological Diversity (1997) and the 
National Environmental Management Act (1998) outlining the principles 
of environmental governance in the new democratic South Africa were 
formulated. 
Governance structures
The National Environmental Management Act of 1998 (or NEMA in short) is 
internationally regarded as one of the most progressive legal frameworks for 
environmental management. It articulates the idea of environmental justice 
and emphasises the principle of public participation in section 2(4) where it 
states: 
Environmental justice must be pursued so that adverse environmental 
impacts shall not be distributed in such a manner as to unfairly discriminate 
against any person, particularly vulnerable and disadvantaged persons; 
(…) 
The participation of all interested and affected parties in environmental 
governance must be promoted, and all people must have the opportunity 
to develop the understanding, skills and capacity necessary for achieving 
equitable and effective participation, and participation by vulnerable and 
disadvantaged persons must be ensured. (Republic of South Africa 
1998a)
The Act defines environment as an area of cooperative governance which 
means that legislative and executive powers are allocated to various line 
functionaries at the national level (e.g. the Department of Environmental 
Affairs, the Department of Water Affairs, the Department of Mineral Resources 
or the Department of Energy) as well as to provincial and local authorities. 
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In order to ensure alignment of governance efforts, NEMA stipulates that all 
spheres of government and state organs concerned with environmental issues 
“must co-operate with, consult and support one another” (Republic of South 
Africa 1998a).268 
The lead authority mandated to formulate, coordinate and monitor 
the implementation of national environmental policies, programmes and 
legislation is the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) which since 
2009 has operated under the newly established Ministry of Water and 
Environmental Affairs. The work of the department is supported by statutory 
bodies such as the South African National Parks (SANParks), which is charged 
with overseeing and managing conservation in South Africa’s national parks, 
and by the South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI), which 
plays a crucial role as a consultative body. SANBI was established through 
the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004. It has 
been given a broad mandate, which aside from maintaining botanical gardens, 
includes carrying out and coordinating research, reporting on the status of 
biodiversity and providing science-based policy advice to environmental 
stakeholders at all tiers of government (see Republic of South Africa 2004a, 
section 11). Hence, SANBI also closely works with environmental departments 
and conservation authorities in the provinces (e.g. CapeNature in the Western 
Cape), particularly in the context of bioregional plans and programmes, which 
will be illustrated in the case of CAPE. 
Donor presence in environment 
The circle of donors providing aid to environmental issues in South Africa has 
– compared to other sectors – always been rather small. The limited extent of 
external support in the first years of democracy was not necessarily caused by 
a lack of donor interest but by the fact that the lead agency on the government 
side, the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (now Department 
of Environmental Affairs), was in a state of institutional flux and officials were 
“initially cautious and reluctant to engage” (Albertyn & Fakir 2000: 45). An 
evaluation of ODA conducted in 2000 identified ten donor agencies which 
had invested in environmental projects by then, namely DFID, Finida, Norad, 
USAID, GTZ, the Netherlands, and the Danish Cooperation for Environment 
and Development (DANCED), the most active bilateral aid provider. 
Multilateral players engaged were the European Union, UNDP and the Global 
268 Although the principles of cooperative environmental governance are widely endorsed, various 
scholars have shown that the current environmental governance and policy regime in practice 
is highly fragmented which hampers effective service delivery (see, for instance, Kotze 2006; Du 
Plessis 2008). 
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Environment Facility which has been the largest source of international 
funding for environmental activities over the past two decades (Albertyn & 
Fakir 2000). From 1994 to 2012, South Africa received GEF grants amounting 
to USD 108.1 million for national projects, plus USD 2.7 million for smaller 
programmes executed by civil society and community-based organisations. 
USD 288.7 million were spent on regional and global projects in which South 
Africa participated (Global Environment Facility 2012).269
By 2012, the group of donors active in environment had been significantly 
reduced. Most of them had phased out their conventional ODA to environment 
in South Africa, having shifted the focus to other topics and new forms of 
partnerships. The major players remaining are the World Bank and UNDP 
as implementing agencies for GEF-financed programmes.270 The nature of 
cooperation and the contribution of experts in this setting may be illustrated 
with the example of what is seen as South Africa’s most influential undertaking 
in the field of environment, the CAPE programme. 
The making and implementation of the CAPE programme
Following the policy change in the early years of the democratic transition, 
South Africa was granted USD 12.3 million by the Global Environment Facility 
in support of the ‘Cape Peninsula Biodiversity Conservation Project’. Running 
from 1998 to 2005, the project was mainly carried out by SANParks and WWF-
South Africa who were assisted and supervised by the World Bank. The bulk of 
the funding was directed at the creation of the Table Mountain National Park 
and the expansion of the Table Mountain Fund. USD 1 million was assigned 
for preparing a long-term strategy and action plan to protect the biodiversity 
in the Cape Floristic Region (CFR). The process began with a phase of stock-
taking and analysis. During the initial phase, scientists from the University 
of Cape Town were commissioned to assess the current state of biodiversity 
in the terrestrial, marine and freshwater ecosystems of the CFR. Experts of 
the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research reviewed the legal, policy, 
institutional, financial, social and economic aspects affecting conservation 
269 The Global Environment Facility has been set up as an independent financing mechanism 
providing grants and concessional funding to cover incremental costs of measures targeting global 
environmental benefits in the areas of biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land 
degradation, ozone layer depletion, and persistent organic pollutants. As of 2014, the organisation 
comprised 183 member states. South Africa joined the GEF when it became a democracy in 1994. 
270 The GEF term ‘implementing agencies’ is to some extent misleading insofar as the role of the IAs 
(as, for instance, the World Bank, UNDP or UNEP) is focused on assisting and overseeing the actual 
implementers which are usually government bodies or NGOs. In GEF terminology, the latter are 
called ‘executing agencies’. 
313
CHAPTER 7 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policy-making in Young Democracies: Sector Studies
in this area (Younge & Fowkes 2003).271 The recommendations contained in 
these studies were taken up by a team comprising consultants and technical 
staff of executing agencies such as the Western Cape Nature Conservation 
Board (today known as CapeNature), DEAT and SANParks who formulated 
a first draft strategy. Their preliminary version was scrutinised and refined by 
representatives from government, the private sector, civil society and the local 
science community during a three-day workshop held in early 2000 (Lochner 
et al. 2003). The revised draft was then circulated to around 1 500 individuals 
before its final release as the ‘Cape Action Plan for the Environment’ (CAPE) 
which comprised the following main objectives: 
To establish an effective reserve network, enhance off-reserve conservation 
and support bio-regional planning;
To develop methods to ensure sustainable yields, promote compliance with 
laws, integrate biodiversity concerns into catchment management and 
promote sustainable nature-based tourism; 
To strengthen institutions, policies and laws, enhance co-operative 
governance and community participation, and support continued research 
(CAPE Project Team 2000: 3)
Nationally and internationally, the CAPE strategy was seen as the outcome of 
a successful regional planning exercise. Part of the success was ascribed to the 
extensive public consultation with a large number of disparate stakeholders 
whose commitment was deemed crucial to ensure that the strategy would be 
financed and internalised in the long term. In order to achieve the necessary 
‘ownership’ of local actors, it was attempted to keep external players at the side-
lines of the process. According to members of the organising team, outcomes 
“were consequently only translated into a log frame format and presented 
to international role-players once local buy-in was secured” (Lochner et al. 
2003: 31).  
Hence, although the development of the CAPE strategy was substantially 
funded from outside, the involvement of donor experts – for example, the 
World Bank task team leader or consultants funded through GEF resources – 
was limited to administrative backing and supervision. A CapeNature official 
described their part as follows: 
271 For a detailed list of the reports and their respective recommendations, see Younge and Fowkes 
(2003). 
314
The Delusion of Knowledge Transfer
They did bring in some expertise but it was more expertise in terms of 
funding, project management and that kind of thing, and they did make 
use of local expertise or local scientists in terms of developing the original 
strategy. And so we went through a whole process within which we agreed 
on what we want to do with this funding. So it wasn’t forced on us, it 
was part of a broadly negotiated process. There were lots of arguments at 
that stage between the scientists locally, you know, the one group saying 
no we must go in this direction, the other one saying we must go in that 
direction. And so the GEF experts played a facilitating role in trying to find 
a common ground. (Interview 13) 
Although the outcomes were broadly accepted and the parties involved pledged 
to realign existing resources around agreed priorities, it was clear that turning 
the strategy into action would require external funding, at least in the first 
phase of implementation. The action plan designed for the initial five years 
called for an investment of ZAR 812 million (equivalent to around USD 107 
million at that time), of which ZAR 487 million (ca. USD 64 million) needed 
to be sourced from outside (Cape Action Plan for the Environment 2000).272 In 
order to attract financiers, an international conference was held in September 
2000 where core projects related to priority areas outlined in the strategy 
were presented. All proposals had been developed by or in close collaboration 
with the respective South African institutions that would execute them (Cape 
Action Plan for the Environment 2000; Younge & Fowkes 2003). 
Amongst the largest aid providers responding to this request was the GEF 
which in subsequent years approved a range of supporting activities, such 
as the Agulhas Biodiversity Initiative, the CAPE Biodiversity Conservation 
and Sustainable Development Project as well as investment through the 
Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF).273 The World Bank and UNDP 
were commissioned to oversee the interventions and ensure compliance 
with GEF requirements. According to the programme developer of the CAPE 
Coordination Unit, experts of both organisations particularly assisted in 
hooking up proposals with the international agenda to make projects ‘sellable’ 
to the GEF: 
272 Rand was converted into USD using the exchange rate on 31 December 2000 (7 595:1). 
273 The Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund was launched in 2000 as a partnership between the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), the World Bank, the John D and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation, 
and the government of Japan with the aim to provide grants to NGOs and the private sector for 
undertaking conservation activities in biodiversity hotspots. As of today, it is also supported by 
Conservation International, L’Agence Française de Développement and the European Union. 
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C […] from the World Bank and N […] from UNDP were very involved 
in putting together the application to the GEF, so they helped us frame it 
and package it, you know, ‘the GEF’s not interested in this, but they might 
be interested in that’, ‘frame it like a programmatic approach’, ‘build on 
another phase here’ – that sort of thing. Having said that, it did come on 
the back of this twenty-year strategy that we had already. So it wasn’t like 
they were coming in fresh with their own new ideas. (Interview 25) 
One of the biggest policy changes leveraged through donor-funded CAPE 
initiatives was the introduction of ‘biodiversity stewardship’ as a new tool of 
managing South Africa’s protected areas network. Evolving on a few pilot sites 
in the Western Cape Province, the concept was rapidly taken up into national 
policies and legislation. 
The evolvement of ‘biodiversity stewardship’ 
Analyses conducted in the context of CAPE found that while 80% of priority 
conservation areas in the Western Cape region were in private and communal 
hands, few mechanisms were in place to secure the conservation of threatened 
species and ecosystems outside the formal reserves managed by the state. It 
was recognised that especially in view of the fragmentation of landscapes, 
government authorities would not be able to link the sites flagged as critically 
endangered and build conservation corridors without bringing private and 
communal landowners on board (Ashwell et al. 2006). In 2002, the Botanical 
Society in collaboration with CapeNature initiated a small pilot project in order 
to develop and refine workable stewardship arrangements with farmers owning 
land of high biodiversity importance. The stewardship concept rests on the 
idea that instead of buying up land to protect threatened habitat, conservation 
authorities offer a range of cooperation agreements to land owners who are 
willing to conserve biodiversity through sustainable land use for which they are 
rewarded with tangible benefits.274 Central to the concept is that land owners 
do not cede any ownership rights, but remain the custodians and key users of 
their properties. They voluntarily decide whether to enter an agreement and 
which of the available options to take, with categories ranging from informal, 
flexible agreements to legally binding, long-term contracts which demand 
a higher degree of commitment but qualify for more substantial incentives 
274 CapeNature has defined stewardship as follows: “Stewardship refers to the wise use, management 
and protection of that which has been entrusted to you or is rightfully yours. Within the context of 
conservation, stewardship means protecting important ecosystems, effectively managing invasive 
alien species and fires, and grazing or harvesting without damaging the veld” (Cape Nature 
Conservation 2003). This definition has been widely adopted throughout the country. 
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such as tax deductions and advanced management assistance (Cadman et al. 
2010).275 
While landowner engagement initiatives existed before – with little 
success due to cumbersome procedures and a lack of legal security – the 
Conservation Stewardship Pilot Project helped to simplify and sharpen the 
stewardship concept by exploring feasible models on three pilot sites in the 
Cape Floristic Region (Ashwell et al. 2006).276 Although the project closed in 
2004 without having contracts signed, it had a substantial effect insofar as 
it informed subsequent bioregional programmes concerned with the creation 
of conservation corridors by involving the private sector and communities 
(e.g. the Agulhas Biodiversity Initiative or the Succulent Karoo Ecosystem 
Programme).277 Several of these activities were greatly driven forward 
by external funding, in particular from GEF and CEPF. For international 
investors, South Africa’s stewardship approach fitted neatly with the globally 
emerging paradigm of ‘mainstreaming’ biodiversity into production sectors 
and development planning (see, for instance, Petersen & Huntley 2005; Global 
Environment Facility 2010a; Huntley & Redford 2014). Hence, the concept 
was promoted by the aid community as an efficient tool to ‘establish the 
foundations of the biodiversity economy’ (World Bank 2011b).278 
In fact, the stewardship programmes carried out in the context of CAPE 
have leveraged significant changes in land-use planning and helped to expand 
protected areas. Through contracts with private landowners and communities, 
the area of (critically) endangered ecosystems under conservation in the Cape 
Floristic Region increased from 16 115 hectares in 2004 to 61 603 hectares 
in 2011 (World Bank 2011b:  31). The models and guidelines developed in 
the Western Cape were adopted by other provinces such as the Eastern Cape, 
KwaZulu-Natal, and Gauteng, and they were taken up by the Department of 
Environmental Affairs which set up a ‘Biodiversity Stewardship South Africa’ 
programme to establish and strengthen provincial stewardship initiatives 
275 Aside from the landowner’s willingness to put effort into conservation and accept land-use 
limitations, the biodiversity value of the land is a determining factor for which types of arrangement 
are being offered by authorities. The highest stewardship category under which land is declared a 
nature reserve requires that the site contains ecosystems, habitats and species which are critically 
important and endangered. 
276 The pilot sites of the Conservation Stewardship Pilot Project were the Agtergroenberg near 
Wellington, the Bot River Valley near Grabouw and the Lower Breede River area near Swellendam 
(Ashwell et al. 2006).
277 According to the Project Completion Report compiled by the Botanical Society, no actual agreements 
had been signed at project completion, but several were pending for final legal processing (Botha 
2004). 
278 This term was used in the World Bank’s final report on the GEF-funded ‘Biodiversity Conservation 
and Sustainable Development Project’ which targeted the expansion of stewardship arrangements 
and the development of financial incentives for environmental services, amongst others (World 
Bank 2011b).  
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(Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2009b). Having been 
tested and proved on the ground, the concept was gradually incorporated 
into South Africa’s environmental policy and legal frameworks. While the 
Protected Areas Act of 2003 and the Biodiversity Act of 2004 laid out enabling 
provisions for piloting the approach, biodiversity stewardship was featured as 
a key conservation mechanism in strategic documents such as the National 
Biodiversity Framework (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
2009b) and the National Protected Area Expansion Strategy (Department 
of Environmental Affairs 2010b).279 Moreover, the government developed 
a national Biodiversity Stewardship Policy and Guideline Document as well 
as a framework for fiscal incentives encouraging conservation through the 
custodianship of land (Republic of South Africa 2009a). By 2014, biodiversity 
stewardship has taken hold as a strategy to secure South Africa’s threatened 
ecosystems. The experiences and results achieved so far have received much 
attention from the international community which promotes the Western 
Cape as a pioneer of innovative conservation approaches (Cadman et al. 2010; 
Müller & Fourie 2011). 
The role of donors in the CAPE process 
Biodiversity stewardship is just one example of a concept which in the course 
of CAPE implementation triggered a step-by-step change in the country’s 
conservation regime. In both government and donor publications, CAPE is 
praised for its achievements with regard to policy reform. A UNDP expert 
engaged in the process from the beginning explained its effect as follows: 
What happened with the CAPE programme is that it tested things, it was 
an early starter, which then progressively got injected into the national 
policy process. Prior to the CAPE programme starting, all there was in 
terms of policy for biodiversity was a White Paper. We then subsequently 
had two Acts, the Biodiversity Act and the Protected Area Bill and then we 
have the National Biodiversity Framework. All of this was sort of infused 
into that. (Interview 7) 
279 The National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act 2003 creates a legal framework for 
the management of South Africa’s protected areas network and outlines a range of conservation 
categories and related governance options. The crucial provision it entails with regard to the 
stewardship concept is that it allows private and communal land to be declared as protected areas, 
given the consent of the owner (Republic of South Africa 2003). The National Environmental 
Management: Biodiversity Act 2004 provides an array of planning tools for assessing the state 
of biodiversity such as the National Biodiversity Framework; the categorisation of threatened 
ecosystems helps to focus interventions on priority areas to be conserved and to identify sites for 
biodiversity stewardship (Republic of South Africa 2004a). 
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International bodies attribute part of CAPE’s success to the ‘catalytic support’ 
they provided to the process. In its Country Portfolio Evaluation for South 
Africa, the GEF emphasises that 
key policy, strategy, and legislation changes such as SANBI’s expanded 
mandate, the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP), 
the National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act, and the 
National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act have been 
funded directly or catalyzed or informed by GEF investment and projects. 
(Global Environment Facility Evaluation Office 2008: 62)
 Promoting its contribution through the ‘Biodiversity Conservation and 
Sustainable Development Project’, the World Bank on its website reports 
that aside from channelling grants it supplied “the expertise and technical 
knowledge of several experts” (World Bank 2013a). While such statements 
remain at a very general level, a closer look reveals that the role of donors in 
implementing the CAPE strategy has in fact been very specific and limited, 
both with respect to financial and advisory support.  
In terms of funding, the initiatives carried out in the context of CAPE mainly 
stemmed from local sources. The share of foreign contributions in major 
projects did not exceed 40%, while the remaining budget was provided by 
government authorities, the private sector, South African NGOs and academic 
bodies (cf. Table 20). 
Table 20: Local and foreign resources in GEF-supported CAPE projects
Project Period Local sources Foreign sources




1998–2005 92.02 87.1 13.65 12.9
Agulhas Biodiversity 
Initiative




2004–2010 51.40 82.4 11.00 17.6
Source: World Bank (2006: 22); Child (2010: 41); World Bank (2011b: 27).
Although external funding appears relatively modest, it had a significant 
effect from the perspective of the actors involved, insofar as it enabled them to 
experiment with ideas – e.g. the stewardship concept – for which they did not 
have allocations from the state (Cadman et al. 2010). The establishment of a 
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shared, publicly accessible database (the Biodiversity Geographical Information 
System) and a facility disseminating biodiversity information to underpin 
land-use planning, for instance, was primarily made possible through foreign 
money and support, as a leading official at SANBI acknowledged: 
We would not have been able to win the case with our government in terms 
of our funds to say actually the way forward is to have an information 
facility that can be accessible to researchers, to the public, to the citizens, 
unleashing this information and bringing it in the public eye. We wouldn’t 
have been able to make the case to our government at the time – and they 
[the donors] were able to pioneer that kind of idea. (Interview 24) 
International funding coming in through CAPE helped both national and 
provincial authorities to pilot initiatives, but it also entailed bureaucratic 
burdens. Referring particularly to the World Bank, interviewees from DEA, 
SANBI and CapeNature criticised the cumbersome requirements related to 
financial management and procurement which partly blocked implementation 
and made processes overly complex. Yet, since their institutions are generally 
underfunded, officials nonetheless weighed the value of accessing additional 
financing higher than the administrative challenges related to it, as the 
statement of a SANBI director reflects:  
We have learnt how to overcome those [challenges], so I would play those 
down rather than play those up. We’re wiser now, we won’t go into another 
GEF grant without setting up a coordination unit that’s big enough to 
really do it – whereas the other way around we did that, and our team 
ended up being stretched beyond, so were all of our other partners. So, 
you know, now there are great benefits to show, and as time passes the 
bitterness of being so under the hammer all the time by the donors sort of 
evaporates a bit and you can see the positive impact. (Interview 25) 
Similarly, a leading official at CapeNature commented: 
We did benefit a lot from being part of international funding and we feel 
we’re now getting to the stage where we know how to play the game, so to 
speak. You’ve got to understand how it works, you have to be able to know 
how to play the game to get the benefits and I think that applies both sides, 
for the funder but also for the recipient. And we’re definitely more mature 
now in terms of how to deal with these kinds of things than we were ten 
years ago, without any doubt. (Interview 13)
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According to interviewees, South African authorities went through a ‘steep 
learning curve’ in terms of handling the different requirements associated with 
grants channelled through the World Bank and UNDP. While the main role of 
the latter was to function as a conduit for GEF money, they also served as a 
source of expertise, particularly with regard to innovative approaches tested 
and adopted in other countries. One example mentioned by officials was the 
provision of best practice cases and international experiences around ‘payments 
for environmental services’ (PES) schemes which compensate land users for 
maintaining and enhancing the flow of ecosystem services. Since SANBI and 
CapeNature considered including such a scheme in a future financial incentive 
system targeting sustainable land management, there was an interest in how 
PES mechanisms were set up elsewhere. Given their links to PES programmes 
carried out in Costa Rica and other Latin America countries, the World Bank 
and UNDP were able to present examples and facilitate exchange with experts 
and practitioners from abroad who shared their lessons learned. Such kind of 
input was perceived as very useful on the South African side, with officials 
appreciating the “global perspective” (Interview  24) their international 
partners brought in. 
While in the course of CAPE and related initiatives a range of workshops 
and study tours on specific topics took place, technical assistance was used 
to a rather limited extent, and if so in many cases provided by South African 
experts affiliated with public and private research institutes. To give just one 
example, when SANBI required a consultant to develop a feasible PES model, 
the six-month assignment was given to an internationally renowned resource 
economist from the University of Pretoria. Experts from abroad were mainly 
used for progress reviews and evaluations because they “require an outsider’s 
perspective” (Interview 7), as a UNDP representative argued. In the case of 
the ‘Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Development Project’, for 
instance, final reports were compiled by an expert from New Zealand and a 
British consultant (see Tortell 2010; World Bank 2011b).
The most regular collaboration throughout the lifespan of CAPE initiatives 
took place between members of the CAPE Coordination Unit housed at 
SANBI and permanent staff in the UNDP country office, with the latter acting 
as interlocutors for both managerial and technical issues related to GEF-
funded programmes. Despite challenges in terms of ensuring compliance with 
reporting and management requirements which put all actors under pressure, 
interviewees from both sides spoke in high terms of the quality of cooperation 
and the relationship that has evolved. A SANBI official summarised her 
experience as follows: 
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I think it’s a very complementary relationship. I think they bring us insight 
into what the international agenda is, and they bring us some clues as to 
what’s happening in other places of the world. They’re able to help us frame 
funding applications – for example, there’s a big project on the Agulhas 
Plain that has received climate change adaptation funding. And if it were 
not for N and his colleagues at UNDP, we wouldn’t have even figured out 
that we could frame our work in that way. At the same time, what we give 
the UNDP and the World Bank is practice of this international agenda 
wish list. So they came up with a concept of mainstreaming – and a couple 
of years ago, I presented on mainstreaming at a GEF meeting and we were 
the only project at that stage that was putting these policies into practice. 
(…) So we bring them that nice hook into a developing paradigm but with 
all the capacity and all the experience and all the skills of the teams of 
people that work on these projects. (Interview 25) 
The high capacity of government officials particularly within SANBI was in 
fact highlighted by UNDP representatives in the Pretoria country office. A 
programme officer concerned with UNDP’s environment and energy portfolio 
in South Africa commented: 
When you run the projects through them, you can see these guys are in full 
control. You have less stress, they deliver, they know what they want, they 
know where they are going, they are pretty at the play, you know. They are 
on top of the game. (Interview 8) 
As these statements indicate, both government and donor representatives 
perceived the cooperation as taking place at eye level, with South Africans 
taking the lead. Summarising the role of international players in CAPE, it 
can be stated that aside from providing and channelling funds their main 
contribution was to mobilise expertise and to facilitate knowledge exchange 
by using the global networks of their organisations. External actors did give 
technical input in designing and implementing initiatives, but they did not 
play a decisive part in decision-making and policy processes. The priorities 
of CAPE and the policy changes it brought about were largely an outcome of 
local negotiation informed by national science and practice. This is not to say 
that findings and experiences from outside were disregarded. In fact, South 
African actors expressly appreciated advice provided by foreign specialists and 
scholars, but apparently external expertise was only taken up at a stage when 
the broad agenda was already agreed upon. This ensured that despite the use 
of foreign aid CAPE remained a locally driven process. The fact that CAPE 
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partnerships and initiatives persist while major donor projects have ended can 
be seen as an indication supporting this view.  
Entering the second phase of CAPE 
It should not be concealed, however, that the gradual phasing out of 
international financiers did entail problems for authorities who struggled to 
find alternative sources of funding and to retain staff recruited in the course 
of CAPE projects. A leading official of CapeNature described his organisation’s 
situation during this phase of transition as follows: 
We could take up, I would say, about 50% of the people that were part of 
the CAPE project in terms of project managers and so on but we couldn’t 
take all of them and absorb them as part of the process. I think SANParks 
were even worse off, you know, they took a very small percentage on. So I 
think the goal there was to create this kind of workforce of expertise and 
make it part of the organisational structures, but it didn’t in all cases work 
out like that. (Interview 13)
Such challenges, however, did not bring an end to the partnerships established 
in the course of CAPE. At the end of the first ten-year phase, most participants 
signalled a willingness to continue the cooperation, as a member of the 
coordination unit at SANBI reported:
Early this year [2011], we asked everybody, do you want CAPE to carry 
on or should we just close it because the project is done now, and all of the 
partners said they wanted it to carry on. They’re all engaged, they still come 
to the meetings, it’s no longer about implementing a project, it’s about all 
of the other things that we need to do to get alignment around conservation 
and development in the Cape Floristic Region. (Interview 25) 
At the beginning of the second phase of implementation, 23 government entities 
and NGOs were signatories to the CAPE Memorandum of Understanding 
(Cape Action for People and the Environment 2011). Although this does 
not give evidence of proceedings on the ground, it indicates at least formal 
commitment and can be seen as a sign that the strategy has gained a high 
degree of legitimacy across environmental stakeholders. 
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Harnessing external ideas for the local agenda
While CAPE originally emerged as a regional programme, national authorities 
such as the Department of Environmental Affairs and SANBI played a crucial 
part in the process. Both authorities are known for taking a strong stance in 
dealing with donors. A UNDP programme officer exemplified this: 
We recently had a project for which the EU was proposing to give between 
USD 500 000 and USD 700 000, and USD 30 000 for the preparation of 
a small concept about the project. It was on climate change mitigation. The 
government said, ‘no, we don’t want it’. We wrote so many letters and 
they said no (…). We’ve got a couple of ideas which we pushed, which we 
thought they were good and innovative – the government just said ‘we’re 
not interested’, (…) they say ‘you can go back with your money’, and 
that’s it. So it’s an interesting dynamic. (Interview 8) 
The fact that aid offers are rejected by government officials is noticeable insofar 
as environmental authorities do face financial constraints, with many relying 
on external resources to fulfil their mandate (see Chapter 6). CapeNature, for 
instance, needs to source 40% of its budget externally. Yet, in the course of 
CAPE, decision-makers have come to the point where donor support comes 
at a high cost to their organisation if not aligned to its core business. A high-
ranking director stated: 
In the early stages of CAPE, (…) some of the projects were not entirely 
what we needed, they were a bit off the mark. But through the process we 
learnt, and nowadays, for example, we wouldn’t take on international 
funding projects unless it speaks directly to our research needs or our 
capacity-building needs or protected area expansion objectives, whatever 
the funders aim at, so we’ve become much more choosy in terms of what 
we accept as a funding. (Interview 13) 
The policy not to engage with foreign funders unless their support fits South 
African priorities is also promoted at the national level. A leading official at 
SANBI strongly emphasised the importance of setting and defending the local 
agenda against donors irrespective of financial imbalances: 
If you understand what your agenda is, what you want to achieve and 
you say this is your agenda then you can engage with donors on a more 
equal footing. But if you don’t have that understanding and you haven’t 
got the confidence to put it on the table, then of course people who are 
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cleverer than you can come and tell you what to do (....). It’s a two-way 
thing, it’s not – you’re not a victim here, you know, victim, victim, victim... 
And somebody comes along and we just take the money. So it’s a two-way 
street. We have to have more confidence in what we see are our solutions. 
We must have the confidence to also absorb other best practices in the world 
but not take it holus-bolus. We must have the confidence and ability to say 
to donors, ‘there you are, let’s work together’. (Interview 24) 
That environmental agents in South Africa do in fact adopt such a firm attitude 
towards donors and advance their own proposals for cooperation rather than 
accept external suggestions was repeatedly confirmed by staff in country offices 
and embassies. An environmental specialist who previously worked as a first 
secretary for the Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria reported about her former 
South African counterparts: 
They know what they want, and then they know also which country they 
want to use for support. At least it’s the picture of what I experienced. For 
instance, they approached the Norwegian Embassy to have some support 
for pollution control in Durban where they have refineries and so on. And 
Norway was not so much into pollution control. So we said, ‘oh, Denmark 
is doing this, so why do you come to Norway’? And they said ‘No. First, 
Denmark is coming in with too many experts. We don’t want these to 
overtake our ministry. And we have been on the internet, talking with 
a Norwegian institution that has this kind of instrument that we want 
to use. That’s why we are coming to you’. So, I have many stories like 
that. They are doing their homework to see where to find the best technical 
advice or solutions or at least what they think has to be done, then they 
start a dialogue. (Interview 39) 
This account points to a salient feature of environmental agents’ dealings 
with aid: they define not only the need and area of support, but also whom 
to approach, what to request and which conditions to set. The ability to show 
this kind of leadership seems to rest to a large extent on the highly capacitated 
cadre of experts in environmental authorities. 
Negotiating expertise: The absorptive capacity of experts in environmental 
authorities  
Assessing the capacity of environmental entities such as DEA and SANBI, a 
UNDP expert pointed out: 
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Some of these guys who are managing various sectors of government are 
now well capacitated. It’s been 15 years now and we’re starting to see 
an emergence of young, assertive people, who when you come and say 
we are gonna do a workshop or do this, they say, no, that’s not capacity-
building. We only like your idea (…). So in that context I think they are 
forcing organisations like ours to become innovative and to come up with 
good approaches. We can’t just sell anything anymore. You can’t just say 
something and everybody says it’s good, it’s good. No. Now there are people 
who can say, no, this is not good. (Interview 8) 
From a donor perspective, the strength of environmental authorities in 
terms of in-house expertise and capacity is a double-edged sword. On the 
one hand, it simplifies the cooperation if aid projects are administrated by 
capable counterparts in recipient institutions. On the other hand, the pace 
of interventions is often slowed down due to lengthy negotiation processes 
which a director in the biodiversity unit of DEA explained as follows: 
It’s because we are adding some value to the process. We just don’t accept 
it, we question it, we will say ‘what are the implications for this’ and ‘it’s 
a duplication’, this and that. And so that’s why we take long and it’s often 
perceived as if we are delaying processes or not being proactive enough to 
harness opportunity. But I think it’s about questioning why this is done. 
(Interview 15) 
The frictions emerging in the joint preparation of projects are not necessarily 
caused by contradicting objectives but are sparked off by the divergent use 
of concepts and terminologies, with government and donor experts trying to 
frame interventions in line with their own agendas and paradigms. Conflicts 
of this sort have recently emerged in the context of designing applications 
for the fifth GEF replenishment. For the period 2010–2014, South Africa was 
offered an indicative resource envelope of USD 52.65 million accessible for 
interventions in the fields of biodiversity, climate change and land degradation 
(Global Environment Facility 2010b). Preparing project proposals, experts 
from DEA and international partners had different conceptions about both 
approaches and issues to be prioritised, as the following narrative of a ministry 
official reflects: 
Interviewee: There was a lot of pressure for us to make decisions about 
how we want these projects to run as a programme approach or as an 
individual project approach. And the country’s position is that we need 
to use these GEF resources to empower smaller organisations so that they 
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can build capacity. And then UNDP came with their approach to say 
‘no, we want to be the big player in this whole process, we want to take 
on a programmatic approach rather than a project, or a smaller project 
approach’. So there was much conflict in that respect because we didn’t see 
the merit in actually taking on a programmatic approach as opposed to a 
project approach. But eventually, I don’t know whether we saw the light, 
but we gave in in the sense that we took the programme approach because 
some of the implementing agencies in the country supported it. (…) 
Interviewer: But there wasn’t a struggle about the content or the priorities? 
Interviewee: There was a conflict of interest in terms of the content as well. 
Certain things were duplication and belonged to other branches within 
the country or within the department, so then we had to start channelling, 
choking and changing things. For example, green economy: Green economy 
is a concept and a project that is driven by a different branch and not the 
biodiversity branch. So we had to change things to make them aligned 
with our priorities. Say, we need to remove green economy from the concept 
and maybe include it under some other way, like valuation of biodiversity 
for example – which is one and the same thing, but again, it’s aligning 
with the national priorities. And also terminology, you know, to include 
the priority areas – for example, GMO [Genetically Modified Organisms] 
that is one of our priorities. From the outside perspective that wasn’t a 
priority, so we had to fight for the space for GMOs in the project. 
‘Protected areas’ and ‘stewardship’ as well: Those are two concepts that are 
very often interchangeable. But ‘stewardship’ means something different 
in South Africa. It’s about voluntary participation of land owners and it’s 
outside the protected areas, and ‘protected areas’ is a formal designation 
of protected areas [owned by the state]. So those content issues did emerge. 
(Interview 15) 
Frictions around divergent terminologies for ‘one and the same thing’ might 
seem trivial at first glance. Yet, since wording conveys meaning, it has significant 
implications for the nature and legitimacy of activities, particularly in the realm 
of environmental governance. Recognising the nuances of technical language 
and paradigmatic underpinnings is thus crucial in the context of setting up 
policy-related government programmes, even more so if they are prepared with 
the assistance of aid experts who bring in their own organisations’ interests.
How easily initiatives can be infused with ‘external’ concepts from outside 
becomes evident in the case of the Grasslands Programme. South Africa’s 
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grasslands biome has been identified as one of the spatial priorities for 
conservation action that is particularly threatened by productive activities 
such as agriculture, coal mining and forestry (Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism 2005). In response to this finding, SANBI requested GEF 
funding for the design and implementation phase of a programme targeting 
the integration of biodiversity objectives into the major production sectors 
operating on South Africa’s grasslands biome. A South African official involved 
in the process remembered how the notion of ‘mainstreaming’ was pushed 
into the proposal:
So we developed the concept and then the UNDP came in and said ‘no, we 
need to make this concept more sexy’, that were the words that they used. 
So they added some terminology of ‘mainstreaming in production sectors’ 
and all sorts of things. And it didn’t go down well in the initial stages. 
(Interview 15) 
While the programme was launched in 2008 to run until 2013, the 
‘mainstreaming’ notion only slowly gained acceptance in both environmental 
policy circles and production sectors. A mid-term review conducted in 2011 
remarked that benefits were achieved on a very limited scale and criticised 
that some targets were so unrealistic that it was recommended to drop them 
altogether (Tortell 2011). Still, the experiences gained from the Grasslands 
Programme were presented at several international conferences and 
workshops, amongst others at a side-event of COP 11 in Hyderabad where 
– according to a participating DEA official – the initial insubstantiality of the 
concept was acknowledged:  
The UNDP people (…) admitted that when they did take the concept note 
of the Grasslands Programme, they actually didn’t know what they were 
doing and it was a major risk to actually take this approach. So if the 
government knew that it was something that was uncharted territory, they 
wouldn’t have bought into it at all, because it’s a major risk: How do you 
ensure that such a programme is actually going to provide tangible benefits 
for our grassland conservation? And so it was just a concept, a pie in the 
sky that they actually sold to us. And again, it comes back to officials like 
myself trying to make sense of some of those abstract concepts. And we 
make sense of it with the knowledge that we know – and sometimes we’re 
not convinced, but then we try to pull it together. (Interview 15)
That such kinds of experiments do not result in major failures can to a significant 
extent be ascribed to SANBI’s and DEA’s institutional strength. The presence 
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of civil servants possessing a high level of technical knowledge, together with 
a sound understanding of national and international agendas, seems to make 
environmental authorities in South Africa less prone to being “swayed off the 
path” (Interview 25) while being advised and assisted from outside. Having 
learned from experience, government officials indicated a high awareness for 
the need to scrutinise and adjust external models and approaches, as a DEA 
director commented: 
UNDP comes in with this concept – but it needs to be shaped and aligned 
with the national processes. (…) And sometimes those concepts are too 
bizarre to actually be adopted by the South African people. So if it can’t be 
adopted, it’s not going to be a success. (Interview 15) 
The targeted use of external expertise and the impact of local consultation
Given that national authorities can revert to a cadre of highly skilled specialists, 
one can hardly find technical assistants embedded within the organisations. 
Asked whether there are any advisors deployed to DEA, an official responded: 
In the ministry itself, there is very limited [use] of those (…). And I think 
we don’t have a permanent person that would be sitting here. Actually I 
think once the concept paper and everything is developed, then they move 
away from the project and the rest is us that implement it (…). So we don’t 
have them constantly influencing what is happening. (Interview 16) 
If external experts are requested, they are contracted for a rather short time 
period and to carry out a specific task outlined by the recipient authority. 
According to a UNDP officer the recipient authority is adamant that they are 
the ones setting the conditions for support: 
In some instances you find that we do the contracting for them. But they 
will formulate everything you need like what they want this person to do 
and then they will also be responsible for monitoring the performance of 
this particular person. Immediately once you say you are going to supervise 
this person, and you put the money, they say ‘oh, even if the money is 
yours, no, we have control of the person’. (Interview 8) 
Foreign specialists brought in for consultancies are in most cases paired 
with local experts from government or research institutes. The policy drafts 
or studies produced usually pass through an internal discussion and public 
329
CHAPTER 7 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policy-making in Young Democracies: Sector Studies
consultation process before being taken up to the political decision-making 
level for approval. 
The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) explicitly provides 
for public participation in policy development, and various structures have 
been set up to integrate stakeholders from the national and provincial 
governments, communities, the private sector and science. Platforms which 
enable the articulation of interests and views on environmental issues include 
the national Wildlife Forum, which brings together the government and 
the wildlife industry, the Peoples and Parks conferences, which deal with 
community concerns, or the ‘Rhino Dialogues’, which were initiated in 2012 
in response to the deteriorating rhino poaching crisis. Although the scope of 
influence stakeholders are able to exert through such structures varies, it is 
clear “that public participation has become a basic feature of environmental 
decision-making” (University of Cape Town 2007:  78). A director at DEA 
commented on the required consultation processes: 
In the case of biodiversity, to a large extent your stakeholders are polarized, 
so you actually never get them all on the same page and agreeing. But we 
do have an extensive process prescribed within the Act of what constitutes 
public consultation and that would need to be taken into account. So our 
stakeholders are the public, the users, fellow government departments 
where we need mandate’s clarity sometimes, industry if there are impacts 
of an industry, communities. So we try to ensure that we’ve got really 
as many voices as possible. (…) So, when we present the report to our 
minister to take a decision, she can safely say that we have really consulted 
and have on record the views of all these constituencies. (Interview 14) 
Public involvement, in a way, counter-balances the impact of external expertise. 
An example is South Africa’s green economy modelling report. Following a 
first national summit on the issue held in 2010, DEA requested a scoping study 
which would outline potential opportunities and options for a transition to a 
green economy in South Africa. On behalf of DEA, UNEP commissioned two 
policy analysts from the US-based Millennium Institute and two researchers 
affiliated with the South African Sustainability Institute and the Centre for 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Studies of Stellenbosch University for 
technical assistance. This team finally conducted the modelling exercise 
and prepared the report, but the priority sectors, targets and scenarios to be 
included in the analysis were defined in the course of a workshop attended by 
South African policy-makers, economists and researchers. Moreover, various 
government departments contributed to data collection (UNEP 2013). Hence, 
although the assessment process was co-financed and supported by UNEP, 
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UNDP and the European Commission, the ‘South African Green Economy 
Modelling Report’ launched in 2013 was substantially shaped and informed 
by local actors.
Conclusion
All in all, a fairly clear picture emerges with regard to environmental policy 
processes in South Africa: although being financially supported through aid, 
these processes are firmly led and driven by local actors. Environmental 
authorities rely to some extent on external financiers, at least in emerging areas 
which are not (yet) established enough to receive budgetary allocations. The 
strength of recipients in defending their agenda-setting and decision-making 
autonomy despite this dependency derives from different sources. First, there 
is the comparatively high level of in-house expertise within government 
bodies which are staffed with a cadre of civil servants able to scrutinise and 
adjust policy concepts suggested from outside. If necessary, they are able to 
defend decisions against external pressure. Second, there are established 
internal advisory and public consultation mechanisms which mitigate external 
influence insofar as they ensure national deliberation. Due to the strong voice 
and interaction of local stakeholders from government branches, the private 
sector, civil society and not least the science community, the impact of donors 
in environmental policy-making is fairly limited. 
It’s not all about the money: Synthesis of findings
In the preceding six case studies, we explored the impact of aid-related expert 
advice on policy-making in South Africa and Tanzania. ‘Impact’ is used here 
(and can only be used) in its qualitative meaning, that is, in terms of the 
effects of external engagement on the agenda-setting and steering capability of 
recipient bureaucracies. The key question addressed was: what enables young 
democratic governments to retain their agenda-setting autonomy, that is, to 
define and defend own priorities, while relying on aid, notably expert advice? 
Against a background of previous findings and theoretical considerations three 
structural conditions were assumed to be decisive in this regard: the recipient’s 
financial status; its administrative capacity, especially to absorb advice from 
external experts; and the local knowledge base (i.e. the strength of the internal 
science community). The assessment of South Africa’s and Tanzania’s relative 
strength with respect to these indicators revealed variance not only between 
the two countries but also across the three sectors: education, health and 
environment (see Chapter 6). 
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There are, as the case studies showed, remarkable differences in the way 
countries that receive aid and advice from outside deal with donors. This may 
not be surprising, given that each area of governance has its own history of 
aid relationships and experiences which impact on the way recipients position 
themselves towards the aid community. Although the cases are distinct, 
their comparison allows the identification of fairly clear patterns in which 
certain structural conditions are responsible for strengthening or weakening 
governments’ ability to remain sovereign in their policy-making while dealing 
with donors. It is instructive to highlight the effects of these conditions with 
empirical findings before we conclude, glancing at the role of recipient agency 
in a given context. 
Financial strength 
Financial strength or, the opposite, financial dependency is certainly the 
dimension which is used most often to explain donor–recipient relationships. 
It is argued that governments which rely heavily on foreign funding have 
little power to defy policy pressures exerted by the aid community (see, for 
instance, Bräutigam 2000; Gould 2005a; Mkandawire 2010). The case studies 
provide indications that this thesis partly applies, but also suggest that finances 
are neither the only nor necessarily the decisive condition for recipients’ 
bargaining positions. 
In Tanzania, empirical evidence which supports the dependency narrative 
is found across all sectors. The fact that aid accounts for the bulk of ministerial 
development budgets and for more than 97% of HIV/Aids expenditures 
inevitably coerces authorities to reach consensus with funders if they want 
to maintain some scope of action. Policies and programmes which are not 
‘endorsed’ by donors become irrelevant if they cannot be implemented due to 
lack of money. The stark dependence on aid lends itself as explanation why 
decision-makers feel forced to consult with aid experts and usually follow their 
‘advice’ – which tends to be an implicit requirement for cash disbursement 
– even if this means the need to adjust priorities and plans according to 
external funders’ priorities. The uptake of climate change as a priority issue, 
the formulation of a new HIV/Aids Care and Treatment Plan, or the repeated 
revision of the Primary Education Development Programme III are just three 
examples of this kind of alignment which appears to be driven by the necessity 
to secure foreign funding, rather than by actual conviction on government 
side. 
In South Africa, one finds a very different setting. This is not too surprising 
given that aid as a share of budgets is much lower, currently around 1% of 
national departments’ expenditures. Decision-makers particularly in education 
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and health showed themselves quite aware of the fact that their scope of action 
is not delimited by donor money, although that is valued as an additional 
source of finance. The relative independence from aid enables them to take a 
strong stance towards potential funders when it comes to defining priorities 
and setting the conditions of cooperation. If donors do not agree and withhold 
support, it may affect the pace of policy implementation but not compromise 
implementation as such. 
While this applies to the health and education sector (or at least to major 
reforms carried out in these fields) the situation is different in the environment 
sector where national bodies and provincial authorities do face financial 
constraints and often rely on external funding to realise important programmes. 
However, this does not seem to affect the sovereignty of environmental 
actors: despite requiring resources from outside, they take a firm stand 
towards international players. Although environmental entities have received 
substantial grants particularly from the GEF and have closely collaborated with 
experts from the World Bank and UNDP, they have been able to retain control 
over the agenda and keep external actors out of decision-making spheres; the 
CAPE process delineated in this study can be seen as a case in point.
The examples of the South African environment sector and to some extent 
also of HIV/Aids, an area where financial and technical assistance continues to 
play a role, challenge the thesis that the recourse to aid inevitably results in a 
loss of policy autonomy. They also refute what seems like an irrevocable fact 
in Tanzania, namely that recipients need to accept external involvement in the 
policy space in return for money. Various statements of government officials 
indicate that this corollary is taken as given and is internalised across leadership 
ranks in Tanzanian authorities (cf. Interview 49, Chapter 7; Interview 54, see 
Chapter 7; Interview 61, see Chapter 7; Interview 66, see Chapter 7).
Although the sectoral variance regarding the level of dependence is 
considerable, the similarity of statements from ministerial representatives is 
notable. One could have expected that leaders in education where aid amounts 
to ‘only’ 8.5% of total and 60% of development expenditures (considering 
MoEVT figures in 2010/11) might have a different position than decision-
makers in HIV/Aids whose programmes are almost entirely financed by the 
aid community. However, this does not seem to be the case. Quite contrary to 
the assumption that due to their relatively high domestic budget the Tanzanian 
educational actors would take the strongest stance towards donors, they clearly 
showed signs of resignation with respect to defending a local agenda. Whereas 
officials in HIV/Aids at least tried to convince donors to support national policy 
priorities (as exemplified by the treatment/prevention struggle), officials 
in education seem to have lost confidence in raising objections due to the 
perception of being at the mercy of external funders. 
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The observations that (a) South African environmental actors successfully 
retain their policy autonomy despite relying on aid and (b) the Tanzanian 
education sector seems particularly weak in agenda-setting, although being 
‘better off’ than others in terms of finances, suggest that financial strength is 
not necessarily the (only) determining factor of recipients’ ability to maintain 
the lead in policy-making while being advised from outside.
Administrative capacity 
Looking at the South African environmental sector, a feature which obviously 
plays a crucial role in policy processes is the outstanding administrative strength 
of authorities dealing with donors. Whether it is the national Department of 
Environmental Affairs, the South African National Biodiversity Institute as an 
advisory body or the provincial agency CapeNature, all of them are known for 
being staffed with highly knowledgeable and skilled officials who encounter 
experts from the aid community at eye-level in terms of environmental 
expertise. Given that these actors possess both specialist knowledge and a 
sound understanding of national and international agendas, they are able 
to scrutinise and challenge policy ideas presented to their organisations by 
international funders – as a UNDP officer remarked, “there are people who 
can say ‘no, this is not good” (Interview 8). This kind of ‘absorptive capacity’ 
of the administration – that is, the capacity to receive, competently interpret, 
adapt to local circumstances and implement advice from outside – is based 
on the quality of internal expertise and has been a major factor why the 
policy changes leveraged through CAPE were an outcome of exploration 
and negotiation by local stakeholders, although the programme was heavily 
co-financed from outside. The ability of environmental authorities to guide 
such processes and to keep control over the engagement of external actors, 
including the rejection of proposals which do not support the South African 
agenda, rests to a significant extent on the capacity of their own expert cadres. 
A notable point is that administrative strength does not necessarily 
mean to have in-house expertise for all spheres of responsibility on hand. 
Particularly in emerging knowledge areas entities such as DEA or SANBI face 
‘capacity gaps’ which require assistance from outside. But these organisations 
determine the tasks assigned to consultants themselves (e.g. the compilation 
and interpretation of data or the development of planning tools required), 
and clearly delimit the scope of assistance. While external experts are 
commissioned to carry out analytical work or prepare recommendations, they 
do not get engaged in decision-making processes. Instead, their deliverables 
are validated by officials who deduce policy implications and put them forward 
for discussion. Absorption capacity, in other words, appears to be a major 
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factor why environmental agents in South Africa remain firmly in control of 
their agenda, despite resorting to financial and technical support; the risk of 
being swayed by foreign actors is mitigated by a strong administration in the 
environmental sector. 
In other fields of governance, the scope of influence for external experts 
tends to be greater. Due to their limited in-house capacity, line departments 
in health and education rely much more on sourcing policy advice (as 
opposed to mere technical assistance) from outside. Advisors and consultants 
supplied by aid organisations have played a significant role in past and recent 
reform processes in these sectors. In the course of establishing a new skills 
development system or preparing the National Health Insurance, for instance, 
they were not only used to elaborate technicalities of implementation, but also 
to provide expertise and advice in early stages of policy exploration. The ideas 
and concepts conveyed through experts from outside markedly shaped the 
policies and schemes adopted by the South African administration.
Yet, it needs to be emphasised that despite using advice at various stages, 
authorities in health and education have held the upper hand in making policy 
choices. While strategic decisions taken in the course of reforms were certainly 
informed by external expertise, they remained nonetheless locally ‘driven’ for 
at least two reasons. First, decision-makers were not burdened with substantial 
financial needs and could thus pick or reject recommendations without being 
concerned about funders’ reaction. Second, despite limited in-house capacity, 
recipient authorities were strong enough to determine general policy objectives 
and direct advisors accordingly. 
This kind of steering capability often appears to be missing on the part of the 
administration in Tanzania. Due to the immense shortfalls of qualified staff in 
national ministries (with deficits being even worse at lower levels), the latter 
are struggling to carry out intellectual work without financial and technical 
assistance. This does not mean that policy and planning units are void of skilled 
officials; one can find highly knowledgeable individuals with an impressive 
training background and years of experience who are able to undertake the 
analytical exercises and studies required. Yet, the number of such specialists 
is just insufficient. The fact that at the time of research the Ministry of Health 
and Social Welfare had only three health economists at its disposal (with one of 
them being the permanent secretary) indicates the dimension of the problem. 
The scarcity of specialists has two implications for recipient organisations: their 
ability to develop an endogenous policy vision which is essential to direct the 
aid community and its experts is severely constrained, and they are also hardly 
capable of thoroughly investigating the advice put forward by external actors 
and – where appropriate – to disprove their arguments with own analyses. 
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The lack of steering and absorption capacity opens up a wide space for 
external experts to affect sectoral agendas and decision-making, as the 
examples in the case studies illustrate. Health sector strategic plans and 
educational programmes have been strongly shaped by advisors and consultants 
who provided ‘evidence’ in the form of situational assessments, statistics, 
expenditure reviews or evaluations. In many cases, policy recommendations 
were taken up almost unfiltered in the sense that they were included one-to-
one into policies and strategic frameworks. One explanation as to why decisive 
documents (e.g. the Education Sector Development Programme) frequently 
mirror external concepts and priorities is that the contribution of ministry staff 
in the course of their preparation is often more nominal than substantial, and 
that internal processes of critical validation are non-existent.
As the comparison of cases in South Africa and Tanzania shows, it is not 
the use of aid-funded experts per se which allows external influence but 
the absence of absorptive and steering capacity in recipient authorities. The 
latter seems even more problematic if there are no vocal stakeholders who 
are able to challenge external policy proposals, thereby supporting their own 
administration to defend its agenda.
Local knowledge base 
The availability of a local science community which is able to play a critical 
part in policy discourses and to serve as a source of alternative expertise was 
suggested as a third factor determining the recipients’ strength to set their 
own agendas. Sector studies from both countries confirm the relevance of this 
dimension through both positive and negative examples. Again, the CAPE 
process which has brought about significant policy changes in South Africa 
lends itself as case in point: aside from participating in public consultations, 
scientists from local academic institutions were involved by carrying out 
research required to understand the state of biodiversity and socio-political 
conditions affecting conservation. Their results were crucial for developing 
policies and approaches fitting the particular context in which they were 
meant to be applied. Many of the analyses conducted in the course of CAPE 
were financed with grant money from the GEF or other external financiers; 
yet, they were contracted out to South African researchers holding knowledge 
of both environmental issues and country-specific peculiarities. The utilisation 
of local scientists as producers of policy-relevant expertise clearly limited the 
‘import’ of external views into the process. 
The example of CAPE thus suggests a more general conclusion: the 
availability of local expert communities potentially helps recipient authorities 
to keep foreign actors out of decision-making spheres and thus to preserve 
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their agenda-setting authority, even if they rely on donor funding. While the 
environmental sector in South Africa serves best to illustrate this finding, 
it is also supported by other cases: the fact that the South African health 
administration invited the HIV community to participate in developing the 
second National Strategic Plan for AIDS, and used academics from within 
the country to provide advice and consultancies in the process of preparing a 
National Health Insurance system seems to have strengthened its ability to re-
assume leadership in policy-making. Various donors supported these processes 
with financial and technical assistance, but their impact on decision-making 
remained limited. 
The Tanzanian environmental sector serves as a third example. The National 
Environmental Policy and the Environmental Management Act – despite being 
funded from outside – were drafted by local experts from government and 
academia. These documents, therefore, clearly reflect a national perspective 
on how the environment in Tanzania should be conserved and managed. 
Although there are a number of reasons for the failure of implementation, 
including conflicting interests in the political realm, deficient budgets and staff 
constraints, it is not a matter of ‘imposed’ priorities which hinders execution. 
On the contrary, environmental authorities, most notably the Division of 
Environment in the Vice-President’s Office, have repeatedly been trying to 
get support for implementing its policy and legal frameworks. In this case the 
cause of failure was that the aid community had shifted its attention to new 
issues.  
The significance of local expert communities manifests itself not only where 
they have contributed to policy processes, but also where they are either non-
existent or simply not utilised. The former applies to the Tanzanian education 
sector, the latter to health. In both areas, foreign experts commissioned by 
aid agencies have taken over the function of feeding decision-making bodies 
with ‘facts’ which suggest certain policy choices – for example, to introduce 
‘treatment as prevention’ or to focus educational investment on the primary 
level due to its high ‘rate of return’. Under the rule of the current imperative 
of ‘evidence-based’ policy-making, recipients have little to argue against 
such recommendations if they cannot present ‘counter-expertise’ to support 
a dissenting position. The lack of local explanations for social problems 
such as the current quality crisis in education or a lack of sexual behaviour 
change despite widespread HIV awareness opens up room for donors to give 
reasons and provide solutions which fit the paradigms prevailing in their 
headquarters. If their reasoning is not scrutinised by actors within or outside 
the administration, recipients risk becoming fields of experimentation for 
the aid community’s newest ideas and approaches – USAID’s ICT project in 
primary education is a case in point. 
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Overall, the investigation of educational and health policy-making in 
Tanzania indicates that the absence or non-involvement of local science 
communities tends to weaken policy-makers’ ability to contest advice put 
forward by the aid community. Since they are, in principle, able to play a 
crucial role as knowledge producers and critical examiners of outside expertise 
– as observed in the policy fields of environment or health in South Africa – 
it is even more questionable why expert cadres available (e.g. in the field of 
health) are not used more effectively. 
The effects of structural conditions and recipient agency 
Taking a comparative perspective on the six case studies from South Africa and 
Tanzania, a general conclusion can be drawn: all of the conditions we focused 
on – financial strength, administrative capacity and the local knowledge base 
– do in fact appear to have a determining impact on recipients’ control over 
sectoral agendas. What needs to be emphasised here is that it is not one of these 
conditions but – as Whitfield and Fraser (2010) have concluded from similar 
research (see Chapter 1) – their ‘intersection’ which seems to be decisive. A 
higher degree of financial dependency does not necessarily result in a loss of 
control but can to a certain degree be compensated by a strong administration 
which uses the local science community to define and defend its policy 
choices against outside advice. Equally, being better off in terms of finances 
does not prevent external influence if authorities are unable to scrutinise 
donor recommendations for their responsiveness to the local agenda, and/or 
continue to rely on foreign advisors and consultants who provide evidence for 
policy decisions. 
In other words: it follows from these observations that it is insufficient to 
explain external influence on policy-making with a single factor since there is 
no one-dimensional causality. Using only aid dependency as a justification for 
weak recipient leadership would thus mean to disregard other conditions from 
which governments could potentially gain strength to keep control over their 
policy space. That some senior officials in Tanzania nonetheless tend to do so, 
hints at an important aspect pertaining to the effect of structural conditions, 
namely the significance of subjective interpretation and consequent agency 
on the recipient side. As Whitfield and Fraser (2009: 39) have pointed out, 
“conditions do not determine the outcome of any negotiation in a mechanistic 
sense”. While they do provide resources or constraints which delimit the 
bargaining power of decision makers, it also matters how the latter react to 
them. 
The case studies from Tanzania have shown that recipients confronted with 
largely similar conditions choose different strategies of dealing with donors. 
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In education, officials seem to have adopted an attitude of submissiveness 
towards aid experts whereby resistance is expressed through deliberate 
postponing of decision-making; in health, leaders rhetorically keep promoting 
national priorities while at the same time accommodating funders’ demands; 
in environment, decision-makers embark on tactical manoeuvring, framing 
priorities to the aid agenda while following their own route in implementation. 
All these strategies primarily aim at maximising aid which in the light of the 
existing budget deficits is a justifiable objective. The downside of executing 
such strategies is that to a greater or lesser extent policy autonomy gets lost.
The question is whether this is an inevitable consequence of receiving aid – 
the cases from South Africa indicate that it is not. As delineated in the sector 
studies, all three fields at times faced unfavourable conditions. Particularly 
during the early years of transition, authorities were short of money and 
experienced officials, and thus they relied on funding and expertise from 
outside. Nonetheless, decision-makers took an assertive attitude towards 
donors, maintaining their sovereignty in agenda-setting. While other factors 
(e.g. diplomatic interests) also came into play, the aplomb demonstrated 
by South African leaders led external actors to accept and support national 
policy visions. This observation supports Whitfield and Fraser’s finding that 
while structural conditions largely explain variation in recipients’ ability to 
retain control over the agenda, “a significant degree of variation is due to the 
confidence of recipient governments to turn their conditions into negotiating 
capital” (Whitfield & Fraser 2009: 364). 
Individual decision-makers in Tanzania, too, possess this kind of confidence 
which enables them to interact with aid experts on a par, although they have 
few resources to draw on. Yet, here an attitude of resignation among decision-
makers in government is pervasive. Senior officials are more likely to cede 
policy-making and planning to aid experts who feed ‘national’ strategies 
with their own ‘solutions’ for development. Overcoming the acquiescence 
prevailing among leadership ranks may be a first step in constraining external 
actors’ scope of influence, despite adverse structural conditions.
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THERE IS NO 




This book began by referring to the repeated critique and persistent failure 
of expert advice that has become a prime tool of foreign aid, with the rise 
of the ‘knowledge for development’ paradigm. We argued that the chronic 
ineffectiveness of ‘technical assistance’ – the label under which advisory 
activities are commonly subsumed – does not primarily result from deficient 
implementation (as it is often suggested by evaluation studies) but from 
structural constraints that frustrate knowledge transfer in the context of 
development cooperation. Moreover, the engagement of external experts in 
the policy space of recipient countries must be considered dangerous for young 
democracies insofar as it opens up room for outside interference; ultimately, 
thus our thesis, posing a threat to the legitimacy of these countries’ governments 
as they risk losing control over their own policy agendas. Using South Africa 
and Tanzania as sites of empirical investigation, we aimed to identify the 
conditions which determine recipients’ ability to retain their agenda-setting 
autonomy. We sought to identify general impediments that explain why aid-
related expert advice keeps developing countries in a status of dependency, 
rather than making them self-reliant as is claimed by the aid community. 
The inherently political nature and especially the vested interests attached 
to aid are key explanatory factors in this regard (see Chapter  4). Donor 
governments use development assistance as a device to promote foreign policy 
and economic objectives. Thus, expertise provided in this setting is inherently 
not as ‘neutral’ as is usually claimed by those who emphasise its ‘evidence-
based’ grounding. The extent to which advice is tied to donors’ agendas varies 
depending on their policies and organisational set-ups. In any case, it needs to 
be at least broadly in line with the political views of the funding governments. 
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Since the preferences of the latter shift with elections, as well as with global 
trends and fads in aid policies, priorities and modalities of aid frequently 
change. This ephemerality is detrimental to advisory processes insofar as they 
require a certain degree of continuance and stability if they are to have any 
sustained impact (see Chapter 5). 
The linkage between aid and politics also explains the supply-driven 
nature of expert activities which has consistently been criticised as a major 
flaw by assessment studies (see, for instance, Forss et al. 1988; Berg 1993; 
Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway & Asplan Analyse 1994; Williams et 
al. 2003; Land 2007; European Commission 2008; World Bank Independent 
Evaluation Group 2008). Most of these reports call for a greater involvement 
of recipients in identifying their needs or defining the terms of reference 
for external support. However, such suggestions, we have argued, will not 
solve the root cause of the prevailing mismatch between demand and supply 
(see Chapter 5). For donor governments and their respective implementing 
agencies, placing experts in recipient authorities not only helps to support 
policy ideas that conform to their own political convictions but also to trace 
the use of their taxpayers’ money. Some donor governments (e.g. the US) 
make that a condition of their aid programmes. To cede decision-making over 
expert assistance to beneficiaries in order to increase local ‘ownership’ and 
commitment would mean to give up control and influence. From the donor 
perspective, this would counteract efforts to legitimate aid spending and to 
prove accountability vis-à-vis domestic constituencies. Therefore, expert 
advice in aid will remain oriented at funders’ interests, even if recipients are 
formally being given more say. 
Another set of problems are flaws pertaining to expert employment: 
the absence of clear concepts of knowledge transfer on the donor side, an 
insufficient fit of advisors’ expertise, experience and competencies, and 
adverse employment conditions that impede the building of trust and social 
ties (see Chapter 5). In view of such constraints, external experts at best fill 
gaps in recipient authorities, but contribute little to ‘capacitating’ counterparts 
as it is purported by aid providers. In actual fact, the latter profit from this 
failure insofar as their support would eventually become obsolete if knowledge 
transfer was achieved. 
A third root cause of the inefficacy of expert advice was identified in the 
unequal relations that – despite all rhetoric of ‘partnership’ – continue to exist 
in development cooperation (see Chapter  5). The imbalance which derives 
from the situation that one party depends on the assistance of the other – be 
it financially or in terms of specialist knowledge – is reinforced by the fact that 
advisory relations in aid are structured along a knowledge hierarchy which 
places ‘international’ (i.e. Northern) over ‘local’ knowledge. It manifests 
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itself in stark discrepancies concerning the quality and credibility accredited 
to expertise. Aid agencies perpetuate this hierarchical classification through 
procurement practices that marginalise expert communities in recipient 
countries and solidify the pre-eminence of their own expert cadres. The obvious 
status difference between ‘international’ advisors and their counterparts in 
government authorities hampers the building of relationships which would 
allow for knowledge transfer, exchange and mutual learning. 
The intricacies resulting from hierarchical relations and vested interests 
underlying aid partly explain why decades of ‘technical assistance’ have had so 
little impact in terms of ‘capacity-building’, and why technocratic suggestions 
are unlikely to increase its effectiveness. The intrinsic constraints of aid-
related expert advice delineated in this study account for its failure to help 
recipient governments in becoming independent. Policy-makers in developing 
countries, thus, continue to rely on experts financed and provided by donor 
agencies. The persistent presence of external actors in their policy space, 
however, implies the constant risk of foreign interference in decision-making. 
The sector studies from South Africa and Tanzania (see Chapter 7) document 
the close involvement of aid experts in policy processes but also show that 
the extent to which they are able to shape agendas varies considerably. 
Recipients’ ability to retain the lead in decision-making is to some extent 
dependent on the degree of their financial dependence. Our analysis revealed 
that it is also determined by the strength of their administrations and science 
communities in the respective fields. Also, the finding that policy-makers who 
faced similar structural conditions positioned themselves differently towards 
the aid community, for example by adopting an attitude of resignation or by 
employing strategies of resistance, hinted at the significance of agency within 
a given context (see Chapter 7). 
All in all, the case studies show that external advice has different effects 
on young democracies. The case of the Tanzanian education sector most 
strongly supports the initial thesis that such advice threatens the legitimacy of 
governments insofar as it makes decision-making responsive to the preferences 
of foreign actors rather than to those of domestic stakeholders. The orientation 
towards donor demands undermines the ‘input’ legitimacy of educational 
governance. ‘Output’ legitimacy is undermined since programmes developed 
from outside largely fail to bring about substantial change. The fact that the 
government formally bears the blame for policy failure in education, although 
decisions are largely driven by donors, hints at the accountability problems 
entailed in the reliance on external advice. The dominance of aid experts has 
narrowed down if not eliminated the space for endogenous policy thinking 
in responsible authorities. Unable to provide a genuine policy vision, leaders 
342
The Delusion of Knowledge Transfer
seem to have lost control over the country’s education agenda to the expert 
cadres of foreign funders. 
The Tanzanian education sector represents the most extreme case in our 
study, but indications for a loss of policy-making authority were found in the 
fields of health and environment as well. The case studies from Tanzania thus 
substantiate the claim that aid-related expert advice potentially jeopardises 
the legitimacy of democratic governments if these are not able to maintain 
their decision-making autonomy to advance their own agendas. That this is 
possible in principle, if recipients possess resources that allow them to scrutinise 
external expertise and adapt it to national policy visions, can be seen in South 
Africa. In all three fields under investigation, policy-makers have managed 
to retain the lead in decision-making despite drawing on external assistance. 
Yet, as repeatedly pointed out, the country is a rather unusual case, given its 
outstanding financial and institutional strength. Most young democracies in 
sub-Saharan Africa rather face conditions as found in Tanzania. Hence, the 
risk that their governments similarly lose (or have lost) legitimacy due to their 
dependence on donor funding and advice is high. 
The findings of this study indicate the pertinence of this peril. Yet, it would 
be overstating the case if we do not admit to some weaknesses in the empirical 
approach. First, the loss of legitimacy has to be theoretically inferred rather 
than actually being ‘measurable’. The limitations of the scope of empirical 
inquiry did not allow us to ascertain the public acceptance of policies or the 
assessment of government performance by citizens. Such evidence would 
provide ultimate proof of the thesis that loss of control over agenda-setting 
actually puts the legitimacy of young democratic regimes at risk. Obviously it 
could only be gathered by large-scale surveys in each country. It is important 
to note that the scarcity of social science research and public opinion polls in 
developing countries not only poses a problem for research on the link between 
government policy positions and citizens’ preferences, it is also problematic for 
the democratic system insofar as important indicators of representation are 
missing.
An auxiliary approach for investigating to what extent policy agendas 
reflect local concerns (as opposed to priorities of foreign actors) would have 
been to include parliamentary debates about sectoral challenges and reform 
proposals into the analysis. This might have been feasible for South Africa 
where records of parliamentary committee meetings are provided online in 
English. However, access to Tanzania’s National Assembly records requires 
Swahili skills not at our disposal.
Given these constraints, we tried to mitigate this missing evidence by 
including the perspectives of academics and civil society activists who, while 
counting among elites, can be considered part of ‘the public’. In fact, they 
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theoretically represent the vocal public which influences public discourses 
and shapes public opinion. The focus of the investigation is on tracing the 
policy interests of two groups of actors, namely the government (represented 
by policy-makers and senior bureaucrats) and donors (represented by experts 
of aid agencies in their various roles). Thereby, we classified the interests 
of the former as ‘local’ and those of the latter as ‘external’. To be sure, this 
is a generalisation that oversimplifies reality. Yet, it helped to reconstruct 
struggles over policies and to understand which side was more successful in 
shaping the outcomes of the discourse. The fact that we primarily relied on the 
protagonists involved in such processes to give an account of their own and 
others’ roles meant that no ‘unbiased’ material (if such exists) to draw on was 
available. Using expert interviews in spite of their methodological limitations 
(see Chapter 2) allowed us to carry out sector studies in two countries, and to 
include past and present policy processes. The variety of cases, in turn, helped 
to reveal general complexities of expert advice in the aid setting, as well as 
to identify conditions which determine its effects. Similar empirical research 
covering other aid-receiving countries in Africa and other world regions 
would be instructive to test the generalisability of findings and their validity 
in different contexts, nationally, culturally, economically and with respect to 
the pertinent aid policies. It would surely be advantageous if this research was 
carried out by or in collaboration with local scholars who might have a deeper 
understanding of historical developments, social realities and the political 
scenes in their countries than researchers from the North. 
Much literature about aid emanates from political science and economics, 
and focuses on its political and institutional effects in recipient countries. This 
study contributes to the debate with insights from the sociology of science and 
provides a new perspective which highlights the complexities of knowledge 
transfer as the ultimate aim of expert advice. While international organisations 
have been promoting knowledge transfer through expert advice as the new 
panacea for development, this study provides explanations why in most cases 
it fails to be of use for recipients, or, even worse, has a detrimental impact on 
the fragile fabric of their democracies. 
It needs to be emphasised at this point that we do not insinuate that 
harming recipients’ institutions is the intention of anyone involved in the aid 
business. Most experts we met in country offices, embassies and government 
authorities conveyed the impression that they truly sought to help their 
South African or Tanzanian counterparts in coping with the massive problems 
related to healthcare, education systems or the environment. Some advisors 
were themselves highly critical of their own organisations’ practices, and 
seemed seriously interested in how to bring about change. The findings of our 
research, however, suggest that providing developing countries with experts 
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from outside will not achieve this change, irrespective of the commitment and 
good will of individual actors or attempts to refine approaches. This conclusion 
sounds rather pessimistic and in a way prompts the withdrawal of a large 
amount of aid immediately. In fact, the results of this study tempt one to 
dissuade donors from continuing to supply advice to countries that obviously 
lack the absorptive capacity to adequately deal with it. 
It would probably be more constructive to use the available means to support 
the knowledge communities in developing countries so that these become able 
to produce a critical mass of local experts who qualify as producers and critical 
scrutinisers of expertise. This support does not necessarily need to (or should 
better not?) be delivered through conventional aid programmes since these 
are invariably affected by conflicts of interests and accountability pressures 
that undermine their actual objectives. It could, instead, take the form of 
investment that facilitates institutional cooperation between research centres, 
be they university-based or ‘think tanks’ outside the academic system. It could 
also be provided in the form of educational scholarships that enable students 
to enter higher education paths, notably not only abroad (which, most often, 
means in the North) but in their own countries. It could mean making funding 
available for the setup of new university programmes that are locally designed 
and oriented at the specific country challenges. None of these suggestions are 
new, but they seem to have faded from the spotlight of foreign funders. One 
reason, probably the most important one, is the difficulty in gaining visible 
results from such kind of investment in a relatively short time, the kind of 
tangible evidence that can be demonstrated to the taxpayers/voters at home. 
In terms of value for the societies of developing countries, however, such 
a strategy is likely to have more effect than using ‘parachute experts’ from 
outside to provide technical assistance that all too often does not respond to 
these countries’ political agendas. 
Examples that hint at the potential of science-related initiatives can already 
be found. In Tanzania, cooperation between the Muhimbili University College 
of Health Sciences in Dar es Salaam, the University of Heidelberg (Germany) 
and GTZ in the early 2000s led to the introduction of a first Master of Public 
Health Programme. Producing a crucial cadre of public health specialists, the 
annual course is still being offered by the School of Public Health and Social 
Sciences, and the two universities have continued collaboration and exchange. 
In South Africa, remarkable achievements regarding the transformation of 
the higher education landscape were accomplished through the so-called 
‘South Africa Norway Tertiary Education Programme’ (SANTED). Starting in 
2000, it aimed at improving the access, retention and success of previously 
disadvantaged students, enhancing the administrative and academic capacity 
of selected universities, and facilitating regional cooperation. When the 
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programme formally ended in 2010, it had – despite a comparatively small 
amount of foreign investment – catalysed structural changes and institutional 
linkages spanning 16 universities in South Africa and the SADC region (see 
Gibbon 2014). 
It is certainly difficult to ‘measure’ the impact of such initiatives directly. 
However, the fact that they outlast the time frames of external support indicates 
a degree of sustainability which many aid projects are lacking. The value of 
students who benefit from better education opportunities in their countries 
and empower their societies through building an endogenous knowledge 
base must not be underestimated just because it cannot be easily expressed 
in numerical terms. The long-term profit from building ‘human capital’ in 
developing democracies through strengthening their higher education systems 
should be considered by those who have the means to provide support but also 
by the governments in these countries themselves. Surely, investing in tertiary 
education may seem like an unaffordable luxury for decision-makers facing a 
myriad of social problems that require attention and budget. This may explain 
why some science systems in sub-Saharan Africa are underfunded to such 
an extent that they operate “in a ‘subsistence mode’ where they struggle to 
reproduce themselves” (Mouton et al. 2008: 200). Their absolute dependency 
on foreign funders in many cases bars them from playing a systemic role 
insofar as they are unable to set their own research agendas independently 
from external influences (Mouton et al. 2008). To carry out science in 
response to local needs, universities would need to be “backed by long-term 
commitment of adequate resources from government and the private sector” 
(Girvan 2007: 33). The provision of domestic means for research and higher 
education is critical because 
only on this basis do external support and collaboration stand a chance of 
success. In this, as in all other areas, external inputs cannot substitute for 
internal effort. (Girvan 2007: 33)
It needs to be acknowledged that many African leaders increasingly try to put 
science on their political agendas. Although these endeavours have not always 
or not yet been translated into budgets, newly formulated policy frameworks 
and intensified efforts to produce data on science and technology systems signal 
rising awareness of their potential (see NEPAD Planning and Coordinating 
Agency 2014). At the same time, however, it is noticeable that this potential is 
often reduced to stimulating economic growth through innovation, whereas the 
value of science communities for policy-making and governance is neglected. 
This manifests itself in the weak and sometimes non-existent links between 
the political sphere and academia. Various researchers we met for this study, 
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particularly in Tanzania, complained about the disinterest of decision-makers 
in their findings. Such complaints, of course, are neither new nor confined to 
developing countries, and the tense relationship between science and politics 
has been a topic of debate for a while (see Barker & Peters 1993; Bechmann 
2003; Lentsch & Weingart 2009b). Yet, the disregard of local knowledge by 
policy-makers in young African democracies is specifically distressing insofar 
as an important resource that could strengthen their sovereignty is left 
unexploited.
Certainly, expert communities in developing countries are still small in many 
fields and require internal and external support to grow. They nonetheless 
constitute a source of expertise that – if tapped by their governments – 
could contribute to decreasing the dependence on advice from outside and 
to abolishing the asymmetry between foreign and local experts. For young 
democracies, using the knowledge and capacity of their own societies seems 
indispensable if they want to find and realise their own policy visions. 
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Appendix
The following table provides a detailed list of interviews carried out in the 
context of this study. For reasons of anonymity, we do not provide names of 
informants but their official position, the organisation they were affiliated with 
at the time of the interview, and the sector they were engaged in. If more than 
one position is listed, the interview was carried out with two or three persons. 
The reference numbers on the right are the ones used for marking citations in 
the text.
 
Table 21: List of interviewees
Date Organisation Position Sector No.
SOUTH AFRICA 
02.11.11 DFID Senior Health Advisor Health 1
31.10.11 GIZ Programme Director Skills Development 
Programmes, Interview 1
Education 2
21.11.12 GIZ Programme Director Skills Development 
Programmes, Interview 2
Education 3
02.11.11 GIZ Programme Manager Multisectoral HIV/Aids 
Programme
Health 4
02.11.11 Swedish  
Embassy
Senior HIV/Aids Advisor & Programme Officer Health 5
03.11.11 UNAIDS Senior Policy & Programme Advisor Health 6
02.11.11 UNDP Principal Technical Advisor: Ecosystems and 
Environment 
Environment 7
03.11.11 UNDP Programme Manager Environment and Energy Environment 8
04.11.11 US Embassy Health Attaché Health 9
19.11.12 World Bank Regional Coordinator General 10
01.11.11 WHO Medical Officer HIV Health 11
31.10.11 WHO WHO Representative Health 12
08.11.11 CapeNature Executive Director: Environment Support Services Environment 13
20.11.12 DEA Chief Directorate – Environment Specialist Environment 14
22.11.12 DEA Head: Environment Planning Environment 15
19.11.12 DEA Director for Sustainable Development & Green 
Economy
Environment 16
23.11.12 DoH Senior M&E and Research Specialist Health 17
19.11.12 DoH Director: Development Cooperation - International 
Relations
Health 18
19.11.12 DoH Chief Director HIV and AIDS, STI Health 19
21.11.12 DHET DDG: Special Projects Unit Education 20
21.11.12 DHET Chief Director: International Relations Education 21
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Date Organisation Position Sector No.
20.11.12 DoL DDG: Public Employment Services Education 22
22.11.12 National 
Treasury
Chief Director International Development 
Cooperation
General 23
01.11.11 SANBI Chief Executive Officer SANBI Environment 24
09.11.11 SANBI Director SANBI Fynbos Programme - CAPE 
Coordinator
Environment 25
04.11.11 SANBI SANBI National Grasslands Programme Officer Environment 26
01.11.11 Section27 Executive Director Health 27
10.11.11 University of 
Western Cape
Professor, School of Public Health Health 28
23.11.12 University of 
Witwatersrand




12.03.13 CIDA First Secretary Development/Education Sector 
Team Leader
Education 30
09.05.12 CIDA Education Advisor Education 31
12.03.13 Consultant Education expert Education 32
07.05.12 Danida Programme Officer Environment Environment 33
06.03.13 Danida Senior Advisor Health Policy, Planning and 
Management
Health 34
04.03.13 DFID Education Advisor Education 35
07.03.13 Finnish  
Embassy
Counsellor Natural Resources Environment 36
10.05.12 GIZ Programme Manager Health Coordination Health 37
07.03.13 Netherlands 
Embassy
First Secretary Health & HIV/Aids Health 38
04.05.12 Norway  
Embassy 
Counsellor Environment and Climate Change Environment 39
07.05.12 Swedish  
Embassy
First Secretary Education & Research Education 40
08.05.12 UNDP Practice Specialist Environment Environment 41
08.05.12 USAID Team Leader Education Education 42
13.03.13 USAID Health Office Director Health 43
09.05.12 WHO National Professional Officer Health Service 
Delivery 
National Professional Officer Managerial 
Processes for National Health Systems
Health 44
05.03.13 World Bank Education Specialist Education 45
03.05.12 World Bank Senior Environmental Specialist Environment 46
03.05.12 World Bank Senior Health Specialist Health 47
15.03.13 MoEVT Officer Higher Education Department Education 48
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12.03.13 MoEVT Director of Primary Education Education 49
11.03.13 MoEVT Assistant Director Monitoring & Evaluation 
Assistant Director Policy and Planning 
Education 50
15.03.13 MoEVT Assistant Director Teacher Education Department 
Officer Teacher Education 
Principal Education Officer
Education 51
10.05.12 MoHSW prev. Chief Medical Officer Health 52
01.05.12 MoHSW prev. Chief Medical Officer Health 53
04.03.13 MoHSW Head of Health Care Financing Health 54
13.03.13 MNRT National Forest and Beekeeping Programme Environment 55
05.03.13 MNRT Assistant Director Policy and Planning Environment 56
11.03.13 MNRT Tanzania Forest Services, Publicity Officer Environment 57
14.03.13 MNRT prev. Director Forest and Beekeeping Division Environment 58
07.03.13 NEMC Senior Environment Management Officer Environment 59
11.03.13 PMO-RALG Permanent Secretary Education 60
04.03.13 TACAIDS Director of Finance and Administration Health 61
08.03.13 TACAIDS Director of Policy and Planning Health 62
04.03.13 TACAIDS Executive Chairman TACAIDS Health 63
08.05.12 TACAIDS prev. Executive Chairman TACAIDS Health 64
05.03.13 TACAIDS prev. Director of Policy and Planning TACAIDS Health 65
09.05.12 VPO-DoE prev. Director of Environment; Consultant Environment 66
11.03.13 VPO-DoE Director of Environment Environment 67
07.03.13 Ifakara Health 
Institute
Lead Policy Translation Thematic Group Health 68
06.03.13 University 
of Dar es 
Salaam 
Professor, Institute for Resource Assessment Environment 69
07.05.12 Twaweza Head of Twaweza Education 70
13.03.13 University of 
Bagamoyo
Professor, Educational Research and Psychology Education 71
GERMANY
17.01.12 GIZ prev. Tanzania Portfolio Manager General 72
06.02.12 GIZ Public Health Consultant - prev. GIZ Health 73

